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A challenge for realising the benefits of smart meters, promoting energy security 
and decarbonising electricity is encouraging domestic consumers to switch from 
flat-rate electricity tariffs to a new generation of time of use (TOU) tariffs. 
However, a greater challenge is how to ensure that the right consumers sign up 
and that consent is informed: not all consumers will save money on a TOU tariff 
and evidence shows that a sizeable minority could be financially worse off. 
In a marked departure from the existing literature, this thesis argues that opt-out 
enrolment (a type of ‘nudge’) is unlikely to be a suitable method of recruiting 
consumers onto TOU tariffs, even though it could achieve almost universal 
enrolment. The first study shows that half of British energy consumers are unable 
to make informed choices about the cost-effective tariff for them, particularly 
those in low socio-economic grades. Consumers are therefore unlikely to opt-out 
of being switched onto a TOU tariff, even when unsuitable.  
Results from three further studies covering a collective sample size of 16,000 
participants, show that tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards electric 
vehicle (EV) owners could increase demand for TOUs amongst EV owners whilst 
reducing demand amongst non-EV owners, who pose less of a burden to the 
electricity network and are less likely to save money from switching. Unlike opt-
out enrolment, tailored marketing is an ‘effective and selective’ nudge (Johnson, 
2016). Unlike personalised defaults, tailored marketing can achieve informed 
consent. 
The results have implications for multiple ‘smart’ energy programmes, from 
signing up to TOU tariffs or direct load control contracts to participating in vehicle-
to-grid services. In each case, a decision will need to be made about whether 
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consumers will be left to opt-in or opt-out of such services, and to what extent it 
matters that consent is informed.   
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Table of contents 
Declaration .......................................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... 4 
Table of contents ................................................................................................ 6 
List of figures .................................................................................................... 14 
List of tables ...................................................................................................... 16 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... 19 
Published work ................................................................................................. 21 
Peer-reviewed journal publications ................................................................ 21 
Peer-reviewed conference papers ................................................................. 21 
Policy reports ................................................................................................. 22 
Journal publications under review .................................................................. 23 
List of acronyms ................................................................................................ 25 
Chapter 1 .......................................................................................................... 26 
Introduction: ...................................................................................................... 26 
Opt-ins, opt-outs and effective and selective nudges – injecting energy into an 
old debate ......................................................................................................... 26 
1 The changing electricity system .................................................................. 27 
2 Behavioural science and nudge .................................................................. 31 
3 The limitations of the nudge agenda and anti-rationality arguments ........... 34 
4 Policy getting ahead of science .................................................................. 37 
5 A new approach to nudge – ‘effective and selective’ nudges ...................... 39 
6 Aim and scope of research ......................................................................... 41 
  7 
7 Original contribution .................................................................................... 42 
8 Structure of thesis ....................................................................................... 45 
Chapter 2 .......................................................................................................... 49 
Literature review, part (a): ................................................................................. 49 
The vision and the reality – a smarter electricity system and the empirical 
evidence on consumer demand for TOU tariffs................................................. 49 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 50 
2 The vision of a smarter energy future ...................................................... 51 
3 A systematised review of the literature on consumer demand for TOU tariffs
 ....................................................................................................................... 66 
4 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 104 
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................ 109 
Literature review, part (b): ............................................................................... 109 
Achieving the vision – economics, behavioural economics and “effective and 
selective” nudges ............................................................................................ 109 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 110 
2 Why use economics and behavioural economics? ................................... 112 
3 A brief history of classical economics ....................................................... 115 
4 Consumer disengagement: market failures vs violations of rationality ...... 118 
5 Behavioural economics, nudge and the environment – changing behaviour
 ..................................................................................................................... 123 
6 The limitations of anti-rationality arguments and the narrow evidence base 
of nudge ....................................................................................................... 129 
  8 
7 Explaining heterogeneity ........................................................................... 141 
8 A new approach to nudge: effective and selective .................................... 148 
9 Summary and remaining questions........................................................... 153 
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................ 158 
Methodology: .................................................................................................. 158 
Field experiments combined with population-based surveys .......................... 158 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 159 
2 Empirical strategy for research question 1 ................................................ 160 
3 Empirical strategy for research question 2 ................................................ 168 
4 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 184 
Chapter 5 ........................................................................................................ 185 
Results (1): ..................................................................................................... 185 
The Tariff Decision Making Study – energy bill payers struggle to optimise ... 185 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 186 
2 Method ...................................................................................................... 190 
3 Implementation of survey .......................................................................... 200 
4 Descriptive statistics of sample ................................................................. 201 
5 Tariff decision making results ................................................................... 204 
6 Discussion ................................................................................................ 208 
7 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 218 
Chapter 6 ........................................................................................................ 222 
Results (2): ..................................................................................................... 222 
  9 
The Flex Trial (2a) and Population-Based Survey Experiment (2b) – tailored tariff 
marketing is an effective and selective nudge ................................................ 222 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 223 
2 Study 2(a) “The Flex Trial” ........................................................................ 226 
3 Study 2(b) “the Population-Based Survey Experiment” ............................. 274 
4 Discussion ................................................................................................. 297 
5 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 308 
Chapter 7 ........................................................................................................ 313 
Results (3):...................................................................................................... 313 
The OLEV trial – timely, tailored email prompts are an effective and selective 
nudge .............................................................................................................. 313 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 314 
2 Method ...................................................................................................... 315 
3 Implementation of trial ............................................................................... 338 
4 Descriptive statistics of sample ................................................................. 340 
5 Results – average treatment effects ......................................................... 346 
6 Results – habit discontinuity effect ............................................................ 348 
7 Discussion ................................................................................................. 352 
8 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 358 
Chapter 8 ........................................................................................................ 361 
Global discussion: ........................................................................................... 361 
The pros and cons of opt-out enrolment and tailored marketing for recruiting 
domestic consumers onto TOU tariffs ............................................................. 361 
  10 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 362 
2 Aim 1: synthesise the evidence on UK consumer demand for TOUs ........ 363 
3 Aim 2: identify a method of increasing uptake to TOUs without using defaults 
or mandates ................................................................................................. 366 
4 Weighing up the limitations ................................................................... 387 
5     Conclusions .......................................................................................... 398 
Chapter 9 ........................................................................................................ 399 
Conclusion and future research: ..................................................................... 399 
Minimise opt-outs and market TOU tariffs at high consuming electricity users
 ........................................................................................................................ 399 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 400 
2 Summary of key findings and main argument of thesis ............................. 400 
3 Original contribution of this thesis ............................................................. 406 
5 Concluding remarks .................................................................................. 417 
References ..................................................................................................... 421 
Appendices: .................................................................................................... 466 
Supplementary information and robustness checks ....................................... 466 
0 Bibliographic references for all studies included in review numbered 
according to the references in Figure 4........................................................ 467 
1 Questionnaire used in the Tariff Decision Making Study ........................... 470 
2 Keywords for Google advert targeting in the Flex Trial ............................. 471 
3 Assumptions used to estimate electricity demand of a heat pump and EV
 ..................................................................................................................... 473 
  11 
4 Electricity prices used to provide quotes in the Flex Trial ......................... 475 
5 Survey questions embedded in the Flex website ...................................... 475 
6 Average treatment effect of price comparison and tailoring on all binary 
outcomes in the Flex Trial (logit robustness check) ..................................... 477 
7 Treatment effect of price comparison on mobile visitors in the Flex Trial (logit 
robustness check) ........................................................................................ 478 
8 Questionnaire used in the Population-Based Survey Experiment ............. 478 
9 Average treatment effect of individual control group interventions on 
willingness to switch to the TOU tariff in the Population-Based Survey 
Experiment (robustness check) .................................................................... 495 
10 Manipulation checks: did participants pay attention and perceive the tailoring 
in the Population-Based Survey Experiment? .............................................. 496 
11 Treatment effect of tailoring on EV and non EV owners in the Population-
Based Survey Experiment (logit robustness check) ..................................... 497 
12 Emails sent to EV owners in OLEV trial .................................................. 498 
13 The impact of tailored emails on open rates and click-through rates in OLEV 
trial (logit robustness check) ........................................................................ 501 
14 Explaining email open rates by time since EV purchased in OLEV trial (logit 
robustness check) ........................................................................................ 502 
15 Explaining email open rates by time since EV purchased with controls for 
missing data (robustness check) .................................................................. 503 
Annex 1: .......................................................................................................... 505 
Policy contributions and implications .............................................................. 505 
1 The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) ...... 506 
  12 
2 Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) ......................................... 507 
3 The Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV) .......................................... 511 
4 Energy suppliers ....................................................................................... 512 
5 Distribution network operators .................................................................. 513 
Annex 2: .......................................................................................................... 515 
Directions for future research .......................................................................... 515 
1 Increase the precision of estimates of uptake to TOU tariffs ..................... 516 
2 Test whether tailored marketing effects generalise to electric heating owners 
in a trial on recipients of the Government’s Renewable Heat Incentive ....... 517 
3 Test why whether tailored marketing is effective ...................................... 517 
4 Test methods of identifying consumers with ‘flexibility capital’ .................. 518 
5 Test the impact of non-punitive TOU tariff structures ................................ 519 
6 Test whether disaggregated energy billing for EV owners can maximise the 
consumer savings from TOU tariffs .............................................................. 520 
7 Test the consumer acceptability of EV controlled charging schemes with/out 
vehicle-to-grid services ................................................................................ 522 
8 Develop an accurate method for comparing TOU tariffs ........................... 524 
9 Test tailored marketing in other consumer good markets for which opt-out 
enrolment is unethical .................................................................................. 525 
Annex 3: .......................................................................................................... 527 
Using survey weights ...................................................................................... 527 
1 Survey weights – when they will be used, and when they will not ............ 528 
Annex 4: .......................................................................................................... 531 
  13 
Ethics, internal and external validity of RCTs .................................................. 531 
1 Internal and external validity ..................................................................... 532 
1.2.1 Violations or interference in the randomisation mechanism ................ 533 
1.2.2 Excludability ........................................................................................ 533 
1.2.3 Non-interference (the stable unit treatment value assumption) ........... 535 
1.2.4 Partial compliance as a result of compliers and defiers ...................... 537 
1.2.5 Attrition ................................................................................................ 539 
1.2.6 Spillovers ............................................................................................ 541 
1.2.7 Measurement error ............................................................................. 543 
2 Evaluating external validity........................................................................ 548 
3 Ethical considerations ............................................................................... 550 
Annex 5: .......................................................................................................... 552 
Choosing regression estimators – OLS versus random effects and logit ........ 552 
1 Random effects versus OLS for the meta-analysis ................................... 553 
2 Choice of statistical model – OLS vs logit ................................................. 554 
  14 
List of figures 
Figure 1 The future energy consumer as imagined by UK Power Networks. .... 56 
Figure 2 Flow diagram of review process. ........................................................ 82 
Figure 3 Characteristics of the studies included in the review. ......................... 84 
Figure 4 Consumer measures of demand for TOU tariffs by study type and default 
frame. ................................................................................................................ 91 
Figure 5 Government tariff switching campaign from 2014 (the average annual 
savings have since increased to £300). .......................................................... 130 
Figure 6 Inattention to default options. ............................................................ 135 
Figure 7 Peak load reductions across consumers enrolled onto TOU tariffs on an 
opt-in versus opt-out basis. ............................................................................. 136 
Figure 8 EV tariffs ........................................................................................... 147 
Figure 9 Overview of the Flex trial design ....................................................... 229 
Figure 10 The advert shown to people who search for the keywords on Google.
 ........................................................................................................................ 230 
Figure 11 The animated adverts which will be displayed on websites containing 
the keywords displayed in 2 . .......................................................................... 230 
Figure 12 The homepage for the control website (left), the price comparison 
website (center) and the tailored website (right). ............................................ 233 
Figure 13 Quote results in the control group (left), price comparison group 
(middle) and tailored group (right) for visitors who reporting owning an EV .... 237 
Figure 14 Basic description of how an off-peak tariff works on the homepage in 
all experimental conditions. ............................................................................. 238 
Figure 15 The Off-Peak tariff visualisation in the price comparison condition. 239 
Figure 16 Get a quote survey questions as presented to all website visitors in all 
experimental conditions. ................................................................................. 242 
  15 
Figure 17 Identifying the minimum detectable effect size based on the cost of 
participant recruitment. ................................................................................... 247 
Figure 18 Participant flow diagram for the Flex Trial (CONSORT).................. 256 
Figure 19 Demand for the TOU tariff across experimental groups .................. 264 
Figure 20 Page views by experimental group ................................................. 264 
Figure 21 Participant flow diagram for the Population-Based Survey Experiment 
(CONSORT).................................................................................................... 286 
Figure 22 Overview of the OLEV trial design. ................................................. 321 
 Figure 23 The webpage (left) and an example of the downloadable tips (right).
 ........................................................................................................................ 326 
Figure 24 Participant flow diagram. ................................................................. 339 
Figure 25 Outcome variables in the OLEV trial compared to average email 
campaign outcomes ........................................................................................ 345 
Figure 26 Email open and click through rates by experimental group ............. 346 
Figure 27 Average email open rate by time in months since EV purchased ... 349 
  
  16 
Table 1 Summary of empirical phases of this thesis ......................................... 45 
Table 2 Different types of DSR tariffs, services and activities. .......................... 58 
Table 3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for review screening. .......................... 69 
Table 4. Search terms used in conducting the search with example search string 
for use in Scopus. ............................................................................................. 70 
Table 5 Average uptake to TOU tariffs by study design, country, tariff design, 
default frame, benefit frame, bill protection, additional financial incentive and 
automation. ....................................................................................................... 86 
Table 6. Explaining variation in uptake of TOU tariffs. ...................................... 92 
Table 7. Bill savings from switching to a TOU tariff. .......................................... 98 
Table 8 Four key assumptions underpinning the classical economic model ... 116 
Table 9 Some of the factors found to affect human decision making outside of the 
classical economics literature. ........................................................................ 122 
Table 10 Heterogeneity in ability to save and bounded rationality. ................. 143 
Table 11. Evidence on the effectiveness of prompts. ..................................... 150 
Table 12 Characteristics of energy bill payers in the British population and in the 
survey sample with and without survey weights ............................................. 201 
Table 13 Distribution of responses across response options. ......................... 205 
Table 14 Distribution of energy bill payers’ responses by scenario and socio-
economic grade .............................................................................................. 205 
Table 15 Proportion of energy bill payers correctly identifying the cost-minimising 
tariff by scenario and socio-economic grade excluding respondents who indicated 
they did not know ............................................................................................ 207 
Table 16 Summary of the intervention design across the three website versions 
in the Flex Trial. .............................................................................................. 232 
List of tables 
  17 
Table 17 Energy bill quotes provided to website visitors based on appliance 
ownership. ...................................................................................................... 235 
Table 18 Randomisation balance checks on sample size per experimental group
 ........................................................................................................................ 255 
Table 19 Characteristics of energy bill payers in the British population and in the 
sample from Google Analytics ........................................................................ 258 
Table 20 Outcome variables in the Flex Trial. ................................................. 259 
Table 21 Characteristics of web session in Flex Trial. .................................... 260 
Table 22 Self-reported appliance ownership and household characteristics in 
Flex Trial. ........................................................................................................ 262 
Table 23 Average treatment effect of price comparison and tailoring on get a 
quote rates to the tariff. ................................................................................... 266 
Table 24 Average treatment effect of price comparison and tailoring on secondary 
outcomes. ....................................................................................................... 270 
Table 25 Treatment effect of price comparison on participants who visited the 
website on a mobile phone. ............................................................................ 273 
Table 26 Randomisation balance checks on baseline characteristics in the 
Population-Based Survey Experiment. ........................................................... 287 
Table 27. Characteristics of energy bill payers in the British population and in the 
survey sample with and without survey weights.............................................. 289 
Table 28 Outcome variables in the Population-Based Survey Experiment. .... 290 
Table 29 Self-reported appliance ownership and household characteristics in 
Flex Trial. ........................................................................................................ 293 
Table 30 Does tailored TOU tariffs towards EV owners increase demand amongst 
EV owners whilst suppressing demand amongst non EV owners?................. 296 
  18 
Table 31 Example of the messages provided in each experimental group 
(italicised text is absent in the generic email but present in the tailored email).
 ........................................................................................................................ 324 
Table 32 Ex-ante power calculations on the open rate outcome variable. ...... 329 
Table 33 Ex-ante power calculations on the click-through rate outcome variable.
 ........................................................................................................................ 330 
Table 34 Descriptive statistics of sample and randomisation balance checks on 
baseline characteristics ................................................................................... 342 
Table 35 Comparing the characteristics of participants with valid and invalid email 
addresses ....................................................................................................... 344 
Table 36 The impact of tailored emails on open rates and click-through rates348 
Table 37 Explaining email open rates by time since EV purchased ................ 351 
Table 38 Avenues for future research (see Annex 2 for details). .................... 413 
 
  
  19 
I am grateful to many organisations and individuals for the time and resources 
they have given me over the course of my PhD. 
First of all I am extremely thankful to Gesche Huebner and David Shipworth for 
supervising me through my PhD. I feel particularly fortunate to have had 
supervisors who are very generous with their time and feedback, from which this 
thesis has benefitted immeasurably. A special thanks to Gesche who has 
fastidiously gone through each and every one of my pre-analysis plans, including 
when on maternity leave. Thanks to both of them for their encouragement 
throughout and particularly their support in submitting various parts of this 
research for publication.  
I am, of course, also very thankful for the funding that I received from the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council through the London-
Loughborough Center for Doctoral Training in Energy Demand (grant numbers: 
EP/H009612/1; EP/L01517X/1).  
A great thanks also goes to Thomas Younespour and Nick Brooks of the UK 
Government Office for Low Emission Vehicles for championing the idea of 
running a trial on its electric vehicle grant recipients and without whose support 
the trial would not have taken place. I also would like to thank Farhan Khan and 
David Coker from the Department for Transport for their invaluable contribution 
in getting the project off the ground. Thanks also Exterion Media for providing 
access to their consumer panel. 
I thank the UCL Energy Institute and the Bartlett School of Environment, Energy 
and Natural Resources which has helped me in many ways since I joined in 2013: 
funding to attend conferences, funding to help me implement alternative plans 
Acknowledgements 
  20 
when one of my field partners dropped out as well as wonderful colleagues with 
whom I have worked alongside. In particular I thank Michelle Shipworth for her 
advice on research ethics and Mike Fell for countless discussions about demand-
side response that have improved this research tremendously. Thanks also to 
Dina for always making sure that there is a change of conversation from energy 
at the lunch table.  
I would also like to thank the environmental economics group at the Department 
of Forestry and Environment at Yale University and to UCL for funding my stay 
there.  
Manu Savani, my fellow field experimenter, I thank for some of the most useful 
feedback that I have received on my research. 
Finally, I thank my wonderful school friends Rachel Bainbridge, Georgie Burns 
and Vanessa Fortune for spending the past four years eating dinner in Pizza 
Express on ‘2 for 1’ O2 vouchers (nothing wrong with a Pizza Express!).  Thank 
you also to Ciaran Abel.  
I dedicate this thesis to my mum Sandra Nicolson, the hardest working person 
that I know and whose work ethic has no doubt made it possible for me to reach 




  21 
Published work 
This thesis draws on work from several of my previous publications, outlined 
below. 
Peer-reviewed journal publications 
Nicolson, M., Huebner, G.M., Shipworth, D. and Elam, S. (2017). “Tailored 
emails prompt electric vehicle owners to engage with tariff switching information”. 
Nature Energy, 2, 17073, 1-6. 
 I authored the text for this paper in full, revising it based on comments from 
G.M. Huebner in particular but also from D. Shipworth and three 
anonymous peer reviewers. Chapter 7 of this thesis draws heavily on this 
article, occasionally verbatim. 
Nicolson, M., Huebner, G.M. and Shipworth, D. (2017). “Are consumers willing 
to switch to smart time of use electricity tariffs? The importance of loss-aversion 
and electric vehicle ownership.” Energy Research & Social Science, 23: 82-96.  
 I authored the text for this paper in full, revising it on the basis of comments 
from G.M. Huebner, D. Shipworth and three anonymous peer reviewers. 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis draw on content from this article. 
Peer-reviewed conference papers  
Nicolson, M., Huebner, G.M. and Shipworth, D. (2016). “Applying behavioural 
economics to boost uptake to ‘smart’ time of use tariffs – a pre-analysis plan for 
a randomised control trial”. Behave 2016 4th European Conference on Behaviour 
and Energy Efficiency, 8-9 September 2016. 
 I wrote the text for this article, revising it based on comments to the 
conference presentation received from my co-authors. The Pre-Analysis 
  22 
Plan section of this paper is reproduced, although not necessarily 
verbatim, in Method section for study 2(a) in Chapter 6. 
Policy reports 
Hledik, R., Gorman, W., Irwin, N., Fell, M., Nicolson, M., Huebner, G.M. “The 
value of TOU tariffs in Great Britain: Insights for decision-makers”. Report 
prepared for Citizens Advice. London, UK: Brattle Group and UCL Energy 
Institute, July 2017. 
 This was a collaborative project between the Brattle Group and 
collaborators at the UCL Energy Institute, for which UCL was responsible 
for undertaking a systematised review of the literature on demand for TOU 
tariffs and a survey of 3,000 British energy bill payers, both of which are 
used in this thesis as follows: 
o The systematised review forms the basis of the review described in 
Chapter 2. The trial protocol for the review was drafted by M.J. Fell 
with feedback from myself and G.M Huebner; the literature 
searching and screening was conducted by M.J. Fell and G.M. 
Huebner; the data extraction from the screened documents was 
conducted solely by me; the meta-analysis is exclusively my work; 
and the interpretation of the results is also mine but benefitted from 
feedback from M.J. Fell, G.M. Huebner and R. Hledik. For clarity, 
the tasks undertaken by G.M. Huebner and M.J. Fell are also 
marked in the chapter itself by adding their initials in parentheses 
after the relevant task; when unmarked, the tasks are undertaken 
exclusively by me.  
  23 
o Part of the primary research conducted for this project – an online 
survey of 3,000 British energy bill payers – forms the basis of the 
results for Study 2(b). The idea to include a question on tailoring the 
marketing of a TOU tariff was mine and the questions used to 
generate the data used in this thesis were designed solely by me. 
No other content from this survey is used in this thesis.  
 The final report was written collaboratively between all authors, however I 
was only responsible for authoring specific sections on the ‘Consumer 
attractiveness of TOU tariffs’ (p.35-38) and the Marketing results of the 
‘Primary Market Research’ section (p.46-48). It is only the written sections 
of this report that were written by me and dealt specifically with my 
research that are used (in a very limited basis) in this thesis.  
Nicolson, M., Huebner, G.M., Shipworth, D., Elam, S. (2016). “Do you want a 
time of use tariff with that? Prompting electric vehicle owners to switch tariff 
shortly after purchasing their vehicle”. Report to the UK Office for Low Emission 
Vehicles. London, UK: UCL Energy Institute, November 2016.  
 This unpublished report was written by me and revised based on 
comments from G.M. Huebner, D. Shipworth and also Nick Brooks at the 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles. I draw on content from this report in 
Chapter 7.   
Journal publications under review 
Nicolson, M., Fell, M.J., Huebner, G.M. “Consumer demand for time of use 
electricity tariffs: a systematised review of the empirical evidence”. Under review 
at the Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews.  
  24 
 I wrote the text for this article and revised it based on comments from G.M. 
Huebner and M.J. Fell. This is the article which is based on data collected 
for Citizens Advice (referred to in the policy report above). The review in 
Chapter 2 draws heavily on this article, often verbatim.   
  
  25 
List of acronyms 
BEIS Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
CMA Competitions and Markets Authority 
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DLC Direct load control 
DSR Demand side response 
EUT Expected utility theory 
EV Electric vehicle 
GB Great Britain 
Ofgem Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
OLEV Office for Low Emission Vehicles 
ONS Office of National Statistics  
TOU Time of use tariff  
















Opt-ins, opt-outs and effective and selective 
nudges – injecting energy into an old debate  
Chapter 1: Introduction  27 
1 The changing electricity system  
1.1 Domestic demand-side response    
The UK energy system is changing. Renewable electricity now accounts for 25% 
of total UK electricity generation compared to less than 5% in 2004 (DUKES, 
2017). The way we heat our homes and the type of vehicles we drive are 
changing too. In 2010, one year prior to the introduction of the UK Government’s 
electric vehicle (EV) grant, there were just 24 plug-in EVs on the road; today there 
are just over 100,000 (SMMT, 2011, 2017a). Ownership of heat pumps, the 
Government’s favoured alternative to gas boilers in homes (DECC, 2012b), is 
also rising (DUKES, 2017).  
Whilst necessary for meeting UK carbon emission targets (DECC, 2008), these 
changes present a range of challenges for the electricity system and the 
affordability of energy. Unlike fossil-fuelled power plants, renewable generation 
cannot be ramped up or ramped down to match the daily or seasonal variations 
in electricity demand (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2014). 
Another concern is the strain that EVs and the greater penetration of electric 
heating will place on the UK electricity network, particularly at times of peak 
electricity demand (DECC, 2012a; Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 
2015; National Grid, 2017; Ofgem & BEIS, 2017).  
Domestic demand for heating and transport presents a particular challenge 
because, whilst household customers only consume one third of energy by 
volume (Ward et al., 2015), they are estimated to consume 50 percent of the 
electricity used in the peak evening hours (Hesmondhalgh, 2012). 
The conventional solution to managing increased electricity demand is to 
reinforce local electricity networks, which could be funded through taxes on 
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consumer energy bills (Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 2012). 
Energy storage and interconnectors could help to address the challenges of 
having an increasingly intermittent renewable electricity supply. However, 
storage technologies are still costly and interconnectors require cross-country 
cooperation and large infrastructure investments, adding to the upfront costs of 
moving to a low-carbon economy (Trainer, 2013).  
An approach that could potentially lower the cost of the energy transition is to 
incentivise consumers, including domestic consumers, to charge their vehicles or 
run their heating at times of low electricity demand or when renewable sources 
of electricity are more abundant.1 This is called demand-side response (DSR) 
and the most recent UK Government estimates suggest that DSR could save 
consumers up to £40 billion in the coming decades through reductions in energy 
bills (Sanders et al., 2016; Ofgem & BEIS, 2017).    
One way in which it is expected that domestic consumers will be incentivised to 
participate in DSR is through price signals delivered via time of use electricity 
tariffs (TOUs), in which the price of electricity varies depending on factors such 
as electricity network constraints and the wholesale price of electricity. Following 
the UK smart meter roll-out, it will be much easier for energy companies to charge 
consumers according to the time of day they use electricity (Accenture, 2013; US 
Department of Energy, 2013b; DECC, 2012a) and therefore to offer TOUs 
because smart meters automatically send electricity meter readings to energy 
suppliers in near real time and are capable of doing so at half-hourly intervals 
(Smart Energy Code Company, 2017).  
                                            
1 Storage technologies and demand-side response are mutually complementary but it is also 
important to distinguish between energy storage and demand-side response because they both 
involve different financial costs and potentially different types of consumer behaviour change. 
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Trials have demonstrated that consumers adjust their consumption patterns 
when migrated onto a TOU tariff as part of their participation in industry trials (see 
Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, [2012] for a literature review of 30 
trials). Nevertheless, for this vision of a smarter, more flexible energy system to 
become reality, energy bill payers must switch from their existing flat-rate 
electricity tariffs to a TOU tariff or a range of other types of DSR services in the 
first place. However, the evidence for whether consumers will adopt TOU tariffs, 
or how to increase uptake if demand is lower than required, is much less clear.  
 
1.2 Consumer adoption: gaps in the evidence on domestic 
demand-side response 
With the UK smart meter roll-out still in its infancy, TOU tariffs of the type required 
to meet the challenges of a future low-carbon electricity system are not widely 
commercially available (Michael J. Fell et al., 2015; M Nicolson et al., 2017). 
Although there are basic legacy options such as Economy 7 tariffs in the UK, 
designed to stimulate overnight demand for nuclear power, there is no measure 
of market demand for modern smart meter enabled TOU tariffs amongst GB 
consumers. Measures of uptake to smart TOUs amongst US consumers exist as 
do a range of proxies for GB consumer demand; this includes recruitment rates 
into industry TOU tariff trials, uptake to Economy 7 tariffs and measures of 
willingness to switch to future TOU tariffs from surveys (Chapter 2). However, 
there has been no attempt to synthesise this wide range of evidence to provide 
an overall estimate of the likely uptake of TOUs amongst domestic energy bill 
payers in GB.  
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This lack of evidence is concerning because over 70% of GB consumers have 
not switched their energy tariff, despite being able to save an average of £300 
(CMA, 2016c), when the average saving from signing up to a domestic DSR 
programme is likely to be much lower. A collective saving of £40 billion is 
approximately £40 per household per year from now until 2050 (Ofgem & BEIS, 
2017). 
One way of guaranteeing sufficient uptake to TOU tariffs or other DSR services 
is to make them mandatory, as in Ireland (Commission for Energy Regulation, 
2015). However, consumers do not like being told what to do and, furthermore, 
whilst some consumers will benefit from TOU tariffs, evidence suggests that a 
sizeable minority could face substantially higher electricity bills, sometimes by up 
to £200 per year (Star et al., 2010; Carmichael et al., 2014; Sidebotham, 2014a; 
Long Island Power Authority, 2015). One key concern is that these energy bill 
increases may disproportionately affect consumers who are most in need of 
reducing their energy bills (Ofgem, 2014b; Citizens Advice Bureau, 2014; 
Citizens Advice, 2017).  
Voluntary recruitment strategies, on the other hand, will be easier to implement 
than mandates and may be better able to balance the need for greater energy 
system flexibility with policymakers’ additional obligations2 to minimise the 
negative distributional impacts of the smart energy transition.  
Thus, on the face of it, there are two major gaps in the evidence on domestic 
DSR: (1) whether consumers will adopt TOU tariffs and, (2) how adoption could 
                                            
2 Smart Energy GB, the independent body responsible for the smart meter consumer engagement 
campaign, is specifically tasked with helping to ensure that smart meters benefit all consumers, 
including vulnerable groups. The GB regulator, Ofgem, is specifically tasked with investigating 
and helping to minimise the negative distributional implications of TOU tariffs (see the recently 
commissioned report: Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2017).  
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be increased if uptake is insufficient whilst using recruitment methods that 
preserve freedom of choice.  
Behavioural science offers a range of methods to increase uptake to TOU tariffs 
whilst preserving freedom of choice and hence respecting consumer 
heterogeneity (Sunstein, 2013b). Evidence from the behavioural science 
literature shows that an important choice is whether recruitment to TOU tariffs is 
opt-in or opt-out. To illustrate why, this thesis now briefly turns to an example 
from the health literature, the domain to which behavioural science has been most 
widely applied. This will be followed by a summary of the aims and research 
questions that this thesis intends to answer. 
2 Behavioural science and nudge 
2.1 Opting in versus opting out 
The large cross-country variation in registration rates to national organ donor 
registers provides one of the most famous examples of the difference in 
enrolment rates observed across opt-out and opt-in enrolment systems. In 
Germany, approximately 12% of people are registered as organ donors whereas 
in Austria the rate is 99.9% (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). The difference is that 
in Austria, all citizens are automatically enrolled onto the organ donor register 
unless they opt-out, whereas in Germany, consent is not presumed and citizens 
have to opt-in (Sunstein, 2013b). Opting out of the organ donor register in Austria 
is no more costly than opting into the organ donor register in Germany. This 
makes the difference in enrolment rates difficult to explain from a classical 
economic perspective – the dominant model of consumer decision making – 
which predicts that humans respond only, or at least primarily, to incentives.  
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Whilst it may be tempting to speculate that this cross-country gulf in organ donor 
registrations is due to differences in culture, social norms or higher levels of 
altruism or “extraordinarily effective educational campaigns” in Austria (Sunstein, 
2013b, p.1), behavioural science offers a much more plausible explanation for 
the difference. In Austria, the path of least resistance is to stay on the organ donor 
register whereas, in Germany, the easiest course of action is also to do nothing 
and remain unenrolled. The tendency people have to stick with the pre-selected 
option is called inertia or, more formally, status-quo bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1991).  
Environmental researchers have drawn three key lessons from the difference in 
uptake across opt-in versus opt-out organ registration enrolment systems. The 
first is that opt-out enrolment should be used to make people ‘green by default’ 
(Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Sunstein and Reisch, 2013; Faruqui et al., 
2014; S. A. Fenrick et al., 2014; Broman Toft et al., 2014; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015; 
Egebark and Ekström, 2016).  
The second lesson is that the observation that consumers respond both to 
incentives but also to the way in which choices are framed means decision 
making cannot be fully rational, as assumed by classical economics. Economics 
should therefore be reformed to account for these additional influences on 
behaviour; the fusion of psychology and economics into a discipline that assumes 
behaviour is influenced by incentives and the way choices are framed is called 
behavioural economics (Baddeley, 2017).3  
The third is that governments should use these findings to help promote policy 
outcomes (Benartzi et al., 2017), including those affecting the environment 
                                            
3 Calls for economics to be reformed to include findings from other social sciences is not a new 
one, but has been argued for decades (Friedman, 1953), if not centuries (Hume, 1738). 
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(Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Sunstein and Reisch, 2013; Sunstein, 2013a). 
The branch of behavioural economics concerned with influencing consumer 
behaviour to achieve policy outcomes, such as increasing numbers on organ 
donor registers or green energy tariffs using default enrolment, is called ‘nudge’ 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  
2.2 Nudge and the environment 
Since the publication of Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth and 
happiness (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), governments are increasingly using 
insights from behavioural economics and behavioural science more broadly to 
supplement or replace traditional economic levers such as taxes and fines to 
influence citizens’ behaviour (in order) to achieve public priorities (Benartzi et al., 
2017). There are two key virtues of nudge from a policymaker’s perspective, 
which is that they can be easier to implement than taxes and mandates which 
may lack public support and, compared to financial incentives like the UK 
Government’s Feed-in-Tariff or the Ultra-Low Emission Vehicle grant which 
deducts up to £5,000 from the value of eligible EVs, nudges are almost free, 
providing a high ‘bang for their buck’ (Benartzi et al., 2017).  
Unsurprisingly, there is increasing support behind the idea of using behaviourally 
informed interventions to help achieve environmental outcomes too. The 
European Commission has published a set of guidelines for designing 
interventions to change energy behaviour (Dahlbom et al., 2009), all of which are 
non-coercive and do not rely on financial incentives, thereby fitting the definition 
of nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The policy interest in nudge and 
behavioural interventions is also mirrored in the academic environmental 
literature with a range of review articles having discussed the potential application 
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of behavioural economics to helping meet carbon emission targets (Shogren and 
Taylor, 2008; Hepburn et al., 2010; Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 2011; Sunstein, 
2013a; Sunstein and Reisch, 2013; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Frederiks et 
al., 2015; Hobman et al., 2016; Lehner et al., 2016).  
3 The limitations of the nudge agenda and anti-
rationality arguments 
However, the problem with each of these aforementioned lessons is that they are 
far too simplistic. The nudge literature fails to adequately account for: (1) possible 
trade-offs between environmental and social outcomes; (2) the lack of conclusive 
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that consumers who do not switch to the 
cheapest available tariff or do not invest in energy efficiency interventions that 
would reduce their energy bills are not acting rationally and; (3) variations in the 
impact of nudge across different policy domains. These are outlined below. 
First, whilst opt-out enrolment is appropriate in cases where there is a single 
optimal course of action that most people do not take, but which can be favoured 
by making it the default, it is far less appropriate when the best course of action 
varies substantially across people (Carroll et al., 2009; Keller et al., 2011). 
Although, on average, trials find that TOU tariffs reduce energy bills, the impacts 
vary substantially across energy bill payers with a sizeable minority having been 
made significantly financially worse off (Long Island Power Authority, 2015; 
Schare et al., 2015; Star et al., 2010; Schofield et al., 2014; Sidebotham, 2014b). 
Further, if the effectiveness of opt-out enrolment implies that consumers are not 
fully rational, then people may be unable to process all of the information required 
to identify whether such a tariff will increase or decrease their energy bill, a pre-
requisite for making an informed choice over whether to opt-out. Equally, 
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householders may also be at risk of being inappropriately enrolled onto a TOU 
tariff even if they are left to opt-in.  
Thus, the question is not as simple as ‘How can we increase uptake to TOU tariffs 
if adoption is lower than required?’ or even ‘How can we increase uptake to TOU 
tariffs if adoption is lower than required whilst respecting freedom of choice?’. 
Rather, the important question is, given that people do not exercise their freedom 
of choice and that freedom of choice does not necessarily guarantee good or 
informed choices, is it possible to identify recruitment methods that could increase 
uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who are most likely to save money 
whilst not simultaneously increasing uptake amongst those for whom TOU tariffs 
may substantially increase their energy bills? Answering this question is therefore 
one of the key aims of this thesis.  
Second, how do we know that energy consumers are not at least approximately 
fully rational? Although research shows that consumers fail to exploit all the 
potential financial savings from switching tariff, this does not necessarily imply 
energy bill payers are not making rational choices with respect to their energy 
tariff or supplier because the cheapest tariff is not necessarily the optimal tariff 
(Wilson and Price, 2010). Just because people fail to make fully rational decisions 
regarding how much to save for retirement and when to retire (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2006b, 2008; van Rooij et al., 2011; Klapper et al., 2013) does not mean 
that it will also affect decisions over their energy tariff, a much less complex 
process that does not require an understanding of concepts such as compound 
interest, inflation, mortality tables and more (see Chapter 3). Third, if only a small 
proportion of consumers are not fully rational, then an opt-out policy may have 
very little negative impact on consumer welfare. This is known as the “as if” 
defence of the rationality paradigm; economists widely accept that economic 
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theory often incorrectly characterises behaviour at the individual level, but are 
reluctant to build bounded rationality into their models on the assumption that the 
proportion of consumers who violate the principle of rational choice will be so 
small that the model will still be correct on average (Friedman, 1953). Finally, 
rationality may vary across consumer groups in ways that affect their likelihood 
of responding to behavioural interventions. For instance, research from 
international development shows that people with below average incomes have 
lower  ‘mental bandwidth’ for processing information than people with above 
median incomes, because poverty places an undue burden on people’s limited 
mental resources (Mani et al., 2013). If this transfers to the rich and poor in 
developed countries, then it could be that early adopters of low carbon 
technologies – for example EVs and heat pumps who are key candidates for DSR 
(Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 2012; Frontier Economics, 2012) – 
will be much less susceptible to behavioural interventions than other types of 
consumers. Thus, the interesting question is not whether energy bill payers are 
or are not rational, but rather, which bill payers are boundedly rational (Simon, 
1957), with respect to what behaviours and how pervasive is it? Answering this 
questions is therefore another key aim of this thesis. 
Third, even if consumers do struggle to make the best decisions for themselves, 
it does not imply that nudge is the right approach to help them make better 
choices for them or for society as a whole, as nudge aspires to do (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003; Camerer et al., 2003). Indeed, empirical research shows that, in 
some situations, making decisions based on ‘rules of thumb’ rather than based 
on all the information available to us can lead to better decisions (Gigerenzer and 
Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). However, most of the 
empirical research on nudge has been confined to the health and finance 
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domains (Loewenstein et al., 2012; Lehner et al., 2016). There is therefore a risk 
that the nudge agenda could influence environmental policy on a narrow evidence 
base comprised mostly of the effectiveness of opt-out enrolment for increasing 
uptake to renewable energy tariffs (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Broman Toft 
et al., 2014; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015) and social comparison energy billing 
feedback (Slemrod and Allcott, 2011; Harries et al., 2013; Dolan and Metcalfe, 
2013; Schultz et al., 2015).4  
Finally, the nudge approach has been criticised for its promotion of many high 
profile labels such as ‘behavioural insights’ and ‘behavioural biases’ which lack 
precise definitions and theoretical underpinnings (Spotswood, 2016). In this 
thesis, I have aimed to clarify as many of these terms as possible, for example, 
by offering precise definitions for both behavioural economics, nudge and 
behavioural science (and the potential differences between all three), in Chapter 
3. 
4 Policy getting ahead of science 
Applying nudge to energy without further research presents two key risks. The 
first is a more general risk that the strong “conceptual” appeal of nudge (Halpern 
et al., 2012; Loewenstein et al., 2012) means that nudge gets employed as a way 
of achieving energy and environmental outcomes in the absence of empirical 
evidence in its support or even despite evidence to the contrary, whilst potentially 
displacing more traditional tools such as taxation and mandates which can be 
very effective (House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, 2011). 
This was also a concern amongst health practitioners who pointed to the 
                                            
4 This list is not exhaustive however the other applications of nudge in the environmental sector 
are relatively limited by comparison to the health and finance literature. For a comprehensive 
review of nudge as applied to energy and the environment see Frederiks et al. (2015) and Lehner 
et al. (2016). 
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effectiveness of the EU smoking ban after calls for greater use of softer 
behavioural change tools to reduce smoking and obesity rates (Loewenstein et 
al., 2012; Halpern et al., 2012). 
The second risk is more specific to TOU tariff enrolment, which is that the success 
of opt-out enrolment at increasing enrolment rates to e.g. company pensions 
(DellaVigna, 2009), and national organ donor registers (E. Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003), is used to justify a policy of automatically enrolling consumers 
onto TOU tariffs and other automated DSR schemes. However, TOUs are not 
like pensions because not everyone will benefit from TOUs. Nevertheless, a 
number of industry (Faruqui et al., 2014) and academic reports (US Department 
of Energy, 2016; Cappers et al., 2016) and journal papers (S. A. Fenrick et al., 
2014) have already come out strongly in favour of a policy of opt-out enrolment 
for TOU tariffs.  
The problem of using nudge to change behaviour in general arises from a 
fundamental but as yet unresolved contradiction in behavioural economic theory 
and nudge itself (Lunn, 2015; Goldin, 2015). Nudge intends to help consumers 
make “better” decisions for themselves and society on the basis that “in some 
cases individuals make inferior choices, choices that they would change if they 
had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities and no lack of willpower” 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, p.175). However, behavioural science shows that 
people make different choices depending on how the choice is presented to them, 
which, if true, means we can no longer infer what people want from what they do 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Lunn, 2015), a key 
assumption behind economic welfare analysis (Samuelson, 1938) known as 
revealed preference theory (Varian, 2006). Therefore, it is extremely hard to 
prove that people are not doing what is in their best interest – that they are not 
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rational – because behavioural economics removes the standard means for 
identifying what is in the best interest of the consumer.  
Further, in the absence of an omniscient central planner who knows what is in 
peoples’ best interests, it also means that we do not have an easy method for 
determining which direction to nudge people in (Goldin, 2015), even if people are 
failing to act in their interests.  
The alternative to opt-out enrolment when policymakers do not know or cannot 
determine what course of action is in a person’s best interests is for decision 
makers to be left to make an active choice either way (Keller et al., 2011; Sunstein 
and Reisch, 2013) which is known to come at a cost of much lower enrolment 
rates to TOU tariffs (US Department of Energy, 2013a). Moreover, if consumers 
are boundedly rational, opt-in enrolment still would not guarantee that the tariffs 
would disproportionately attract consumers with high flexible electricity use such 
as EV and heat pump owners. A new approach is needed. 
5 A new approach to nudge – ‘effective and selective’ 
nudges 
Despite its limitations, nudge still has two key advantages over harder tools such 
as mandates. The first is that people do not like being told what to do and, unlike 
mandates, nudges respect freedom of choice and consumer heterogeneity. The 
second is that nudges can be extremely cheap (Benartzi et al., 2017). Increasing 
customer switching in a low cost way is crucial if suppliers are not going to pass 
the costs of engagement onto consumers in the form of higher bills (Deller et al., 
2017).  
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A more promising nudge than opt-out enrolment is to use tailored marketing to 
nudge those consumers who are most likely to save money from being on a TOU 
tariff onto TOU tariffs – for instance, EVs and heat pump owners – that does not 
simultaneously increase uptake amongst those who are less likely to save. Using 
strategies from behavioural science to increase opt-in enrolment rates has been 
used in the healthcare sector, including to increase registration rates to organ 
donor registers (A Spital, 1995; Spital, 1996), and is sometimes called enhanced 
active choice (Keller et al., 2011).   
Unlike opt-outs and even personalised opt-out enrolment (Sunstein, 2013b; 
Sunstein and Reisch, 2013), tailored marketing has the potential to be both 
“effective and selective” (Johnson, 2016). For example, evidence from 
behavioural economics (Beatty et al., 2014) suggests that tailoring the marketing 
of TOU tariffs towards EV and heat pump owners could increase uptake amongst 
these consumers groups (effective) whilst deterring uptake amongst consumers 
who are less likely to save and could be made financially worse off (selective). 
Since consumers who have the potential to save the most are also the consumers 
with high consuming flexible electrical loads, using tailored to increase TOU tariff 
enrolment does not necessarily conflict with the electricity system’s requirements 
for much greater energy system flexibility – but only if tailored marketing does 
increase uptake amongst these high consuming electricity users. 
Tailored marketing has never been successfully tested as a method of recruiting 
consumers onto energy tariffs. It is therefore unknown whether tailored marketing 
would attract EV or heat pump owners onto TOU tariffs. Indeed, there is very little 
robust evidence on how to increase voluntary uptake of TOU tariffs or DSR 
services if adoption is lower than required to realise the benefits outlined by the 
Government in its flexibility strategy (Ofgem & BEIS, 2017) or the business case 
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for smart meters, which relies on a 30% adoption rate of TOU tariffs by 2030 
(BEIS, 2016b). The small body of evidence that has tested methods of increasing 
uptake to TOUs is almost exclusively survey-based and usually performed on 
convenience samples of students (Verhagen et al., 2012) or participants recruited 
via social media (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Buryk et al., 2015) or online crowd 
sourcing platforms (Schwartz et al., 2015). Without exception, all studies test 
methods for increasing uptake amongst the average energy bill payer, which 
ignores the fact that a sizeable minority of energy bill payers, in some cases up 
to 40%, could be made substantially financially worse off (see Chapter 2). As 
suggested in section 1 of this chapter, there is not even a robust answer to the 
more basic question of how many consumers are likely to adopt TOU tariffs in the 
first place. 
6 Aim and scope of research 
This thesis has two overarching aims. The first is to conduct a systematic 
literature review to provide an average estimate of consumer demand for TOUs 
based on all published studies. The second is to provide evidence on how to 
increase British consumer demand for TOUs without making them the mandatory 
or default tariff. To achieve this second aim, the research intends to answer two 
research questions:  
1. Are consumers able to identify the optimal tariff for them when given all the 
information required to make an informed choice? This question can also 
be rephrased as, is consumer decision making over electricity tariffs 
affected by bounded rationality?  
2. If consumers are not able to choose the optimal tariff, would tailored tariff 
marketing towards consumers groups who are more likely to save money 
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on a TOU whilst reducing enrolment amongst consumers who could be 
made financially worse off? This question can be rephrased as, is tailored 
marketing an effective and selective nudge? 
This research focuses exclusively on the economic motivation of domestic energy 
bill payers in the UK with a particular focus on EV owners and heat pump owners. 
These groups are chosen because they are most likely to save money on, and 
provide benefits to the electricity network, by switching to a TOU (for reasons laid 
out in Chapter 2).  
The primary data collection for this thesis is confined to the UK. Some of the 
studies are confined to GB consumers whereas one is UK wide – the reasons for 
this are covered in the individual study chapters themselves. However an EU 
Directive 2009/72/EC mandated the implementation of smart meters in all EU 
Member States, with the added provision that 80% of consumers should have a 
smart meter by 2020 (European Commission, 2009). Therefore the method and 
results are relevant for countries around the world with smart meter programmes5 
which are also facing the challenge of how to decarbonise supply whilst ensuring 
consumers get reliable and affordable access to electricity.  
7 Original contribution  
This research aims to make four contributions. The first contribution is 
substantive. The results will have implications for all types of consumer 
participation in the smart grid, of which there are many examples: signing up to 
TOU tariffs, selling surplus solar to the grid, having the set-point on their 
thermostat adjusted in line with the real-time price of electricity (direct load control 
of heating) and giving electricity back to the grid via the battery in their EV 
                                            
7 Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the US as well as parts of Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
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(vehicle-to-grid). In each case, if it is agreed that consumers must give their 
consent to provide these services, a decision will be made about whether 
consumers will consent by default, unless they opt-out, or whether they have to 
actively decide to provide such services, and if so, whether opt-in enrolment is 
likely to be high enough or whether it will need to be ‘enhanced’.  
It makes a contribution to the evidence base used by the UK Government on how 
many consumers are likely to sign up to a TOU in real life (as opposed to how 
many say they will in surveys) and how it might be able to increase uptake to 
TOUs without making them mandatory, as in Ireland, or opt-out, as being 
advocated by some US scholars. With the increased adoption of EVs and targets 
for a 25% penetration rate of heat pumps by 2030 (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2013) and closure of the UK’s coal-fired power plants, the need for high 
quality evidence on the likely consumer uptake of TOUs amongst domestic 
energy consumers – and how to increase it – is growing ever more pressing. 
The second contribution is methodological. It is to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of alternatives to surveys for measuring demand in missing markets amongst 
niche populations. Like other research into future energy technologies, 
measuring demand for future DSR electricity tariffs has been hindered by the fact 
that these tariffs do not yet exist commercially on a large scale; in GB, there are 
currently only two modern (‘smart’) TOU tariffs, the British Gas’ ‘Free Weekends’ 
tariff, launched in late 2016, and Green Energy’s TIDE tariff, launched in 2017. 
Measuring demand for these tariffs amongst consumers with higher than average 
flexible electricity loads, such as EV owners, is particularly challenging due to 
their relatively low prevalence in the population. This research has used a number 
of innovative methods to get around both these problems, including developing a 
website for a virtual energy company which consumers could browse and 
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partnering with the UK Government Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV) to 
access a sample of over 6,000 UK EV owners for participation in a randomised 
control trial.  
 
The third is a theoretical contribution to behavioural economics. That consumers 
do not switch tariff more frequently despite the large savings on offer (Defeuilley, 
2009; CMA, 2016b) can be accounted for by multiple models of decision making, 
including the market failure framework from classical economics as well as 
bounded rationality. Answering the first research question – can consumers 
identify the optimal tariff when given all the information required – will help to 
validate the extent to which bounded rationality affects consumer decision 
making over energy tariffs and not just decisions regarding pensions and whether 
to join the organ donor register.  
The fourth contribution is to broaden the empirical evidence on the effectiveness 
of nudge interventions, which the House of Lords Science and Technology Select 
Committee (2011) fears may be influencing UK policy on the back of a very 
narrow evidence base. So far, the literature on nudge has mostly focused on how 
to increase average adoption of particular financial services such as pensions 
(Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) using blunt instruments such as defaults that fail to 
account for the variation in optimal savings rates across younger and older 
employees or how to encourage people to save money for rainy days (Ashraf et 
al., 2006), quit smoking (Giné et al., 2010) or lose weight (Volpp et al., 2008) 
using commitment devices that may only attract the most sophisticated 
consumers. This research provides vital evidence on ways in which choices can 
be framed that could influence decision making when policymakers do not have 
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enough information to identify which option should be made the default (Sunstein, 
2013b) or when the optimal choice varies across people. 
8 Structure of thesis                      
This thesis has 9 chapters and reports the results of four empirical studies which 
are summarised in Table 1. Chapter 2 outlines the role of domestic DSR in GB 
followed by the design and results of a systematised literature review of the 
available evidence on consumer demand for TOUs from OECD countries and 
what strategies have been tested to increase demand. The review presents and 
discusses the results of a meta-analysis of 66 individual measures of uptake to a 
TOU across 27 studies in six OECD countries to provide a consolidated estimate 
of uptake to TOUs, controlling for the country in which the estimate was measured 
and other potential correlates. 
Table 1 Summary of empirical phases of this thesis 
Study Design Sample size 
Literature review, part a Systematised review 66 
Tariff Decision Making 
Study 
Online survey with tariff vignettes 811 
The Flex Trial Fictional energy company testing 
price comparisons against tailored 




Online survey experiment testing 
impact of tailoring on EV owners 
relative to average bill payer 
2,960 
The OLEV trial Email trial with UK Office for Low 
Emission Vehicles testing the 
7,038 
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impact of a tailored vs generic email 
on EV owners 
 
Since very few strategies have been tested to increase demand, Chapter 3 
provides an overview of the leading theories used to explain and influence 
individual decisions, with a particular emphasis on classical economics (the most 
common model of individual decision-making) and behavioural economics (a 
leading alternative) to inform the development of strategies that will be tested to 
increase consumer uptake of TOUs in this thesis. This chapter justifies the choice 
of tailored marketing as a way of increasing uptake to TOU tariffs.  
Chapter 4, the methodology section, outlines why a survey is the best method for 
testing the extent to which consumers are able to make optimal decisions about 
which tariff to switch to. It then argues why randomised control trials run in both 
the field (field experiments) and in the context of a population-based survey are 
well suited methods for testing the causal impact of the tailored marketing on 
consumer demand for TOUs. It outlines the approach taken to avoid some of the 
major criticisms of randomised control trials and the strategy used to obtain a 
revealed preference measure of consumer demand (a preference based on the 
choices people make rather than choices people say they will make) for TOUs, 
given that TOUs are not currently widely commercially available.  
Chapters 5-7 present the design, hypotheses, analytical methods and results of 
each study. Chapter 5 presents the results of a survey (the “Tariff Decision 
Making Experiment”) used to measure the extent to which consumers are able to 
choose the optimal tariff from a menu of options (n=811). The results of this study 
showed that people struggled to select the best tariff for them. To test methods 
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of increasing the likelihood that the tariff will be adopted by consumers most likely 
to benefit, to aid consumer decision making, Chapters 6 and 7 present the results 
of three randomised control trials in the context of an online natural field 
experiment targeted at EV owners and heat pump owners (the “Flex Trial”), a 
population-based survey experiment  and an email trial in partnership with OLEV 
targeting just UK EV owners (the “OLEV trial”). The online natural field experiment 
and the population-based survey experiment are presented in the same chapter 
(Chapter 6) because they test the same hypotheses. The Flex Trial provides a 
realistic environment in which to test the hypotheses but, since participants are 
not informed that they are partaking in a trial, it was not possible to robustly 
identify which participants owned electric vehicles and heat pumps. The 
Population-Based Survey Experiment complements the results of the natural field 
experiment by collecting data on electric vehicle ownership amongst all study 
participants, making it possible to test whether the tailored marketing 
simultaneously boosts uptake amongst electric vehicle owners whilst depressing 
uptake amongst non electric vehicle owners using treatment-effect heterogeneity 
analysis. A limitation of treatment effect heterogeneity analysis is that the results 
cannot be interpreted causally; the OLEV trial reported in Chapter 7 was 
conducted on a sample of participants who were already known to own electric 
vehicles, making it possible to estimate the impact of tailoring using the average 
treatment effect, which can be given a causal interpretation. In general, each of 
these study-specific chapters are divided into four parts: (1) design and 
hypotheses; (2) analysis method; (3) main treatment effects and; (4) an 
interpretation of the main findings in relation to the hypotheses and research 
questions. Methodological strengths and limitations are also discussed with 
suggestions for how these could be addressed in future work. 
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Chapter 8 discusses the results and limitations of each of the four primary data 
collection studies and the meta-analysis of the 27 pre-existing studies presented 
in Chapter 2 in light of the wider literature and the overall aims of the thesis. 
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis with a summary of the main findings followed by 
a summary of the real-world application of the results and implications for future 
policy regarding the regulation of the retail electricity market in GB and the 
marketing of tariffs by energy suppliers. The theoretical implications of the results 
are also discussed, with questions for future research presented. 
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The vision and the reality – a smarter 
electricity system and the empirical evidence 
on consumer demand for TOU tariffs 
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1 Introduction  
This review chapter is structured in two parts. Section 2 outlines how and why, in 
the coming decades, the UK electricity system is expected to be turned on its 
head (BEIS, 2016c; Ofgem & BEIS, 2017; Institute of Engineering and 
Technology, 2017). Whereas now centralised bodies turn off and on electricity 
generation assets in line with the population’s rhythms of electricity use and 
disuse, the future electricity system is one characterised by energy consumers 
responding to signals from their energy supplier, or potentially a range of bodies, 
by adapting their electricity consumption patterns in line with electricity supply.6 I 
shall refer to this as “the vision”.  
The second part, covered in Section 3 and which I shall refer to as “the reality”, 
outlines the widespread consumer disengagement with the energy market which 
suggests that domestic electricity consumers will not necessarily play the role 
expected of them in this vision of a smarter energy future. One of the simplest 
ways in which consumers are initially expected to offer greater flexibility is by 
signing up to TOU tariffs (BEIS, 2016b, 2016c). This section presents the design 
and results of a systematised review of the literature to investigate what empirical 
evidence there is to support the assumption of consumer participation and to 
provide a ‘best’ available estimate of overall domestic consumer demand for TOU 
tariffs and any early evidence of what might increase that demand. The theory 
behind why consumer engagement is so low, and what tools could increase 
                                            
6 DSR is not the only way in which the energy system is expected to change in future. Other 
changes include increasing proportions of renewable generation, energy storage and the 
electrification of heating and transport.  
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engagement to turn vision into reality is reserved for its own chapter (Chapter 3), 
which contains part (b) of the literature review.  
2 The vision of a smarter energy future 
2.1 Meeting the challenges of decarbonisation   
The UK Climate Change Act sets a legally binding target for Government to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% of 1990 levels by 2050 (DECC, 2008). To 
achieve this, it needs to radically decarbonise national energy supplies, which 
account for 29% of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions, making energy supply 
the largest emitting sector just after the transport sector (BEIS, 2015). 
Decarbonising energy supplies whilst also ensuring consumers can access 
energy when they need it, at a price they can afford to pay, requires radical 
changes to the energy system as a whole (DECC, 2012a; European Commission, 
2015; BEIS, 2016c; Ofgem & BEIS, 2017). At present, the body that operates 
GB’s national electricity transmission system – the National Grid – ensures that 
electricity demand matches electricity supply by “switching on and off fossil-
fuelled power plants” (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2014, 
p.1).  
However, decarbonising energy supplies will make it increasingly desirable for 
more of this balancing of electricity supply and demand to be done by getting 
consumers (the demand-side), including domestic consumers, to alter their 
consumption patterns in line with supply (DECC, 2012a; European Commission, 
2015; BEIS, 2016c; Ofgem & BEIS, 2017). This is called demand-side response 
(DSR), or demand-side flexibility, and it can be defined as a “change in electricity 
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consumption patterns in response to a signal” (Element Energy, 2012, p.9). There 
are three key drivers behind DSR, all of which are themselves driven by the need 
to radically decarbonise energy supplies. Each of these drivers is outlined in turn. 
2.1.1 Maintaining security of supply in the face of intermittent generation 
As countries replace fossil fuels with renewables such as solar and wind, which 
provide a cleaner but less predictable supply of electricity, the ability to just turn 
up or turn down electricity supply when required will decline substantially in the 
lead up to 2050. Electricity is expensive to store (Trainer, 2013) and 
interconnections with other countries require cooperation and reduce energy 
independence, whereas incentivising consumers to defer electricity usage until 
its windy or sunny – or to store electricity for later use – by charging consumers 
less for electricity when renewable generation is high, means that supply and 
demand can be matched at relatively low cost (Hesmondhalgh, 2012; Element 
Energy, 2012; Hledik et al., 2017).  
2.1.2 Maintaining security of supply at an affordable price 
The UK Government is therefore relying on consumer participation in DSR to help 
maintain energy affordability (DECC, 2012a). Today, one third of domestic 
consumers’ end bills are from electricity network and levy charges (Ofgem, 
2017a) and, if current trends continue, this will rise to 50 percent by 2030 (Ward 
and Darcy, 2015). The aim is that DSR could deliver efficiency savings which 
could be passed onto consumers in the form of lower bills, for example, through 
tariffs which charge consumers less for electricity used at off-peak times or when 
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renewable generation is more abundant (DECC, 2012a; Frontier Economics and 
Sustainability First, 2012; Ofgem & BEIS, 2017). These are called TOU tariffs. 
2.1.3 Maintaining security of supply when electricity demand goes up – heat 
pumps, electric vehicles and everyone else 
Without DSR, peak time electricity demand is expected to increase because, to 
meet carbon emission targets, the UK Government like governments elsewhere, 
are working to replace the vehicle fleet with EVs (Committee on Climate Change, 
2013) and household gas central heating with electric heating, particularly heat 
pumps (DECC, 2010). However, the electrification of heat and transport will place 
one of the greatest burdens on the future electricity network (Frontier Economics, 
2011). Domestic demand for heating and transport presents a particular 
challenge because, whilst household customers only consume one third of 
energy by volume (Ward et al., 2015), they are estimated to consume 50 percent 
of the electricity used in the peak evening hours (Hesmondhalgh, 2012). This 
thesis therefore focuses on domestic consumers, with a particular emphasis on 
heat pump and EV owners. 
Heat pump owners were selected in particular because, across all low-carbon 
pathway models, heat pumps are the favoured substitute to gas boilers in 
individual buildings (DECC, 2010). The UK’s Climate Budget is reliant on heat 
pumps delivering 25% of the heat demand in the domestic sector by 2030 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2013). Over 60% of a household’s energy 
demand comes from heating (Palmer and Cooper, 2012), most of which is done 
in the evening peak when people return from work.  
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EV owners were selected because evidence to date shows that EV owners have 
got into the habit of charging their vehicles when they get home from work 
(Zarnikau et al., 2015; My Electric Avenue, 2015; Capova et al., 2015), when 
electricity demand is at its peak and, in the UK like many other countries, the least 
efficient and therefore most polluting power plants are brought into operation to 
meet peaks in demand. As EV sales and battery capacities increase, so too do 
the risks to electricity networks. Estimates suggest that UK electricity networks 
will become overloaded when EVs reach 30%-60% market penetration(My 
Electric Avenue, 2015).  
Conventionally, the risks posed to electricity networks from increases in electricity 
demand are addressed by reinforcing local electricity networks funded through 
‘green’ taxes on consumer energy bills (My Electric Avenue, 2015). However, 
DSR offers a much cheaper way of managing this increased electricity demand 
because it does not require such large additional infrastructure investments7 
(European Commission, 2015). 
2.2 The expected role of domestic consumers in a smarter 
energy future 
There are many ways in which domestic consumers are envisioned to participate 
in DSR. One way is by signing up to TOU tariffs (BEIS, 2016b, 2016c) which 
expose consumers to price signals that indicate when it is, or is not, optimal for 
them to consume electricity. Following the smart meter roll-out, it is expected that 
                                            
7 Although DSR will be significantly enabled through the smart meter roll out, the UK’s Smart 
Meter Implementation Programme is not solely being delivered to support DSR but primarily to 
ensure accurate billing and help deliver energy demand reduction (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b). 
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suppliers will offer many different types of TOU tariffs, each of which can provide 
different levels of flexibility and require different levels of participation from 
consumers. The different types of TOU tariffs are described in Table 2 however, 
for simplicity, this thesis uses the term ‘TOU tariff’ to refer to all the possible tariff 
types described in Table 2.  
Static TOU tariffs are the simplest form of TOU tariff that could deliver peak-load 
reductions in electricity demand and they would involve consumers actively 
changing when they use electricity. Heat pump owners on a static TOU tariff could 
schedule their heating system to meet a lower thermostat set-point temperature 
during peak times, thereby saving money and minimising the impact that their 
heating system will have on the electricity network (Frontier Economics, 2012; 
Sidebotham and Powergrid, 2015). Field trials in the UK show that TOU tariffs do 
effectively reduce peak demand from heat pumps (Sidebotham and Powergrid, 
2015).8  
By signing up to a static TOU tariff, and setting the timer on their EV charge point 
to charge their vehicle overnight, when electricity demand is low, EV owners 
could reduce the running costs of their EV and minimise the impact of charging 
their EV on the electricity network. Field trials from the US find that TOU tariffs 
have reduced peak time charging of EVs by 50% (Zarnikau et al., 2015). Static 
TOU tariffs could also play an important role in maximising the environmental 
benefits of EVs; when charged consistently at the most polluting times, which in 
the UK is during the evening peak, greenhouse gas emissions from EVs can be 
                                            
8 Although trials also report dissatisfaction amongst some TOU trial participants with heat pumps 
(Bell et al., 2015; Fell, 2016).  
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nearly 50% higher than if charged at average electricity grid carbon intensity (Ma 
et al., 2012).  
Another way in which domestic consumers are expected to participate in DSR, 
also featured in Table 2, is by signing up to services such as direct load control 
(DLC) contracts, in which a third party provider remotely switches appliances 
on/off (Ofgem, 2013a; Michael J. Fell et al., 2015).  
There are also specific DLC services for EV owners. A good example of one of 
the roles that EV owners are expected to play in the future smarter electricity 
system can be found in a ‘Future Smart’ publication by UK Power Networks, the 
body responsible for managing the electricity network in London and East of 
England (Figure 1). 







This document is describing a form of DLC called controlled charging, in which a 
third party remotely interrupts the current being used to charge an EV. Automated 
responses like DLC and controlled charging are particularly important for the less 
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predictable tariffs, such as real-time pricing tariffs, and have been found to 
produce greater and more sustained reductions in peak time electricity demand 
than programmes in which consumers need to respond manually across TOU 
tariffs of many designs (Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 2012).  
However, since the only technical requirement for TOU tariffs is a smart meter, 
which are being installed in homes as part of the national smart meter roll-out 
(BEIS, 2016b), it is likely that TOU tariffs will be one of the first types of DSR 
offerings available to domestic consumers. Perhaps reflecting this, it is static TOU 
tariffs that the UK Government requires 30% of consumers to sign up to by 2030 
to ensure the smart metering programme is cost-effective (BEIS, 2016b). This 
thesis therefore focuses mostly on TOU tariffs. However, since it is expected that 
consumers will need to sign up or provide their consent for any tariff or service in 
Table 2 (European Commission, 2015), the discussion presented in this thesis, 
and the results, are broadly applicable to all domestic DSR services.  
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Table 2 Different types of DSR tariffs, services and activities. 
 
Tariff/service/activity Incentive structure Function 
Static TOU tariff Two or more unit rates that 
apply at fixed times of the 
day and week. A customer 
on a three-rate static TOU 
tariff is likely to be charged 
a higher rate for electricity 
on weekday evenings 
compared to during the day 
and a super off-peak rate 
overnight. 
Useful for delivering reductions 
in daily peak demand, for 
example from heating or EVs. 
Dynamic TOU tariff Two or more unit rates that 
vary throughout the day or 
week. When these tariffs 
have been trialled on pilot 
groups of consumers, 
participants receive a text 
message notifying them of 
the rate that will apply the 
following day (e.g. High, 
Medium, Low). 
Provide more flexibility to 
electricity operators than static 
TOU and could help to balance 
demand with renewable power.  
Real time pricing 
tariff 
Rate varies in near real-
time in accordance with the 
wholesale market price of 
electricity, which reflects 
the balance of electricity 
supply and demand. 
Provides greater potential 
flexibility to electricity network 
operators to respond to hourly 
or even sub-hourly changes in 
supply/demand and 
renewables. 
Peak time rebate 
tariffs. 
Financial rewards for 
reducing consumption at 
peak times of day or year. 
Provides reductions at key 
times of the day or year, for 
example, the Winter peak in the 
UK or summer peaks due to air-
conditioning use in countries 
with hot climates. 
Direct load control 
service 
A third party remotely 
switches off/on appliances 
in line with near real-time 
balance of supply and 
demand. When EV charge 
points are the device under 
control, this is known as 
As above, with the added 
advantage that electricity 
network operators have greater 
assurance of a response 
because consumers do not 
have to manually respond to 
changes in their electricity rate 
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‘controlled charging’. Could 
be combined with tariffs. 
or even programme their 
appliances to respond. 
Vehicle-to-grid 
services 
EV owners are paid a fee to 
allow electricity grid to use 
EV battery as temporary 






Small electricity producers 
and consumers 
(prosumers) buy and sell 
electricity directly from each 
other rather than from one 
of the traditional large 
energy suppliers. 
Purchasing could be 
automated based on 
algorithms set to match 
user preferences, for 
example, to automatically 
sell surplus solar power. 
Could help to “reduce the level 
of energy balancing which 
needs to be carried out by the 
[National Grid]” (Energy 




2.3 Enablers of domestic DSR  
The scenarios described above, in which domestic consumers flexibly adjust their 
electricity consumption patterns and habits in line with the requirements of the 
wider electricity system, is a vision not a present reality. Until this year, when two 
smart meter enabled static TOU tariffs entered the market, there were no 
commercially available smart TOU tariffs anywhere in GB or most of Europe. 
There are a number of key changes that need to take place before the vision 
described above becomes a reality, the most challenging of which will be 
ensuring that consumers play the part imagined for them.   
2.3.1 Energy policy  
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Whilst TOU electricity pricing has been an established and increasingly 
sophisticated part of grid management strategies involving large industrial and 
commercial users for many years, domestic TOU tariff programmes remain 
restricted to relatively basic options such as Economy 7 tariffs in GB, or the 
Tempo Tariff, in France, which are a legacy of these countries’ historical 
investment in nuclear power, which is also much less flexible than fossil fuel 
power plants. These legacy tariffs required the installation of secondary meters 
which can, for example, record night-time consumption independently of day-time 
consumption.  
Although Economy 7 tariffs played an important role in generating overnight 
demand for nuclear electricity when the UK invested majorly in nuclear power in 
the 1970s following the oil crises, they are not designed to handle the needs of 
an electricity system that is powered by wind or solar which varies throughout the 
day or to handle unexpected faults in the electricity network. There is also no 
incentive for British suppliers to encourage domestic consumers to alter their 
consumption patterns because suppliers are not exposed to the true cost of 
supplying domestic customers at different points in the day. However, a number 
of key policy enablers for domestic DSR are already underway to address these 
barriers.  
First, the rollout of smart meters in homes across the UK and elsewhere, which 
record electricity use in near real-time, will make it easier for energy companies 
to bill consumers according to the time of day they use electricity. Second, the 
announcement by Ofgem of half hourly settlement for domestic electricity use in 
2017, so that consumers can be billed according to their personal half-hourly 
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variations in electricity use rather than the consumption profile of the average 
electricity consumer within a given profile class, “will expose the true cost of 
supplying that customer in any given half-hour” (Ofgem, 2016c, p.4). This will 
place incentives on suppliers to create TOU tariffs that will incentivise consumers 
to use electricity at cheaper times.  
Half hourly settlement may also motivate the development of more innovative 
products and services from other potentially actors, such as smart thermostats 
which could be bundled with TOU tariffs so that, instead of having to manually 
respond to changes in price, consumers could allow their supplier or the third 
party thermostat manufacturer to automatically turns up or down in response to 
changes in the supply and demand of renewable electricity. Ofgem (2017b) has 
removed its restriction on tariff bundles to facilitate the offering of more innovative 
products required for realising a smarter, low carbon electricity system. 
2.3.2 Energy technology 
Many organisations are already trialling methods of providing smart automated 
responses, in which a ‘smart’ appliance can automatically respond to the price 
signals on a TOU tariff. For instance, a UK based home energy management 
company has been trialling remote control of heat pumps in which a technology 
is used to calculate the optimal thermostat set-point for the heat pump throughout 
the day, for example by storing the heat in the fabric of the home during the cheap 
times on a simulated TOU tariff to reduce its use during the expensive peak times 
(Carter, 2016). DLC is particularly useful for heat pumps because domestic heat 
pumps, when run most efficiently, take longer to heat up than domestic gas 
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boilers, meaning that it may be relatively difficult for a householder to manually 
adjust their heating patterns in response to their tariff (Carter, 2016).  
A company called Open Utility is trialling its peer-to-peer electricity trading 
platform called Piclo with its business customers (Ofgem & BEIS, 2017) and 
research has shown that it is possible to use smart meter data to disaggregate 
electricity use at the individual appliance level (Kelly and Knottenbelt, 2016), 
which could potentially be used to create appliance-specific TOU tariffs. 
2.3.3 Consumer participation  
Whilst the technological and policy barriers may be largely out of the way 
relatively soon, this vision of a more flexible electricity system in which domestic 
consumers respond manually or automatically to signals delivered through TOU 
tariffs can only be realised if consumers are willing to participate. Two types of 
consumer participation are required: (1) consumers to switch to a TOU tariff or 
other DSR programme and; (2) respond to the price signals by changing their 
consumption patterns.  
A literature review of over 30 trials in which participants were put onto TOU tariffs 
to investigate its effect on electricity consumption patterns concludes that 
consumers are indeed sensitive to changes in the price of electricity throughout 
the day with the highest recorded reduction in peak demand of 22% (Frontier 
Economics and Sustainability First, 2012). However, the evidence on whether 
consumers will sign up to a TOU tariff in the first place is far less clear. Arguably 
this could be even more important, because, with greater automation, people 
would not need to respond to the price signals themselves.  
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2.4 A gap in the evidence on consumer participation in DSR 
Aside from the United States, where more modern TOUs are now commercially 
available, there is no measure of current commercial consumer demand for 
TOUs. Alternative sources of evidence on consumer demand for TOUs include 
recruitment rates into TOU field trials, measures of stated demand elicited from 
survey participants and current market uptake of legacy tariffs such as Economy 
7. However, to my knowledge, there has been no attempt to synthesise this 
evidence from this wide range of sources and methods to obtain an overall 
estimate of the likely uptake of TOU tariffs amongst domestic energy bill payers 
or what factors (e.g. tariff design, marketing) might increase uptake.  
This lack of evidence is problematic because there are good reasons to believe 
that domestic consumers may not sign up to TOU tariffs or other DSR services. 
Since the privatisation of retail energy markets around the world almost two 
decades ago, half of all consumers have not left the incumbent former state 
supplier (Defeuilley, 2009). In its most recent inquiry, GB’s Competition and 
Markets Authority found that over 70% of British consumers are not on the 
cheapest tariff for them despite potential average annual savings of almost £300 
in 2015 (CMA, 2016c) and the fact that, for most people, energy bills represent 
the second highest item of household expenditure after housing (Office of 
National Statistics, 2016).  
This lack of consumer engagement in the energy market presents a potential 
problem for uptake to TOU tariffs as well as other products such as DLC of home 
heating, for which the average saving is likely to be much lower; the 
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Government’s reported estimates are that it will save consumers in the region of 
£40 per household per year until 2050 (Ofgem, 2017b).9 Indeed, discouraged by 
what they see as overwhelming consumer disengagement in the energy market, 
the Smart EV Group (a stakeholder group representing the interests of electricity 
network operators) is in favour of a policy to mandate controlled charging of EVs 
(whereby a third party remotely manages the electricity supply to a customers’ 
EV) (Cross et al., 2016). In Ireland, the regulator has taken the decision to make 
TOU tariffs mandatory for all domestic energy consumers (Commission for 
Energy Regulation, 2015). However, given that a fairly sizeable minority of people 
have ended up paying more on a TOU tariff relative to a flat rate tariff, such an 
approach is unlikely to be popular and may result in a backlash against smart 
meters if people perceive this as the only way to avoid TOU tariffs.  
Synthesising the available evidence is important to help overcome the 
methodological limitations of individual measures of uptake. For example, there 
are also limitations in the extent to which recruitment rates into trials and stated 
willingness to switch to a TOU tariff from surveys can be interpreted as measures 
of demand for TOU tariffs, which can only be accounted for in a meta-analysis 
which controls for differences in uptake across measurement methods. In some 
cases, there are challenges in interpreting measures of commercial uptake as 
evidence of consumer demand. For example, approximately 13%–21% of British 
                                            
9 Citing a recent report (Sanders et al., 2016), Ofgem’s flexibility strategy reports that the 
maximum overall savings from greater system flexibility are estimated at £40 billion between 2016 
and 2050; by the authors’ own calculations, if these savings were shared across 27 million UK 
households (Office for National Statistics, 2016a), this amounts to £40 per household per year or 
£1,480 over the 34 years between 2016 and 2050. This estimate is in the same order of magnitude 
to the savings made by customers participating in GB field trials of TOU tariffs.  
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energy bill payers are on ‘legacy’ TOU tariffs introduced in the 1970s to stimulate 
night-time demand for nuclear power (Consumer Focus, 2012; Michael J. Fell et 
al., 2015; M Nicolson et al., 2017). Historical research suggests that Economy 7 
meters were mainly installed by councils into local authority housing alongside 
electric night storage heaters in post-war Britain, in response to lobbying by the 
Electricity Development Association, the body financed by the electricity supply 
industry to develop common sales and marketing material under the Electricity 
Act of 1919 (Carlsson-Hyslop, 2016). Uptake to these tariffs is unlikely to reflect 
underlying householder preferences for off-peak pricing. 
The challenge of even conducting such a review is amplified by the fact that tariff 
trials were not designed with the aim of estimating potential consumer uptake 
and, to my knowledge, there has been no prior attempt to extract the recruitment 
rates from these DSR trials or whether they are even reported in final project 
reports. Moreover, the evidence base is drawn from participants from all over the 
world and applying different tariff designs (static TOU, dynamic TOU etc.) and 
recruitment strategies (e.g. opt-in versus opt-out). However, this also presents an 
opportunity to assess the extent to which uptake varies depending on the tariff 
design and recruitment strategy, which could be used by decision-makers to 
inform the development of TOU tariffs and consumer engagement campaigns. 
Extracting measures of uptake from studies run in multiple countries using a 
range of methods, whilst controlling for the individual effects of these variations, 
increases the statistical power of the meta-analysis to identify potentially 
important influences on uptake.  
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The next section presents the design and results of a systematised review used 
to identify and screen potentially relevant evidence to produce the ‘best available’ 
estimate of consumer demand for TOU tariffs and to identify what methods might 
be used to stimulate consumer demand given the high levels of consumer inertia 
in the retail electricity market identified in the Competition and Markets Authority’s 
most recent investigation (CMA, 2016b). 
3 A systematised review of the literature on consumer 
demand for TOU tariffs 
3.1 Aim of this review 
This section presents the design and results of a systematised literature review 
(Grant and Booth, 2009) aimed at answering three main research questions: 
1. What is domestic consumer demand for TOU tariffs in GB? 
2. What methods are known to increase demand for TOU tariffs?  
3. What is the variation in energy bill impacts across TOU tariff customers? 
Systematised reviews use methods from systematic reviews (Grant and Booth, 
2009), such as pre-specified inclusion/exclusion criteria and extraction methods, 
to minimise bias that can arise if researchers consciously or unconsciously select 
articles for review that favour particular conclusions or only those with which the 
researcher is already relatively familiar. Unlike a full systematic review, and like 
rapid evidence assessments, the completeness of searching was determined by 
time constraints. This review also includes a meta-analysis, “which statistically 
combines the results of quantitative studies to provide a more precise estimate 
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of the results” (Grant and Booth, 2009, p.94) to answer the research questions 
above. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Study selection 
Included studies consist of those written in the English language that document 
empirical, quantitative findings on uptake to TOU tariffs amongst domestic energy 
consumers in OECD countries.10 It was decided to include work from all OECD 
countries rather than just GB, despite this being the geographical focus for this 
thesis, because prior knowledge of this literature suggested that there would be 
too few GB studies to permit a robust meta-analysis. Studies reporting work 
conducted in non-OECD countries were excluded because it was judged that 
such countries may have different priorities and concerns related to electricity 
usage (e.g. in developing countries, particularly energy access) that would mean 
measures of uptake in these countries would be unlikely to generalise to the GB 
setting. Qualitative studies were not included in the review because each of the 
research questions that the study aims to answer requires quantitative data. 
Future reviews could usefully seek to find evidence to help explain the level of 
demand for TOU tariffs established in this study, which would require consultation 
of qualitative studies. 
                                            
10 Studies reporting uptake measures based only on study recruitment were initially going to be 
excluded, in the review protocol, however the decision was later taken to include such studies in 
order to provide a greater range of evidence based on studies in which people are actually able 
to switch to the tariff having made the decision to switch (unlike in survey research).  
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It was then necessary to define what data would be considered as representing 
‘uptake’ to a TOU tariff. To get an idea of what uptake to TOU tariffs might look 
like under real world conditions, this review includes reports of switching rates to 
commercially available TOU tariffs. However, since these tariffs are almost all in 
the US - where central air conditioning rather than heating is the dominant load - 
it is not known whether this research can be generalised to Northern European 
or the GB setting where most of the demand is from heating (which is currently 
mostly gas). The review therefore also includes measures of uptake obtained in 
surveys which cover a wider range of countries, including GB. It is possible that 
surveys will overestimate demand for tariffs because it is easier to switch 
hypothetically than in real life and because there is no financial consequence of 
switching to the wrong tariff. The review also includes recruitment rates into TOU 
tariff trials as a measure of uptake. These trials were designed as efficacy trials 
(aiming to assess the impact of tariffs on electricity consumption patterns under 
high uptake of the tariffs) rather than effectiveness trials which also seek to 
measure effectiveness conditional on uptake. However, because two of these 
trials were in GB, it is the only evidence available on actual uptake to a next 
generation TOU amongst GB consumers. Trials may have differed substantially 
from what can be expected of an "average" tariff launch, particularly the use of 
financial incentives and bill protection. Differences in uptake across uptake 
method are accounted for in the analysis. 
Studies that documented qualitative findings only were excluded because these 
types of studies could not be used to provide a quantitative measure of uptake. 
Studies that did not report empirical results (e.g. include only modelled uptake) 
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were excluded because these studies would either be reliant on an empirical 
measure which the inclusion criteria would capture or would be based on targets 
or estimated optimum uptake levels, which are not equivalent to actual consumer 
demand. Studies that did not report research including a TOU tariff (e.g. which 
focused only on DLC or other non-price-based DSR) were also excluded from 
consideration because DLC combined with a TOU tariff is likely to be a more 
commercially viable offering than DLC only programmes and price-based DSR 
programmes are the most likely method by which consumers will be expected to 
engage. Studies in which a TOU tariff was offered with automation, either 
customer controlled automation or by a third party, would however fit the inclusion 
criteria. Studies focused exclusively on the non-domestic sector were excluded 
because they are not in the scope of this thesis. The inclusion and exclusion 
criteria are summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for review screening. 
 
Include if source Exclude if source 
Is in English Is not in English 
Reports findings from empirical research 
or evaluation. 
Does not report empirical results (e.g. 
includes only modelled uptake)11. 
Includes quantitative findings that can 
help to inform estimation of tariff uptake 
rates. 
Reports only qualitative findings.  
                                            
11 Originally this also excluded uptake based on trial recruitment but this was later changed to 
increase the total pool of evidence. 
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Reports research designed to enable 
estimation of the degree of consumers’ 
expressed or demonstrated willingness 
to sign up (hypothetically or in reality) to 
at least one TOU tariff design, and the 
reasons associated with this. 
Does not report research including a 
TOU tariff (for example, focused only on 
DLC or other non-price-based DSR 
product).  
Reports work conducted in an OECD 
country. 
Reports work conducted in a non-OECD 
country. 
Is focused on the domestic sector. Is focused on the non-domestic sector. 
 
 
3.2.2 Search methods 
An initial list of five key recent publications on consumer demand for TOU tariffs 
were identified (Michael J Fell et al., 2015; Fell, 2016; Hobman et al., 2016; 
Stenner et al., 2015; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013) as a basis to generate keywords 
for electronic searches (Table 4). The reference lists of these publications were 
also checked and publications with titles that suggested they may fit the screening 
criteria were saved for further review. Forward citation checks were conducted 
using Google Scholar to identify documents referencing these publications, which 
were saved for later review if the titles were deemed to fit the screening criteria 
above. Using a ‘snowballing’ approach, reference lists of documents that pass 
screening criteria were also accessed for inclusion.  
Table 4. Search terms used in conducting the search with example search string 
for use in Scopus. 
 
   
 
Chapter 2: Literature review – part 1  71 
 TOU  Uptake  
Concept TOU tariffs 
Time-varying tariffs 
Off peak tariffs 
Dynamic pricing 
Cost-reflective tariffs  






















Scopus example TITLE-ABS-KEY("TOU" OR "time-of-use" OR "time-varying" 
OR "off peak" OR (dynamic W/2 pric* OR tariff*) OR "cost-
reflective" OR "critical peak" OR "peak-time" OR peaktime 
OR "real-time pric*" OR "realtime pric*") AND TITLE-ABS-
KEY(uptake OR consumer* OR accept* OR switch* OR 




The following bibliographic databases were searched: 
 Scopus 
 Web of Science (all databases) 
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 ScienceDirect 
 Searches were also developed based on the above search terms for the 
websites of the following organisations: 
 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
 Ofgem 
 Citizens Advice 
 Sustainability First 
 Distribution Network Operators 
 National Grid 
 Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group working papers 
 UK Energy Research Centre 
 European Commission Research and Innovation (Energy) 
 US Department of Energy (including SciTech Connect) 
 Websites of UK and US academic institutions (URLs including “.ac.uk” and 
“.edu”)  
Searches were recorded and reported to aid replicability, with potential sources 
saved in the reference management software Mendeley.  
3.2.3 Study selection 
Search results were screened according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
outlined in Table 3. Screening was initially conducted in parallel by two 
screeners12 until high levels of agreement were reached in the EPPI-Reviewer 
                                            
12 As outlined at the outset of this thesis, under the title ‘Published work’, this review was 
conducted as part of a project for Citizens Advice. The search strategy and screening was 
conducted by colleagues at the UCL Energy Institute Michael Fell and Gesche Huebner. I inputted 
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software (review author initials: MF, GMH). Subsequent screening on 
title/abstract was performed by a single screener (review author initials: MF). 
Included items were then screened again on the full document. The list of final 
documents for inclusion were reviewed following screening. Publications known 
to be relevant but which were not present in the initial documents for screening 
were later included if they passed the screening criteria.  
3.2.4 Data extraction 
All sources included were coded in EPPI-Reviewer for the following key 
characteristics: 
 Geographical location of study 
 Whether air conditioning was a significant load 
 Study start year 
 Method of assessing uptake (survey, commercial product, trial 
recruitment, other) 
 Experimental design 
 Type(s) of TOU tariff(s) tested and their characteristics  
 Organization(s) administering the study 
 Organization(s) offering (or framed as offering) the TOU tariff(s) 
 Characteristics of sample receiving the TOU intervention 
 Size  
                                            
on the search strategy and undertook all of the data extraction from the documents and all the 
analysis.  
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 Sampling method – participant characteristics, recruitment method (opt-in, 
opt-out/framing) 
 Whether an incentive was given to participants 
 Whether bill protection was included 
 Type(s) of outcome(s) measured by the intervention (including 
measure/proxy of uptake/responsiveness and customer satisfaction) 
 Role of automating technology 
 Whether an ongoing satisfaction assessment was conducted  
 Reported outcome(s), key interpretations and main conclusions 
Extraction was conducted by a single reviewer in EPPI-Reviewer (review author 
initials: MLN). Not all studies reported uptake and so this had to be computed, 
where possible, from the information provided.13 Nine studies included at the 
screening stage  (Train et al., 1987; Goett and Keane, 1988; Raw and Ross, 
2011; Wakefield et al., 2011; Gamble et al., 2009; Faruqui et al., 2013; Ohio 
Power Company, 2013; Long Island Power Authority, 2015; Harding and 
Lamarche, 2016) did not include information to compute or obtain a measure of 
uptake so were excluded at this point. Report tables were compiled using EPPI-
Reviewer in MS Word format from which a second extraction was undertaken to 
transpose key characteristics required for numerical analysis into MS Excel, for 
later importing into the statistical software package Stata for meta-analysis.  
                                            
13 For example, a tariff trial might report the total number of participants solicited for participation 
and the total number of enrolled participants. Alternatively, a study might report the total number 
of customers enrolled on a commercially available tariff on offer to all French consumers, in which 
case the recruitment rate can be approximated based on the population of France.  
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3.2.5 Data synthesis – meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis is most commonly used to aggregate results of clinical trials and 
the standard definition of meta-analysis reflects this: “meta-analysis is a statistical 
methodology that integrates the results of several independent clinical trials that 
are considered by the analyst to be “combinable”” (Huque [1988] cited in 
Kontapantelis and Reeves, 2010; 201). Meta-analysis is a two-stage process, the 
first of which involves providing an appropriate summary statistic for each study 
and the second in which the statistics are combined to obtain an overall average 
effect (Kontapantelis and Reeves, 2010; Kelley and Kelley, 2012).  
For the first stage, I create a normalised measure of uptake to a TOU tariff across 
all studies. Unlike the measures of uptake from trials and those for commercially 
available tariffs, which are expressed as proportions, most surveys measure 
willingness to switch along Likert scales. For comparability, I convert these 
outcomes into the proportion of participants who selected any point above the 
mid-point as switchers.14 I note that this does not constitute making an 
assumption that people who expressed a strong willingness to switch would 
switch in reality; this is just a method of obtaining a normalised outcome measure 
and the discussion of the results gives a strong consideration to the extent to 
which behavioural intentions predict future behavioural action, consistent with the 
empirical literature (Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006; Morwitz et al., 2007). 
                                            
14 For example, on a 5-point Likert scale in which 1 is not willing to switch and 5 is strongly willing 
to switch, the proportion of participants who selected 4 or 5 was recorded and used as the 
outcome measure. 
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For the second stage, to obtain an aggregated measure of uptake to TOU tariffs 
I compute the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for mean uptake to a 
TOU tariff disaggregated by the method by which uptake was measured 
(commercial uptake, trial recruitment, stated preference) for reasons that will 
become apparent in the discussion of the results. In clinical meta-analyses, this 
average is usually weighted by the sample size in each study, as recommended 
in (Kontapantelis and Reeves, 2010).  
The intuition behind such weighting in clinical trials is that studies with larger 
sample sizes will have more precise estimates of the effect size. However, since 
the outcome measure in each study is a single observation in itself rather than an 
average of multiple observations, it is not possible and, in any case would not 
make sense, to compute the standard error around uptake for each study; 
instead, variation in average uptake across all studies is illustrated by presenting 
the confidence intervals.15  
To estimate the correlation between uptake to a TOU tariff and observable 
differences in the tariff design, recruitment method and, importantly for this thesis, 
the way in which the tariff was framed to consumers, the following equation was 
used to describe the uptake in study i in a study s: 
Equation 1  𝛾𝑖𝑠 =  𝛼𝑖𝑠 +  𝛽𝑖𝑠𝜃𝑠 + 𝛽𝑖𝑠𝜇𝑖𝑠 +  𝛽𝑖𝑠𝜒𝑖𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠  
                                            
15 For many TOU trials, the final reports only reported the proportion who agreed to participate 
but not the number of participants who were solicited to take part so it would not be possible to 
account for the sample size per group. Moreover, the number of participants who complete a 
survey is not comparable to the number of people who are solicited to take part in a tariff trial or 
who are eligible for signing up to a commercially available tariff.  
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where 𝛾𝑖𝑠 is a proportion ranging from 0.0 to 1.00 for each uptake measure i in 
study s. The constant, 𝛼𝑖𝑠, equals the average uptake to a TOU tariff across each 
measure i and study s conditional on the covariates 𝜃𝑠, 𝜇𝑖𝑠  and 𝜒𝑖𝑠. The covariate 
𝜃𝑠 is a dummy variable in which the value 1 is assigned to an uptake measure i 
from a study s that reports willingness to switch to a TOU tariff from a survey 
experiment and the value zero if the uptake measure is from a study that reports 
the participant recruitment rate into a TOU tariff trial or uptake to a commercially 
available tariff. This is included in all specifications because it is assumed that the 
method of measuring uptake will affect the size of uptake y. 𝜇𝑖𝑠 is a dummy 
variable in which the value 1 is assigned to an uptake measure i from a study s 
in which enrolment was opt-out and 0 if it was opt-in. This is included in all 
specifications because the research on opt-in versus opt-out enrolment suggests 
that opt-out enrolment rates are substantially different to opt-in rates.  
To estimate the relative contribution that each covariate makes to explaining the 
variation in 𝛾, each covariate represented by 𝜒𝑖𝑠 in the equation above is 
introduced separately, in independent regression analyses in which 𝜒𝑖𝑠 is 
respectively: a dummy variable  or a series of dummy variables indicating whether 
the uptake measure i from a study s run in GB, the Netherlands, Australia, 
Norway or France, in which the United States is the omitted dummy and therefore 
the reference category; a series of dummy variables indicating whether the 
uptake measure i from study s relates to a capacity pricing tariff, a critical peak 
rebate tariff, a dynamic TOU tariff, real-time pricing tariff, static TOU tariff 
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combined with critical peak pricing, a static tariff combined with real time pricing, 
an inverse static TOU tariff (in which the peak rate is overnight rather than during 
the day), a static TOU tariff plus a static TOU tariff combined with critical peak 
pricing and a static TOU tariff plus a static TOU combined with critical peak pricing 
and a critical peak rebate16, in which a static TOU tariff (in which the peak rate is 
during the day rather than overnight) is the omitted dummy variable and therefore 
the reference category against which the coefficient 𝛽 on each covariate should 
be compared; a dummy variable indicating whether the uptake measure i was 
from a study s in which the tariff was framed to potential consumers as being able 
to save them money (a money frame), and zero otherwise, excluding studies in 
which it was not possible to identify what framing was used; a dummy variable 
indicating whether the uptake measure i was from a study s in which the tariff was 
framed to potential consumers as being able to save them money and help the 
environment (an environmental frame), and zero otherwise, excluding studies in 
which it was not possible to identify what framing was used; a dummy variable in 
which the value 1 is assigned to a measure of uptake i in study s in which the 
tariff was accompanied by bill protection and zero otherwise; a dummy variable 
in which the value 1 is assigned to a measure of uptake i in study s in which 
participants were offered an upfront cash payment and zero otherwise, excluding 
uptake measures from all survey experiments17; a dummy variable in which the 
                                            
16 The penultimate two categories contain multiple tariffs because the study from which the 
measure of uptake was drawn enrolled participants into a trial in which they would have been 
randomly assigned to different types of tariffs. As such, the measure of uptake cannot be 
disaggregated by tariff type but instead arguably reflects a persons’ willingness to participate in a 
trial in which they could be enrolled on any of the tariffs. 
17 Cash incentives are usually provided to compensate people for the inconvenience of 
participating in a trial or to attract consumers to participate in a trial or to sign up to a tariff; in 
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value 1 is assigned to a measure of uptake i in study s in which the tariff was 
accompanied by an automation device that allows consumers to remotely adjust 
their electrical devices in response to the price or which allows a third party, 
usually the supplier, to do so on their behalf. The term δs is a fixed effect for each 
study s from which the measure of uptake i was taken, implemented as a series 
of dummy variables for each study.  
The equation will be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression.18 
Ordinary Least Squares regression assumes that uptake measures are 
identically and independently distributed across studies. However, this is unlikely 
to be true because many uptake measures are recorded from the same studies, 
for example, because some studies tested multiple tariff types and recorded 
uptake measures independently for each tariff type. Uptake measures from the 
same study are likely to be correlated because they are based on the same 
sample population, tariffs, study design and so on. Some of these potential 
drivers are observed and included in the model, for example, tariff type and 
whether the study was a survey; however, others, such as recruitment method, 
are not included either because it was not recorded in the original reports or 
because the methods vary too much to create meaningful sub-groups. Equation 
1 therefore includes fixed effects for each study, which adjusts standard error 
                                            
surveys, cash is used as payment for undertaking the survey so it does not serve the same 
purpose and would not be appropriate to consider it as such.  
18 Meta-analyses often make use of bespoke meta-analyses function in software packages, such 
as the meta or metaan command in Stata. However, these commands have been designed with 
clinical trials in mind, in which the outcome from each study (the standardised effect size from a 
treatment administered in a randomised control trial) can be associated with a respective standard 
error, which provides an estimate of the variation in response to the treatment within the 
population. As noted above, the measure of uptake in each study is an observation not an average 
of several observations so a standard error estimate cannot be computed. 
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estimates for specific intra-cluster correlation that cannot be explained by the 
covariates. Study fixed effects will also penalise results that are strongly 
dependent on results from a single or very few studies and which may therefore 
be less reliable than results from multiple studies (however, conversely, the fixed 
effects could also mask effects that are constant across studies, which may 
therefore be reliable results, which is why we use and interpret results which 
include these effects carefully). 19 
Studies did not report uptake by different population sub-groups to enable 
meaningful analysis of heterogeneity across factors such as age, income, 
appliance type (EV, heat pump) and so on.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Results of the search 
  
                                            
19 Random effects models are the preferred method for meta-regressions using results from 
clinical trials which, unlike this study, intend to estimate a common effect size of a given 
intervention based on the results of multiple, independent randomised control trials (Kontapantelis 
and Reeves, 2010; Kelley and Kelley, 2012). This was rejected as a preferred specification in this 
context for reasons outlined in detail in Annex 5. 
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Figure 2 describes how the references identified through the searches were 
processed for this review. A total of 41 documents were marked for inclusion. 
During extraction, two subsequent studies (Schwartz et al., 2015; Verhagen et 
al., 2012) were added that were not already included because the authors 
recognized their absence and knew that they met the screening criteria, and 13 
studies were excluded because they either did not report a measure of uptake or 
because insufficient information was provided to compute a measure of uptake. 
During synthesis, a further three studies (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Buryk et al., 
2015; Schwartz et al., 2015) were excluded because the sources did not provide 
information on the distribution of responses across the Likert scale measure of 
uptake to compute the proportion of switchers. This left a total of 27 studies for 
analysis covering 66 individual measures of uptake to a TOU tariff20.  
  
                                            
20 Some studies ran multiple trial arms so provide multiple methods of uptake. 
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Figure 2 Flow diagram of review process. 
 
Notes: Diagram created by M.F. 
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3.3.2 Characteristics of included studies 
Figure 3 presents a heat map of the key characteristics of the studies included in 
the review. The size of the square represents the number of measures 
corresponding to the level of each factor. As can be seen, the majority of the 
evidence on consumer demand for TOU tariffs is from the United States, with 15 
measures of uptake from GB out of a total of 66 measures. 
The majority of the evidence relates to uptake to static TOU tariffs and is based 
on stated willingness to switch to tariffs, as measured amongst participants in 
surveys, as opposed to uptake rates to commercially available tariffs or the 
proportion of participants who agreed to go onto a TOU tariff as part of their 
participation in an academic trial. Of the 12 measures that are based on the 
proportion of consumers signing up to a commercially available time-varying tariff, 
nine are from the United States, two are from France (EDF Tempo, EDF TOU) 
and one is from GB (Economy 7). 
Most of the measures of uptake are based on opt-in rather than opt-out 
recruitment methods, very few used bill protection or an additional participant 
financial incentive to encourage uptake. The predominant way in which TOU 
tariffs in the sample were framed to consumers is to emphasise that TOU tariffs 
can save money, and just a small number of measures (n=2) are also drawn from 
studies which emphasised the environmental benefits. No other ways of framing 
the tariffs were used.  
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Figure 3 Characteristics of the studies included in the review. 
  
   
 
Chapter 2: Literature review – part 1  85 
3.3.3 Risk of bias in included studies 
The Cochrane Collaboration’s ‘Risk of Bias’ tool suggests that bias be considered 
along five domains – selection, performance, attrition, detection, reporting – and 
an ‘other bias’ category to capture threats to internal validity. Risk of bias was not 
assessed during the review but is being assessed here. Detection bias is a 
problem in this review insofar as that the review only included reports written in 
English, so figures may be more representative of English speaking OECD 
countries, which is a relative minority of the 35 OECD countries. This is not a 
problem for fulfilling the aims of this thesis which has a GB focus.  
Reporting bias is highly likely to present an issue for generalising findings on the 
bill impacts of TOUs since very few studies reported bill impacts. When 
synthesising findings, the bill impacts are not interpreted as generalisable and 
these results are excluded from the summary statistic measures.  
There is also a possibility of bias owing to the fact that most studies did not report 
the total sample size of participants solicited to adopt a TOU tariff or participate 
in a TOU tariff trial. It was therefore not possible to account for sample size when 
synthesising the evidence on uptake as is considered best practice in meta-
analyses conducted in the medical domain. However, sample size is considered 
when interpreting the reliability of the results.  
3.3.4 Consumer demand for TOU tariffs and factors correlated with demand 
The variation in uptake is large, with enrolment ranging from a mean of 0%-96%. 
The mean enrolment rate is 29% with a standard deviation almost as large 
(sd=24%) and the median enrolment rate is 27%. The variation in uptake across 
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studies may be explained by a number of factors, including study type, country 
and tariff design, as identified by the research questions. Table 5 presents a 
breakdown of the average uptake according to these factors, sorted in 
descending order of the mean (with the exception of the yes/no/unknown 
questions), with the lower and upper 95% confidence intervals also presented. 
For some measures, uptake is taken from studies in which participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two TOU tariffs (e.g. static TOU or static TOU 
combined with critical peak pricing) so uptake cannot be disaggregated by tariff 
type and is therefore presented as uptake for two or more tariff types.  
Table 5 Average uptake to TOU tariffs by study design, country, tariff design, 
default frame, benefit frame, bill protection, additional financial incentive and 
automation. 
  









Study type:      
Survey 37 36 31 43 34 





1 33 12 
      
Country:      
Australia 51 54 46 56 15 
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UK 30 30 22 37 15 
US 25 9 10 35 25 
Norway 25 25 - - 1 
France 19 19 - - 2 
Netherlands 14 13 4 25 8 
      
Tariff design:      
Static + (Static + 
CPP) + CPR 
44 44 - - 2 
CPR 53 53 14 70 5 
CAP 39 37 23 36 3 
Static 35 35 24 46 22 
CPP 28 21 12 43 10 
DP 22 25 8 36 5 
RTP 17 5 2 33 10 
Static + RTP 12 12 - - 1 
Static + CPP 9 6 - - 4 




24 36 1 
Static inverse 1 1 - - 1 
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Default frame:      
Opt-out 83 87 57 108 3 
Opt-in 26 25 21 32 62 
      
Benefit frame:      
Money & 
Environment 
36 36 36 36 2 
Money 30 23 22 37 48 
Unknown 26 26 14 38 16 
      
Bill protection      
Yes 35 32 16 53 12 
No 27 28 21 33 49 
Unknown 35 25 - - 5 
      
Upfront cash 
payment: 
     
Yes 35 36 28 41 35 
No 20 12 10 30 27 
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Unknown 37 26 - - 4 
      
Automation:      
Yes 31 28 16 46 15 
No 32 33 25 39 33 
Unknown 18 7 4 31 7 
      
Note: Due to small sample sizes it was not possible to compute confidence 
intervals for all the variables recorded; these cells are marked with a dash to 
indicate that they are intentionally left blank. 
 
The most notable differences in uptake are those between study type and 
recruitment method, whether opt-in versus opt-out, a relationship which is made 
clearer in Figure 4, which is a bar chart of the mean uptake to any TOU tariff for 
each of the 66 measures of uptake obtained across the 27 studies. With just one 
exception (Hartway et al., 1999), the highest measures of uptake are recorded 
from studies using opt-out recruitment (Lutzenhiser et al., 2010; Lakeland 
Electric, 2015; Charles River Associates, 2005) and studies using willingness to 
switch as a proxy for potential uptake (BEIS, 2016a; Fell, 2016; M Nicolson et al., 
2017; Verhagen et al., 2012; Stenner, 2015). Although the mean uptake for 
commercial tariffs is lower in magnitude than recruitment rates for trials the 
difference is not statistically significant (p=0.490) which is why these are grouped 
together with measures from commercial tariffs.  
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As a result, all analyses include controls for whether the study is a survey and 
whether enrolment is opt-out, with the results presented in Table 6. Since an 
analysis of variance test reveals that the intra-cluster correlation is 0.47 which is 
high and demonstrates that it is not appropriate to assume that the error term is 
independently distributed, fixed effects are used in nearly all analyses. Note that, 
study fixed effects will also penalise results that are strongly dependent on results 
from a single study or very few studies and which may therefore be less reliable 
than results from multiple studies. However, conversely, the fixed effects could 
also mask genuine effects that are constant across studies, which is why I use 
and interpret results which include these effects carefully. 
Throughout columns (1) to (9) in which a range of control variables are added, 
uptake measures elicited from surveys are consistently estimated as being 
between 28 to 36 percentage points higher than uptake to commercially available 
TOU tariffs or tariffs people were able to sign up to in trials, after controlling for 
intra-cluster correlation between measures obtained from the same surveys 
using fixed effects. Opt-out enrolment is estimated as being consistently 70 
percentage points higher, after controlling for intra-cluster correlation. When both 
measures are inputted into the regression analysis, the model estimates that they 
explain 85% of the variation in uptake to TOU tariffs (column 1, Table 6).  
There are significant differences in uptake between countries, but when study 
type is controlled for the only significant remaining difference is between the UK 
and Australia (p<0.05). As the Australian evidence is drawn from a single study, 
this is most likely due to specific design considerations of this individual study.  
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Figure 4 Consumer measures of demand for TOU tariffs by study type and default 
frame. 
Notes: Each bar represents a measure of uptake. Some studies obtained multiple 
measures so individual studies may appear multiple times. All studies used opt-
in enrolment unless they are highlighted as having used opt-out. The horizontal 
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Table 6. Explaining variation in uptake of TOU tariffs. 
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Bill protection       0.061   
   
 
Chapter 2: Literature review – part 1  94 
      (0.184)   







































Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X X 
Observations 65 65 65 66 65 65 61 34 52 
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.848 0.906 0.077 0.847 0.847 0.840 0.723 0.830 
 
Notes: Deviations in the sample size in each column from the total sample of 66 is due to missing data on some covariates 
i.e. studies for which there was insufficient information provided in the final report to enable extraction on that particularly 
covariate. 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 (Benjamini and Hochberg [1995] adjusted p-value 0.0375), ** p < 0.01 (Benjamini and Hochberg [1995] adjusted 
p-value 0.0075), *** p < 0.001 (Benjamini and Hochberg [1995] adjusted p-value 0.0005)
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The raw data also suggests there is substantial variation in uptake depending on 
tariff design. The regression model estimates that real time pricing tariffs are 
correlated with a 13 percentage point lower level of uptake when compared to a 
static TOU tariff (p<0.01), when controlling for recruitment method, whether 
uptake was measured in a survey and intra-cluster correlation in measures within 
surveys (column 3, Table 6). The model also estimates that static TOU tariffs are 
preferred to capacity pricing (p<0.001) and marginally statistically significantly 
more popular than dynamic pricing tariffs (p<0.10). No other differences approach 
statistical significance. This is possibly due to the low sample size for other tariff 
designs such as critical peak rebates and the inverse TOU tariff, which is only 
recorded once in the dataset. When regression analysis is run with only the 
different tariff designs as control variables (column 4, Table 6), the adjusted R-
Squared value indicates that tariff design explains 8% of the variation in uptake, 
which is substantially lower than for the other factors considered so far. 
There is no statistically significant difference in uptake across measures of uptake 
obtained from studies in which people were told about the potential financial 
savings from switching tariff (p=1.000) or the financial and environmental benefits 
(p=1.000), as reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 respectively. This is not 
necessarily surprising; only one study (across 2 measures) tested the impact of 
environmental and financial messaging so it may be that the sample size is too 
small to measure any impact. Moreover, although a seemingly high number 
emphasised financial benefits, it was not possible to identify any particular 
framing from 20% of the studies and very few studies provided details of what 
messaging was used, making it difficult to understand how strong the messaging 
was e.g. emphasis, frequency etc. 
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Offering people bill protection (p=0.184) does not appear to have a statistically 
significant impact on uptake (column 7), however it does once removing the fixed 
effects which control for correlation in uptake across studies (p<0.05) which is 
likely to be reflective of the fact that only very few studies tested bill protection 
and all had relatively high levels of uptake (for brevity, results not reported in 
Table 6). Bill protection is measured in relatively few studies (7 studies), but in 
some studies multiple times, meaning that the fixed effects could also be masking 
the positive effect of bill protection. Unfortunately, with observational data, there 
is no way to disentangle the effect of measures being similar to each other by 
virtue of having been obtained from the same study (e.g. and therefore measured 
amongst the same participants, in the same country and for the same tariffs) from 
any potential causal effect of bill protection on uptake. It was not possible to 
control for differences in the sampling methods used across studies because 
many studies did not report the method used.  
Providing people with upfront financial payments for signing up to a TOU tariff, 
either in trials or for commercial offerings (survey measures excluded), has a 
strong statistically significant positive effect on uptake (p<0.001) regardless of 
whether the specification controls for correlation in uptake within studies (p<0.01).   
Some TOU tariffs are accompanied by automation devices (usually smart 
thermostats which customers can use to remotely control their space heating and 
cooling e.g. to avoid peak times) but the data suggests that uptake is not related 
to the presence of automation (p=0.958), even after removing controls for intra-
cluster correlation (p=0.158).21 In further exploratory analyses, not reported here, 
automation was also not found to have any effect on uptake to real time pricing 
                                            
21 For brevity, the result without fixed effects is not reported in Table 6. 
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tariffs or dynamic tariffs (p=0.502) or real-time pricing tariffs on their own 
(p=0.299), however this may be due to the low small sample size.  
All results discussed above are robust to the adjustment of p-values to control for 
multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method for 
controlling the false discovery rate. The adjusted p-values are reported in the 
notes to Table 6.  
3.3.5 Variation in energy bill impacts amongst TOU tariff customers 
Obtaining information on bill savings was difficult because it was rarely reported 
in final reports. Those that do report energy bill savings are outlined in Table 7 
below which presents the proportion who saved money on a TOU tariff along with 
the average and maximum savings and losses, because it highlights the range of 
potential impacts on people’s energy bills from switching to a TOU tariff. 
Since many studies did not report the energy bill impacts, these results may not 
be representative of the savings or losses realised by all consumers enrolled on 
TOU tariffs. However, at least for GB, where there have only been three major 
TOU tariff trials22, two of which reported the energy bill impacts (Carmichael et 
al., 2014; Sidebotham, 2014), the results provide a good indication of the likely 
impact on British consumers’ energy bills. In these trials, the average impact is 
positive – a saving of between £21 and £31 per year – with some consumers 
saving nearly £400 a year. On the other hand, in both trials a sizeable proportion 
were made financially worse off – 40% in Sidebotham (2014) and 25% in 
Carmichael et al. (2014), with some financially worse off by up to £190.  
 
 
                                            
22 LCNF, CLNR and the EDRP trial. 
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Table 7. Bill savings from switching to a TOU tariff. 
 



















56% $89 $80 $396 $274 
Schare et al. 
(2015) 
- $60 - - - 
Star et al. 
(2010) 
- $305 - - 6.3% of total 
bill relative to 
flat rate 
Carmichael 
et al. (2014) 
75% £21  £148 £40 
Sidebotham, 
(2014) 
60% £31 £25 £376 £191 
 
Notes: Column 1 presents the proportion of people who saved money on the tariffs and columns 
2-5 the average saving, average loss, maximum saving and maximum loss respectively relative 
to the customers’ previous tariff. The hyphens indicate missing data.  
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3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Overall demand for TOU tariffs 
Median uptake to a TOU tariff across 66 individual measures of uptake and 27 
unique studies is 27%. However, the variation in uptake is huge with a range in 
uptake measures of 0%-96%. The results in Table 6 suggests this is most likely 
to be driven by variation in the way in which uptake is measured in studies as 
well as whether people were recruited to the tariff by default or via opt-in 
enrolment. Notably, the majority of the data in this review, particularly data from 
GB, represents stated willingness to switch to a TOU tariff obtained from 
participants in surveys and median uptake in surveys is five times higher than 
uptake to commercially available tariffs.  
Therefore, demand for TOU tariffs is best expressed as a range, based on the 
minimum and maximum mean recorded uptake and expressed for opt-in and opt-
out enrolment separately. Based on the evidence, if opt-out enrolment is used, 
uptake is most likely to exceed 57% but with an uncertain upper limit of enrolment 
approaching 100%. If consumers are left to opt-in, uptake to TOU tariffs is most 
likely to fall between 1% (the lower bound estimate for mean uptake to 
commercially available tariffs, most of which are offered in the US) and 43% (the 
upper bound estimate for mean willingness to switch obtained from surveys, most 
of which were run on nationally representative samples of British energy bill 
payers).  
However, since the upper bound estimate of 43% comes from surveys measuring 
how willing people are to adopt a TOU tariff, it is best interpreted as capturing the 
maximum potential national uptake of TOU tariffs if every consumer who is willing 
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to sign up to a TOU tariff at the time of the survey does indeed go on to sign up. 
Nevertheless, since it is well known that behavioural intentions are a relatively 
poor predictor of future behavioural action23, it also follows that a 40% adoption 
rate is unlikely to be achieved in reality unless substantial efforts are expended 
on encouraging switching. Consumer inertia is a major problem around the world 
with the majority of consumers having never left their home supplier since 
privatisation of retail electricity markets began over two decades ago (Defeuilley, 
2009).  
At the same time, I also acknowledge that it is not possible to conclude with 
certainty whether observed differences in uptake between countries are due to 
genuine inter-country differences in consumer demand for TOUs (i.e. that 
consumers in GB and Australia are more in favour of TOU tariffs than consumers 
in the US) or due to differences in measurement method. Differences in uptake 
measurement method also overlap almost exactly with differences in the types of 
populations sampled. Survey recruitment has mostly been nationally 
representative (BEIS, 2016a; Fell, 2016; M Nicolson et al., 2017) whereas 
participants solicited to take part in TOU trials are, in many cases, very different 
to the average energy bill payer24. Also, unlike for country, the model does not 
include separate controls for differences in recruited populations because, in 
most cases, non-nationally representative participant solicitation overlaps exactly 
                                            
23 Unfortunately empirical studies testing the relationship between intentions and behavioural 
action do not provide a clear picture of the strength of the correlation between these two variables 
(Morwitz et al., 2007). One meta-analysis finds that intentions explain 28% of the variation in 
behavioural action (Sheeran, 2002) whereas another reports frequency weighted average 
correlation between these two variables as 0.53, with a lower 95% confidence limit of 0.15 and 
an upper limit of 0.92 (Sheppard et al., 1988). 
24 For example, in cases where the overwhelming majority of people solicited to participate have 
central air conditioning (Neenan and Patton, 2015; Hartway et al., 1999) or in cases where 
recruitment to a TOU tariff was undertaken amongst a pool of people who had already consented 
to have a smart meter installed as part of their participation in an earlier wave of the project 
(Carmichael et al., 2014).  
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with measurement method itself. However, on balance, my judgement is that it is 
highly unlikely that all of the variation in uptake across surveys and commercially 
available tariffs is attributable to cross-country variation in demand for TOU tariffs 
and is more likely to be attributable to the fact that, for a variety of reasons, people 
are more likely to express an intention to switch to a TOU tariff than they are to 
switch to one in reality.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that there is therefore a strong risk that 
uptake to TOU tariffs in GB is more likely to fall closer to 1% than 43% unless 
effort is taken to encourage consumers to switch or enrolment is done on an opt-
out basis.  
3.4.2 Evidence on recruitment strategies to increase uptake to TOU tariffs 
As predicted, these results suggest that uptake could fall substantially below the 
U.K. Government's 30% target (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b). To get a sense for 
how tariff uptake might be increased I ran meta-regression analysis to help to 
obtain answers as to what methods could increase uptake. 
The studies provide strong evidence that opt-out enrolment increases uptake 
because out of the three trials which tested this approach, two of them did so 
using a randomised control trial design with very large sample sizes and robust 
designs (Potter et al., 2014; Lakeland Electric, 2015). The outlying 96% uptake 
in an opt-in study (Hartway et al., 1999) is for a US programme in which most 
customers had central air conditioning that the programme allowed them to put 
on a timer to help avoid the peak prices. The paper reporting these findings states 
that “the high sign-up rate is directly attributed to an intense marketing effort 
consisting of phone calls, face-to-face meetings and workshops (Hartway et al., 
1999, p.899). However, a number of other trials (Phillips et al., 2013; Bourne and 
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Watson, 2016; Carmichael et al., 2014) used similar recruitment methods and did 
not achieve these high enrolment rates so it is hard to explain why this 
programme was so successful and suggests it is best treated as an anomaly. 
Providing small upfront financial rewards (e.g. shopping vouchers [Whitaker et 
al., 2013]) is estimated to increase uptake by 22 percentage points in the meta-
regression. However I cannot confidently attribute the differences in uptake to this 
financial incentive rather than other differences between studies that do and do 
not use financial incentives. This is because none of the studies compare uptake 
to a tariff when a financial incentive is offered to the uptake in a control group that 
was not offered a financial incentive.  
The meta-regression revealed no statistically significant difference in uptake 
across studies in which the tariff was offered with bill protection or automation. 
However, there is not enough data to be highly confident that this means that bill 
protection and automation have no effect on uptake or whether too few studies 
offered these features to provide sufficient power to detect an effect or because 
the impact is being masked by other confounding variables given that very few 
studies manipulated these factors experimentally. This is likely to be because, as 
mentioned above, the focus on the literature so far has been on whether tariffs 
change people's consumption patterns rather than whether or why people would 
sign up to such a tariff of their own accord in the first place. Only further 
experimental studies would be able to determine whether bill protection and 
automation will increase uptake to TOU tariffs in the population.  
Determining the impact of the way tariffs are marketed and communicated to 
consumers is substantially harder to answer using existing data because nearly 
all studies, apart from one (M Nicolson et al., 2017), either tell people the tariff 
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will save them money (a money frame) or do not specify what frame was used at 
all. Two studies excluded from this review because it was not possible to 
standardise their uptake measures (Buryk et al., 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015) – 
in addition to the study which was included (M Nicolson et al., 2017) – found 
mixed results as to the impact of telling consumers about the environmental 
benefits of TOU tariffs on uptake. Since nearly all energy tariff marketing already 
frames switching tariff as a way of saving money, there is no evidence as to 
whether changing this approach could increase uptake to TOU tariffs, which, are 
likely to provide much lower savings than just switching to the cheapest available 
flat-rate tariff.  
3.4.3 The impact of tariff design  
The model provides strong evidence that real-time pricing tariffs, in which the 
price of electricity can vary freely throughout the day according to real-time supply 
and demand of electricity, are less popular amongst consumers than static TOU 
tariffs, in which the price bands apply for fixed periods each day or season. 
Dynamic TOU tariffs, in which the price of electricity varies, usually within fixed 
parameters, freely throughout the day and capacity pricing tariffs are less popular 
than static TOU tariffs.  
3.4.4 Energy bill impacts 
Due to the high level of non-reporting of energy bill savings, the bill savings 
presented in Table 7 cannot be reliably used as a measure of average potential 
savings however they do illustrate that savings are likely to vary substantially.  
The finding that the majority of domestic consumers save money (in this review 
between 56%-75%), with a sizeable remainder of consumers worse off on a TOU 
tariff than a flat-rate tariff, is discussed elsewhere (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2014) 
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and is corroborated by another literature review on the impact of TOU tariffs on 
electricity consumption patterns (Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 
2012). It highlights that a key challenge faced by this area of research is how to 
devise recruitment strategies that increase uptake to TOU tariffs whilst respecting 
this very relevant heterogeneity in bill impacts.  
4 Conclusions 
This review outlined the vision the Government has for an increasingly flexible 
energy system in which domestic consumers have an important part to play. It 
contrasted this vision with the reality of domestic consumer engagement in the 
energy market. It then synthesised a range of evidence on domestic consumer 
demand for TOU tariffs from over 27 studies, incorporating 66 individual 
measures of uptake to various TOU tariffs in different countries, using different 
recruitment methods and measured in different ways.  
The aim was to identify the likely uptake of TOU tariffs amongst domestic energy 
consumers and what factors might influence uptake, to inform the research 
questions and focus of this thesis.  Four main conclusions are drawn from this 
literature review as a whole. 
4.1 Evidence on domestic demand for TOU tariffs is  imprecise 
and unreliable 
The available evidence suggests that, if GB consumers are left to opt-in to TOU 
rates, uptake could be as low as 1% or could reach 43%. On the other hand, it is 
also possible that opt-in uptake could exceed 43% if new recruitment approaches 
are tested since, after all, the interval of 1%-43% is based on the existing 
literature which has only tested a limited number of ways of increasing opt-in 
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uptake, namely small upfront cash payments and bill protection. Making 
enrolment opt-out rather than opt-in could generate uptake rates of almost 100%.  
Although there are limitations to the estimate of uptake to TOU tariffs obtained 
through this review (it does not account for variations in uptake over time and it 
is based on evidence from multiple countries not just GB), given that the highest 
estimated enrolment rates were obtained from survey studies which may be 
vulnerable to hypothetical bias, the results suggest that there is a high risk that 
the proportion of consumers who choose to switch from a flat-rate tariff to a TOU 
tariff is likely to be lower than the 30% required by the UK Government to realise 
the business case for smart meters (BEIS, 2016b).  
4.2 Lack of evidence on how to increase uptake to TOU tariffs, 
except for opt-out enrolment 
There is very little evidence as to how uptake to TOU tariffs could be increased 
aside from using opt-out enrolment, which may or may not be appropriate in the 
case of TOU tariffs. Small upfront financial incentives, bill protection and 
automation all show promise but the relationship could be spurious.  
There is even less evidence on how these tariffs should be framed to consumers. 
The majority of studies promote TOU tariffs as a way of consumers saving 
money, even though monetary savings from switching to a TOU tariff are modest 
and likely to be overshadowed by the savings from switching to the cheapest 
available flat-rate tariff. About 20% of studies do not indicate what messaging 
was given to consumers at all. The lack of evidence on how best to frame tariffs 
to increase uptake is therefore a particular oversight because, as the next chapter 
will demonstrate, unlike opt-out enrolment and potentially even bill protection, 
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framing is likely to be more a more suitable method of attempting to increase 
enrolment to TOU tariffs.  
4.3 A lack of real-world evidence on GB energy bill payers 
In GB, the evidence on consumer demand for TOU tariffs comes from two 
industry field trials (Schofield et al., 2014; Sidebotham, 2014a), three survey 
experiments (Michael J. Fell et al., 2015; BEIS, 2016a; M Nicolson et al., 2017) 
and a measure of market uptake to the Economy 7 tariff (Consumer Focus, 2012). 
Just four studies experimentally manipulated the framing of the tariff and all were 
survey based (Verhagen et al., 2012; Schwartz et al., 2015; Buryk et al., 2015; M 
Nicolson et al., 2017). Purchase intentions are imperfect predictors of sales 
(Morwitz et al., 2007) and, with the exception of one (M Nicolson et al., 2017), the 
studies did not sample from populations of interest to distribution network 
operators, policymakers or DSR companies, being confined to Dutch university 
students (Verhagen et al., 2012), participants of online labour markets in the US 
(Schwartz et al., 2015) and a convenience sample recruited via social media and 
email (Buryk et al., 2015).  
To enable robust causal inferences, any future research seeking to test the 
impact of framing on uptake must involve the random assignment of participants 
to variations of the same tariff to test which variation results in higher switching 
rates. More evidence is required which is GB specific and would measure uptake 
by offering GB consumers a tariff and seeing how many adopt it rather than 
measuring willingness to switch amongst market research participants presented 
in surveys, which may overstate demand because the scenarios are hypothetical. 
However, obtaining a measure of uptake based on actual sign up rates is likely 
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to be challenging given that smart TOU tariffs are not yet commercially available 
anywhere in GB.  
4.4 A lack of evidence beyond the average energy consumer 
A final limitation of the evidence base is that it lacks nuance over the extent to 
which uptake may vary across consumer groups in the population. The academic 
and policy literature reviewed focuses predominantly on the so-called ‘average’ 
energy consumer who owns ‘flexible’ electrical loads such as dishwashers, 
tumble dryers and washing machines (‘wet’ goods), which, unlike cooking and 
lighting, are easier to defer to alternative times of the day but which presently 
have a much wider ownership than the much higher consuming flexible electrical 
loads such as EVs and heat pumps (when combined with automation and/or 
storage). The UK smart meter impact assessment, for example, is based on 
consumers with wet goods participating in DSR (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b) on 
the assumption that heat pumps and EV loads will become important at a later 
date, once these appliances reach a higher market penetration.  
However, focusing on the current ‘average’ energy consumer (as someone 
whose flexible appliances consist of ‘wet’ goods) is inadvisable for three reasons. 
First, whilst shifting individually small but collectively large loads from wet goods 
may have a large impact on the electricity network, the savings for each 
household from using their washing machine at 10pm, for example, rather than 
8pm are relatively modest and, for a large proportion of consumers, are likely to 
be outweighed by the increase in electricity costs due to the other loads that the 
consumer cannot readily shift, such as those for cooking or television (this is 
discussed in more detail in the next section). Selling tariffs to these consumers 
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may be less effective at reducing energy bills than targeting consumers with high 
flexible electrical loads.   
Second, government subsidies for electric vehicles and low carbon heating 
technologies such as heat pumps have been associated with a recent and very 
rapid increase in ownership, meaning that the average energy consumer of today 
may be very different from the average consumer in the relatively near future. 
The uptake of electric vehicles, in particular, is growing almost exponentially 
(SMMT, 2017c) meaning that early planning will be required to help cope with this 
sudden increase in demand, particularly given that uptake is concentrated in 
particular regions and therefore on particular local electricity networks.25  
Third, for reasons outlined in more detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, early 
intervention to convert electric vehicle and heat pump owners onto time varying 
tariffs could be crucial for overall adoption rates if consumers are more 
susceptible to behaviour change campaigns at the point when they first adopt 
their new technology.  
This marks the end of the second chapter. The next chapter provides an overview 
of the major theories of individual decision making that could be used to create 
testable hypotheses about how uptake to TOU tariffs could be increased without 
using mandates and which therefore respect consumer heterogeneity. 
                                            
25 This is based on the authors’ own mapping of EV purchases in the UK obtained from the UK 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles, which administers the UK EV grant. It is not possible to 
reproduce this map in the thesis because it could risk identifying individual EV owners.  
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1 Introduction  
The last chapter reviewed the empirical evidence on domestic consumer demand 
for TOU tariffs. It concluded that uptake to TOU tariffs could be far lower than 
required to realise the business case for smart meters (BEIS, 2016b) and the 
vision of a smarter energy system laid out in both government and industry 
strategy documents (BEIS, 2016b; Ofgem, 2017; Institute of Engineering and 
Technology, 2017; UKPN, 2017).  
This chapter outlines two major theories of decision making that can explain the 
lack of consumer engagement in the retail energy market in GB, its likelihood of 
affecting uptake of TOU tariffs and what could be done to increase uptake to help 
realise the vision. One of these theories is classical economics, the leading theory 
used to explain consumer decision making under uncertainty (Barberis, 2013). 
Classical economics offers two explanations and solutions for low switching 
rates. The first is that the costs of switching are higher than the benefits, which 
can be solved by increasing the savings or lowering the costs of switching. The 
second is imperfect information about the benefits of switching, which can be 
solved by increasing access to information.  
The other theory is behavioural economics, a sub-field of economics which fuses 
economics with psychology (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). Behavioural 
economics is one of the leading alternative theories used to explain sub-optimal 
decision making (Barberis, 2013). Behavioural economics implies that 
information and monetary savings on their own are unlikely to be sufficient to 
ensure optimal uptake of TOU tariffs but that another strategy, known as 
‘nudging’, could be significantly more effective.  
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 justifies the focus on 
classical and behavioural economics. Section 3 provides a brief summary of 
classical economics, concentrating on hassle costs as an explanation for low tariff 
switching rates. Section 4 outlines the major limitations of classical economics, 
namely that many of the model assumptions often fail to hold in reality. This 
section is sub-divided according to which assumptions are expected to be 
violated: the assumptions of the rules governing the market (the market failure 
explanation for low switching rates) and the assumption that humans are fully 
rational decision makers. This section lays out a range of evidence suggesting 
that consumer decision making often fails to meet the standards of a fully rational 
consumer and therefore that behaviour can be influenced by a much wider range 
of tools than incentives. 
Section 5 outlines behavioural economics and nudge, theories which have shown 
how violations of the assumptions of rationality can be exploited to change 
behaviour. Section 6 outlines the limitations of anti-rationality arguments and the 
potential problems of generalising nudge to the energy domain and using opt-out 
enrolment to boost uptake to TOU tariffs. Section 7 proposes that many of these 
problems are caused by consumer and treatment effect heterogeneity. Section 8 
suggests how this heterogeneity could be exploited to help increase uptake to 
TOU tariffs amongst EV and heat pump owners whilst reducing uptake amongst 
consumers groups who could be made financially worse off from switching to a 
TOU tariff, to answer research question 2; this section also draws on a number 
of findings from the nudge and behavioural science literature including message 
framing, prompts and habit discontinuity. Section 9 summarises the chapter and 
concludes by re-stating the research questions outlined in the introduction now 
that they can be linked to the two theoretical frameworks that informed them. 
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2 Why use economics and behavioural economics? 
2.1 Accounting for price effects 
Although any individual theory of consumer decision-making is likely to be wrong, 
some models will be more useful for explaining decision making over energy 
tariffs than others (Box, 1976). Economics is an obvious model to start with 
because models which can account for the actual or potential role that incentives 
play in consumer decision making over energy tariffs is likely to be more suitable 
than models which cannot. This is for two reasons.  
First, although there is ample evidence from psychology, as well as other social 
science disciplines, to suggest that people are not as responsive to price as a 
classical economic model would suggest (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006; Agarwal 
et al., 2015; Dupas and Robinson, 2015) there is no denying that people do 
respond to financial and non-financial incentives in predictable ways (Dellavigna 
et al., 2017); if a good is taxed, people consume less of it, if it is subsidised people 
consume more of it. People are also price sensitive to the cost of energy, as 
demonstrated in numerous TOU tariff trials (Frontier Economics and 
Sustainability First, 2012).  
Second, whilst price may be only a minor and therefore expendable variable in 
some contexts, it is an important variable in the case of energy tariffs; if TOU 
tariffs are going to play a role in maintaining energy affordability in the transition 
away from fossil fuels, then price needs to play a role in consumer decision 
making over tariffs.  
2.2 Accounting for psychological influences on behaviour  
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However, since incentives are not the only drivers of behaviour, including these 
additional psychological and contextual factors may provide a better, and 
potentially more useful, approximation of how consumers make decisions about 
energy tariffs than the classical economic lens alone. Behavioural economics 
integrates findings from psychology into a standard economic framework, thereby 
giving it explanatory power for the effect of price on behaviour as well as other 
contextual factors such as marketing, or what academics call ‘message-framing’ 
(Zhao and Pechmann, 2006; Chong, 2007; Spence and Pidgeon, 2010; 
Gallagher and Updegraff, 2012).  
2.3 Distinguishing between behavioural economics and 
psychology  
Psychology can also explain price effects. For instance, in the Means-Motive-
Opportunity framework (Raw and Ross, 2011), money could be either a motive 
or an opportunity. The key difference between behavioural economics and 
psychology is not in the theory26 or in its empirical predictions – which are often 
indistinguishable – but in the way behavioural economists and psychologists 
approach research. For the behavioural economist, the burden of proof is on 
behavioural economics to show that the classical economic model fails to provide 
a sufficiently good approximation of real-world behaviour so as not to be useful, 
and therefore tends to use the classical model as the benchmark against which 
its interventions are judged.  
For instance, most behavioural economics studies will include a control group 
that receives a financial incentive (e.g. Halpern et al., 2012; Giné et al., 2010) or 
                                            
26 Although there are theoretical distinctions, they rarely have a major impact on the empirical 
predictions or the hypotheses formed by behavioural economists and psychologists. 
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will run additional robustness checks to demonstrate why the behaviour observed 
is inconsistent with the classical model, even after accounting for Friedman’s 
(1953) “as if” defence of the rationality paradigm (e.g. Camerer et al., 1997; Della 
Vigna and Malmendier, 2006). Psychologists, on the other hand, are more likely 
to start from the assumption that behaviour is not approximately rational and 
proceed by applying different models such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Azjen, 1985) or the Means-Motive-Opportunity model.  
This thesis follows the convention of behavioural economics by using classical 
economics as a benchmark against which the behavioural economic model is 
tested. This is for three reasons: (1) the UK Government, like many others, use 
classical economic models to conduct their cost-benefit analyses and to inform 
all their policy decisions, including over the roll out of smart meters and its wider 
benefits (BEIS, 2016b), of which DSR is one key secondary benefit; testing the 
validity of such a widely used model, and to what extent it applies to GB energy 
bill payers, is therefore important; (2) As will become clearer in Section 4.4, it is 
still not known whether classical economics could not be used to explain, and 
therefore solve, the lack of consumer engagement in the energy market (Deller 
et al., 2017); (3) Classical economics is a simple model – that is its main virtue – 
which makes clear predictions about what should be observed if the assumptions 
are true. It therefore lends itself well to being a benchmark.  
Nevertheless, since the impact of marketing or message-framing is just as easily 
explained by psychology as behavioural economics, I will use the broader term 
‘behavioural science’ interchangeably with behavioural economics as in the more 
recent literature on nudge (Cialdini et al., 2015; Benartzi et al., 2017).  
2.4 Focusing on the individual  
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The review is confined to theories of individual decision making because the 
decision to switch tariff is undertaken by one or two household energy bill payers. 
In doing so, this thesis will not capture some of the potentially important wider 
cultural and social factors which may influence participation in DSR. These are 
discussed in the global discussion of this thesis. 
3 A brief history of classical economics  
Sometime after the 1600s, up until the Industrial Revolution, resources in most 
countries went from being distributed according to the whims of its kings or 
queens to a new system underpinned by a belief that the market would 
dispassionately, and therefore efficiently, allocate resources on the people’s 
behalf.27 This latter belief is the cornerstone of the classical theory of economics.  
According to economic theory, under certain assumptions ( 
Table 8), individuals acting to fulfil their private interests will ensure an outcome 
that is not only best for themselves but also one which is best for society as a 
whole, as if by an “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776). An outcome which is ‘best for 
society as a whole’ is one in which “no one can be made better off without 
someone being made worse off” (Stiglitz, 2000, p.57). This is the definition of 
market efficiency.28  
Market efficiency is achieved, according to the theory, by rational individuals each 
undertaking private cost-benefit analyses in which they weigh up the costs and 
benefits of a range of possible options to identify and select the one that will 
                                            
27 Of course, markets in the sense of people trading goods between one another began long 
before the creation of the market economy as we know it today. However it is the modern market 
economy that is relevant for understanding behaviour in the retail electricity market today. 
28 It is known as Pareto efficiency or the Pareto principle.  
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maximise their overall expected utility, which is the satisfaction they expect to 
gain from each good or service. This is called expected utility theory (EUT).  
Table 8 Four key assumptions underpinning the classical economic model 
   
# Assumption Brief description  
1 Full rationality  
 
Agents maximise their utility against a fixed budget constraint. 
Although there is disagreement about how rationality should 
be defined, most agree that it is composed of the following 
characteristics: (1) “people have well-defined preferences (or 
goals) and make decisions to maximise those preferences” (2) 
“those preferences accurately reflect (to the best of the 
person’s knowledge) the true costs and benefits of available 
options” (3) “in situations involving 
uncertainty…people…update probabilistic assessments in 
light of new information” (Camerer et al., 2003, p.1215); (4) 
people make choices to maximise those preferences against 
a budget constraint (Stiglitz, 2000); (5) people have 
“unbounded computational capacity” to weigh up the costs and 
benefits of the available options to determine the optimal 
outcome (Allcott, 2011, p.98) and; (6) people only have 
preferences over certain types of attributes, for example, price 
and customer service but not attributes like the type of font or 
colour used in the marketing of the product.  
2 Perfect 
information 
All the information required to undertake the individual cost-
benefit analysis required to maximise utility is available to 
consumers. For electricity tariffs this is electricity consumption 




There are a sufficient number of buyers and sellers in the 
market that no individual seller or buyer has an influence on 
price. No monopolies. 
4 No externalities The true costs of consumption are reflected in the market price 
so that the private costs and benefits are equal to the social 
costs and benefits to avoid collective action problems. Ofgem 
is reforming electricity settlement rules so that suppliers are 
exposed to the true variation in the cost of supplying electricity 
to domestic consumers across the day. 
   
Note: This list is not intended be exhaustive.  
EUT is the dominant theory used to explain how people make decisions under 
uncertainty (Barberis, 2013) and it can be applied to explain how consumers 
make decisions about their energy tariff. When choosing between electricity 
tariffs, the outcomes of our decisions are uncertain because we have to predict 
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our future electricity demand as well as the future price of electricity. Since we 
may not predict these values with full accuracy, the expected utility framework 
models each energy bill payer as an agent who will weigh up the expected 
benefits of switching (e.g. lower bills, a fixed rate tariff, or anything else they 
value) against the expected costs (e.g. the time taken to monitor prices, 
undertake the switch), based on the best available information about our future 
electricity demand and prices.  
According to EUT, consumers will switch between flat-rate tariffs or switch from 
a flat-rate to a TOU tariff if and only if it will maximise their overall utility. By 
behaving in this way, each consumer plays their part in ensuring that retail energy 
prices will reflect wholesale energy costs. If this model is correct, consumers will 
ensure that uptake to TOU tariffs or other DSR services is optimal. Optimal 
uptake of TOU tariffs by domestic consumers can be defined as the level of 
uptake required to balance the supply and demand of electricity, after accounting 
for alternative and complementary methods such as energy storage, 
interconnectors and so on.  
However, there are good reasons to believe that this model is incomplete. First, 
there is a substantial gap between the retail and wholesale price of electricity and 
gas (CMA, 2016b, 2016c), suggesting that the collective decisions of consumers 
are not leading to outcomes that are in the best interest of consumers as a whole. 
Based on their recent investigation of retail competition in the GB energy market, 
the Competitions and Markets Authority (CMA) concluded that suppliers have 
overcharged consumers to the value of over £2 billion a year (CMA, 2016c). 
Prices on the standard variable tariff (SVT) – the default tariff on which 70% of 
the customers of the Six Large Energy Firms are enrolled – are significantly 
higher than the wholesale cost of electricity and gas (CMA, 2016c).  
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What explains this disengagement in the energy market and what does it have to 
say for uptake to TOU tariffs? The next section considers two main explanations, 
market failures and violations of rationality. 
4 Consumer disengagement: market failures vs 
violations of rationality  
4.1 Market failures – imperfect information  
Economists have long maintained that assumptions 2-4 outlined in Table 8 are 
ideals which never hold in reality (Friedman, 1953). Whenever any one or more 
of these conditions is not met, economists say there is a market failure (Stiglitz, 
2000). According to the market failure argument, if people only knew how much 
they could save from switching tariff then they would switch. Consequently, the 
first-best solution – according to the theory – for ensuring the optimal number of 
consumers sign up to TOU tariffs is to make sure people know how much they 
could save from switching to one. This requires two main ingredients: smart 
meters for accurate billing and price comparison websites, which lower the costs 
of comparing tariffs to calculate savings.  
Price comparison websites enable consumers to enter their postcode, provide 
details of their gas and electricity consumption (or, if unknown, an average value 
provided by the site) to obtain a list of energy tariffs sorted in descending order 
of the expected annual bill. Consumers can switch through the website so that 
they do not have to do any more than just wait for their direct debits to be switched 
over (and, without a smart meter, provide an initial meter reading). To work for 
TOU tariffs, price comparison websites would need access to energy bill payers’ 
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half-hourly electricity consumption data, or for real-time TOU tariffs sub half-
hourly data, recorded by smart meters.  
When market-based corrections fail, according to this model, more coercive 
Government interventions such as mandates, bans and subsidies may increase 
welfare (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). However, in this case, forcing consumers 
to switch to TOU tariffs, as will occur in Ireland (Commission for Energy 
Regulation, 2014), is likely to be highly unpopular and could lead consumers to 
reject the installation of their smart meter to avoid being switched to a TOU tariff.29  
However, there are at least two reasons to doubt whether smart meters and price 
comparisons will be sufficient to ensure optimal uptake to TOU tariffs. These are 
now outlined below. 
4.2 Market failures – adverse selection  
EUT predicts that price comparisons generated using accurate data on historical 
consumption patterns (in the absence of accurate projections of future patterns) 
would decrease switching rates to TOU tariffs, particularly amongst two of the 
most desirable candidates for TOU tariffs, namely EV and heat pump owners by 
exacerbating adverse selection, or the so-called ‘free-rider’ problem.  
Some consumers will have consumption patterns that mean they would save 
money on a static TOU tariff without making any changes to the timing of their 
electricity use (Baladi et al., 1998; Herter, 2007; Train et al., 2016; Qiu et al., 
2017). Others will face higher costs to switching to a TOU tariff. For example, 
most EV owners charge their vehicles when they get home from work, during the 
                                            
29 This is not farfetched when you consider that, in the Netherlands, a popular backlash against 
smart meters resulted in the Dutch Government reversing its decision to make smart meters 
mandatory (Metering.com, 2009).  
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existing evening peak (Zarnikau et al., 2015; My Electric Avenue, 2015; Capova 
et al., 2015), and households with heat pumps tend to run their heating systems 
all day and do not already own storage (Energy Saving Trust, 2013; Summerfield 
et al., 2016).  
According to EUT, which predicts that decisions are made based on a rational 
evaluation of costs and benefits, TOU tariffs will attract a disproportionate number 
of those who already have low peak time electricity consumption, thus defeating 
the purpose of TOU tariffs which is to change peoples’ consumption patterns 
(Baladi et al., 1998; Herter, 2007; Train et al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2017). This is 
called averse selection, and it was such a concern in the early days of TOU tariffs 
in the US, that nearly all US TOU tariffs were and still are deliberately designed 
to assess whether the consumption patterns of volunteers are different from those 
of non-volunteers by mandating TOUs for some and giving a choice to others 
(e.g. Baladi et al., 1998).  
Providing consumers with a comparison of what they would pay on a TOU tariff 
compared to a flat-rate tariff based on their historical half-hourly consumption 
data would simply show consumers who have ‘peaky’ demand profiles that 
switching to a TOU tariff would increase their energy bill whilst making it clear to 
those with favourable consumption profiles that they could save money on a TOU 
tariff by default.  
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4.3 Violations of rationality – describing real-world consumer 
behaviour  
Economics is a “dismal” science because it assumes man to be selfish 
and money-grubbing “a lighting calculator of pleasures and pains”…it 
rests on an outmoded psychology and must be reconstructed in line 
with each new development in psychology…(Friedman, 1953, pp.164–
165). 
 
Market failures like adverse selection are one explanation for why information 
provision could fail to achieve the optimal level of uptake to TOU tariffs. Another 
is that, even when the market assumptions are met, outcomes will never be 
optimal if the people who participate in the market do not behave like the model 
predicts.  
Empirical studies from cognitive and social psychology, sociology and 
neuroscience have, for over half a decade – as Milton Friedman’s quote above 
attests – produced a range of evidence to suggest that real-world consumer 
decision making systematically violates many of the other assumptions implicit in 
the classical economic model’s conception of how humans make decisions. 
These are summarised in Table 9. For instance, people are not just affected by 
the costs and benefits of different options, they are also affected by the way in 
which these costs and benefits are communicated to them (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981) and their ability to process information, or what Herbert Simon 
(1957) called bounded rationality.  
Simon rejected the idea proposed by psychologists such as Freud who reduced 
all decision making to the product of a conflict between conscious and 
unconscious forces, but was also sceptical of the economist’s model of a human 
as an omniscient information processing machine; instead, Simon proposed that 
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the real-world behaviour of people lay somewhere in the middle (Parsons, 1995). 
According to Simon, people are “generally quite rational” in the sense that “they 
usually have reasons for what they do” (Simon, 1985, p.297). However, people 
are limited in their computational power and, the amount of information that any 
person must process and consider when deciding between alternative tariffs, 
pensions, health insurance plans and so on, is so great that “even an 
approximation” to full rationality “is hard to conceive” (Simon, 1957, p.79).  
Another important determinant on behaviour is which option is the default, as 
shown by the differences in enrolment rates across opt-in and opt-out systems 
for organ donor registration (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). The tendency people 
have to stick with the pre-selected option is called inertia or, more formally, status-
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1991).  
Table 9 Some of the factors found to affect human decision making outside of the 
classical economics literature. 
 
Factor Brief definition  




Used to explain the limits on human information processing 
capacity (Simon, 1957). 
Inattention/limited 
attention 
People do not pay full attention to all information available or 
presented to them when making decisions (Loewenstein et al., 
2013). 
Framing effects Used to explain the impact of marketing. People change their 
preferences depending on arbitrary features of the decision 
making environment or the way in which the choices are 
described, for example whether the outcomes of a choice are 
framed in terms of the losses or gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981), which choice is presented as the default option (Carroll et 
al., 2009) and the name or label given to a choice (Beatty et al., 
2014).  
Loss-aversion People weight losses higher than equivalent gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992), which 




Refers to the finding that people cooperate rather than betray 
other players in economic games such as the Dictator Game 
(Andreoni, 1995), even though doing so results in lower earnings. 
   
 
Chapter 3: Literature review – part 2  123 
Priming The finding that we are often influenced by subconscious cues 
(Bargh et al., 1996). 
Status-quo bias The preference for the current state of affairs (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1991), used to explain 
‘stickiness’ in consumer markets such as mortgages, banks and 
energy tariffs. 
Social norms The way in which individual behaviour is influenced by other 
peoples’ behaviour, including how much energy we use (Slemrod 
and Allcott, 2011; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2013; Schultz et al., 2015). 
Time inconsistent 
preferences 
Refers to the finding that people will change their preference 
depending on whether the choice is present-framed or future-
framed (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). Used to explain 
behaviours which require willpower such as personal savings, 




5 Behavioural economics, nudge and the environment – 
changing behaviour 
A number of researchers, including environmental researchers, have drawn three 
key lessons from the difference in uptake across opt-in versus opt-out organ 
registration enrolment systems and the wider evidence from behavioural science.  
5.1 Lesson #1 People are not rational 
The first lesson that has been drawn is that decision making is not fully rational. 
If people made decisions purely based on the costs and benefits of alternative 
outcomes – a defining characteristic of a fully rational consumer – then contextual 
factors that have no effect on a decision makers’ incentives, such as the default 
option or the order in which choices are presented, would have no impact on their 
choice at all. The fact that consumers do respond to the way choices are framed 
means decision making cannot be fully rational.  
A growing body of academics have argued that this means that classical 
economics should be reformed and its assumptions replaced by more ‘realistic’ 
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ones based on empirical research from other social sciences, particularly 
psychology which has a large literature on framing effects. Inspired, in particular, 
by the early work of two psychologists (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991, 1992) and the political scientist Herbert Simon (1957), 
some economists have begun modifying economic theory based on the findings 
reported in Table 9. The output of this collective body of work is referred to as 
behavioural economics or, sometimes more broadly as behavioural science.30 As 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, I use the two terms interchangeably.  
Although there is no agreed-upon definition of behavioural economics, the 
various available descriptions of the field (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000; Shiller, 
2005; Shogren and Taylor, 2008; Lunn, 2013, 2015; Baddeley, 2017) can be 
combined to produce the following definition:  
Behavioural economics integrates findings from social 
science disciplines, other than economics but particularly 
psychology, into a standard economic framework, whereby 
each modification is included depending on whether 
empirical tests demonstrate that it is relevant to the 
behaviour in question.  
In short, what this means is that behavioural economics adds variables from 
psychology and other social sciences to the standard cost-benefit analysis if 
empirical evidence suggests that these variables are relevant to the behaviour of 
interest. 
5.2 Lesson #2 Out with the old and in with the ‘nudge’  
                                            
30 Not all researchers in the field agree with the term ‘behavioural economics’. For instance, the 
evolutionary economist Jason Collins (2015) said in a recent talk “I am going to refer to 
‘behavioural economics’ today, even though what I am going to talk about is more rightfully called 
‘behavioural science’” because the latter term does a disservice to the field of psychology from 
which behavioural economics has drawn so much. Recent journal articles on nudge have also 
started referring to ‘behavioural science’ rather than ‘behavioural economics’ (e.g. Benartzi et al., 
2017) and, in the United States, the team tasked with designing interventions informed by nudge 
is called the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, whilst President Obama (2015) issued an 
Executive Order directing government agencies to use ‘behavioural science’ in the design of their 
programmes. 
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Further, these scholars argue that governments should use these findings to help 
promote policy outcomes, including those on the environment. For example, 
whilst a classical economic model would assume that smoking reflects an 
inherent privileging of short term pleasures over the long term health benefits of 
not smoking, a behavioural economic model could account for the possibility that 
smokers may indeed value their long term health over the immediate pleasures 
of smoking a cigarette but that they may lack the self-control required to abstain 
at the precise moment they experience a craving (Giné et al., 2010). Motivated 
by this potential alternative explanation for seemingly sub-optimal decision 
making, health and household finance researchers have run a range of studies 
demonstrating that the “same errors that trip people up can also be used to help 
them” (Loewenstein et al., 2012, p.1), for example: 
…present bias can be used to advantage through programmes 
that offer small, frequent (and hence immediate) payments for 
beneficial behaviours. Such programmes targeted at smoking 
cessation, medication adherence, and weight loss have been 
shown to have major effects on behaviour. One recent study… 
incorporated a number of behaviourally informed features, most 
notably, frequent, mounting payments for documented [smoking] 
abstinence. The programme significantly increased smoking 
cessation rates at the end of pregnancy (41% v 10%) and the 
benefit was still evident 12 weeks postpartum (24% v 3%). 
 
Two seminal journal articles first promoting this idea were Regulation for 
Conservatives (Camerer et al., 2003) and Libertarian Paternalism (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003), however the concept of using behavioural economics to change 
behaviour did not gain substantial traction amongst policymakers until this 
approach to behaviour change was rebranded as ‘nudge’ by Thaler and Sunstein 
in 2008. In this book, Thaler and Sunstein defined a nudge as a strategy which 
changes: 
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…people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, [an] intervention 
must be easy and cheap to avoid (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008, p.6).  
 
Since the publication of Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth and 
happiness (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), governments are increasingly using 
‘insights’ from behavioural science more broadly to supplement or replace 
traditional economic levers such as taxes and fines to influence citizens’ 
behaviour to achieve public priorities (Benartzi et al., 2017). Whole units have 
been created within government dedicated to applying this research to 
policymaking, starting with the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team in 2010 followed 
by similar teams in the Netherlands, Australia, Germany, Singapore and the 
Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in the United States, where President 
Obama (2015) issued an Executive Order directing government agencies to use 
behavioural science in the design of their programmes. Now almost every UK 
Government department has dedicated ‘behavioural insights’ functions that test 
ways in which behavioural science could be used to inform policies. This includes 
the Department for Health, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customers, Ofgem, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, BEIS and many more. 
There are two key virtues of nudge from a policymaker’s perspective. The first is 
that they permit freedom of choice so can be easier to implement than taxes and 
mandates which may have limited public support. The second advantage is that 
nudges, when effective, achieve impact at very low cost. Nudges therefore 
provide a high ‘bang for their buck’ (Benartzi et al., 2017) relative to conventional 
policy tools such as financial incentives like the UK Government’s Feed-in-Tariff 
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or the Ultra-Low Emission Vehicle grant which deducts up to £5,000 from the 
value of eligible electric vehicles.  
Unsurprisingly, support is therefore also growing behind the idea of using 
behaviourally informed interventions to help achieve environmental outcomes 
and low cost too. The European Commission published a set of guidelines for 
designing interventions to change energy behaviour (Dahlbom et al., 2009) all of 
which are non-coercive and do not rely on financial incentives, thereby fitting the 
definition of nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The policy interest in nudge and 
behavioural interventions is also mirrored in the academic environmental 
literature with a range of review articles having discussed the potential application 
of behavioural economics to helping meet carbon emission targets (Shogren and 
Taylor, 2008; Hepburn et al., 2010; Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 2011; Sunstein, 
2013a; Sunstein and Reisch, 2013; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Frederiks et 
al., 2015; Hobman et al., 2016; Lehner et al., 2016). 
5.3 Lesson #3 Green by default 
The last lesson is that opt-out enrolment results in extremely high participation 
whereas opt-in enrolment keeps participation very low. It has therefore been 
argued that the default option should be chosen to maximise the environmental 
benefits (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Sunstein and Reisch, 2013; Faruqui 
et al., 2014; S. Fenrick et al., 2014; Broman Toft et al., 2014; Ebeling and Lotz, 
2015; Egebark and Ekström, 2016).  
A range of studies have shown that automatically enrolling people onto renewable 
energy tariffs, unless they opt-out, substantially increases uptake to renewable 
energy tariffs compared to when enrolment is opt-in (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 
2008; Hedlin and Sunstein, 2015; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015). The same finding has 
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also been replicated in two US field experiments in which people were defaulted 
onto TOU tariffs (US Department of Energy, 2016), with industry papers arguing 
that people could also be ‘smart by default’ (Faruqui et al., 2014). Finally, a recent 
field experiment showed that, when printers are set to double-sided printing by 
default, paper usage is substantially lower than if people are expected to select 
double-sided printing each time they print a document (Egebark and Ekström, 
2016). 
5.4 Summarising the evidence on nudge 
In summary, behavioural economics and nudge have developed a relatively large 
body of evidence to suggest that behaviour is much more complex than the 
classical economic model proposes. It also provides conclusive evidence that 
behaviour is significantly different under opt-in compared to opt-out enrolment 
systems (DellaVigna, 2009) and that behaviour can be influenced by a much 
wider range of factors than just financial incentives alone (Benartzi et al., 2017; 
Dellavigna et al., 2017).  
However, as alluded to in the introduction and a House of Lords Select 
Committee Report (2011), we should be very cautious before assuming that all 
potentially undesirable behaviour – in this case low tariff switching rates – can be 
explained by behavioural biases or boundedly rational behaviour that nudges can 
solve. The problem with each of the lessons outlined above is that they are overly 
simplistic.  
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6 The limitations of anti-rationality arguments and the 
narrow evidence base of nudge 
6.1 The exception does not break the rule: how do we know 
people are not approximately fully rational?  
The literature from psychology and other social sciences suggests the 
importance of re-evaluating economic models that assume unbounded 
computational capacity, fixed preferences and choices made based on a desire 
to maximise expected utility (Allcott, 2011). However, it is difficult to prove using 
observational data alone that a particular choice does or does not deviate from 
rationality. Although research shows that consumers fail to exploit all the potential 
financial savings from switching tariff (CMA, 2016b), this does not necessarily 
imply energy bill payers are not making rational choices with respect to their 
energy tariff or supplier because the cheapest tariff is not necessarily the optimal 
tariff. Similarly, although it has been suggested that householders are ‘leaving 
money on the table’ when it comes to not investing in home improvements such 
as loft insulation, it has also been suggested that the energy efficiency gains from 
such improvements may be overestimated whilst the hassle costs of investment 
have been underestimated (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham and 
Palmer, 2014).  
Low tariff switching rates and low investment in energy efficiency is perfectly 
consistent with a model of a fully rational consumer facing high information search 
costs (Wilson and Price, 2010). In the energy tariff market where people do not 
have access to accurate information about their energy consumption, a lack of 
information may be a key driver in explaining why consumers do not switch more 
often. Although switching rates have remained at a relatively steady 14% each 
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year (Ofgem, 2008, 2011a, 2012, 2013b, 2014a, 2015), even after the advent of 
price comparison websites and a number of Government and media campaigns 
promoting the savings to be made from switching (), it is not known whether 
switching rates would have been worse in their absence. The impact of price 
comparisons and savings messages on switching has never been tested 
systematically.  
Figure 5 Government tariff switching campaign from 2014 (the average annual 
savings have since increased to £300). 
 
More importantly, the fact that individual choices do not always conform to the 
assumption of rational choice merely implies that classical economics is 
simplistic, not that the model is incorrect or not useful. Economists have long 
acknowledged that people often violate the assumptions of rational choice.31 
                                            
31 For example, Gary Becker, when accepting his Nobel prize in economics notes that “actions 
are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory, calculating capacities and other limited 
resources” (1992, p.1). 
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However, many economists have been reluctant to incorporate these findings into 
economic cost-benefit analyses for two reasons (Tyran, 1999). The first reason 
stems from the argument that the criteria for judging whether any model is a good 
model of decision making is not whether the model’s assumptions apply to all of 
the people, all of the time but whether the assumptions are true for human 
decisions on average (Friedman, 1953; Box, 1976). As Friedman (1953) said, a 
perfectly realistic model of the wheat market would have to be so complex as to 
render the theory utterly useless for making clear and general predictions about 
the impact of different variables on the supply and demand for wheat. Second, 
the assumption is that, violations of the rationality assumption at the individual 
level will be so rare that it will not affect the predictive validity of the model to 
explain aggregate behaviour. This is known as the “as if” defence of the rationality 
paradigm because, as long as enough people behave in line with the 
assumptions of the model, then it will be true that people behave “as if” they were 
perfectly rational.  
It has been shown that, in many cases, a large proportion of consumers do not 
conform to the model of the fully rational decision maker and therefore that, in 
these cases, the classical economic model fails to provide a good approximation 
of human decisions at the individual or aggregate level (Kahneman et al., 1991). 
However, just because many people struggle to make optimal choices in the 
context of household savings (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006b, 2008; van Rooij et al., 
2011; Klapper et al., 2013), does not mean that people will also struggle to 
choose the right energy tariff when equipped with all the information.  
Choosing the optimal energy tariff is much simpler than planning for retirement 
which requires knowledge of much more complicated concepts than a kilowatt 
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hour or a standing charge. Optimal retirement savings choices requires an 
understanding of “compound interest, inflation, financial markets, mortality tables, 
and more” (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008, p.413). By comparison, according to the 
UK Department for Education’s national curriculum (2013), the numeracy skills 
required to identify the optimal energy tariff are those expected of children leaving 
primary school in Britain. Moreover, one major lesson from behavioural 
economics is that, context has a major influence on decision making (Lunn, 
2015). Therefore, just because people fail to make fully rational decisions 
regarding their household finances does not mean that it will also affect people’s 
decisions over their energy tariff.  
6.2 The challenge of generalising nudge to the energy and 
environment domain   
The evidence behind the nudge toolkit is confined to a relatively narrow set of 
tools applied in a limited number of domains that are affected by particular biases 
or decision errors (House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, 
2011). For instance, self-control is thought to explain why people struggle to stick 
to weight-loss plans, diets, exercise regimes and quit smoking (Mullainathan and 
Thaler, 2000). A number of studies have shown that commitment contracts, in 
which a person pledges money which they forfeit if they do not meal their goal, 
can be effective at helping people achieve all of these health related goals (Ashraf 
et al., 2006; Volpp et al., 2008; Giné et al., 2010; John et al., 2011; Milkman et 
al., 2014; Royer et al., 2015). However, compared to consuming chocolate or 
cigarettes, our overconsumption of energy is not primarily a failure of self-control. 
In particular, self-control is less likely to be relevant in the case of switching tariff 
since the gap in time between the costs and benefits is nowhere near as large as 
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that in the health or climate change domain so a commitment device is unlikely 
to help increase uptake to TOU tariffs.  
Research also shows that, in cases where there is a socially desirable behaviour 
in which a minority of people do not participate, publicising this can make the 
wayward minority behave more like the well-behaved majority (Schultz et al., 
2007, 2008; Behavioural Insights Team, 2012), including to encourage high 
energy consumers to reduce their energy use in line with the average member of 
their neighbourhood (Slemrod and Allcott, 2011; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2013; 
Schultz et al., 2015). However, in the environmental sector, very few 
environmentally friendly behaviours are the social norm. In the UK, the 
overwhelming majority of consumers are on flat-rate tariffs. Therefore, social 
norms marketing and commitment devices will not necessarily contribute towards 
achieving all or even most of the behaviour changes that the UK Government is 
relying on in its 2050 Pathways (DECC, 2010), including increasing the proportion 
of people on TOU tariffs. 
Inertia is thought to explain why so few people switch energy tariff and it has been 
shown that this tendency to stick with the status quo can be exploited to increase 
adoption of green energy tariffs (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Ebeling and 
Lotz, 2015; US Department of Energy, 2016). However, opt-out nudges are not 
feasible in all cases. For example, whilst it may be easy to set a printer to double-
sided printing by default as in Egebark and Ekstrrm (2013), a default rule cannot 
easily be created to guide consumers into taking public transport rather than a 
car or airplane when going on holiday (Sunstein and Reisch, 2013). Although it 
would be feasible to make TOU tariffs the default tariff type to which consumers 
are enrolled unless they ask to remain on a flat-rate tariff, there are other 
problems with green defaults which will be elaborated on below. 
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6.3 The limitations of ‘green by default’  
Default, or opt-out, enrolment is one of the most successful nudges ever tested 
in terms of its impact on human behaviour (DellaVigna, 2009). It is curious, then, 
that so many years after the publication of a Science paper (Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003) demonstrating that an opt-out policy for organ donation also 
substantially increases the number of organs donated and lives saved, there are 
relatively few examples of countries that have moved from an opt-in system to an 
opt-out. The main reason that countries do not adopt opt-out enrolment, even in 
cases where doing so can yield such large benefits, is that opt-out systems are 
not feasible or even appropriate in all cases.  
Whilst opt-out enrolment is very appropriate in cases where there is a single 
optimal course of action that most people do not take but which can be favoured 
by making it the default, it is much less appropriate when the best course of action 
varies substantially across people because then an opt-out enrolment system 
risks enrolling many people onto services they do not want, or worse, which are 
not in their interest (Carroll et al., 2009; Keller et al., 2011). Not all consumers or 
even the average consumer will save money on a TOU tariff, with evidence 
suggesting that up to 40% of GB consumers could be made significantly 
financially worse off (Chapter 2).  
The second disadvantage of opt-out enrolment is that it can violate a key principle 
of consent, which is that it should be given voluntarily by an individual with the 
capacity to make an informed choice. Opt-out enrolment can violate the 
standards of informed consent in one of two ways. One way is that people may 
be inattentive to the option that was pre-selected for them, resulting in ‘choice’ 
without awareness (Keller et al., 2011). Although opt-outs are commonly thought 
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to work by exploiting people’s tendency to stick with the status quo (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988) a number of other overlapping mechanisms have also 
been cited including loss-aversion (Dinner et al., 2010), implied endorsement 
(Brown and Krishna, 2004), effort-minimisation (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988; Thaler and Sunstein, 2003) and inattention to the default option (Smith et 
al., 2013a). It is well known that defaults can function through inattention from 
anecdotal evidence about the number of people who unknowingly consent to 
receiving unwanted marketing material or find themselves paying for 
subscriptions they did not actively renew (Figure 6).  
Figure 6 Inattention to default options. 
 
  
If consumers do not realise what option was pre-selected for them, this risks 
automatically enrolling consumers onto TOU tariffs without their knowledge, even 
if they are warned in advance. This is not unlikely given that many British 
consumers do not even read correspondence from their energy supplier and that, 
even those who do, most only read their bill to see what amount they owe 
(Consumer Focus, 2011). This risk is not just theoretical. Compared to those who 
were randomly assigned to an opt-in recruitment approach, Sacramento 
Municipal customers randomly assigned to be automatically enrolled onto TOU 
tariffs reduced their peak-time consumption by 50% less on the TOU tariff and 
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80% less on the critical peak pricing programme (US Department of Energy, 
2015) as shown in Figure 7, indicating that they may have been unaware that 
they had been switched.32 In one trial, not represented in Figure 7, participants 
who were automatically enrolled onto a TOU tariff did not reduce their peak 
consumption at all (US Department of Energy, 2013a), meaning that they would 
have certainly seen an increase in their electricity bill.  
Figure 7 Peak load reductions across consumers enrolled onto TOU tariffs on an 
opt-in versus opt-out basis. 
Notes: These diagrams are reproduced exactly from the US Department of 
Energy’s report (US Department of Energy, 2015). The chart on the left refers to 
the peak load reductions seen in the SMUD trial of a TOU tariff and the chart on 
the right refers to reduction seen in the SMUD trial of a CPP tariff.  
 
Another way is that, even if people notice the default option, they may not have 
the capacity to make a fully informed choice. The model of the fully rational 
decision maker from economics assumes that all agents have the capacity to 
make informed decisions, unless perhaps they have a medically diagnosed 
disability; however, if people are not fully rational, then this significantly widens 
the potential pool of people who may be disadvantaged by an opt-out policy. 
Bounded rationality has received much less attention as a potential disadvantage 
of opt-out enrolment but is particularly important in the area of TOU tariffs, where 
                                            
32 Another explanation, that is not mutually exclusive, is that those who opted-in to participate in 
the TOU tariff trial were just more enthusiastic about the programme and thus made more effort 
to undertake behaviours that would help them save money (Keller et al., 2011). 
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if people are unable to process all of the information required to identify whether 
such a tariff will increase or decrease their energy bill, they would not have the 
capacity to know whether to opt-out.  
Although bounded rationality would affect people considering whether to opt-in 
too, opt-out enrolment combined with bounded rationality has larger negative 
welfare implications than bounded rationality combined with opt-in because opt-
out enrolment is so effective and evidence suggests consumers will stay on a 
TOU tariff regardless of whether it is saving or costing them money, because 
“even bad defaults are sticky” (Carroll et al., 2009, p.1640). Indeed, retention 
rates in the US TOU tariff trials were the same across both opt-in and opt-out 
recruitment methods (US Department of Energy, 2015), suggesting that some 
people must have been losing out relative to a flat-rate tariff but yet did not 
disenroll.  
Since opt-out enrolment is so effective, generating enrolment rates in excess of 
57% and sometimes up to 100% (see Chapter 2), automatically enrolling 
consumers onto TOU tariffs or other automated DSR schemes could result in 
large numbers of people being switched onto unfamiliar tariffs that will increase 
their energy bills, particularly those with low-literacy. 
Whilst the financial consequences of opt-out enrolment could be overcome 
through automated DSR, consumers and the regulator may consider it unethical 
for energy companies or other third parties to automatically enrol consumers onto 
TOU tariffs, DLC schemes or use their EV to discharge or charge without 
informed consent (vehicle-to-grid).  
Some advocates of opt-out enrolment recognise the limited ability of opt-out 
enrolment to account for consumer heterogeneity but suggest that it can be 
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overcome through modifications such as personalised default rules (Sunstein, 
2013b) or that it is justified by the efficiency savings from enrolling many more 
people. I do not question that this is true in some contexts, however it is not the 
case here. Once smart meters are rolled out more widely, consumers and 
suppliers will have access to accurate information about past consumption; 
however, if only past consumption is used to inform whether a person would be 
suitable for a TOU tariff, this is likely to lead to the type of adverse selection feared 
by classical economists, whereby only those who already have favourable 
consumption profiles are defaulted onto TOU tariffs. A personalised default will 
therefore have to be based on a lot more than just electricity consumption alone 
and currently, as shown in Chapter 2, there is insufficient evidence for what 
information this would have to be, even if consumers would consent to providing 
it. Therefore, at least for the moment, personalised defaults are not a viable option 
for recruiting customers onto TOU tariffs. Even if they were, inattention to the 
default means they could be considered unethical. 
Finally, although separate analyses suggest that opt-out enrolment will likely lead 
to higher demand reductions overall, given the relatively much higher enrolment 
rates (Cappers et al., 2016), policymakers are obliged to minimise the negative 
distributional impacts of TOU tariffs. Indeed, the distributional impacts of TOU 
tariffs are a major concern for Ofgem and BEIS. It is therefore desirable to 
determine whether it may be possible to increase active adoption of TOU tariffs, 
since this could help lower peak demand whilst protecting consumers.  
6.4 Mixed results for ‘soft’ nudges  
Aside from opt-out enrolment, the impact of ‘softer’ nudges, such as message-
framing and commitment devices, is highly mixed. It is therefore not known 
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whether nudge will always perform significantly better than would traditional tools 
such as information provision. Take, for example, framing effects. Consider an 
individual choosing between two products, x and y. According to EUT, the 
individual will make their choice based only on the attributes of each of the 
products x and y, an explanation that runs counter to the existence of an entire 
industry that enables companies to extract a higher purchase price for one 
product, than for another functionally identical product, based exclusively on how 
that good is communicated to people. Whilst most people call this marketing or 
advertising, in the academic literature, the observation that “seemingly arbitrary” 
(Goldin, 2015, p.238) contextual features of a decision such as the way a product 
is described (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) also affect decisions is called 
‘framing’.   
One of the most well-known ‘framing’ effects is the finding that people are more 
willing to pursue risky rather than safe options when the risks are communicated 
to them in terms of the number of lives or money that could be lost (a loss-framed 
message) than when the risks are framed in terms of the number of lives or 
money that could be saved (gain-framed message) (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981, 1992; Druckman, 2001; Peer et al., 2015; Tom et al., 2007). That people 
seem to be more greatly motivated by messages that emphasise the 
disadvantages of not pursuing a course of action than the advantages of pursuing 
it, has also been replicated in studies in which there are no risks involved in the 
decision being made (Harper, 2012).  
On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that companies may be 
spending a lot of money advertising products that people would purchase anyway 
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(Blake et al., 2015).33 The academic evidence on the effectiveness of message 
framing, based on studies in which the effect is tested systematically, finds that 
in some studies message-framing is effective, whereas in others it has no 
discernible effect and, in many cases, the effect will occur in opposite directions 
for the same message. For instance, out of the only two studies known to have 
tested the impact of loss-framing on TOU tariffs, one study found that loss-framed 
messages (“switch to a TOU tariff to avoid missing out on savings”) had no impact 
on stated willingness to switch to a TOU tariff relative to a gain frame (“switch to 
save money”) (M Nicolson et al., 2017) whereas another study found that a similar 
loss-framed message increase willingness to switch relative to the gain-framed 
message (Verhagen et al., 2012). In a study on attitudes towards climate change 
mitigation, gain framed messages were superior to loss-framed messages at 
increasing positive attitudes towards climate change reduction strategies 
(Spence and Pidgeon, 2010).  
Moreover, it is not just loss and gain framing that garners inconsistent results. 
Two studies found that telling people about the environmental benefits of TOU 
tariffs increased willingness to switch to a dynamic TOU tariff (Buryk et al., 2015) 
and to a critical peak pricing tariff (Schwartz et al., 2015), but another study found 
that marketing a TOU tariff in terms of its ability to cut the cost of electricity and 
help the planet had no statistically significant impact on willingness to switch 
relative to just telling people that a TOU tariff could save them money (M Nicolson 
et al., 2017). A large study recently published in Nature Climate Change 
concluded that there is little evidence to support the assumption that “shifting the 
main justification for GHG [greenhouse gas] mitigation from benefits of reducing 
                                            
33 The nineteenth century retailer John Wanamaker famously said “Half the money I spend on 
advertising is wasted, the trouble is I don’t know which half”. 
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climate change risks” to other benefits such as green jobs or protection from 
health hazards would increase public support for climate change mitigation 
strategies (Bernauer and McGrath, 2016a).  
7 Explaining heterogeneity  
This does not mean that people are fully rational, that framing does not work and 
we should continue using EUT. EUT cannot, for example, easily explain why, in 
the CMA’s (2016b) survey of over 7,000 British energy bill payers, a total of 34% 
said they had never considered switching supplier. A rational consumer would 
always consider whether to switch tariff and then decide, based on full 
consideration of all the relevant costs and benefits, whether the switch will 
maximise their utility. There is therefore sufficient evidence to be strongly 
sceptical that the classical economic model is able to explain all of the behaviour 
in the energy market; it is just that it is more nuanced than both the classical 
economists and the behavioural economists suggest.  
Given that message framing results are mixed even across framing studies with 
the same or very similar outcome variables and of varying sample sizes34, one 
key possible reason for the inconsistency in these results is differences in 
participant samples. Verhagen et al. (2012) and Spence and Pidgeon (2010) 
performed their studies on Dutch and UK university students, Buryk et al. (2015) 
on a sample of participants recruited through the authors’ social media network, 
Nicolson et al. (2017) on members of a market research company’s online 
consumer panel whilst the other recruited US citizens through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Schwartz et al., 2015).  
                                            
34 Otherwise we might be concerned that a lack of statistical power could be driving results in 
studies which find no effect or that studies finding an effect are just false positives.  
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That studies with different participant samples generate different results is a 
finding to be explained, not an explanation in itself. What these differences point 
to is treatment effect heterogeneity (Athey and Imbens, 2016), some behaviours 
and people are more receptive to message framing than others and/or different 
behaviours and people respond to different types of messages. These are 
considered in turn. 
7.1 Heterogeneity in rationality across behaviour and people 
– explaining null effects 
Whilst some types of decisions, perhaps those that are complex and require lots 
of information processing, are particularly vulnerable to boundedly rational 
decision making, easier decisions are less likely to be affected. Meanwhile, some 
people may be more susceptible to making boundedly rational choices than 
others.  
Studies in financial literacy do not find that all consumers are financially illiterate; 
rather, they find that financial literacy varies substantially across consumers 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006a, 2008; Klapper et al., 2013). This cannot be 
accounted for using EUT – the “as if” argument – but it also means that some 
people do behave in line with the model. This could also be true of energy bill 
payers: some may be boundedly rational but others not. Given that not all people 
will save money from a TOU tariff, this creates four potential population sub-
groups based on concrete factors such as whether they are able or willing to shift 
their electricity use away from peak times on a TOU tariff but also psychological 
factors such as whether they exhibit bounded rationality, as outlined in Table 10:  
1. People who would save money on a TOU tariff and who do switch to one 
(optimal choice);  
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2. People who would save money on a TOU tariff but who do not switch (sub-
optimal choice):  
3. People who will not save money on a TOU tariff but who do switch to one 
(sub-optimal choice) and;  
4. People who will not save money on a TOU tariff and do not switch (optimal 
choice) 
 Table 10 Heterogeneity in ability to save and bounded rationality. 
 
 Tariff chosen 




Should choose TOU tariff (e.g. 0.60) 1 2 





Whilst a classical economic model focuses on whether the people in group (1) 
already have favourable consumption profiles (adverse selection) bounded 
rationality opens up the potential for a different type of ‘behavioural’ adverse 
selection, whereby people with unfavourable consumption profiles do switch to a 
TOU tariff, as represented by group (3). As argued above, the number of people 
in group 3 would be larger under an opt-out than opt-in system since opt-out 
enrolment results in much higher enrolment rates overall.  
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Nevertheless, another important question is what people are likely to be in each 
box even under an opt-in policy? Research from international development 
shows that people from rich countries have greater ‘mental bandwidth’ for 
processing information than people in rich countries (Mani et al., 2013). If this 
transfers to the rich and poor in developed countries, then it could be that early 
adopters of low carbon technologies – for example EVs and heat pumps who are 
key candidates for DSR – will be more rational than others. In which case, it may 
suggest that these consumers are likely to adopt TOU tariffs in higher numbers 
than others, in line with a classical economic approach and as assumed in the 
UK Government’s smart meter cost-benefit analysis (DECC, 2014, p.59). It could 
also make them much less susceptible to framing than other types of consumers. 
However, just because EV owners and heat pump owners say they are more 
likely to adopt a TOU tariff does not mean they will in reality – indeed, a major 
downside of opt-in enrolment is that enrolment rates are so low.  
Further, it also does not mean that some consumers who will not save will not 
switch; a fairly sizeable minority of participants who signed up to take part in the 
TOU tariff trials reviewed in Chapter 2 were financially worse off compared to 
their original flat-rate tariff. Moreover, since EV and heat pump owners are 
unlikely to save money on a TOU tariff automatically, they would need to make 
inferences beyond their historical consumption patterns to a hypothetical 
scenario where they can alter the timing of their vehicle charging or heat pump 
operation to capitalise on the cheaper rates, a process requiring a great deal of 
effort and cognitive capacity in the absence of any tools to assist them.  
7.2 Heterogeneity in message impacts – explaining multi-
directional effects 
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Although variations in bounded rationality across people would explain why some 
studies find no impact from message framing, it does not explain why two studies 
find effects but just in the opposite direction. To explain effects of multiple 
directions, it must also be the case that the same messages have different 
impacts on different people, so-called treatment effect heterogeneity.  
Consistent with this explanation, one study found that telling people about the 
environmental benefits of particular behaviours increased willingness to engage 
in those behaviours, but only amongst people who already had pro-environmental 
values (Haws et al., 2014). Indeed, one of the explanations for the failure of one-
size fits all re-framing of climate change is the problem of confirmation bias 
(Klayman, 1995; Duarte et al., 2014), whereby messages which emphasise the 
environmental benefits of particular products or actions which are liable to be 
ignored by the very people whose actions are most likely to be un-environmental. 
This would suggest that the best approach is to tailor marketing messages 
towards particular groups but in ways that control for confirmation bias. 
The fact that the same message will be effective on some people but not on 
others can be used to advantage in the context of TOU tariff recruitment since 
not everyone will be able to adjust their consumption patterns whereas others, 
such as EV and heat pump owners, have much greater potential to do so whilst 
also delivering much-needed relief to the electiricty grid. Instead of appealing to 
their potential environmental motivations, which may not be shared by all new EV 
and heat pump owners or future owners when they become more mass market 
(Haws et al., 2014), another approach is just to market TOU tariffs to EV owners 
and heat pump owners based on the fact they own an EV or heat pump, for 
instance, by calling it a ‘heat pump tariff’ or ‘EV’ tariff.  
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Since the name will make no difference to the design of the tariff itself, the 
classical economic model would imply that such names should make no 
difference to the tariff’s appeal since someone who chooses a two-tiered TOU 
tariff called an EV tariff is no better or worse off than someone who chooses an 
two-tiered TOU tariff that is not called an EV tariff. However, the fact that many 
energy suppliers in the US and the UK are already offering or have offered ‘EV’ 
tariffs (see ), many of which are available to all domestic customers and are no 
different to any other two-rate TOU tariff such as the UK’s Economy 7 tariff in 
which electricity used overnight is charged at a lower rate than electricity 
consumed during the day, suggests that labelling may have an effect on 
enrolment.  
Moreover, that people can be influenced by such labels has already been 
demonstrated in a study on the UK Government’s cash-transfer called the ‘Winter 
Fuel Payment’; Beatty et al. (2014) found that increasing the income of a 
pensioner by £100, without labelling it, increased their spending on energy by £3, 
while labelling the increase a ‘Winter Fuel Payment’ led to £41 of the £100 being 
spent on fuel. Like for the Winter Fuel Payment, these EV tariffs are EV specific 
in name only; the name is just a ‘frame’, which, if effective, could increase uptake 
to TOU tariffs amongst those who benefit.  
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Notes: The top left panel demonstrates the existence of lump sum discounts 
offered to consumers who have EVs. The top right and bottom left panels 
demonstrate suppliers offering tariffs that are called ‘EV tariffs’ but which are 
available to any domestic electricity consumer and thus which are therefore EV 
tariffs in name only. The British Gas EV tariff in the top right is a TOU tariff 
although it is no longer available.  
 
A complementary method of drawing heat pump and EV owners’ attention to TOU 
tariffs is to tailor all the information provided by a supplier about their tariff to these 
two consumer groups. Tailoring “is a process of creating individualised 
communication” (Kreuter et al., 2002, p.272) on the basis that “greater perceived 
relevance and salience increases motivation to process information and enhance 
message receptivity, information processing and behaviour change” (Rimer and 
Kreuter, 2006, p.187).  
Tailored communications have been most frequently used in the health education 
literature, where tailoring has been used primarily as a message strategy in which 
specific content is provided to individuals based on demographic variables (e.g. 
providing specific smoking cessation materials for blue-collar workers, older 
smokers and pregnant women), cultural variables (religion, collectivism, racial 
pride) and behavioural variables such as readiness to engage in behaviour 
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change (Rimer and Kreuter, 2006). However, although studies have tested the 
impact of tailored energy feedback on household energy use (e.g. Abrahamse et 
al., 2007), tailoring has not been explicitly tested in the context of electricity tariffs.  
8 A new approach to nudge: effective and selective 
So far then, this chapter has shown that there are strong limitations to using opt-
out enrolment to increase adoption of TOU tariffs. The alternative to opt-out 
enrolment when policymakers do not know or cannot determine what course of 
action is in a person’s best interests is for decision makers to be left to make an 
active choice either way (Keller et al., 2011; Sunstein and Reisch, 2013). 
However, active choosing is costly (making difficult decisions when you are 
boundedly rational is hard) so could still result in very few people switching at all; 
indeed the systematised review in Chapter 2 suggested that opt-in uptake could 
be as low as 1%, which is substantially lower than the Government’s target of 
30% (BEIS, 2016b).  
Moreover, allowing people to opt-in would not prevent people from switching who 
would not benefit from the tariff, as appears to have happened in a number of 
TOU tariff trials for whom a sizeable minority ended up worse off than if they had 
stayed on their flat rate tariff (Long Island Power Authority, 2015; Schare et al., 
2015; Star et al., 2010; Schofield et al., 2014; Sidebotham, 2014b). It also would 
not guarantee that the tariffs would disproportionately attract consumers with high 
flexible electricity use such as EV and heat pump owners; plain active choice may 
mean some people enrol on a TOU tariff when it will not save them money whilst 
others might not enrol on a TOU tariff even though it would, as outlined in Table 
10.  
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Johnson (2016), drawing on similar views expressed in Spital (1995, 1996) and 
Carroll et al. (2009), argues that in these cases a nudge is needed which is 
effective and selective: it ensures that that people who would benefit from an 
intervention receive it, whilst ensuring that those who would be worse off do not  
sign up. Although Johnson (2016) discusses this in the context of mortgage 
choices where the optimal mortgage will also vary from person to person, in this 
context, it would mean designing an intervention that increases uptake to TOU 
tariffs amongst those who can save money (maximising the number in box 1 of 
Table 10) that does not also attract those who cannot save (minimising the 
number in box 3),  to increase the likelihood of ‘getting people into the right box’ 
(Johnson, 2016). The approach described above – tailored marketing – could be 
used to get people in the right box.  
Nevertheless, there are alternatives that could be effective and selective which 
do not rely on nudge, which, as argued before, is only likely to be more effective 
if decision making is not approximately rational. Another solution to this problem, 
which may become available in the near future, is for services to be created which 
provide bill payers with a comparison of their energy bill under a range of TOU 
tariffs relative to the most competitive flat-rate tariffs that are based on realistic 
assumptions about how much the bill payer could adapt their consumption 
patterns.  
These ‘predictive’ price comparisons could be created using algorithms trained 
on the electricity consumption data from similar consumers who switched to TOU 
tariffs. Such algorithms could assume that households with EV and/or heat 
pumps with storage would have a higher amount of electricity available for shifting 
into off-peak times than would consumers with just the standard ‘flexible’ 
appliances which the UK Governments lists as washing machines, dishwashers 
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and tumble dryers (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b). According to EUT, in the absence 
of any other market failures (violations of the assumptions in Table 8), such 
information would be sufficient to ensure enough people – and particularly those 
with EVs and heating – adopt a TOU tariff to realise the social benefits of DSR 
and prevent adverse selection. However, even if such services do become 
available, the same evidence from psychology discussed above suggests that 
this information will simply not be sufficient to motivate consumers to adopt a 
TOU tariff, regardless of what appliances they own.   
Moreover, tailoring may not be sufficient. Another implication of behavioural 
economics is that people are not constantly updating their existing knowledge 
with new information (Camerer et al., 2003), meaning that, even if tailored 
information is available, it does not guarantee that energy consumers will pay any 
attention to it. This creates a role for prompts. 
8.1 Prompts  
Prompts have been effective in a range of contexts and through a variety of 
mediums as summarised in Table 11. 
Table 11. Evidence on the effectiveness of prompts. 
 
Sender Type of prompt Outcome 
UK Government HM 
Courts and Tribunals 
Service 
Text 145% increase in court fine payments 
(Haynes et al., 2013).  
Will making service Telephone 50% increase in the proportion of people 
who include a charitable bequest in their 
will during the will-making process 
(Sanders and Smith, 2016). 
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HM Revenue and 
Customs 
Email 20% increase in the number of small 
business owners clicking through to find 
out about beneficial programmes e.g. 
Growth Vouchers (Behavioural Insights 
Team, 2015). 
 
Department for Work 
and Pensions 
Text 80% increase in the number of benefits 
claimants turning up for recruitment 
events (Behavioural Insights Team, 
2015). 
US Department of 
Defense 
Email 40% increase in online enrolment in 
savings programmes (Social and 
Behavioral Sciences Team, 2015). 
The UK Army 
Reserves 
Email 80% increase in enrolment rates to army 




The research unequivocally demonstrates that sending some prompt is better 
than sending no prompt. However, consistent with the evidence on framing 
discussed above, there is also evidence to suggest that the framing and content 
of the prompt matters a great deal too. For example, although a text message 
prompt worked better than no prompt to increase payment of court fines, a 
second phase of the experiment found that personalising the text message to 
address the recipient by name increased the average amount paid by 41% from 
an average of £14.73 to an average of £20.87, which they estimated generated 
additional revenues of over £800,000 in the one week that the personalised text 
message was used in the trial (Haynes et al., 2013).  
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Using prompts to encourage consumers to switch tariff is one of the key 
recommendations made by the CMA (2016c) to help boost switching rates 
however it has never been robustly tested. To my knowledge, only one trial has 
tested prompts to encourage people to switch tariff but had difficulty in identifying 
the treatment effect because the prompt was delivered in a letter and the outcome 
was the number of visits to a price comparison website, resulting in a high rate of 
attrition and making it difficult to robustly identify the treatment to which website 
visitors had been assigned.35  
8.2 Timing of information delivery and habit discontinuity  
Evidence from the literature on habit formation suggests that the timing of prompt 
delivery can also be crucial. According to the habit discontinuity hypothesis 
(Verplanken and Wood, 2006; Verplanken et al., 2008) “behaviour change 
interventions are more effective when delivered in the context of life course 
changes…[because] when habits are (temporarily) disturbed, people are more 
sensitive to new information and adopt a mind-set that is conducive to behaviour 
change” (Verplanken and Roy, 2016, p.1). Although this evidence is mostly 
theoretical (Thompson et al., 2011), a small number of studies have tested it 
empirically amongst people who have recently moved home or otherwise 
relocated (Wood et al., 2005; Bamberg, 2006; Verplanken et al., 2008; 
Verplanken and Roy, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016).  
In the context of vehicle users, it has been found that people with strong 
environmental attitudes have lower self-reported car use, but only after recently 
                                            
35 The two intervention letters were given unique URLs (e.g. goenergyshopping-test1.com and 
goenergyshopping-test2.com). However, because most internet providers have auto-complete 
address bars, it is likely that some proportion of people will have just visited the normal site 
goenergyshopping.com, and would therefore have been lost to analysis. This trial was run by the 
Behavioural Insights Team in June and September 2015 in partnership with the Department for 
Work and Pensions and had a sample size of 270,000 with five trial arms. 
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moving home (<12 months ago) (Verplanken et al., 2008; Verplanken and Roy, 
2016; Thomas et al., 2016). Verplanken & Roy (2016) investigated the total length 
of this ‘window of opportunity’ for influencing behaviour after a life change and 
found that, although recent movers (moved under 6 months ago) were statistically 
significantly more likely to report having participated in new types of pro-
environmental behaviours than those who had not recently relocated (moved >6 
months ago), this effect disappeared after three months.  
This raises the question as to whether, in the same way that moving into a new 
home is a potential ‘window of opportunity’ to influence people’s use of their 
vehicles, purchasing ones first EV or heat pump would be a good time to prompt 
EV owners or heat pump owners to switch to a TOU tariff. All of the Government’s 
existing tariff switching campaigns are targeted at the average energy bill payer 
() and timed to coincide with the start of the heating season, when energy bills 
are higher. However, the previous discussion suggests that such campaigns are 
unlikely to attract the attention of EV owners or heat pump owners and should 
instead be tailored to these groups specifically and sent as close to the time at 
which they purchase their vehicle or new electric heating system as possible. 
9 Summary and remaining questions  
According to classical economics, under perfect market conditions, the optimal 
uptake of TOU tariffs will automatically follow from the collectively rational 
decisions of all the energy bill payers in the market as they go about switching 
between tariffs to maximise their expected utility. However, since these perfect 
market conditions rarely materialise, the tariff that is best for the individual is 
unlikely to be the tariff that is best for society as a whole.  
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The aim of any TOU tariff recruitment policy should be to bring actual uptake in 
line with the socially optimal level of uptake. Governments have many tools at 
their disposal for achieving this, some of which are more politically acceptable 
than others (John et al., 2009). This includes regulation to mandate TOU tariffs 
or interventions to increase voluntary uptake such as information provision (to 
correct imperfect information) and, more recently, nudges, which aim to change 
“behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.6).  
However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the 
appropriateness or effectiveness of nudge in the energy and environmental 
domain. In particular, there is a risk that the effectiveness of opt-outs at boosting 
uptake to organ donor registers and renewable energy tariffs is used to justify an 
opt-out approach to recruiting domestic consumers onto TOU tariffs.  
First, nudge will only be more effective than traditional market failure based 
interventions such as information provision if consumer behaviour over energy 
tariffs is not approximately fully rational. It is impossible to say whether energy bill 
payers are or are not making fully rational choices over their energy tariff solely 
based on the observation that they have not switched to the cheapest energy 
tariffs on the market since they may have rationally calculated that the costs of 
switching do not outweigh the benefits or that other non-price factors are more 
important (Wilson and Price, 2010). Whilst this explanation may seem unlikely in 
“a near-homogenous market like electricity”, it remains a possibility because 
“consumers may perceive that suppliers vary in attributes such as customer 
service or environmental awareness” or that there are practical non-price benefits 
of being with one supplier for both their gas and electricity (Wilson and Price, 
2010, p.654).  
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Although it is well accepted by economists and non-economists alike that people 
will often make choices that do align with a model of perfect rationality (most 
people make mistakes sometimes, some people make mistakes a lot of the time), 
failures of rationality at the individual level do not necessarily imply that the 
classical economic model will be inaccurate on average (Friedman, 1953); it is 
only if a significant number of energy bill payers fail to make rational choices that 
the classical economic model will be inaccurate as opposed to just simplistic.  
Second, even if consumers are boundedly rational, it is not clear that opt-out 
enrolment is the best nudge to increase uptake to TOU tariffs. The key advantage 
of opt-out enrolment is that it ostensibly respects freedom of choice and therefore 
respect for heterogeneity: “Suppose…people are facing serious economic 
difficulty… and if green energy is more expensive than the alternative, it may…be 
important to allow consumers to opt out” (Sunstein and Reisch, 2013, p.5).  
However, if consumers do not have the energy literacy skills required to identify 
whether a TOU tariff is optimal for them, then consumers may not opt-out of being 
enrolled regardless of whether a TOU tariff would decrease or increase their 
energy bill. On the other hand, if energy bill payers are able to rationally process 
the information required to identify whether a TOU tariff would be optimal for 
them, there may be no need to be concerned about the welfare of consumers 
under an opt-out policy. An alternative approach would be to design a nudge that 
selectively increases uptake amongst those who would benefit from being on a 
TOU tariff without also increasing uptake amongst those who would not. A 
promising approach suggested by the literature reviewed in this chapter but also 
in Chapter 2 would be to tailor the marketing of TOU tariffs towards consumer 
groups with higher than average flexible electricity use, and actively prompt them 
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to switch at timely moments when theory suggests they will be more susceptible 
to behaviour change interventions. 
EV and heat pump owners were both identified as key groups for participating in 
DSR in Chapter 2, since both the electrification of heat and transport are expected 
to place one of the greatest burdens on the future electricity network. Empirical 
evidence shows that EV owners substantially reduce their peak time and day-
time charging when enrolled on TOU rates36 (Zarnikau et al., 2015) and that the 
temperature set-point on heat pumps can be lowered at peak times for periods of 
up to one hour without consumer concern to deliver demand reductions of 3kWh37 
(Sidebotham, 2014a), a useful reduction given that estimates suggest that heat 
pumps could add 2.5kW each to peak load (Frontier Economics, 2012). 
Encouraging these consumers to adopt TOU tariffs could save them a significant 
amount of money, particularly heat pump owners given that electricity is 
substantially more expensive than gas (Palmer and Cooper, 2012), making 
affordability a key concern for the electrification of heat (DECC, 2012b). 
This thesis therefore aims to answer two research questions, based on the 
theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter: 
1. Are perfectly informed consumers able to make optimal decisions over 
their energy tariff? This question can also be rephrased as, is consumer 
decision making over electricity tariffs affected by bounded rationality?  
2. If bounded rationality does affect tariff decision making, could tailoring the 
marketing of TOU tariffs towards EV and heat pump owners be used to 
                                            
36 Peak time and day time charging reduced by 50% relative to a control group of EV owners that 
were not enrolled on a TOU tariff. The sample size consisted of 40 EV owners (36 on TOU and 6 
in the control) which, to my knowledge, is the largest trial of TOU tariffs on EV owners. 
37 In this trial the heat pumps were accompanied with storage, however other trials in which the 
fabric of the building is used as storage do report overheating being a problem overnight (Fell, 
2016). 
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increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst EV and heat pump owners whilst 
reducing enrolment amongst other consumers for whom TOU tariffs could 
make them financially worse off?  
The hypotheses belonging to each of these research questions are outlined in 
the results chapters because they are closely related to the design of the 
experiments. 
This concludes Chapter 3. The next chapter outlines the broad methodological 
approach taken to answer the questions above. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis has two overarching aims: (1) synthesise the empirical evidence on 
consumer demand for TOU tariffs and; (2) provide evidence on how to increase 
British consumer demand without enrolling people onto TOU tariffs by mandate 
or by default. To fulfil the second aim this thesis intends to answer two research 
questions, namely: (1) What proportion of British energy bill payers can identify 
the cost-minimising tariff when given all the information required to choose 
between flat rate and TOU tariffs? and (2) Can tailored message framing be used 
to increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who are more likely to save 
money from switching to one whilst reducing uptake amongst those less likely to 
save?  
The design and results of the systematised review used to achieve the first aim 
was presented in Chapter 2. This chapter will justify the broad methodological 
choices made when designing the studies used to answer the two research 
questions relating to the second aim: online field experiments combined with 
online population-based surveys, with and without an experimental design.  
The chapter will start, in Section 2, with an outline of why an online survey was 
used to answer research question 1. Section 3 will outline why online natural field 
experiments and an online survey experiment were used to answer research 
question 2, focusing on how the strengths of any one method will be used to help 
to overcome the limitations of another.  
Section 4 concludes this chapter. The detailed description of the four individual 
studies (the methods) will be provided in the each of the study chapters 
themselves. The key threats to the internal validity of randomised control trials 
(RCTs) as well the ethical considerations of the approach used are in Annex 4. 
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2 Empirical strategy for research question 1 
2.1 Online survey  
The first research question asks whether energy bill payers’ decision making over 
tariffs is, or could be, affected by bounded rationality. In line with work on financial 
literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006b, 2008; van Rooij et al., 2011), this will be 
tested using a survey in which energy bill payers are asked to identify the cost-
minimising tariff in the presence and absence of TOU tariffs when given all the 
information required. In the similar way that financial literacy is measured by, for 
example, asking people to calculate savings from bank accounts with different 
interest rates (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006b, 2008), participants will be presented 
with fictional individuals who are looking to switch tariff and asked to identify the 
cheapest of a set of three possible tariffs, given the individuals’ electricity 
consumption in kWh and the price of electricity. In the first scenario, the set of 
tariffs will only include flat-rate tariffs but in the second scenario it will include a 
TOU tariff.  
This exercise does not assume that the cheapest tariff is the optimal tariff; it 
merely tests people’s abilities to undertake a costs-benefit analysis, or what 
economists sometimes call solving optimisation problems, in the specific context 
of an energy tariff choice. As discussed in Chapter 3, full rationality means having 
the unbounded computational capacity to undertake cost-benefit analyses 
whereas bounded rationality relaxes this assumption by implying there are 
inescapable cognitive limits on peoples’ abilities to process the information 
required to make trade-off choices. If consumers cannot undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis based on one variable, in this case price, then it is unlikely that they will 
be able to undertake a cost-benefit analysis in which they also need to make 
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trade-offs between multiple factors such as price, customer service, green 
energy, online account management and so on, particularly given that, according 
to the classical theory, people would have to assign a fictional financial value to 
these individual items to undertake the analysis.  
The purpose of the Tariff Decision Making Experiment is not to mimic the 
decision-making process that British energy bill payers currently go through to 
choose a tariff since only a small sub-group of consumers switch tariff and it is 
likely that a large majority never consider the decision; in other words, the survey 
will not measure what proportion of consumers who switch tariff now are subject 
to bounded rationality. The question aims to understand what proportion would 
be able to make this decision optimally, in the sense defined by a classical 
economist, if everyone were put in a position where they had to decide which 
energy tariff to switch to (e.g. under an opt-out policy).  
The survey will be administered online for two reasons. First, an online survey is 
a more suitable medium for administering the numeracy questions than a 
telephone or face-to-face survey. It is expected that people will need time to 
consider the numeracy problem presented. However, a telephone or face-to-face 
survey could make people feel pressurised to provide an answer quickly which 
could increase the likelihood of people guessing the answer, whereas people 
given the opportunity to solve the problem at home may have attempted the 
necessary calculation. Moreover, even if TOU tariffs were made the default tariff, 
consumers are unlikely to be required to decide whether or not to opt-out during 
the course of a single telephone or face-to-face conversation with their supplier.  
Second, postal surveys are more expensive, without providing significant 
additional benefits over online surveys. Although both online and postal surveys 
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could avoid ‘interviewer’ effects, the only major advantage of a postal survey over 
an online survey is that postal surveys can be administered to a random sample 
of the population of interest, whereas online surveys can only be administered to 
people with Internet access who have also agreed to participate in market 
research (Duffy et al., 2005). However, postal surveys still suffer from selection 
error due to participant non-response (Duffy et al., 2005).  
A recent study which investigated people’s attitudes towards TOU tariffs using 
postal surveys delivered to a randomly selected sample of addresses in Australia 
received a response rate of 5% (Stenner et al., 2015).38 Moreover, coverage bias 
in online surveys is less of a problem now that 88% of British adults have Internet 
access (Office for National Statistics, 2016b) and, even so, the bias could be said 
to work in favour of the research. Internet access (Office for National Statistics, 
2016b) and therefore participation in online surveys is higher amongst young 
people (Duffy et al., 2005) but numeracy skills decline with age (Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills, 2012). This would mean that a relatively young 
participant sample from an online survey is likely to provide a conservative 
estimate of peoples’ numeracy skills compared to a similar postal survey, making 
it a more stringent test of the hypothesis that consumers are able to identify the 
cost minimising tariff when equipped with all the information.  
Survey weights are sometimes used to try to correct for selection error.  However, 
whilst this thesis will present both weighted and in-sample estimates of 
descriptive statistics, following the advice in (Solon et al., 2013), weights will not 
be used when estimating causal effects because there is no nationally 
                                            
38 Research shows that postal surveys tend to have relatively low response rates, as compared 
to face-to-face and telephone surveys (Duffy et al., 2005) and sometimes (Lonsdale et al., 2006), 
but not always (McDonald and Adam, 2003), online surveys. 
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representative dataset on British energy bill payers against which survey 
participants can be compared and from which reliable weights could be 
constructed. Instead, the thesis will present full descriptive statistics of the sample 
and interpret the results in light of the characteristics of the participants in the 
sample (see Annex 3 for a full justification of this choice).  
Finally, although energy suppliers would likely write to their customers if they 
were defaulting them onto a TOU tariff – lending external validity to postal survey 
– an increasing number of bill payers manage their accounts online so would 
receive such a notification via email (Ofgem, 2015). Therefore, online surveys are 
more suitable than face-to-face or telephone surveys and, on balance, are likely 
to provide data of similar quality to a postal survey, much more quickly and at a 
substantially lower cost.  
Although surveys are criticised as a research method for measuring future or past 
behaviour on the basis that people may intentionally or unintentionally misreport 
their behaviour (Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006; Morwitz et al., 2007; Kormos 
and Gifford, 2014), these criticisms do not apply here. This survey aims to 
measure whether people are able to correctly identify the cheapest tariff and the 
answer will be objectively right or wrong.  
A survey is also the best available method to answer this question because it 
relies on being able to provide consumers with all the information required to 
compute the cheapest tariff, including their overall electricity consumption and 
their electricity consumption patterns across the day, as would be available to all 
smart meter customers in future. There is currently no way of directly observing 
the choice of tariff made by consumers in the real world which would also permit 
me to evaluate whether their choice was economically optimal given that smart 
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meter data is not widely available; even if this choice was easily observable and 
verifiable, it would not provide the evidence required because, since only a small 
proportion of consumers switch tariff, the data would not provide any indication 
of the decision making abilities of the wider population of energy bill payers who 
do not switch tariff and it is this whole group, not the sub-group of switchers, who 
would be affected by a policy of opt-out enrolment for TOU tariffs.  
Getting participants to solve the numeracy problem required to identify the 
cheapest tariff in a survey has two advantages over the only other known study 
(Wilson and Price, 2010) to have investigated whether consumers can select the 
cost-minimising tariff. The reasons for this are made clear below.  
2.2 Strengths of the numeracy question approach  
Unlike Wilson and Price (2010), the survey design described identifies whether 
consumers are able to recognise the cost-minimising tariff (i.e. regardless of 
whether in reality, they would also seek to maximise factors other than price) and 
whether bounded rationality, rather than imperfect information, could explain why 
consumers cannot identify the cheapest tariff, if any do not.  
First, since participants in this survey are explicitly asked to identify the cheapest 
tariff, a failure to select the cheapest tariff cannot be interpreted as being due to 
the fact that people are trading off price against other non-price factors which they 
value; as discussed in Chapter 3 this possibility prevents researchers and the 
CMA from definitively inferring that unexploited savings from switching are 
evidence of sub-optimal decision making.  
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Second, since consumers have all the information they need to answer the 
question39, information can no longer present a key barrier to getting the answer 
correct and therefore to optimal decision making; as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
finding that 80% of consumers appropriated between 30%-50% of the maximum 
gains available is “wholly consistent with that of rational consumers facing high 
search costs” (Wilson and Price, 2010, p.648). The time required to undertake 
the calculation should also be minimal if consumers have unbounded 
computational capacity.  
Having eliminated energy information search costs, time costs and potential 
unobserved non-price factors – and based only on the theoretical models 
presented in Chapter 3 – only one other potential cost is not omitted from the two 
scenarios: this is ‘thinking costs’, the cognitive effort required to process the 
information. A classical economic model assumes that humans have unbounded 
computational capacity (see assumption 1 in Table 8 in Chapter 3) and therefore 
does not acknowledge the existence of ‘thinking costs’; the explicit purpose of 
this exercise is to test the validity of this assumption in the context of choosing 
between energy tariffs.  
As outlined in Chapter 3, psychologists, and now behavioural economists, do 
assume that thinking costs play a role in decision making and it suggests two 
possible ways in which a participant might respond to a problem that imposes 
high cognitive costs. One approach is to avoid making a decision altogether, a 
tendency which is thought to account for inertia or so-called status-quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1991; Keller et al., 2011). 
                                            
39 The only type of information not provided is information on the method required to undertake 
the calculations. The implications of this will be reserved for discussion in Chapter 5, which 
presents the results of the study.  
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Another is that people may consciously or unconsciously process only some of 
the information, thereby lowering the cognitive costs; for instance, people may 
only process the unit rate of the tariff but forget to include the standing charge in 
their calculation. To distinguish between inertia and an inability to undertake the 
calculation, people will be given the option to say they do not know the answer 
(abbreviated to DK). According to behavioural economic theory, fully rational 
consumers will undertake the calculation correctly whereas boundedly rational 
consumers will either undertake the calculation incorrectly or not attempt the 
calculation at all and select DK. The null hypothesis implied by the classical 
economic model is that there is only one type of person: the fully rational 
consumer. 
2.3 Addressing potential limitations of the approach using task 
simplification  
The main limitation to the survey method employed is that it was not possible to 
financially reward participants for getting the question correct.40 The concern may 
therefore be that people would select a ‘don’t know’ response (abbreviated to DK) 
or even select a response at random, not because they are unable to do the 
maths, but because doing so would make no difference to what they are paid. 
However, this does not fundamentally undermine the ability of the study to 
achieve its aims, which are to: (1) test the validity of the assumption made by 
classical economics which is that consumers are fully rational, which is defined 
in part as having unbounded computational capacity (see assumption 1 in Table 
8 of Chapter 3) and; (2) provide an indication of what proportion of consumers, if 
                                            
40 Participants were paid solely for completing the survey but the company running the consumer 
panel from which participants were recruited would not allow the participants to be paid extra for 
correctly identifying the cheapest tariff.   
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any, would fail to correctly identify whether a TOU tariff would increase or 
decrease their electricity bill if they were put in a position where they needed to 
make this choice e.g. under a policy of opt-out enrolment. 
This is because the classical economic model presents a very high bar against 
which to judge human computational ability. Unboundedly rational consumers 
should require very little time to solve primary-school level numeracy problems, 
meaning that the proportion of people saying they DK or selecting a response at 
random should be negligible – at least according to classical economics. 
Therefore, both incorrect and DK responses are inconsistent with the assumption 
of full rationality. Given the simplicity of the task, if a large proportion of people 
get the answer wrong or say they don’t know, this is much harder to explain using 
a model of a fully rational consumer than that of a boundedly rational consumer. 
As regards the second aim of the study, the absence of an additional financial 
incentive means that survey participants have less of an incentive to identify the 
cheapest tariff than would people deciding whether to opt-out of being enrolled 
onto a TOU tariff or to sign up to a TOU tariff in real life. Although this does not 
mean that participants have no incentive to get the answer correct – people who 
participate in market research panels are under the expectation that they are 
being paid to answer questions correctly and to the best of their ability – the study 
is at risk of overestimating the proportion of people who would be unable to 
identify whether a TOU tariff would increase or decrease their energy bill relative 
to alternative tariffs under an opt-out or opt-in policy. To help counterbalance a 
possible overestimation bias, the vignette and problem will be designed so that it 
is substantially easier to identify the cheapest tariff in the vignette than in real life. 
Moreover, if a sufficient number of people get the question wrong, then the results 
will be meaningful regardless; for example, if 30% of people incorrectly identify 
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the cheapest tariff, but this proportion is overestimated by 50% due to the 
imbalance in incentives, then depending on the representativeness of the 
sample, this may still imply that 15% of all energy bill payers (4.2 million people) 
cannot identify the cheapest tariff and could be adversely affected by an opt-out 
policy.  
2.4 Summary  
Asking consumers to identify the cheapest tariff in an online survey is a suitable 
approach for answering the question because it isolates energy bill payers’ 
abilities to identify the cheapest tariff from other factors that might affect what 
tariff people choose. The possible influence of these other factors is what makes 
it unwise to draw the conclusion that people are boundedly rational from the 
observation that consumers are foregoing large savings by not switching tariff 
(CMA, 2016c).  
Determining whether bounded rationality could be playing a role is important for 
verifying the underlying model that explains consumer decision making and 
therefore what types of interventions are likely to increase switching rates in 
general and to TOU tariffs in particular (research question 2). The second 
research question is a causal question and will be answered using RCTs, for 
reasons outlined in the next section.  
3 Empirical strategy for research question 2 
3.1 Advantages of field experiments: clean, generalisable 
causal analysis 
The key virtue of RCTs is that they enable a clean estimation of causal effects 
(Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986; Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Athey and Imbens, 
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2016). Consider research question two: can tailored message framing be used to 
increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who are more likely to save 
money from switching to one? In a RCT, the treatment – whether or not a tariff is 
marketed as being suitable for EV and heat pump owners – is assigned to 
subjects at random. This means every heat pump or EV owner would have a 
known probability between 0 and 1 of being placed in the treatment group (the 
group in which the TOU tariff is marketed as being particularly suitable for EV and 
heat pump owners) or the control group (the group in which the tariff is marketed 
to the average energy bill payer).  
Random assignment ensures that, on average, the units in the treatment group 
are the same as the units in the control group (Gerber and Green, 2012). Subject 
to two other identifying assumptions being met41, the difference between average 
demand for the tariff in the tailored marketing group and average demand for the 
tariff in the generic marketing group is the causal effect (or treatment effect) of 
tailoring on demand for the TOU tariff, as laid out in the potential outcomes 
framework of causality (Fisher, 1925; Neyman and Pearson, 1928; Rubin, 1974; 
Holland, 1986). 
Nevertheless, whilst RCTs permit the estimation of causal effects, there can be 
doubts over “the extent to which a causal relationship [uncovered in a RCT] holds 
over variation in persons, settings, treatments, and outcomes” (Shadish et al., 
2002, p.83). For instance, RCTs run in laboratory settings are often run on 
student populations where the effect of the intervention is measured on proxies 
                                            
41 These assumptions are excludability and non-interference (Gerber and Green, 2012). The 
excludability assumption is that the outcomes are only affected by the treatment and not by any 
other factors such as “a variable that indicates which observations have been allocated to 
treatment or control” (Gerber and Green, 2012, p.39). The non-interference assumption is that 
the outcome for one unit is uncorrelated with the treatment assignment of other units. This 
assumption is also sometimes called the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). 
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for the real outcome of interest, such as willingness to accept or adopt a TOU 
tariff, a measure commonly known as a ‘stated preference’. The experimental 
research on consumer uptake of TOU tariffs in GB is almost exclusively based 
on energy bill payers’ willingness to switch to a TOU tariff in stated preference 
surveys as shown in the review in Chapter 2.  
However, the intention of Dutch university students to switch to a TOU tariff or 
how switching intention is influenced by how the tariff is described (Verhagen et 
al., 2012) may not be a very good predictor of what proportion of energy bill 
payers, or EV owners, will sign up to a TOU tariff regardless of how it is marketed. 
Whilst stated preference surveys can generate useful insights on how people feel 
about products or services (Johnston et al., 2017), there are many well-known 
problems associated with relying solely on measures of demand collected stated 
preference surveys (Arrow et al., 1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; 
Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006).  
In the case of energy tariffs, people may pay less attention to the way a tariff is 
described in a hypothetical scenario than if the decision had real-world 
consequences or may even pay more attention because they are being explicitly 
paid to read and answer questions about one. Finally, there is no guarantee that 
the people who agree to participate in such trials are likely to have the same 
views or respond in the same way to treatments as the often much larger 
proportion of people who do not agree to take part (List, 2011). 
To address such external validity concerns, researchers have started running 
RCTs in a natural setting amongst participants from the population of interest, 
which in this thesis is energy bill payers or EV and heat pump owners. RCTs run 
in natural settings are called field experiments (Gerber and Green, 2012). In 
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addition to being run in a natural setting, field experiments will usually measure 
the impact of real-world interventions on behavioural outcome variables, such as 
switching to a tariff or signing up to receive email alerts about switching tariff. List  
(2011) distinguishes between two types of field experiments, namely “natural” 
field experiments and “framed” field experiments. Participants of the former are 
not informed that their behaviour is subject to scrutiny or that they are being 
randomised to treatments whereas the latter are informed. The treatment effect 
in a natural field experiment thus represents the average causal effect for the full 
population, “not for a non-random subset that chose to participate” (List, 2011, 
p.7) or an average effect that also captures the impact of being observed as being 
treated, known as evaluation driven effects such as the Hawthorne Effect 
(Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). 
From the 1970s to 1990s, field experiments have been adopted as the key tool 
for policy evaluation in the US (Duflo, 2016) and, since the free text book trials 
and PROGRESA experiments in the 1990s, in development economics too 
(Cameron et al., 2016). In the UK, the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF), 
established with £125 million in funding from the Department for Education and 
the Sutton Trust, conducts field experiments in UK schools. Natural field 
experiments, in particular, are also becoming progressively more common. In 
2010, the UK Government established the Behavioural Insights Team, a research 
team within the Cabinet Office that is now an independent social purpose 
organisation that has run hundreds of natural field experiments, mostly in the 
areas of education and health.  
In contrast, RCTs and field experiments are rarely used in the energy domain 
(Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Vine et al., 2014; Frederiks et al., 2016). For 
instance, the trials that were run to measure the impact of smart meters on 
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household energy demand either had no control group or included groups that 
were called a ‘control’ group, even though participants were not randomly 
assigned (Raw and Ross, 2011). There has been significant criticism of the lack 
of use of RCTs in the evaluation of energy policies. According to Allcott and 
Greenstone (2012, p.5), the large literature assessing the impact of energy 
efficiency improvements on energy demand “frequently does not meet modern 
standards for credibility” (5) and that there is therefore: 
…great potential for a new body of credible empirical 
work in this area [energy efficiency], both because the 
questions are so important and because there are 
significant unexploited opportunities for randomised 
control trials…that have advanced knowledge in other 
domains. 
 
A natural field experiment would therefore be an ideal method for answering 
research question 2, which aims to identify the causal impact of tailoring on 
demand for TOU tariffs but one which would generalise if the intervention was 
rolled out by suppliers or the energy regulator in real life. However, whilst field 
experiments are frequently hailed as the gold standard for impact evaluation and 
causal analysis (Gerber and Green, 2012; Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013), 
they have limitations. The next section outlines these limitations as well as how 
this thesis aims to overcome them to answer research question 2.  
3.2 Limitations of field experiments  
There are three key limitations of field experiments that are relevant to the 
questions posed in this thesis. First, running experiments in the field provides 
substantially less experimental control. For instance, as noted above, to run a 
natural field experiment, participants cannot be made aware that they are 
participating in research. However, this makes it much harder to collect the 
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baseline data required for measuring whether the treatment effect varies across 
different types of people, so-called treatment effect heterogeneity. Measuring 
treatment effect heterogeneity is crucial for answering research question two, 
because it involves determining whether tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs not 
only increases uptake amongst EV and heat pump owners but also whether it 
decreases uptake amongst consumers who do not belong to these groups. 
Survey experiments make it much easier to collect baseline information on 
participants and to measure uptake to tariffs that do not yet exist.  
However, relying on survey experiments alone is unwise because, as alluded to 
above, there is a well-known gap between behavioural intentions and action 
(Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006; Morwitz et al., 2007), a gap which may also 
explain why so many more people say they would switch to a TOU tariff in surveys 
than have signed up to commercially available TOU tariffs (Chapter 2). To obtain 
information on the people participating in the trial a number of field 
experimentalists administer baseline surveys to their participants (e.g. Giné et al., 
2010; Fryer, Roland G et al., 2012; Milkman et al., 2014). However, randomising 
treatments to the sub-group of solicited people who completed the survey defeats 
one of the key potential advantages of running a field experiment (avoiding 
Hawthorne effects) and means that the results may only be generalised to the 
types of people who agree to participate in research (List, 2011). 
Second, in a similar way that it would be hard, if not impossible, for an historian 
to use a field experiment to test the causes of wars that happened several 
hundred or thousands of years ago, it is also challenging for energy researchers 
to test the impact of interventions aimed at increasing the adoption of products 
and services that may not be widely commercially available for years and 
sometimes decades in the future. In particular, the technologies, products or 
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services that we want to encourage consumers to adopt are either not widely 
commercially available due to their currently high price (e.g. electric vehicles, 
hydrogen vehicles, heat pumps, home batteries) or not commercially available at 
all (e.g. TOU tariffs, autonomous vehicles). The ideal field experiment would 
ostensibly involve partnering with an energy supplier that offers a TOU tariff to 
implement an intervention in collaboration with the supplier without alerting 
would-be customers that they are being randomly assigned to different 
conditions.  
An alternative design that would also capture people who may not already be in 
the market for switching energy tariff is to implement an intervention 
independently of an energy supplier but that could be linked to data on switching 
rates by tariff type. However, as noted throughout this thesis, none of these types 
of tariffs or DSR programmes were commercially available anywhere in the UK 
(or indeed most of Europe) at the time of data collection. At the time of writing, 
there are now two smart meter enabled TOU tariffs in Britain, but arguably only 
one of these42  is designed to address the challenges that will be faced by the 
future energy system.  
Third, since the privatisation of the retail electricity markets, all data on customer 
switching is held by individual suppliers or price comparison websites. Even if 
Ofgem or another organisation implemented some intervention, it is not possible 
to measure its impact since the outcome data is not readily available. Although 
data availability is a challenge faced in many disciplines, I would argue that data 
availability is particularly problematic in the energy domain. For instance, the US 
                                            
42 This tariff is the TIDE tariff by Good Energy, which is a three rate TOU tariff of the type that 
features in this thesis. The other tariff, offered by one of the Big Six Energy Suppliers, arguably is 
not well suited to balancing renewable energy supplies with domestic demand or alleviating the 
evening peak in demand. 
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AID’s Demographic and Health Surveys provide nationally representative 
individual level data on key health and employment variables across 90 countries 
around the world, available to researchers at the click of a button. In the UK, 
health researchers have access to longitudinal datasets such as the Whitehall II 
and Millennium Cohort Studies to study potential causal determinants of health 
outcomes. By comparison, up until very recently, energy researchers could not 
even access data on Energy Performance Certificates for homes, which contain 
modelled data on the household energy efficiency of properties and basic 
variables such as floor area and dwelling type that are crucial to understanding 
energy demand in the UK.  
These challenges, as well as others, have led to some degree of scepticism in 
the energy area about the applicability of trials to energy research questions 
(Cooper, 2017), which has developed alternative methods of overcoming the 
challenges presented by undertaking research in a highly future-facing context 
including agent based modelling (e.g. Kowalska-pyzalska, 2015) and 
optimisation models such as MARKAL and UKTM-UCL (Usher and Strachan, 
2010; Daly and Fais, 2014) which do not necessarily rely on collecting any 
empirical data. However, consumer preferences cannot be measured without 
empirical data. Causal inferences, at least in the social sciences, cannot be made 
without empirical data either.  
It is therefore clear that a new approach is required to adequately answer 
research question two. Despite the challenges discussed above, lessons for how 
a natural field experiment, or series of field experiments, could be designed to 
answer research question 2 can be gleaned from areas outside of energy, 
namely, the literature on using Internet data for economics and psychology 
studies (Edelman, 2012; Wiedemann, 2013; Kosinski et al., 2015, 2016) and 
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preference measurement and experimentation in the technology start-up industry 
(Ries, 2011). 
3.3 Online experiments in academia and by tech-startups 
Commercial organisations such as Facebook and Google have long recognised 
the benefits of frequent experimentation to improve the design of their websites 
(Varian, 2010). Academic researchers have also recently been exploiting the 
potential of the Internet to run a range of innovative field experiments (for a review 
of online economics experiments, see Edelman, 2012). In some cases, the 
experiments are run in partnership with existing websites, as in the study by Blake 
et al. (2017) on the effect of price salience on purchase choices of visitors to the 
ticket reselling website StubHub.com. In other cases, the experiment can be run 
by making use of an online retailers existing functionality; a case in point is the 
early eBay experiments, in which economists varied a range of features of eBay 
postings to monitor its effects on bidding behaviour (Katkar and Reiley, 2006; 
Paul et al., 2006; Hossain and Morgan, 2006; Einav et al., 2012).  
More recently, increases in the technical expertise amongst commercial 
developers and academic researchers has made it possible to modify the design 
of entire websites without any involvement with outside commercial organisations 
at all (Schechter et al., 2007; Edelman and Duncan S Gilchrist, 2012). For 
instance, Edelman and Gilchrist (2012) investigate the impact of using clearer 
labels for paid advertisements that appear in Google search listings on peoples’ 
propensity to click on the adverts. To do this, they built a proxy Google website 
that presents a random sub-set of participants with modified advert labels (“paid 
adverts” rather than the more euphemistic label, “sponsored adverts”).  
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A limitation to the realism of the website proxy method is that it relies on giving 
the participants the proxy website address or configuring the Internet settings on 
the participants’ device. Therefore, whilst the intervention is realistic, the context 
is not since it has to be run in a laboratory setting, thereby introducing the risk of 
Hawthorne Effects. A better option is to develop a website independently to which 
participants would be driven in the way recommended to would-be entrepreneurs 
(Ries, 2011).  
In the influential book, The Lean Startup, Ries (2011) promotes the use of 
customer waiting lists whereby potential entrepreneurs create websites for their 
product or service as if it were commercially available today, to which potential 
customers are invited to express their interest by providing their personal details. 
In some cases, participants can pay for the product upfront as part of a 
crowdfunding campaign, as on Crowdcube.com and Kickstarter.com. Other 
companies have extended this idea into a model for their entire business; the 
website itself may be cryptic about whether the product or service has yet been 
developed and/or when it might be shipped to consumers, on the basis that if a 
sufficient number of potential customers express their interest, the product will 
become cost effective to create. This was the original business model of the 
online furniture retailer Made.com (Giudici, 2014).  
The key advantage of the approach recommended in Ries (2011) is that the 
proportion of people who sign-up to such waiting lists or are willing to put their 
own money at stake in a crowdfunding campaign, are likely to provide would-be 
entrepreneurs with much better approximations of future sales of their product 
than would a market research survey that asks people to say how willing they 
would be to purchase the product if it came to market on a rating scale.  
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If the realism of the technology entrepreneurs approach was combined with the 
controlled experimentation used by the academic economists by creating a 
website that resembles an energy supplier’s website (a fictional energy company) 
then the Internet could also be used to collect information on consumer demand 
for TOU tariffs depending on how the tariff is framed to consumers. This would 
enable data to be collected on switching as well as key causal antecedents43 of 
switching such as obtaining a quote, page views and visiting the page of the 
website from which it is possible to switch. Similarly, an email experiment would 
generate data on the proportion of recipients who open the email and the 
proportion who click-through to visit information about switching to a TOU tariff.  
These types of outcome measures – actions taken by people through digital 
products and services – are known as  “digital footprints” (Kosinski et al., 2016, 
p.493) and they are much easier to measure than switching rates themselves. 
Digital footprints also generate a large amount of user data including “web 
browsing logs, records of transactions from online and offline marketplaces, 
photos and videos, global positions system location logs, media playlists, voice 
and video call logs, languages used in Tweets or e-mails, and much more” 
(Kosinski et al., 2016, p.493). This is also desirable because RCTs often require 
large sample sizes in order to detect small but substantively important treatment 
effects (Coe, 2002; Sanders and Chonaire, 2015). 
Of course, there are still potential limitations to these approaches. First, there is 
still an element of self-selection of participants involved in the eBay experiments 
and there would also be self-selection involved in an experiment in which people 
                                            
43 A causal antecedent of switching is any behaviour which a consumer must or is likely to take 
prior to switching, such as visiting the website of a supplier to obtain a quote, given that suppliers 
will not allow consumers to switch without first obtaining a quote. 
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were visiting an energy supplier’s website, whether that website was real or not. 
To avoid this, an intervention would also need to be tested in an online 
environment that is not already likely to be frequented by people who are more 
amenable to switching tariff. This would require using unsolicited marketing 
techniques.  
Second, as outlined in Athey and Imbens (2016), results from a single field 
experiment will not necessarily generalise if and when any intervention tested is 
rolled out because an experiment will usually always be limited to a particular 
geographic location, time or subpopulation. According to Athey and Imbens 
(2016, p.6) “most concerns with external validity are related to treatment effect 
heterogeneity” with the solution being to run multiple RCTs in different contexts 
and comparing the results, as in Meager (2015), or to estimate treatment effects 
conditional on observed covariates.  
This thesis will therefore answer the same research question using data 
generated from multiple RCTs run in the context of a natural online field 
experiment and a population-based survey experiment. A natural field experiment 
could be run on different sub-groups of the population of interest separately, for 
example, one trial run exclusively or predominantly on EV and heat pump owners 
to estimate the average treatment effect on that population sub-group. This effect 
could be compared with a heterogeneous treatment effect (treatment by covariate 
interaction) measured in a survey experiment involving all members of the 
population of interest because data can be collected to identify who is an EV or 
heat pump owner and who not. The advantage of using this combined approach 
is that the natural experiments enables the estimation of a treatment effect that 
is free of evaluation-driven effects on a behavioural outcome variable; the survey 
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experiment enables the treatment effect to be estimated on multiple sub-groups 
in the same experiment. 
Thus, field experiments combined with population-based survey experiments is 
a more suitable strategy for answering research question two than relying on field 
experiments alone; this combination can obtain an unbiased estimate of the 
causal effect of tailored message framing on demand for TOU tariffs amongst the 
average member of the population and sub-groups such as EV and heat pump 
owners that is also likely to generalise if the treatment was rolled out in real life.  
3.4 Summary: online natural field experiments complemented 
by survey data  
An empirical approach is required to answer both research questions in this 
thesis. The first research question – is consumer decision making over tariffs 
affected by bounded rationality? – is descriptive and requires the price of 
electricity and total amount of electricity consumed to be fixed so that there is an 
ex-ante optimal tariff. This question can therefore be most suitably answered 
using an online survey using narrative vignettes.  
The second research question – can tailored message framing increase demand 
for TOU tariffs amongst EV and heat pump owners? – is a causal research 
question. Natural field experiments run on UK energy consumers are the most 
suitable empirical method to provide robust estimates of the treatment effect of 
tailored marketing on demand for TOU tariffs that is more likely to generalise if 
applied by energy suppliers in real life than if the experiment were conducted in 
a laboratory setting amongst a convenience sample of students.  
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Whilst the ideal field experiment would ostensibly involve partnering with an 
energy company that offers a TOU tariff, such a design is not an option because 
these tariffs were not commercially available to domestic consumers at the time 
of data collection. Even though one relevant TOU tariff is available at the time of 
writing, this would still severely limit the amount of experimentation that could be 
conducted since one supplier is unlikely to be able – or even willing – to host the 
number of experiments required to answer many of the unanswered questions 
about the likely consumer adoption of TOU tariffs and DSR services in general. 
To overcome this challenge, whilst producing results which are likely to 
generalise to a real-world setting, two innovative field experiments will be used. 
Informed by the natural online field experiments conducted by economists, the 
first field experiment will involve creating a website for a fictional energy supplier 
which will promote a TOU tariff designed by a GB energy supplier to be 
commercially viable in GB in the near future. Informed by the research on digital 
footprints and the text message trial conducted by Haynes et al. (2013), the 
second will be an email experiment conducted in partnership with OLEV for which 
the outcomes will be click-through rates and open rates to tariff switching 
information, potential causal antecedents of switching tariff.  
Running a natural field experiment, whether online or not, reduces the likelihood 
of obtaining baseline data on participants required for baseline randomisation 
checks and to test for treatment effect heterogeneity, the latter of which will be 
especially important if the treatment is only expected to work on consumers 
belonging to a certain group, as is the assumption here that tailoring information 
to EV owners will only be effective on EV owners. For example, in the eBay 
experiments (Katkar and Reiley, 2006; Paul et al., 2006; Hossain and Morgan, 
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2006; Einav et al., 2012), researchers were able to observe bidding behaviour in 
full but would not be able to identify any user characteristics. In Blake et al. (2017), 
data on participant characteristics was only available for the sub-group of 
participants who logged into their user profiles on StubHub.com.  
This thesis aims to overcome this trade-off in four ways: (1) Targeted sampling 
for the field experiments to try to confine recruitment to participants of certain 
characteristics; (2) Embedding surveys within the context of the field experiment 
that appear to be part of the normal course of undertaking the behaviour in 
question to obtain descriptive statistics on the sample without alerting participants 
to the experiment; (3) Complementing the results of the natural field experiments 
with a population-based survey experiment (Mutz, 2011) amongst a nationally 
representative sample of British energy bill payers who are paid to complete 
baseline information prior to exposure to treatment; (4) Running a field 
experiment on a population that is already known to consist solely of EV owners. 
Population-based field experiments use “survey sampling methods to produce a 
collection of experimental subjects that is representative of the target population 
of interest [with] subjects…randomly assigned to experimental conditions by the 
researcher, and treatments administered as in any other experiment” (Mutz, 
2011, p.2). 
The field experiments provide authentic outcome measures, interventions, 
context and participants whilst the population-based field experiment provides 
authentic participants but greater experimental control to obtain a full range of 
baseline information on participants to make it easier to measure treatment effect 
heterogeneity. Measuring the impact of the same intervention in multiple settings 
and on different sample populations is recommended by Athey and Imbens 
(2016) to enhance the generalisability of results from field experiments. 
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The population-based survey experiment will, like the survey used to answer 
research question 1, be administered online. Online surveys provide a better 
medium by which to present people with tailored marketing of tariffs than a 
telephone survey and, since doorstop selling of energy tariffs is banned, a face-
to-face survey would not provide results that are likely to generalise if such 
marketing was implemented in reality. As argued in Section 2 Empirical strategy 
for research question 1, online surveys provide a similar level of data quality as 
postal surveys at much lower cost.    
Although it is becoming increasingly common to combine field experiments with 
surveys to collect baseline information on participants (Glennerster and 
Takavarasha, 2013), it is much less common to embed a survey within the 
context of a natural field experiment in a way that does not alert participants to 
the fact that an experiment is being conducted, to avoid compromising the 
generalisability of the results. Moreover, although there are a number of field 
experiments being run in a range of policy contexts such as education and health, 
it is rare for a researcher to answer the same research question using data 
generated from multiple RCTs.  
Further, whilst field experiments have been adopted as the key tool for policy 
evaluation in the US since the 1970s (Duflo, 2016) and, more recently, for some 
policy areas in the UK and in the development economics literature too (Cameron 
et al., 2016), RCTs and field experiments have scarcely been applied to causal 
questions of interest in the energy domain (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Vine et 
al., 2014; Frederiks et al., 2016).  
In the preceding section, I argued that this is likely to be due to the challenges 
involved in running field trials in highly future facing settings like energy where 
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many of the low-carbon technologies of interest are not yet commercially 
available and policies have no international precedent. However, since consumer 
adoption is a key part of the success of these technologies or policies, it is not 
advisable to wait until the technologies function or the policies have been 
designed before conducting robust consumer adoption trials. One of the 
contributions of this thesis is to demonstrate ways in which field experiments 
could be used to answer causal questions of research in the energy domain 
despite the challenges.  
4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this section was to justify the research design in the context of 
the potential alternatives (the methodology). The detailed description of the four 
individual studies (the methods) will be provided in the each of the study chapters 
themselves. Chapter 5 will present the design and results of the Tariff Decision 
Making Study; Chapter 6 will present the design and results of both the Flex Trial 
and the Population-Based Survey Experiment and; Chapter 7 will present the 
design and results of the OLEV trial. 
   
 


















The Tariff Decision Making Study – energy 
bill payers struggle to optimise 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis has presented two research questions to address the gaps in the 
literature highlighted in Chapters 2-3 and an approach to answering these 
questions in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 proposed a theoretical model of consumer 
heterogeneity in which an energy bill payer’s likelihood of adopting a TOU tariff 
is influenced both by whether they have the household appliances and 
consumption patterns required to save money on a TOU tariff, consistent with a 
classical economic model, as well as whether the consumer is fully or only partly 
(boundedly) able process the information required to identify whether a TOU tariff 
is the optimal tariff for them. This model motivated my argument that enrolment 
to TOU tariffs should be voluntary and that consumers could not be automatically 
enrolled onto a TOU tariff by default to boost enrolment rates because we could 
not expect boundedly rational consumers to be able to identify whether a TOU 
tariff was right for them and opt-out if it is not.  
This chapter presents the results of the Tariff Decision Making Study, a 
population-based survey designed to test whether consumer decision making 
over electricity tariffs really is affected by bounded rationality (research question 
1), as proposed in Wilson and Price (2010) and the theoretical model presented 
in Chapter 3. It also tests whether bounded rationality is more likely to affect TOU 
tariffs than flat-rate tariffs and whether it varies across consumers in low and high 
socio-economic grades.  
Testing these hypotheses is not only important to identify whether there is 
empirical support for the hypothesis that motivates research question 2 (whether 
tailored marketing could work as an alternative to opt-out), but also whether 
   
 
Chapter 5: Method, results and analysis 1 187 
‘nudge’ in general is even an appropriate approach to increasing uptake to TOU 
tariffs.  
As outlined in Chapter 3, the effectiveness of nudge is conditional on the idea 
that consumers are making sub-optimal decisions due to cognitive biases such 
as status-quo bias or limitations in their cognitive capacity to process the relevant 
information (bounded rationality) rather than just the usual market failures such 
as imperfect information or any other potential drivers of decision making 
(Benartzi et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the fact that many energy bill payers do not 
switch tariff despite the large savings on offer may or may not indicate that their 
decision making is sub-optimal. For instance, although we know that many 
consumers are not on the cheapest tariff (CMA, 2016b), it is hard to rule out the 
possibility that they are factoring other features into their decision other than price 
(Wilson and Price, 2010); if they are, then the fact that consumers are foregoing 
large savings is perfectly consistent with a model of a rational decision maker 
who is trading-off between price and non-price factors that they value.  
Further, even if consumers are not making optimal choices, little research has 
asked whether this is due to a lack of access to the high quality information 
necessary to make the choice or whether it is because bill payers simply do not 
know how to undertake cost-benefit analyses very well (bounded rationality). In 
the absence of smart meters, it is highly likely that people do not have the 
information required to work out what tariff, of all the tariffs on the market, will 
maximise their utility and, as pointed out in Wilson and Price (2010), sub-optimal 
decisions in the context of high information search costs is perfectly consistent 
with a model of a fully rational consumer. 
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The Tariff Decision Making Study attempts to overcome these methodological 
challenges to identify whether consumer decision making is fully rational by 
testing whether participants can identify the cost-minimising tariff from a menu of 
three tariffs when given all the information required in the controlled environment 
of an online survey. This exercise does not assume that the cheapest tariff is the 
optimal tariff; it merely tests people’s abilities to undertake costs-benefit analysis, 
or what economists sometimes call solving optimisation problems, in the specific 
context of an energy tariff choice.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, full rationality means having the unbounded 
computational capacity to undertake cost-benefit analyses whereas bounded 
rationality relaxes this assumption by implying there are inescapable cognitive 
limits on peoples’ abilities to process the information required to optimise (Simon, 
1957). If consumers cannot undertake a cost-benefit analysis based on one 
variable, in this case price, then it is unlikely that they will be able to undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis in which they also need to make trade-offs between multiple 
factors such as price, customer service, green energy, electricity shifting 
potential, online account management and so on, particularly given that people 
would have to assign a fictional financial value to these individual items to 
undertake the analysis.  
Although a growing literature has shown that people struggle to make optimal 
choices in the context of household savings (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006b, 2008; 
van Rooij et al., 2011; Klapper et al., 2013), choosing the optimal energy tariff is 
much simpler than planning for retirement which requires knowledge of much 
more complicated concepts than a kilowatt hour or a standing charge. Therefore, 
just because bounded rationality affects decision making over pensions does not 
mean that it will also affect peoples’ decisions over their energy tariff. Most 
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importantly, it does not mean that the number of people it will affect will be so 
large as to make an opt-out policy undesirable or that models which assume fully 
rational decision making will yield poor predictions at the aggregate 
(macroeconomic) level (Friedman, 1953), the so-called “as if” defence of the 
rationality paradigm (Chapter 3). It is therefore crucial to identify what proportion 
of energy bill payers, if any, struggle to solve the type of optimisation problem 
involved in identifying the optimal energy tariff. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 will outline the survey 
method. Section 3 will describe how the survey was implemented, including 
attrition rates and how screening was applied to obtain the final sample for 
analysis. Section 4 will present the descriptive statistics of the participants in my 
sample alongside the characteristics of a sample of participants from a different 
survey who were recruited to be nationally representative of the British population 
and who also identified as energy bill payers. Section 5 will present the results of 
the tariff decision making questions and Section 6 consists of a brief discussion 
about what these results mean in relation to the specific research question that 
the study was designed to answer (research question 1) and implications for the 
second research question. Section 7 will conclude with a summary of the key 
findings that provide empirical support for the theoretical motivation of research 
question 2 provided in Chapter 3.  
This general structure will be employed for each of the results chapters, after 
which a global discussion section will interpret the results in light of the findings 
from each of the four studies undertaken for this thesis to answer the research 
questions.  
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2 Method 
2.1 Population of interest 
The population of interest for this survey is the average British energy bill payer. 
This population was chosen because the aim of this survey is to identify whether 
the average energy bill payer’s decision making over energy tariffs could be 
affected by bounded rationality (research question 1).  
Following the conventions in the literature, the population of interest is confined 
to domestic energy bill payers, rather than energy consumers more generally, 
because it is energy bill payers who will be responsible for making the decision 
over which tariff the household is on. An energy bill payer is defined as someone 
who is solely or jointly financially responsible for paying the energy bills in their 
home. It therefore excludes people who consume energy but are unlikely to be 
responsible for paying the bills such as children. Although it is possible to imagine 
situations in which someone may be responsible for paying an energy bill but not 
for choosing the energy tariff (e.g. if they live in shared accommodation and one 
adult chooses the tariff), a prior survey finds that there is an almost perfect 
overlap between being an energy bill payer and being responsible for selecting 
the household energy tariff in Britain; in excess of 97% of British energy bill 
payers also identified that they were solely or jointly responsible for choosing the 
household energy tariff (M Nicolson et al., 2017).  
2.2 Recruiting amongst the population of interest 
An online survey was administered in November 2016 by a UK advertising 
agency to its sample of online British market research panellists. Like other 
market research panels, these participants were recruited by the advertising 
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agency to serve as members of their consumer panel in exchange for a small 
per-survey payment. The company aims to recruit people who live or work in 
urban locations, which they define as places with a population greater than 
10,000 (England), 5,000 (Scotland) and 3,000 (Wales).  
The advertising agency runs fortnightly topic-based surveys with its online market 
research panel. The company does not use quota sampling to attempt to ensure 
that a nationally representative sample of participants respond to the survey. The 
advertising company’s clients are mostly based in London so when they survey 
its panellists they stratify based on region – inside London and outside London – 
and randomly select half of their London panellists and half of their non-London 
panellists to take part. However the company holds basic demographic data on 
its participants which will enable me to compare to the characteristics of the 
resulting sample to that of the general population using ONS statistics as well as 
to the characteristics of a nationally representative sample of British adults who 
also identified as energy bill payers in a similar survey conducted in 2015 (M 
Nicolson et al., 2017). 
The questions used for this research were added to the agency’s survey on 
household utilities, which includes questions on mortgages, internet packages, 
mobile phone and landline packages as well as the energy questions that I 
provided. The first question was used to identify whether the participant was an 
energy bill payer. 
Although a nationally representative sample of British adults would be more 
closely aligned to the population of interest outlined above, this sample was used 
because it was made available at no cost to the researcher in return for permitting 
the company to use the results to inform its strategy in relation to its energy 
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supplier clients.44 As will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, drawing 
from the urban population of GB does not fundamentally undermine the ability of 
the results to provide evidence as to whether consumer decision making over 
energy tariffs is currently or in the future likely to be affected by bounded 
rationality (research question 1). This is because numeracy skills do not vary 
geographically to a sufficient extent to be concerned that a slightly older and more 
rural sample would have been substantially better able to solve the problem 
presented (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2012).  
2.3 Survey design 
Participants were asked to respond to three energy related questions. The first 
question required participants to identify whether they are solely or jointly 
responsible for paying the household energy bills using the same question 
wording in Nicolson et al. (2017).  
The second and third question presented participants with vignettes of two 
separate individuals whom they are told are looking to switch electricity tariff. In 
both cases, the participant is asked to select the cheapest of three possible tariffs 
given all the information required to compute the cost minimising tariff for the 
person concerned. Participants were not paid extra for getting the question 
correct but were paid a flat fee for completing the survey. Participants were 
advised to use a calculator to help them and were also able to respond with ‘I 
don’t know’ (abbreviated to DK), to minimise people selecting a tariff at random 
and to help distinguish between participants who did not want to spend time 
                                            
44 The company was not involved in the design, analysis or interpretation of the results reported 
here. 
   
 
Chapter 5: Method, results and analysis 1 193 
working out the answer (inertia) and those who attempt the question but are 
unable to answer it correctly (bounded rationality), as explained in Chapter 4.   
In the first vignette, the participant is provided with three flat-rate electricity tariffs 
from which the fictional individual is able to choose. The following information is 
therefore required to compute the cheapest tariff and is provided to the 
participant: 
 The unit rate of electricity on each of the tariffs in pence per kilowatt hour 
 The standing charge on each of the tariffs in pounds per year 
 The individuals’ yearly electricity demand in kilowatt hours 
 Whether or not the tariff is accompanied by a paperless billing discount, a 
common type of discount used by suppliers 
This is the same information that Ofgem (2013) mandates suppliers to provide to 
consumers on its websites as part of the ‘Tariff Information Label’. 
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The first vignette was presented to participants as follows: 
Selin lives with her partner. Their current tariff has come to an end and they’re trying 
to choose a new one.  
Take a look at the three tariffs they’ve got to choose from and then decide which 
tariff you think would be cheapest for them considering that they use 2,000 units of 





Flat-rate tariff 2 
(3) 
Flat-rate tariff 3 
Unit rate 15p/unit 14p/unit 13p/unit 
Standing charge £68/year £60/year £95/year 
Discount for switching to 
paperless billing 
£30/year None None 
 
Please select the tariff that you think would be cheapest for Selin and her partner. You 
may want to use a calculator to help you. 
The second vignette is identical to the first except that, this time, one of the three 
tariffs includes a TOU tariff. Again, the same information is provided to the 
participant as was provided in the first scenario with the exception that, instead 
of providing information on paperless billing discounts, the participant is given 
information on the timing of the fictional individuals’ energy consumption, as 
required to compute whether the TOU tariff might be the cheapest:   
 The unit rate of electricity on each of the tariffs in pence per kilowatt hour 
 The standing charge on each of the tariffs in pounds per year 
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 The individuals’ yearly electricity demand in kilowatt hours 
 The proportion of electricity consumed at the different time periods in the 
day, corresponding to the times on the TOU tariff 
The reason for including the information on paperless billing in the first scenario 
is to keep the total amount of information provided in both scenarios 
approximately equivalent.  
The second vignette was presented to participants as follows: 
Stephanie lives with her partner. Her current tariff has come to an end and she’s trying 
to choose a new one.  
Take a look at the three tariffs she’s got to choose from and then decide which tariff you 
think would be cheapest for her considering that her family uses 3,100 units of 
electricity a year at the following times of the day: 
 50% between 4pm-8pm  
 40% between 7am-4pm  
 10% overnight (between 8pm-7am) 
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Please select the tariff that you think would be cheapest for Stephanie and her 
partner. Use a calculator to help you. 
The level of mathematics required to answer the questions correctly – requiring 
the ability to undertake addition, multiplication and to compute fractions of whole 
numbers – is the level expected of children finishing primary school in England 
(Department for Education, 2013). This survey therefore presents a relatively low 
bar against which to test the classical economic assumption that consumers have 
unbounded computational capability.   
Immediately prior to being presented with the vignettes, participants are given a 
brief description of what a TOU tariff is and how they compare to flat-rate tariffs 
as in Nicolson et al. (2017) so that knowledge of the key concepts is not a barrier 
to answering the question. This summary also introduces the idea of paying for 





Flat rate  
tariff 2  
(3) 
Flat rate 
 tariff 3 
Super off-peak  























Standing charge £70 £60 £95 
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for having electricity delivered to your home”). Throughout the survey, I do not 
refer to “kilowatt hours” but instead “units” of electricity, for example, £0.14 per 
unit and 2,000 units of electricity used because this is the language used by most 
energy suppliers. Consistent with past research on financial literacy (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2008), the only information that participants were not given was training 
on the method required to solve the problem. The full questionnaire is provided 
in Appendix 1.  
As stated in Chapter 4, the scenarios were intentionally designed to make it 
easier for consumers to identify the cost-minimal tariff in this survey context than 
if they were using the Tariff Information Labels for real-world tariffs. The 
motivation for this is to minimise participant fatigue and to account for the fact 
that, in real life, participants face a greater incentive to choose the optimal tariff 
since it has a consequence on their energy bill whereas in the survey it is 
hypothetical. First, the tariffs were designed so that there is one cheapest tariff 
(i.e. there is no tie). Second, the standing charge was given in pounds per year 
rather than in pence per day (as in the Tariff Information Label) so that 
participants would not have to perform the step of multiplying the daily standing 
charge by 365, the number of days in a year. Third, in reality, people would have 
hundreds of tariffs to choose from, not just three.  
2.4 Outcomes 
The outcome measure is the proportion of participants who correctly identify the 
cheapest tariff.  
2.5 Additional data collection 
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Baseline data is available on the following participant characteristics which is 
collected when participants join the panel and which is also updated at periodic 
intervals: gender, age in five categories (16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55+), 
region in 6 categories (London, South, Midlands or Wales, North, Scotland and 
Other) and socio-economic grade in three categories (A/B; C1; C2; D/E).  
2.6 Sample size 
The advertising agency’s consumer panel consists of 6,240 participants, from 
which approximately 10-15% respond to any given survey. It was therefore 
estimated that approximately 600-900 participants would complete the survey 
which was estimated as being sufficient to obtain an estimate of the proportion of 
consumers who are able to identify the cheapest tariff with 95% confidence and 
a 5% margin of error using the formula outlined in Daniel (1999) and Naing et al. 
(2006), assuming that between 50% to 80% of people would correctly identify the 
cheapest tariff. The most conservative estimate – the one requiring the highest 
sample size – is 768 participants.  
2.7 Randomisation and blinding 
Although it would have been preferable to randomise the order of the scenarios, 
randomisation was not possible. There is therefore a small chance that people 
could be more fatigued in the second scenario and that this could affect their 
performance. On the other hand, given that the task is very short, and that people 
would not be told how they performed, it seems unlikely that fatigue would have 
a large impact. All participants were therefore presented with the flat-rate tariff 
scenario first, as it was felt this would be easier for people to answer and therefore 
reduce attrition.  
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Blinding was not necessary because the survey did not vary across participants. 
2.8 Analysis plan 
The pre-analysis plan for this study was registered prior to data collection on the 
Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) online trial registry 
(20161110AC).  
This study is associated with two hypotheses which the Pre-Analysis Plan states 
will be tested as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Some energy bill payers will fail to identify the cheapest tariff in 
both scenarios.45 
Test: to compute the proportion of participants who correctly identify the 
cheapest tariff in both scenarios (0=incorrect/DK; 1= identified cheapest 
tariff). 
Hypothesis 2: A higher proportion of energy bill payers will fail to identify the 
cheapest tariff when a TOU tariff is included in the menu of tariff options than 
when a TOU tariff is not included. 
Test: a paired sample z test of the difference in two proportions will be 
used to find out whether any observed difference in the proportion of 
energy bill payers identifying the correct tariff in scenario 1 (all flat-rate 
tariffs) is statistically significantly different from the proportion who 
correctly identify the cheapest tariff in scenario 2 (includes a TOU tariff).  
                                            
45 It is acknowledged that this is a weak hypothesis because it does not propose how many 
consumers would be unable to select the cheapest tariff. However, there was insufficient evidence 
upon which to make a precise prediction of the number of customers who were likely to be unable 
to identify the lowest cost tariff. This hypothesis is exploratory.  
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Hypothesis 3: A higher proportion of energy bill payers in the bottom three socio-
economic grades (C2, D, E) will fail to identify the cheapest tariff than energy bill 
payers in the top three socio-economic grades (A, B, C1) in both scenario 1 and 
scenario 2. 
Test: two paired z tests of the difference in two proportions will be used to 
find out whether any observed difference in the proportion of energy bill 
payers belonging to the bottom three socio-economic grades and who 
identify the correct tariff is statistically significantly different from the 
proportion who correctly identify the cheapest tariff and belong to the top 
three socio-economic grades in both scenario 1 and scenario 2.  
3 Implementation of survey 
The survey was sent to 6,239 members of the advertising agency’s market 
research panel in November 2016, out of which 957 participants started the 
survey and a total of 932 completed it, which means the survey had a response 
rate of 15% and attrition rate of under 2%. Participants were paid in points which 
they can redeem for cash after completing a certain number of surveys.46 
Prior to analysis, participants were screened for whether they were energy bill 
payers based on their response to a question in the survey which asked them 
whether they were solely or jointly financially responsible for paying their 
household electricity bills. Just under 13% of participants who started the survey 
indicated that they were not responsible for paying energy bills which is higher 
than the average for the adult population in GB of 5%-8%. These participants 
                                            
46 The value of the points approximately amounted to £3. 
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(121 participants in total) were excluded from all analyses, leaving a total of 811 
valid responses for analysis.  
4 Descriptive statistics of sample 
Table 12 reports the characteristics of all participants with and without sampling 
weights to account for participant non-response and the oversampling of 
Londoners. The first column presents the characteristics of participants from a 
similar online survey performed on a nationally representative sample of British 
adults who identified as energy bill payers in 2015 (M Nicolson et al., 2017). The 
purpose of making this comparison is that, as noted above, a nationally 
representative sample of adults might be expected to be more similar to the 
average energy bill payer (the actual population of interest for the study) than 
participants in this survey who were recruited to be representative of the average 
member of the urban population of GB. Any differences in the characteristics of 
the two will be used to help interpret the generalisability of the results in this study 
to the average energy bill payer in the population. 
The sample weights are inverse probability weights which account for differences 
in response rates across survey participants by age and socio-economic grade 
and increases the weight given to responses provided by individuals outside of 
London to help redress the fact that the sampling strategy led to a higher 
proportion of Londoners being recruited into the sample relative to their proportion 
in the general population. 
Table 12 Characteristics of energy bill payers in the British population and in the 
survey sample with and without survey weights 
 
 Population Sample 
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Gender:     




   
A/B 22 35 36 811 
C1 31 35 30 811 
C2 21 9 11 811 
D/E 26 21 23 811 
Age in five year 
groups: 
 
   
16-2448 9 5 6 806 
25-34 18 22 28 806 
35-44 19 21 23 806 
45-54 18 17 16 806 
55+ 37 35 26 806 
Region: 
 
   
London 13 41 31 811 
Outside London 86 59 69 811 
 
 
The unweighted estimates more closely resemble the population statistics than 
the weighted estimates so participant characteristics are discussed in terms of 
the in-sample rather than weighted estimates. Whilst this might sound 
counterintuitive, research into weighting has shown that weights can often be 
counterproductive (Wooldridge, 2009; Solon et al., 2013) and, in this case, has a 
simple explanation; the response rates were lower amongst the younger 
                                            
47 The population values are for the average member of the British population from the Census 
2011 because equivalent values were not available for the average energy bill payer. 
48 This is based on age groups 15-24 for the GB population because Census statistics are broken 
down into five year intervals in which 16-19 year olds are grouped with 15-16 year olds.  
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participants and participants belonging to the highest socio-economic grade, both 
of which are relatively overrepresented in the company’s market research panel 
by comparison to the population proportions. Indeed, the unweighted 
characteristics of the sample are qualitatively very similar to that of the average 
energy bill payer in terms of gender and age and, in general, supports my 
decision not to use weighted estimates for statistical analysis (for more details 
see Annex 3).  As noted in Annex 3, following Debell and Krosnick (2009), 
differences exceeding 5 percentage points are regarded as notable. 
As evident in Table 12, although the sample has a relatively high proportion of 
participants belonging to the top two socio-economic grades (A/B) and a 
comparably low proportion of participants in socio-economic grade C2, the 
proportion of participants in the second socio-economic grade (C1) and lowest 
socio-economic grade (D/E) are very similar to the population proportions.  
As expected, the sample substantially over-represents Londoners. However, 
there is no compelling reason to believe that the computational abilities and 
cognitive attention of market research panellists or Londoners would differ to 
people living elsewhere in Britain who do not participate in market research, at 
least not after controlling for social grade. The most recent research conducted 
in 2011 suggests that whilst numeracy skills are slightly lower in London than 
elsewhere the difference is small (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 
2012), whilst in the past (2003) Londoners were found to have slightly higher 
numeracy skills than average for Britain. I will conduct and report the results of a 
test of whether Londoners in my sample do outperform non Londoners to help in 
the interpretation of the results. 
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Socio-economic grade, on the other hand, is likely to be an important determinant 
so, as outlined in the methods section in Chapter 4, I will test for differences in 
decision making quality based on socio-economic grade.  
5 Tariff decision making results  
Bounded rationality implies that some British energy bill payers would be unable 
to identify the cheapest tariff from a menu of tariffs when given all the information 
necessary to calculate this (hypothesis 1). Since TOU tariffs are more complex 
than flat-rate tariffs, bounded rationality also implies that the ability to identify the 
cost-minimising tariff would be lower if the menu of tariffs included a TOU tariff 
(hypothesis 2). Recent research also suggests that bounded rationality may 
disproportionately affect those in lower socio-economic grades (Mani et al., 2013) 
and therefore that the ability to identify the cost minimising tariff would also be 
lower amongst those in the bottom three socio-economic grades relative to those 
in the top three socio-economic grades (hypothesis 3).  
Before presenting these results it is first worth addressing the concern that, since 
participants were not paid an additional fee for getting the question correct, they 
may have selected response options at random to avoid expending the time (if 
they are fully rational) or mental effort (if boundedly rational) required to arrive at 
the correct answer. If all participants selected at random, the responses would be 
equally distributed across all three response options whereas  Table 13 shows 
that this is not the case, with  a one-way chi2 test indicating that the observed 
differences are statistically significantly different (p<0.001). Moreover, there is 
substantial variation in the number of people selecting each option, suggesting 
that, whilst I cannot eliminate the possibility that some people selected at random, 
the evidence suggests that the majority did not.  
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Table 13 Distribution of responses across response options.  
 
 




Tariff 1 461 104 
Tariff 2 287 402 
Tariff 3 88 223 
DK 106 203 
   
Notes: The number of people correctly identifying the cheapest tariff is highlighted 
in bold. 
Moving on to the main results, Table 14 presents the responses to the energy 
tariff questions across the sample as a whole and for participants in the top three 
socio-economic grades and those in the bottom three socio-economic grades. 
The percentages in the table represent the proportion who correctly identified the 
cheapest tariff, those who either gave an incorrect response and those who said 
that they did not know the answer.  
Table 14 Distribution of energy bill payers’ responses by scenario and socio-
economic grade  
 
 All bill payers High social grade  
(A, B, C1) 
Low social grade  






















































N 811 563 243 
 
Notes: Values in cells represent mean proportion of participants who correctly 
identified the cheapest tariff or who got the answer wrong or said they did not 
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know. In Scenario 1 the tariff menu only includes flat-rate tariffs. In Scenario 
2 the tariff menu includes a TOU tariff. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses.  
 
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the results show that 49% of British energy bill 
payers correctly identified the cheapest tariff from a menu of flat-rate tariffs.49 
Consistent with hypothesis 2, the proportion of energy bill payers who correctly 
identified the cost-minimising tariff is five percentage points lower when the tariff 
menu includes a TOU tariff (p=0.038).  
Consistent with hypothesis 3, when the tariff menu included a TOU tariff, the 
proportion of bill payers belonging to the lowest socio-economic grades who 
correctly identified the cost minimising tariff was 8 percentage points lower than 
the proportion of bill payers belonging to the highest socio-economic grade. This 
difference is also statistically significant (p=0.035). Bill payers belonging to lower 
socio-economic grades were also less likely to identify the cheapest tariff 
compared to their higher grade counterparts when the menu only included flat-
rate tariffs, although the 7 percentage point difference is only marginally 
statistically significant (p=0.068), suggesting that the biggest gap in decision 
making quality across socio-economic grades occurs when choosing between 
TOU tariffs and flat-rate tariffs as opposed to when choosing between just flat-
rate tariffs. 
The average difference in the proportion of respondents identifying the cheapest 
tariff is being driven by the bill payers who say that they do not know what tariff 
is cheapest, including also the differences across socio-economic grade. As is 
visible in Table 15, when excluding participants who gave a DK response, the 
                                            
49 See Payne et al. (1993) for a relevant discussion of multi-attribute decision making studies. 
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average number of correct responses is substantively identical across both the 
flat-rate and TOU rate tariff menus (54% vs 55%). Although there is still a 
relatively large gap in correct responses across those in the top and bottom socio-
economic grades, regardless of whether the tariff menu only includes flat-rate 
tariffs (51% vs. 56%) or whether it also includes a TOU tariff (51% vs. 57%), 
exploratory analyses that were not pre-specified in advance find that these 
differences are not statistically significant.  
Table 15 Proportion of energy bill payers correctly identifying the cost-minimising 
tariff by scenario and socio-economic grade excluding respondents who indicated 
they did not know  
 
 Tariff menu scenario 
Sample group: Flat rate only Includes TOU tariff 
 Mean (%) N Mean (%) N 





Low social grade  






High social grade  






     
Note: Standard errors around the mean reported in parentheses.  
Since the sample over represents Londoners, I tested whether there is any 
evidence that the Londoners in my sample have higher energy literacy than non-
Londoners. An OLS and logit regression was run in which a dummy variable for 
being a Londoner was regressed against the dummy variable indicating whether 
the participant correctly identified the cheapest tariff in both scenarios. The results 
showed that Londoners statistically significantly outperformed non-Londoners by 
13 percentage points (p<0.01) in scenario 1, without a TOU tariff, but that there 
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was no statistically significant difference in their performance when the TOU tariff 
was included in scenario 2. 
6 Discussion 
This study shows that, when asked to identify the cheapest energy tariff in a 
survey, about half of British energy bill payers fail to do so even when given all 
the information required. As predicted, this study found that decision making 
quality declined when the menu included a TOU tariff, particularly for those in the 
lowest three socio-economic grades in British society (C2, D, E).  
The next section will now discuss the implications this result has for the validity 
of the classical economic model as a framework for how consumers make 
decisions about energy tariffs, optimisation problems involving non-price factors 
and the way in which consumers are recruited onto TOU tariffs.  
6.1 Fully rational or boundedly rational? Implications of the 
results for the classical economic model of decision making 
According to the “as if” defence of the rationality paradigm, whilst the rationality 
assumption is sometimes false at the individual level (some people make 
mistakes all the time, most people make mistakes some of the time), the model 
is correct on average. In other words, bounded rationality either only affects very 
few consumers and/or the mistakes made by these consumers will not have any 
important impact on the market outcome, in this case, on how many consumers 
and what type adopt a TOU tariff. However, even in the simplest scenario 
involving only flat-rate tariffs, about 40% got the question incorrect and 10% said 
they did not know. This is entirely inconsistent with even a model which assumes 
consumers behave “as if” they are perfectly rational, even after considering that 
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participants were not paid extra for getting the question correct. The numeracy 
skills required to correctly answer the questions presented to survey participants 
are those expected of children leaving primary school in Britain. Classical 
economic theory assumes that people have unbounded computational capacity 
to undertake calculations that are infinitely more complex than those presented 
to participants in this survey.  
Given that nearly half of consumers got the question wrong, there are only two 
other possible explanations for the results. The first is that people did not know 
the method, since they were only given information on the attributes of the tariff 
required to identify the cheapest tariff. The second is that, despite knowing the 
method and having the information required to identify the cheapest tariff, there 
are limitations in peoples’ abilities to process information (bounded rationality), or 
what could also be referred to as ‘thinking costs’.  
Although it is not possible to rule out that some people did not know the method, 
the results are still easier to explain using a model of boundedly rational decision 
making rather than a model that assumes consumers behave approximately in 
line with a model that assumes full rationality. All consumers would have been 
taught the numeracy skills required to undertake the task as school children; if 
they no longer recall these methods as adults, this would be easier to explain 
using a model of a boundedly rational consumer who may be inattentive at school 
or who may forget certain bits of information than it is by invoking the model of a 
fully rational consumer who, on average, is fully attentive and with perfect 
memory.  
In contrast to the classical economic model, Simon’s (1957) theory of bounded 
rationality assumes thinking costs are a key potential driver of the types of 
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decisions people make. According to the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, 
boundedly rational consumers will attempt to limit the cognitive burden of solving 
problems in one of two ways, either by avoiding the decision altogether, leading 
to inertia or status-quo bias, or by undertaking the calculation by processing a 
sub-set of the information (e.g. ignoring the standing charge), which can lead to 
errors. Therefore, according to behavioural economic theory, fully rational 
consumers will undertake the calculation correctly whereas boundedly rational 
consumers will either undertake the calculation incorrectly or not attempt the 
calculation at all by selecting DK. Consistent with this model, the results show 
that many consumers got the question incorrect and a sizeable minority answered 
DK.  
The results are therefore broadly supportive of the theoretical framework outlined 
in Chapter 3 which proposed that consumer decision making over energy tariffs 
could be affected by bounded rationality and not just household appliance 
characteristics that determine whether they can save money on a TOU tariff. 
Although the economics profession widely accepts that its rationality assumptions 
are “obviously…wrong” at the individual level (Tyran, 1999, p.159) – there are 
limits on human cognition, people make mistakes and so on – economists are 
reluctant to incorporate bounded rationality in economic analysis on the basis that 
the model is approximately correct at the aggregate level. Indeed, many policy 
decisions are still undertaken based on standard cost-benefit analyses using the 
expected utility framework, including the UK Government’s cost-benefit analysis 
for smart meters (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b). Based on the results of this survey, 
bounded rationality would appear to be so pervasive amongst energy bill payers 
that it arguably could affect competition in the energy market, including explaining 
why retail prices are significantly higher than wholesale prices (CMA, 2016c). If 
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consumers are unable to optimise over their energy tariff, then suppliers will be 
able to exploit this by increasing their prices. 
6.2 Solving optimisation problems involving energy tariffs  
Whilst the lack of a financial incentive is unlikely to fully explain the results, it is 
still possible that some participants would have performed better if they knew 
there was a financial reward for getting the question correct or if they were taught 
the method in advance. However, the explanation for the results does not change 
the seriousness of the real-world implications. 
Given that the majority of energy bill payers were unable to identify the optimal 
tariff when the only factor they were asked to consider was price, energy bill 
payers are unlikely to perform substantially better in real life when they are likely 
to be trading off between multiple factors, such as customer service, green 
energy supply and whether the tariff comes with a free smart thermostat and so 
on. In addition, since Londoners outperformed non-Londoners in the first 
scenario, without a TOU tariff included, it is possible that the proportion of British 
bill payers who are able to identify the cheapest of an assortment of flat-rate tariffs 
would be lower than estimated in this study considering that the study 
overrepresented Londoners. A prior study suggested that consumers were failing 
to optimise when making decisions over their tariff because 80% of consumers 
appropriated between 30%-50% of the maximum financial gains available 
following the privatisation of the energy markets (Wilson and Price, 2010). 
However, it was unable to rule out the possibility that consumers were switching 
for reasons other than price or that information barriers were preventing rational 
consumers from exploiting the full potential gains from switching after the 
liberalisation of the energy markets. As they said, “Whilst non-price gains are 
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likely to be small in a near-homogeneous market like electricity, consumers may 
believe they exist” (Wilson and Price, 2010, p.654). This study provides evidence 
that, even if such benefits do exist, that many bill payers may be unable to 
rationally weigh up the costs and benefits of alternative tariffs. That is why, a 
conclusion of this chapter is that consumers struggle to optimise over their energy 
tariff. 
The results are also very similar to the performance of consumers in financial 
decision making studies, suggesting that, contrary to the discussion in the 
introduction and Chapter 3, consumers may well find choosing an energy tariff 
about as difficult as choosing a pension and even investing in the stock market. 
The proportion of consumers who correctly identified the cheapest tariff in this 
survey is slightly fewer than the proportion of US residents who were able to 
correctly answer a question aimed at assessing their understanding of interest 
rates – of which 60% correctly identified the correct answer – but about the same 
as the proportion who understood risk diversification when investing in the stock 
market (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008).  
The fact that consumers in the lower socio-economic grades perform worse at 
solving optimisation problems – whether because they are less likely to know the 
method or because lifestyle factors give them less mental bandwidth – is highly 
concerning considering that these groups may be expected to be at greater risk 
of fuel poverty. Fuel poverty is a function of the price paid for energy so these 
consumers are most in need of ensuring that, all other things being equal, they 
are not paying more for their energy than they need to.   
Third, the results also have implications for recruitment onto TOU tariffs for either 
opt-in or opt-out. This is discussed in detail below.  
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6.3 Evaluating the implications of the results for TOU tariff 
recruitment 
There are two main ways in which consumers could be recruited onto a TOU 
tariff. One option is for consumers to be left to decide whether or not to switch to 
a TOU tariff of their own accord (opt-in enrolment). Another option is for 
consumers to be automatically switched onto a TOU tariff unless they explicitly 
request to be kept on their flat-rate tariff (opt-out enrolment). There are two main 
factors that affect the extent to which the results of this study have any practical 
implications for the suitability of either of these two methods of recruitment. The 
first is the similarity between the participants of this survey and the average British 
energy bill payer. The second is the similarity between the task given to survey 
participants and the task that consumers would need to perform in the event of 
opt-in or opt-out enrolment.  
To address the first point, the average survey participant was younger than the 
average member of the British population and was overrepresented by 
Londoners. However, given that numeracy skills decline slightly with age 
(Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2012) and are relatively similar 
across regions in the GB, it is unlikely that the results would be substantially 
different amongst a nationally representative sample of energy bill payers; if 
anything, it might be expected that a nationally representative sample with a 
higher mean age would perform slightly worse.  
To address the second point, the task presented to survey participants differs in 
three key potential ways to the task that would be faced by consumers 
contemplating whether to switch to, or opt out of being switched to, a TOU tariff: 
(1) the incentive to identify the cheapest tariff is higher when the stakes are real 
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than in the hypothetical situation presented to survey participants; (2) in real life 
people can use price comparison websites so potentially do not need to be able 
to compute their estimated annual energy bill under any given tariff and; (3) in 
real life consumers have multiple opportunities to switch their tariff and would do 
so if and when they notice an increase in their energy bill having switched to a 
more expensive tariff regardless of whether recruitment is opt-in or opt-out.  
I address each of these in turn but ultimately conclude that whilst the first point is 
a limitation in the ecological validity of the study, as noted above, the second and 
third are only apparent limitations to the ecological validity. Moreover, none 
provide sufficient reassurance that consumers will be substantially better able to 
ensure they switch to a TOU tariff only if it will save them money in either an opt-
in or opt-out recruitment scenario.  
6.3.1 Asymmetry in incentives 
That the participants were being paid to complete a survey in which there are no 
financial consequences from choosing the wrong tariff has some bearing on the 
generalisability of the results to a real-world scenario in which consumers do face 
financial consequences if and when they switch tariff – however, less so than may 
appear at first glance.  
First, given that there was no evidence that people were choosing between tariffs 
at random, participants who were unwilling to expend any effort to identify the 
correct response are likely to have selected a DK response; even when excluding 
those who selected DK, half of all remaining participants failed to identify the 
cheapest tariff. 
Second, there are many reasons why survey participants would be more likely, 
not less likely, to identify the optimal tariff than consumers faced with the choice 
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in real life. The task presented in this study is much simpler than the optimisation 
problem people actually have to solve when faced with switching tariff. If 
consumers cannot solve optimisation problems based only on price, then it is 
even less likely that they will be able to undertake a cost-benefit analysis in which 
they may also want to make trade-offs between multiple factors such as customer 
service, green energy, online account management and so on. Given that, in real 
life, consumers have to choose between multiple tariffs, not just the three tariffs 
as used in this survey, it is highly unlikely that consumer decision making would 
be substantially better just because there is are real financial consequences.  
Third, in real life, people are not just faced with a choice over their energy tariff; 
rather, people are faced with a range of decisions, which according to the 
classical economic model, they are seeking to optimise, from choosing the best 
bank account to choosing the best hotel at which to spend their summer holidays, 
best school to send their children to, best job role from which to progress their 
career, best GP to visit when they are sick and so on. It is unlikely that, given the 
number and range of decisions people have to make every day, week and year 
that people would be more likely to identify the optimal energy tariff for their 
household in real life than they would in a survey where participants were being 
paid to exclusively focus on one choice.  
Finally, even if the survey substantially overestimates the proportion of 
consumers who can identify the optimal energy tariff, the welfare implications are 
no less severe. Prior research suggests that about 16% of British adults have the 
numeracy skills of a child leaving primary school (Department for Business 
Innovation & Skills, 2012), which is about half as many as correctly identified the 
cheapest tariff in this survey, a problem that was also of primary school level. 
Therefore, even if people do make more effort in real life than the participants of 
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my survey, the evidence suggests that this may only translate into improved 
choices for around half of the consumers. If the survey overestimates the 
proportion of energy bill payers who are unable to optimise by 50%, then given a 
domestic electricity customer base of 28 million customers (Ofgem, 2016d), this 
would still represent 6.7 million energy bill payers who are unable to identify the 
optimal tariff.  
6.3.2 Price comparison websites forego the need for being able to undertake cost-
benefit analyses 
Price comparison websites could play an important role in helping people to make 
better decisions over their energy tariff because such websites will perform these 
calculations on behalf of consumers using data on average household electricity 
usage or estimated or actual meter readings. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that so 
few participants would have correctly identified the cost-minimising tariff if they 
were given three figures, each representing the estimated annual energy bill 
under each tariff, since this only requires an ability to identify the lowest number 
in a set of three.  
The results of this study suggest that there would be substantial value in future 
research into how to identify which households may be able to shift demand out 
of peak hours, so that price comparisons for TOU tariffs can be based on potential 
but realistic changes to peoples’ consumption patterns. This is because, quoting 
a consumer for TOU tariffs based on an accurate picture of their historical 
electricity consumption patterns would defeat the purpose of TOU tariffs which is 
to change the time of day that people use electricity. Empirical research would 
also be required to gauge the extent to which consumers understand that such 
estimates are predicated on them changing their behaviour, to avoid consumers 
experiencing large, unexpected increases in their energy bill.  
   
 
Chapter 5: Method, results and analysis 1 217 
On the other hand, given the level of inertia in the energy market, if consumers 
were defaulted onto TOU tariffs, many may not check a price comparison website 
to determine whether the tariff would increase or decrease their bill. Currently, of 
the 14% of engaged consumers who switch each year, just one third report 
having switched via a price comparison website (Ofgem, 2015). Moreover, half-
hourly consumption data will only be available to suppliers if a consumer actively 
consents to this (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2012) which, given 
customer inertia, may mean this data is unavailable for creating tariff projections 
for the majority of consumers.  
6.3.3 The effects will be short-lived 
It is arguable that, even if consumers were defaulted onto a TOU tariff 
inappropriately, they would soon opt-out once they saw the impact on their energy 
bill. However, wider evidence also suggests that poor decision making at the point 
of switching is unlikely to be corrected once people receive their energy bills; 
although consumers defaulted onto a TOU tariff in one US trial did not reduce 
their peak electricity use at all and would therefore have seen increases in their 
energy bill, retention rates were identical across both opt-in and opt-out groups 
(US Department of Energy, 2016). Therefore, we should not expect consumers 
who are inappropriately defaulted onto a TOU tariff to soon dis-enroll once they 
witness the impact on their energy bill.  
That a bad default can be just as sticky as a good default is true in other domains 
too (Choi et al., 2004) and makes sense in this context given that there is 
“widespread consumer disengagement” (Consumer Focus, 2011, p.5) with 
energy bills. Around 20% of consumers in GB not read their bill at all, particularly 
those who pay by direct debit and therefore who do not need to find out how much 
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they owe since the amount owed is debited automatically (Consumer Focus, 
2011).  
7 Conclusions  
This chapter presented the results of a survey experiment aimed at answering 
the first research question: is consumer decision making over electricity tariffs 
affected by bounded rationality? What this study shows is that, even under ideal 
conditions in which energy bill payers are being paid to pay attention to energy 
tariff information and are only asked to maximise based on a single factor (price), 
nearly half of bill payers cannot identify the cheapest energy tariff. Moreover, the 
ability to identify the optimal tariff declined by five percentage points when the 
tariff menu includes a TOU tariff, particularly amongst consumers in the lowest 
socio-economic grades who may be more likely to be in fuel poverty, for whom 
the proportion of correct responses was 8 percentage points lower than those in 
the top socio-economic grades.  
This study makes two contributions to this thesis and the wider literature. The first 
is that a key assumption behind nudging is that people’s decisions are 
suboptimal. However, it is almost impossible to prove that consumers are making 
suboptimal decisions using observational data about consumer behaviour in the 
energy market alone. Just because there are unexploited gains from switching 
tariff does not mean that decision making is sub-optimal; people may be factoring 
other aspects into their decisions than just price, for example customer service 
or other actual or perceived benefits. Moreover, even if decision making is sub-
optimal, it does not imply that peoples’ decisions are not rational, since the failure 
to exploit all the possible financial gains from switching is perfectly consistent with 
a model of a fully rational consumer facing high information search costs.  
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This study ruled out information as a barrier to optimal decision making and 
showed that about half of all energy bill payers in the sample were still unable to 
identify the optimal tariff, even in the simple scenarios presented where they were 
only asked to optimise based on one variable, namely price. The results highly 
suggest that the model of the fully rational decision maker is not even 
approximately correct, and therefore that for tariff decisions, there is a strong 
justification for incorporating bounded rationality into economic cost-benefit 
analyses, such as the model used to evaluate the wider benefits of smart meters 
(BEIS, 2016b), of which TOU tariffs are one such wider benefit. In doing so the 
study provides support for the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3 which 
proposed that consumer decision making over energy tariffs is likely to be 
affected by bounded rationality and not just household appliance characteristics 
that determine whether they can save money on a TOU tariff. 
This leads to the second contribution of this study which is that the consumer 
heterogeneity in both the ability to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative 
tariffs and appliance ownership has implications for the effectiveness of both opt-
out and opt-in enrolment for TOU tariffs. The results imply that, even under ideal 
market conditions in which consumers have perfect knowledge about how much 
electricity they use and at what time of the day (e.g. provided through their smart 
meter), TOU tariffs may not selectively attract the consumers who are most 
important candidates for DSR and who are most needed to go onto TOU tariffs 
or DSR programmes (e.g. those with high peak usage, EV owners, electric 
heating) who will switch whilst detracting those who are likely to be better off on 
a flat-rate tariff.  
On the other hand, a policy of opt-out enrolment could be significantly more 
detrimental to consumer welfare. To avoid harming consumers, a policy of opt-
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out enrolment would need to result in consumers who would likely see an 
increase in their bills on a TOU tariff opting out whilst consumers who have a high 
electricity use at peak times with potential to reduce it sticking with the TOU 
default. However, the results of this study indicate that consumers do not have 
the energy literacy skills required to identify whether they should opt-out. Given 
that opt-out enrolment can result in recruitment rates to TOU tariffs approaching 
100% (Chapter 2), a policy of opt-out enrolment therefore presents a real risk that 
millions of consumers could be signed up to tariffs that increase rather than 
decrease their energy bills, particularly consumers in the lowest socio-economic 
groups in Britain who performed substantially worse in the task.  
Whilst the regulator is unlikely to be able to protect consumers from choosing to 
switch to a TOU tariff on the basis of a quote that may or may not accurately 
predict the change in their energy bill from switching away from a flat-rate tariff, 
automatically enrolling consumers onto a tariff on the basis of quotes that about 
half of all British consumers are unable to independently scrutinise is arguably 
much more problematic. This judgement is based on a distinction often made in 
philosophy, and for the most part upheld in modern legal systems, that it is 
morally worse to actively harm an individual than it is to allow an individual to be 
harmed (James, 1975; Kamm, 1996). Although this is not a settled debate in 
moral philosophy, it arises because of the average person’s moral intuition that 
harming someone is worse than allowing them to be harmed, suggesting that if 
regulators made TOU tariffs opt-out and this increased some consumers’ energy 
bills that this would be perceived much more harshly by the public than if the 
regulator failed to take action to prevent consumers from switching to 
inappropriate tariffs.  
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Nevertheless, taking action to help consumers make decisions which are better 
for them and for society as a whole, which in this is to increase domestic 
consumer participation in DSR, is exactly what Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
proposes nudge can achieve.  
The next chapter therefore presents the results of two studies – a field experiment 
and a population-based survey experiment – which test the effectiveness of 
designing a nudge that aims to increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst 
consumers who are most likely to save money from switching to one whilst 
detracting consumers who are less likely to save (research question 2). 
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Survey Experiment (2b) – tailored tariff 
marketing is an effective and selective nudge 
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1 Introduction 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests that opt-out enrolment could 
potentially result in consumers being rolled onto tariffs which charge them a lot 
more for electricity at precisely the time of day they are most likely to use it, but 
without their knowledge. The results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that millions 
of British energy bill payers may be unable to work out whether a TOU tariff would 
increase or decrease their electricity bill, a pre-requisite for making an informed 
choice over whether to opt-out of being enrolled onto a TOU tariff or whether to 
actively switch onto one. This creates a challenge for creating an effective method 
of increasing uptake to TOU tariffs regardless of whether consumers are left to 
actively opt-in or whether they are enrolled onto a TOU tariff automatically unless 
they opt-out.  
These findings therefore motivate the second research question which is to 
identify methods of increasing uptake to TOU tariffs without using mandates or 
default enrolment but rather using active choice strategies that are enhanced to 
increase the likelihood of enrolling consumers who are more likely to save money 
without enrolling those who could be made financially worse off. Following 
Johnson (2016), I call this a search for an ‘effective and selective’ nudge.  
As argued in Chapter 2, consumers with EVs and households with heat pumps 
are two important candidates for participating in domestic DSR (DECC, 2010). 
Both these groups consume more electricity than the average domestic energy 
bill payer and are expected to place a much larger burden on the future electricity 
network (Frontier Economics, 2011). At the same time, since they use more 
electricity, they also stand to save more from adjusting their electricity 
consumption patterns; for EV owners this would involve using a timer on their 
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charge point to charge their vehicle at a cheaper time of the day whilst heat pump 
owners could set their heating schedule according to the rates on the TOU tariff.  
One plausible method of increasing the likelihood that heat pump and EV owners 
would actively choose to adopt a TOU tariff identified in Chapter 3 is for energy 
suppliers to tailor their marketing of TOU tariffs to these two consumer groups, 
for instance, by labelling their TOU tariffs “Heat Pump tariff” or “EV tariff”. This 
type of tailored marketing counts as a ‘nudge’ as defined in Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) since it does not affect the underlying incentives of switching to the tariff, 
either by making information more readily accessible or the tariff rate or structure 
more favourable for heat pump and EV owners, for instance by offering a 
particularly cheap rate for EV owners or special ‘EV’ or ‘heat pump’ owner 
discounts which would increase the cost to suppliers of offering such tariffs and 
could be perceived as unfair considering these customers are already more likely 
to be wealthier than average.  
According to classical economics, such marketing should have little to no effect 
on uptake because it makes no difference to the underlying incentive. If 
consumers do respond to such marketing, it would imply that a behavioural 
economic model rather than a classical economic model is a more appropriate 
framework for understanding how consumers will behave in response to TOU 
tariffs. However, it does not imply that traditional tools, such as information 
provision, would have no positive impact on uptake or even less of an impact than 
marketing. For instance, another plausible option mentioned in Chapter 3 is for 
energy suppliers to provide consumers with quotes tailored to them based on 
what household appliances they own that directly compare what the household 
would pay on a TOU tariff relative to a flat-rate tariff. To minimise the risk of only 
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attracting consumers who already have favourable consumption patterns 
(adverse selection), these price comparisons could be made by building in 
assumptions about the proportion of a household’s electricity use that is flexible, 
which would naturally lead to larger expected savings for consumers with higher 
flexible electricity use such as EV owners or households with heat pumps.  
Although such a ‘predictive’ price comparison approach may be hard to 
implement in practice, it is possible to imagine a future in which machine learning 
techniques become sophisticated enough to provide reasonable approximations 
of the demand-flexibility potential of individual households. Moreover, this 
approach removes the need for consumers to be able to calculate the savings 
themselves (as the first study showed many struggled to do), so both a classical 
and behavioural economic model would predict it would have an impact on who 
signs up to a TOU tariff – although, according to behavioural economics the 
impact will be small because people are not motivated by reason and facts alone 
but by a range of factors such as who the message is communicated by, their 
emotional state, whether they know anyone else on a TOU tariff and so on (see 
Table 9 in Chapter 3). Nevertheless, although Ofgem surveys (2008, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015) indicate that switching rates have not increased since they 
implemented a range of strategies to address imperfect information problems in 
the energy market, it is only by testing this systematically in a randomised control 
trial that the effectiveness of these strategies can be identified.  
This second results chapter presents the method and results of the Flex Trial 
(study 2a), an online field experiment, and the Population-Based Survey 
Experiment (study 2b) which together test whether tailoring the marketing of a 
TOU tariffs towards heat pump and EV owners could increase uptake to TOU 
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tariffs amongst those groups when they shop around for an electricity tariff online 
but without simultaneously attracting other consumers who are less likely to save.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 will outline the research 
method of the Flex Trial (study 2a) according to the CONSORT statement’s 
reporting checklist for randomised control trials (Schulz et al., 2010; Boutron et 
al., 2010) followed by details on the way the trial was implemented, descriptive 
statistics and the average treatment effect analysis. Section 3 will follow the same 
structure as the previous section but for study 2(b), the Population-Based Survey 
Experiment. Section 4 discusses the results of both experiments in relation to 
whether tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards EV owners and heat pump 
owners is likely to be an effective and selective nudge (research question 2) 
compared to predictive price comparisons. Section 5 concludes with a summary 
of the key findings from both experiments and remaining questions for the third 
and final experiment of this thesis.   
2 Study 2(a) “The Flex Trial” 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Population of interest 
The population of interest for this trial is British energy bill payers, particularly the 
following two sub-groups who have higher than average potential flexible 
electricity consumption: (1) British consumers with plug-in EVs; (2) British 
consumers with heat pumps, the favoured substitute to gas boilers in individual 
buildings (DECC, 2010). 
British energy bill payers who do not own heat pumps or EVs are part of the 
population of interest because these consumers could end up financially worse 
   
 
Chapter 6: Method, results and analysis (2)
  227 
off if they switch to a TOU tariff so it is necessary to understand whether and to 
what extent these tariffs may attract such consumers and whether tailoring could 
deter them.  
Energy bill payers rather than energy consumers as a whole are the target 
because it is assumed that only consumers who are solely or jointly financially 
responsible for electricity bills (the definition of an energy bill payer) and can be 
assumed to be responsible for making tariff switching decisions. British energy 
bill payers rather than UK bill payers are the target because the energy company 
that I worked with to design the tariff only had a licence to operate in GB.  
2.1.2 Trial design  
I designed a website for an energy supplier called “Flex” which promoted a three-
tiered static TOU tariff50 that was designed by a British energy supplier for this 
trial. The website was built by professional website and database developers. 
Participants were recruited to the website through online adverts placed on 
Google that were specifically targeted to recruit a high proportion of EV and heat 
pump owners and a smaller proportion of ‘average’ energy bill payers (more 
details on participation recruitment in section  2.1.3).  
Upon clicking on an advert, participants would be randomly assigned to one of 
the following three versions of the website with a 0.33 probability: 
1. Control website 1: a site which promotes the TOU tariff “Off-Peak Saver 
tariff” and invites people to get a quote for the tariff (“control”) 
                                            
50 The tariff is a three-rate static time of use tariff for which the price of electricity varies between 
three different rates at multiple but fixed times throughout all weekdays but at different times on 
the weekends. 
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2. Control website 2: a price comparison website, which promotes the TOU 
tariff “Off-Peak Saver tariff” and invites people to get a quote for the tariff, 
the results of which are compared to an average flat rate tariff (“predictive 
price comparison”) 
3. The nudge: a tailored website, which promotes the TOU tariff as an 
“Electric Vehicle tariff” and “Heat Pump tariff” and invites to people to get 
a quote for these tariffs (“tailored marketing”) 
The purpose of the second control website is to test whether information 
provision, the traditional method of correcting sub-optimal decision making, is 
more or less effective than a nudge intervention.  
The design of the websites is described in more detail in Section 2.1.4 and the 
trial design is summarised in  
Figure 9. Website visitors were not alerted to the fact that the website had been 
created for an academic research project upfront. Since the trial involved 
deception, no personal data was collected from participants and it was judged 
that, since fewer than 50 people51 would switch to the tariff and the time taken to 
reach the end of the website was minimal (e.g. piloting suggested it takes <2 
minutes), the risk of harm to participants was also minimal. The website stated 
clearly that any data provided would be used for research purposes52 and, if any 
participants switched to the tariff, they were fully debriefed about the trial and 
given information on their likelihood of saving money on such a tariff, in attempt 
                                            
51 This was estimated based on Google analytic predictions of the number of website visitors, 
assuming a switching rate of 0.1%.  
52 This statement was written above the Switch to Us page of the website and did not specify 
what type of research the data would be used for, for instance, that it would be used as part of 
academic research. 
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to compensate them for their time. The trial was approved by the UCL ethics 
committee in June 2016 (project ID number 5701/002).  







The three key strengths of this trial design are that: (1) it overcomes the problem 
of TOU tariffs not being commercially available by creating a tariff and presenting 
it to real consumers; (2) because participants are not explicitly told that they are 
participating in an experiment, it eliminates one potential concern around 
randomised control trials which is that people behave differently when they know 
they are being observed and; (3) since the website was built professionally and 
the visitors to the website are ordinary people who are looking for a new tariff to 
switch to, both the setting and participants are likely to be highly authentic (Gerber 
and Green, 2012). 
2.1.3 Recruiting amongst the population of interest  
Participants were recruited through targeted paid search and display adverts 
delivered through Google with a total budget of £2,270 from 24 November 2016 
until 16 January 2017. The adverts do not refer to any of the treatment content 
on the website and only promote the fact that Flex offers a TOU tariff with cheaper 
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across all three websites. Figure 10 below shows the text and the way the advert 
appears to potential participants through paid search advertising and Figure 11 
shows the text that appears to potential participants through animated display 
advertising.  
Figure 10 The advert shown to people who search for the keywords on Google. 
 
Figure 11 The animated adverts which will be displayed on websites containing 
the keywords displayed in 2 . 
 
The adverts were confined to GB, with further geographic targeting aimed at 
recruiting a much higher proportion of EV and heat pump owners relative to the 
average energy bill payer. First, all of the display advertising budget was allocated 
to targeting EV and heat pump owners by targeting special interest online 
magazines that were likely to be visited by heat pump or EV owners such as Next 
Green Car and Clean Technica.  
Second, the paid search advertising (shown in Figure 10) was designed to recruit 
a higher proportion of EV and heat pump owners through a combination of 
keyword and geographic targeting. I bid for keywords that were ex ante judged 
by me to be correlated with heat pump or EV ownership such as “EV charging 
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leads” and “heat pump controls” as well as keywords targeted at reaching the 
average energy bill payer such as “cheap energy tariffs”1; however, 80% of the 
budget was allocated towards EV specific and heat pump specific keywords.53  
The geographic targeting worked as follows. Since the budget was limited, the 
adverts were confined to 150 postal districts in GB (the smallest geographic unit 
to which Google can target adverts), chosen from a total of 1,689 unique postal 
districts. The 150 postal districts were chosen by excluding areas of the City of 
London that were unlikely to be residential and excluding all districts that Google 
cannot locate54 and then: (1) selecting the top 50 districts with the highest 
number55 of heat pumps; (2) selecting the top 50 districts with the highest number 
of EVs; (3) randomly selecting 50 districts, that were not selected during stage 
(1) and (2) to target the ‘average energy bill payer’. This allocation was performed 
in MS Excel. The purpose of reserving 2/3rds of the targeting for heat pump and 
EV owners rather than for the average energy bill payer was to help increase the 
likelihood that the majority of visitors to the website would own an EV and/or heat 
pump. 
2.1.4 Intervention design 
The blueprint for the design of each website was developed by me in MS 
PowerPoint. Every page on one website had an equivalent page on the other. 
The price bands and structure of the TOU tariff are identical across all 
                                            
53 The full list of keywords are presented in Appendix 2. Note that, although the keywords include 
terms about price comparison, this would not bias the results since the keywords do not appear 
in the advert themselves. 
54 Google was unable to locate 24% of the postcode districts however very few of these districts 
were those with the highest number of heat pumps and EVs, meaning that this was unlikely to 
result in the study being unable to target locations with high numbers of EVs and heat pumps.  
55 The highest number of heat pumps and EVs was chosen instead of the highest density because 
postcode districts vary substantially in size meaning that very small districts with very few heat 
pumps could have a high density but very few people to target. 
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experimental conditions. The text varies across test websites, as required to 
manipulate the independent variables (summarised in Table 16), however the 
design (colour scheme, images, logo) remain constant, as shown in Figure 12.  
Table 16 Summary of the intervention design across the three website versions 
in the Flex Trial.   
    







Save up to £300 
per year on our off-
peak electricity 
tariff 
Off-peak tariffs for 
electric vehicle and 
heat pump owners 
Tariff name Off-peak Saver 
tariff 
Off-peak saver tariff Electric vehicle 




Our off-peak rates: 
From 11.05p per 
unit, no standing 
charge 
Our off-peak rates: 
From 11.05p per 




14p per unit 
£69 standing 
charge 
Our electric vehicle 
tariff: From 11.05p 
per unit, no 
standing charge 
Our heat pump 
tariff: From 11.05p 
per unit, no 
standing charge 
Visitors are able to 
get a quote for what 
their electricity bill 
would be under the 
TOU tariff based on 
whether they own 
an electric vehicle, 
heat pump or 
neither of these 
Yes Yes Yes 
Visitors who obtain 
a quote for the TOU 
tariff also see an 
estimate of what 
they would pay on 
an average flat-rate 
tariff 
No Yes No 
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Figure 12 The homepage for the control website (left), the price comparison 
website (center) and the tailored website (right). 
When operationalising the concept of a price comparison, I followed the practices 
used by major price comparison websites and the academic marketing literature 
on comparison matrices (Häubl and Trifts, 2000; Lynch and Ariely, 2000). When 
operationalising the concept of providing tailored information I used two key 
sources identified during the literature review. The first was the literature on 
tailored communication in the health domain discussed in Chapter 3 where 
tailoring is defined as “a process of creating individualised communication” 
(Kreuter et al., 2002, p.272). A second literature is the literature on labelling 
effects. In the same way that the Government names the cash transfers it gives 
pensioners in Winter the ‘Winter Fuel Payment’ to encourage them to use it on 
heating (Beatty et al., 2014), the tariffs are labelled ‘Electric Vehicle Tariff’ and 
‘Heat Pump tariff’ to indicate that the tariffs are ideal for EV and heat pump 
owners. 
From each of the homepages, as well as at various other points throughout the 
website, visitors are encouraged to enter their postcode to get a quote for the 
tariff. When people enter their postcode they are asked three questions across 
all three experimental conditions: 
1. How many bedrooms does your property have? The response options are: 
1, 2, 3, 4+, in line with the categorisation used by the ONS to enable 
comparison with national statistics collected in the 2011 Census. 
2. Do you own a heat pump or electric vehicle? The response options are: 
Heat Pump, Electric Vehicle, Both, Neither. 
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3. Do you have an Economy 7 meter? The response options are: Yes, No, 
Don’t know. 
The quote mechanism provides visitors with an estimate of their annual electricity 
bill under the TOU tariff based on whether they own a heat pump, EV or neither 
of these appliances, in other words, based on their response to question 2. These 
quotes were given to participants regardless of which of the group to which they 
were assigned. 
The quotes provided to visitors are summarised in Table 17 and were based on 
the following realistic assumptions about total electricity use (since smart meters 
will permit actual usage to be used) but relatively idealistic assumptions about 
electricity consumption patterns to provide quotes that illustrate the best-case 
energy bill scenario for the average energy consumer (i.e. someone without an 
EV or heat pump) if they switched from the average flat-rate tariff on the market 
to the three-rate TOU tariff designed by the energy supplier to be commercial 
viable in the near future: 
 Standard household electricity, excluding that used for an EV or heat 
pump, is 3,300kWh (UK median56) of which: 
o 10% is consumed at the peak time (4pm-7pm on weeknights) 
o 30% is consumed at the off-peak time (during the day) 
o 60% is consumed at the super off-peak time (overnight) 
 Heat pump usage of 6,300kWh running all day except for during peak 
time57 
                                            
56 Source is Ofgem (2011b). 
57 The two heat pump field trials in the UK show that heat pumps are run all day long (Energy 
Saving Trust, 2013). 
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 EV usage of 1,400kWh, consumed at super off-peak times 
Table 17 Energy bill quotes provided to website visitors based on appliance 
ownership. 
 
Appliance owned Quote on TOU tariff 
(£/year) 
Quote on average flat 
rate tariff  
(£/year)  
 [visible in all conditions] [only visible in price 
comparison condition] 
No EV or heat pump 600 584 
EV 630 730 
Heat pump or heat pump & 
EV 
1300 1480 
   
Note: Respondents who indicated they had both an EV and heat pump were 
given the same quote as those who said they had just a heat pump to minimise 
the development work required to the website. 
 
To my knowledge, there is no publicly available data on the electricity usage of 
EVs and heat pumps, so these were estimated based on published records of 
their technical efficiency and likely usage (see Appendix 3 for details). For 
consistency, all consumers were assumed to have the same level of flexibility 
over their ‘standard electricity use’; these assumptions are idealistic in the sense 
that the DUKES data estimates that ‘wet’ goods (washing machine, dishwasher, 
tumble dryer) account for 17% of household electricity demand which BEIS 
assumes is available for demand-flexibility (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b), 
compared to 60% super off-peak usage in this study. The same quote was given 
to customers who indicated that they had both an EV and heat pump as those 
who said they had just a heat pump to minimise the development work required 
to the website.  
   
 
Chapter 6: Method, results and analysis (2)
  236 
The key points to note are that: (1) although the monetary value of the quotes 
vary depending on what appliance people report to own, the values are identical 
across all three website conditions, with randomisation ensuring that, the 
proportion of EVs and heat pumps owned by participants across each group 
would be roughly the same; (2) in the price comparison condition, the estimate 
on the TOU tariff is compared to an estimate based on the average electricity rate 
for a flat-rate tariff in 2015 58, which for electric vehicle and heat pump owners 
shows that they will £100 or £180 per year respectively relative to the average 
flat rate tariff but for the average consumer that they will lose £25 per year, despite 
the very idealistic off-peak usage assumptions (see Table 17); (3) in the tailored 
condition, there is no price comparison information but the tariff is labelled either 
an ‘Electric Vehicle tariff’, ‘Heat Pump tariff’ or ‘Heat Pump and Electric Vehicle 
tariff’ depending on their response to question 2. 
Whilst it may seem surprising that non EV and heat pump owners would be 
financially worse off despite assuming that only 10% of electricity would be used 
at the peak time, it is not that counterintuitive considering that the peak rate is 
over 100% higher than the average flat-rate tariff rate whereas the off-peak rate 
is slightly more expensive and the super-off peak rate is only about 30% lower 
than the flat-rate (see Appendix 4 for prices). Moreover, whilst the magnitude in 
the savings or losses is likely to vary depending on the exact peak and off-peak 
rate differentials which could vary across tariffs, the overall result that the average 
consumer is worse off may not change much for two reasons. First, the price 
comparison here is made with reference to the average flat-rate tariff on the 
                                            
58 This is the average price across all regions and payment methods for standard rate tariffs in 
2015 as reported in DECC’s statistical tables “Table 2.24 “Average variable unit costs and fixed 
costs for electricity for selected towns and cities in the UK”.  
   
 
Chapter 6: Method, results and analysis (2)
  237 
market so the savings or losses from sticking on a flat-rate tariff would be even 
larger if compared to the cheapest tariff on the market. Second, this magnitude 
of savings and losses is consistent with Ofgem’s estimate of the total savings 
from having a smarter energy system and with the energy bill savings and losses 
observed in the trials reviewed in Chapter 2.  
Figure 13 Quote results in the control group (left), price comparison group 




These savings or losses are made clear to visitors assigned to the price 
comparison group (see Figure 13) but underpin the labelling of the tariff as an 
‘electric vehicle’ or ‘heat pump’ tariff in the tailored condition. Thus, whereas the 
price comparison condition uses reason and logic to help people work out 
whether the tariff will save them money, the tailored condition provides people 
with a signal as to whether the tariff may or may not be suitable for them without 
altering the underlying incentives of signing up to the tariff (the rates and overall 
estimated bill are the same as in the other conditions) or changing the costs 
associated with switching tariff (it does not lower search costs associated with 
finding the rates of other electricity tariffs). It therefore fits Thaler and Sunstein's 
(2008) definition of a “nudge”. 
Participants were encouraged to ‘Get a quote’ at various other points on the 
website, not just the homepage, to increase the likelihood of exposure to the 
questions and the quote results, which offer an additional layer of treatment 
intensity above and beyond the homepage. To ensure that visitors to the 
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homepage can get a quick understanding of what an off-peak tariff is, in the likely 
event that they have never encountered one before, a short scroll down the 
homepage reveals a basic description of the tariff and the idea of having peak 
and off-peak electricity rates, shown in Figure 14. It also prompts visitors to get a 
quote. 
Figure 14 Basic description of how an off-peak tariff works on the homepage in 
all experimental conditions. 
 
 
Participants who obtained a quote could also access a more detailed visual 
presentation of the tariff design, which was also framed differently depending on 
the intervention. In the control condition and price comparison conditions, the 
tariff is called an ‘Off-Peak Saver Tariff’. In the price comparison condition the 
tariff description includes the line “Save up to £300 per year on electricity used 
overnight, during the day and all weekend” (see  
Figure 15) and in the tailored condition the tariff is called either an ‘Electric Vehicle 
Tariff’, ‘Heat Pump Tariff’ or ‘Heat pump and Electric Vehicle tariff’ depending on 
the participants’ response to the questions and the description reads “[Charge 
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your vehicle], [Run your heat pump], [Charge your vehicle and run your heat 
pump] for less overnight, during the day and all weekend”.  
Figure 15 The Off-Peak tariff visualisation in the price comparison condition. 
 
 
In summary then, the information given to participants is factually identical across 
all the website versions aside from the framing and the provision of price 
comparison information in the price comparison condition.    
2.1.5 Outcomes 
The main outcome measure is the proportion of people who enter their postcode 
to obtain a quote (binary 1=got a quote; 0=did not get a quote).  
Secondary outcome measures include:  
 Number of pages viewed (interval) 
 Click through rate to the ‘switch to us’ page of the website (binary 1=clicked 
through; 0=did not click through) 
 The proportion who switch to the tariff (binary 1=switched; 0=did not 
switch) 
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Obtaining a quote is being used as the main outcome measure rather than 
switching rates because, as switching rates are low in general, there is unlikely 
to be sufficient variation in switching rates to measure the impact of the 
manipulations. However, all the measures outlined above are arguably valid ways 
of operationalising demand for a TOU tariff.  
2.1.6 Additional data collection 
Gerber and Green (2012) encourage researchers to take advantage of 
opportunities to gather background data on participants that may be helpful in 
predicting the outcomes of interest and therefore for increasing the precision of 
treatment effect estimates. Instead of using a baseline survey administered to 
participants who are recruited in advance as in other field experiments, (e.g. 
Glewwe et al., 2009; Evans and Kremer, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2016), in this 
study surveys were embedded into the website at points at which it would be 
natural to collect data from visitors to an energy supplier’s website: (1) when 
participants were getting a quote and; (2) when switching to the tariff.  
As noted above, to maximise the likelihood of a visitor completing the surveys, 
the website was designed to prompt survey completion at various points 
throughout the website, as is common on most commercial websites. For 
example, if people scrolled down the homepage without inserting their postcode 
to get a quote, they would have another opportunity to get a quote because the 
next page would present the tariff and prompt them to get a quote.  
This additional data collection was maintained to an extreme minimum to limit the 
amount of time that participants would spend on the website given that the tariff 
is not currently available to switch to and to minimise attrition. Data collection was 
generally reserved to obtaining data what appliances visitors owned in order to 
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provide personalised quotes (as outlined in the Intervention section above), to get 
an insight into the effectiveness of the sampling strategy at driving a large 
proportion of EV and heat pump owners to the website and for including in 
treatment effect heterogeneity analyses. This data was not intended for use as 
covariates to estimate average treatment effects because the average treatment 
effect needs to be estimated based on the outcomes for the whole sample not 
just the sub-sample completing the surveys. The data collected at these two 
points is outlined below.  
Data collected when getting a quote: The first point at which visitors were 
surveyed is when they entered their postcode to get a quote for the tariff. Only 
the first three characters of the postcode (the postal district) are stored in the 
database to minimise the likelihood of being able to identify individuals personally 
from the data provided. On entering their postcode, participants were asked three 
questions, namely the number of bedrooms they have in their home, whether they 
own a heat pump or EV and whether they have an Economy 7 meter, as 
described in section 2.1.4. This is approximately the same number of questions 
that suppliers normally ask of website visitors seeking a quote, and, as shown in 
Figure 16, these questions are presented like they would be presented on a 
supplier’s website not like a standard academic baseline survey.  
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Figure 16 Get a quote survey questions as presented to all website visitors in all 
experimental conditions. 
Information on number of bedrooms is collected because it provides a useful 
potential method for comparing the demographics of the website visitors to the 
average household in GB recorded in Census data. 
Collecting information on EV and heat pump ownership is important for 
understanding any treatment effect observed on the tailored website relative to 
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the control website, since the hypothesis that the tailored website will generate 
higher demand for the tariff relative to the control is premised upon the 
assumption that the majority of visitors will own these devices due to the targeted 
recruitment strategy. It is this variable that is used to customise the quote to 
participants.  
Information on whether someone has an Economy 7 meter – the most common 
legacy TOU tariff in the UK – is collected for comparing the characteristics of the 
sample with those of energy bill payers from a nationally representative 
household survey (M Nicolson et al., 2017).  
Since it was expected that the overwhelming majority of people would not switch 
to the tariff, and therefore reach the second survey, including this short survey 
which people would reach directly from the homepage was an important design 
strategy to help maximise the amount of total data collected on participants.  
Data collected when switching to the tariff: The second point at which visitors to 
the website could be surveyed is when clicked on any button that said ‘Switch to 
this tariff’ or ‘Switch’. A short form was presented with the following 5 questions: 
1. How many bedrooms does your property have?59 
2. Do you have any of the following on your house?60  
o Heat pump 
o Electric vehicle – leased 
o Electric vehicle – owned 
o Dishwasher 
                                            
59 This question was asked because it is commonly used by energy suppliers and price 
comparison websites to give quotes, so heightens the ecological validity of the website. 
60 Although ownership of these appliances would ordinarily be elicited across multiple questions 
in a survey, it was considered more time efficient in this context to elicit the responses in a single 
question.  
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o Tumble dryer 
o Washing machine 
o Washer dryer 
o Electric shower 
o Solar panels 
o None of the above 
3. What is your main method of heating your home?61 
o Gas central heating 
o Electric night storage 
o Heat pump 
o Underfloor heating 
o Other gas 
o Other electric 
o Other 
o Don’t know 
4. Do you have a smart meter? Yes, No, Don’t know. Participants were able 
to click on a ‘?’ icon to reveal a short description of what a smart meter is. 
5. Do you have an Economy 7 meter? Yes, No, Don’t know. Participants were 
able to click on a ‘?’ icon to reveal a short description of what an Economy 
7 meter is. 
Heating is the principal source of demand in homes in the UK (Palmer and 
Cooper, 2012) and consumers without electric heating – or another high 
consuming appliance such as an EV – are less likely to save money from 
                                            
61 Question wording and response options adapted from the Energy Follow Up Survey (BRE, 
2013) and as used in Nicolson et al. (2017). Adaptations were to make the response options 
shorter, by amalgamating less common heating types into an ‘Other’ category.   
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switching to a TOU tariff than consumers with high consuming electrical 
appliances. However, appliances like washing machines, dishwashers and 
tumble dryers are considered flexible electricity loads in the sense that they could 
be run at any point in the day (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b), compared to cooking 
which is usually restricted to the morning and evening for the majority of working 
families. Collecting this data would also enable me to calculate what proportion 
of people who switch own these appliances so that, depending on how many 
people switch, it would provide insight into whether consumers are able to identify 
whether they are likely to save money on the tariff, as the results from the Tariff 
Decision Making Study suggest that many may not. The full survey with the 
response options is provided in Appendix 5. 
Data collected from Google Analytics: Google Analytics was implemented on 
each of the websites using the Google Analytics snippet code.62 This provides 
aggregate level data on website visitors including on their gender, age and region. 
Although it cannot be used in any of the analyses – since it is not individual-level 
data – it can be used to understand the characteristics of web visitors as 
compared to the average adult member of the population from Census data to 
help identify the population to whom the average treatment effect estimate 
applies. 
2.1.7 Sample size 
The minimum detectable effect size was ultimately63 defined as the difference in 
the proportion of consumers obtaining a quote (the “conversion rate”) required to 
                                            
62 Google Analytics is a free web analytics service offered by Google. It is the most widely used 
analytics service.  
63 Originally the minimum detectable effect size was defined as the difference between the two 
recruitment rates whereby the marginal cost of recruitment was higher than a pre-defined value 
of recruiting a flexible electricity customer onto a TOU tariff compared to when the marginal cost 
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reduce the marginal cost of converting a customer from the industry average of 
£50 to £10 which is what a small energy supply business is estimated to be able 
to afford (Littlechild, 2005). The actual minimum detectable effect size could 
therefore only be computed once recruitment had concluded, since the cost per 
conversion is a function of how many participants visited the website in total.  
Although this is not the conventional way of running power calculations – ideally, 
sample size calculations are undertaken to guide researchers as to how large a 
trial should be conducted based on an expected baseline variation in the outcome 
variable – there was no reliable baseline data upon which to base sample size 
calculations. However, sample size calculations based on a range of measures 
of uptake based on the estimated sample size provided by Google given the 
budget (12,000 participants) suggested that the trial would be able to detect a 
treatment effect of 80%, which is in the region of some of the effect sizes 
observed from the framing reviewed in Chapter 3.  
Recruitment concluded when the advertising budget was expended and the 
minimum detectable effect size was calculated as being 400%, as identified using  
Figure 17, which is the percentage increase in conversions required to take the 
conversion rate from 0.0084 (with an associated marginal cost of conversion of 
£50) to a conversion rate of 0.0417 (with an associated marginal cost of 
conversion of £10). Whilst this may seem like a very large minimum effect, 
consider that the profit margins for energy suppliers are relatively low (just £47 in 
                                            
of recruitment is the same as the pre-defined value. However, this method was later rejected and 
replaced with the one described above in an addendum to the original Pre-Analysis Plan prior to 
analysis of the outcome measures and also registered on the EGAP website alongside the original 
Pre-Analysis Plan. 
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the UK in 2015) and the former national supplier is estimated to have built up 
losses of £100 per customer to build the customer base (Littlechild, 2005).  
Figure 17 Identifying the minimum detectable effect size based on the cost of 
participant recruitment. 
 
I do not present the post hoc power calculations based on the realised sample 
size and variation in the outcome in the control group because, as noted in an 
update to the CONSORT reporting guidelines (Moher et al. 2010, p.8) “There is 
little merit in a post hoc calculation of statistical power using the results of a 
trial”.64 Once an experiment has been run the power of the experiment is indicated 
by the confidence intervals around the point estimate of the treatment effect 
(Goodman and Berlin, 1994; Moher et al., 2010).  
 
2.1.8 Randomisation and blinding 
                                            
64 As pointed out in Goodman and Berlin (1994): “there is not a unique power estimate to use; 
there is a different power for each underlying difference. Does one say that a nonsignificant result 
rules out a 25% difference with 90% confidence (because there was 90% power for a 25% 
difference); or that it rules out a 21% difference with 80% confidence; or that it rules out a 15% 
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Randomisation mechanism: The treatment was randomly assigned at the cookie-
level. Cookies identify a combination of a unique device (e.g. a persons’ mobile 
phone, tablet or laptop) and an individuals’ user profile on their chosen browser 
however for ease of understanding I refer to participants rather than browsers as 
is the convention established by other researchers for online studies.  
When potential participants click on an advert, they are randomly redirected to 
one of the three different websites with a 1:1 allocation mechanism, using 
randomisation code implemented on the website. Although there is one website 
domain www.flexenergy.co which is inputted into the Google advert, there are 
three sub-domains www.flexenergy.co#1, www.flexenergy.co#2 and 
www.flexenergy.co#3, to which participants are randomly assigned. The website 
number is masked from participants to avoid alerting their attention to the 
existence of website variations.  
Note that, this is different from implementing the three sub-domains into three 
independent Google adverts; this method was rejected because it would not 
necessarily give each participant an equal probability of being assigned to any of 
the three websites because Google will automatically increase the proportion of 
times that a particular advert is displayed if it detects that it has a higher 
conversion rate than other adverts in the group. Although there is no reason that 
think that identically worded adverts with slightly different URLs would perform 
differently, discussions with Google suggested that such a scenario was a 
possibility.  
Blinding: Since the randomisation was performed by the algorithm on the website 
neither I nor the participants were aware of the treatment to which they were 
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assigned; indeed, participants would not be aware that any randomisation was 
taking place.  
2.1.9 Analysis plan 
The pre-analysis plan for this study was registered with the Experiments in 
Governance and Politics (EGAP) trial registry (20161112AA) prior to participant 
recruitment.  
Average treatment effect equation: The second research question asks whether 
tailored message framing information will increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst 
consumers who are more likely to save money. The second research question is 
associated with three hypotheses about the average treatment effect of the 
interventions on demand for the tariff: 
 Hypothesis 1 ‘Get a quote’ rates will be higher in the price comparison 
group than the control group. 
 Hypothesis 2 ‘Get a quote’ rates will be higher in the tailored group than 
in the control group. 
 Hypothesis 3 ‘Get a quote’ rates will be higher in the tailored group than 
in the price comparison group. 
Following Angrist and Pischke (2008) and the conventions in the most recent 
applied econometrics literature65, the following statistical equations will be 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to test hypotheses 1, 
2 and 3 respectively66: 
                                            
65 See, for example, publications in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.  
66 The reason for running two separate regression equations rather than one equation with two 
treatment dummies as Glennerster and Takavarasha (2013) suggest for trials with more than one 
treatment arm is that controlling for the baseline value of the tailored arm could affect the 
coefficient obtained on the price comparison dummy (and vice versa). Running each equation 
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[1]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
[2]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2𝑇3𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
[3]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑇3𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
Where in all equations: 
 𝑌 is a binary outcome measure (1=get a quote; 0=did not get a quote) 
 𝛼 is a constant 
 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
In equation [1]:  
 𝑇2 is the treatment dummy variable (1=price comparison condition; 
0=control condition), thus excluding participants assigned to the tailored 
group 
 𝛽1 is the coefficient on 𝑇2 which measures the effect of being in the price 
comparison group rather than the control group and is the coefficient of 
interest for testing hypothesis 2.1 
In equation [2]: 
 𝑇3 is a treatment dummy variable (1=tailored condition; 0=control 
condition), thus excluding participants assigned to the price comparison 
group 
 𝛽2 is the coefficient on 𝑇3 which measures the effect of being in the tailored 
group rather than the control group and is the coefficient of interest for 
testing hypothesis 2.2 
                                            
separately should yield treatment effect estimates that are more similar to those obtained when 
computing the percentage difference in uptake across each treatment group using the raw data. 
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In equation [3]: 
 𝑇3 is a treatment dummy coded (1=tailored condition; 0=price comparison 
condition), thus excluding participants assigned to the control group 
 𝛽3 is the coefficient on 𝑇3 which measures the effect of being in the tailored 
group rather than the price comparison group and is the coefficient of 
interest for testing hypothesis 2.3 
Based on the review of the theory and literature outlined in Chapter 3, and the 
effectiveness of the targeting strategy to mainly drive participants with EVs and 
heat pumps to the website67, I expect the coefficients 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 to be 
statistically significant and positive.  
The equations above were also run with the secondary outcome measures 
identified in Section 2.1.5 and the following pre-specified set of baseline 
covariates to increase the precision of treatment effect estimates by reducing 
unexplained variation in the outcomes (Gerber and Green, 2012): 
 Whether they are a new or returning visitor (binary 1=yes; 0=no) 
 The referring advert (fixed effects) 
 The device the website was viewed on (binary 1=computer; 
0=mobile/tablet) and; 
 The time the website was visited, for instance 18:40 (fixed effects). 
Note that none of these covariates are collected in the surveys but are collected 
from all consumers regardless of whether they complete the survey based on 
                                            
67 The Pre-Analysis Plan does not make this condition explicit although it was assumed when the 
plan was created.  
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cookies; this was so that average treatment effect analyses would be based on 
the average visitor not visitors who completed the surveys. 
In some disciplines it is considered inappropriate to use OLS regression when 
analysing impacts on binary dependent variables. Following the conventions in 
the applied econometrics literature, robustness checks in which the equations are 
ran using logit with the associated marginal effects will also be run. If the results 
are substantively identical, then the OLS estimates will be interpreted because 
they offer an easier interpretation than marginal effects whilst generally providing 
substantively very similar results to limited dependent variable models such as 
logit and probit (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Beck, 2011). If there are substantial 
differences between the OLS and logit estimates then this could indicate that the 
OLS model provides a poor fit for the data, in which case the logit specification 
reported with marginal effects will be used to interpret the results. See Section 2 
of Annex 5 for a full account of why OLS was chosen as the preferred 
specification over logit.  
Heterogeneous treatment effect equation: Although the recruitment strategy has 
been designed to drive a majority of EV and heat pump owners to the website, it 
is expected that a fraction of the participants will not own EVs and heat pumps 
since the strategy also targets some non EV and heat pump owners to the 
website. Depending on the ratio of heat pump and EV owners to non-heat pump 
and EV owners, the average treatment effect equation may not pick up the 
treatment effect of tailoring on its intended target audience. To get a more precise 
estimate of the impact of tailoring on EV and heat pump owners, an additional 
statistical model was designed to test for the presence of heterogeneous 
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treatment effects to test the following hypothesis in answer to research question 
2: 
Hypothesis 4 ‘Get a quote’ rates will be higher in the tailored condition than either 
the control or price comparison conditions amongst the population of interest 
(heat pump and EV owners). 
The following statistical model was designed to test hypothesis 2.4 amongst the 
participants for whom there is data on whether or not they own an EV or heat 
pump: 
[4]  𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇3𝑖 +  𝛽2𝛿. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇3𝑖 ∗ 𝛿. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝐽𝑖 +  𝜒𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖 
Where: 
 𝑌 is a binary outcome measure (1=get a quote; 0=did not get a quote) 
 𝛼 is a constant 
 𝑇3 is the treatment dummy variable (1=tailored condition; 0=all others) 
 𝛿. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 is a ‘diagnostic index’ (Wydick, 2016), a dummy variable which 
indicates whether an individual has a high value on the diagnostic index 
(i.e. self-reported as having a heat pump or EV) compared to those who 
have a low value (i.e. self-reported as not owning a heat pump or an EV 
or did not report at all) 
 𝛽1 is the coefficient on 𝑇3 which measures the effect of being in the tailored 
group rather than the price comparison group or control group for the 
average participant in the sample 
 𝛽2 is the coefficient on 𝑇3 which measures the correlation between self-
reporting to have an EV or heat pump compared to self-reporting not to 
have an EV or heat pump. 
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 𝛽3 is the coefficient on the interaction term 𝑇3𝑖 ∗ 𝛿. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖T3i*δ. ev&hpi, 
which measures the effect of being in the tailored group and having a high 
value on the diagnostic index (e.g. self-report as having either an EV or a 
heat pump) compared all other possible combinations and is therefore the 
coefficient of interest for testing hypothesis 2.4 
 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
Based on the review of the theory and literature outlined in Chapter 3, I expect 
the coefficients 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 to be statistically significant and positive.  
2.2 Implementation of trial 
Trial recruitment commenced in November 2016 and ended in January 2017 
when the advertising budget had been fully expended.   
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Figure 18 summarises the flow of participants from initial recruitment through to 
randomisation and collection of the behavioural outcome measures. 
Approximately 3 million online users saw the adverts out of which 7,513 clicked 
on the advert and a total of 6,446 unique users landed on the website and were 
randomised to one of the three experimental versions of the site. Outcome data 
is available on 100% of users who were randomised and who are therefore 
participants in the field experiment. 
As shown in Table 18, the sample size is evenly distributed across the three 
groups in line with the randomisation mechanism which was programmed to 
provide each individual with a 1 in 3 probability of being assigned to any of the 
website versions. Given that the randomisation mechanism was effective, we can 
expect that the characteristics of participants in each group are the same, on 
average. 




















Proportion 0.333 0.334 0.332 0.9150 0.9392 0.8548 
N 2148 2155 2143 0.9263 0.9474 0.8740 
       
Notes: The p-values were obtained by regressing the treatment dummy against the 
proportion of participants in each group using OLS linear regression.  
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Figure 18 Participant flow diagram for the Flex Trial (CONSORT) 
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2.3 Descriptive statistics of sample 
2.3.1 Participant demographic profile 
Table 19 presents the characteristics of British energy bill payers obtained from 
a nationally representative survey of British adults compared to the demographic 
characteristics of visitors to the website in the Flex Trial obtained from Google 
Analytics. 
The average visitor is aged 25-3568, living in England and is only slightly more 
likely to be male than female. This makes the sample population relatively 
representative of the wider adult population of GB in terms of gender and region 
but not in terms of age. The sample underrepresents people aged 55 and above 
and particularly over-represents 18-24 year olds who constitute 27% of my 
sample even though they make up only 9% of British energy bill payers in the 
general population.  
Google also shows that 98% of the sample visited the website from within the 








                                            
68 Age 25-34 is the modal age category. 
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Table 19 Characteristics of energy bill payers in the British population and in the 
sample from Google Analytics 
 
 GB population Sample population 
(Google Analytics) 




Gender:   
Female dummy 51 46 
Age in six year groups: 
 
 
18-2469 9 27 
25-34 18 34 
35-44 18 16 
45-54 18 13 
55-64 15 6 
65+ 22 6 
Region within the United Kingdom: 
 
 
England 84 94 
Scotland 8 5 
Wales 5 1 
Northern Ireland 3 0.1 
Unknown - 0.04 
 
 
2.3.2 Outcome variables 
Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables in the Flex Trial are presented in 
Table 20. The proportion of people who get a quote for the tariff is the primary 
outcome measure and, as expected, it is the outcome with the greatest degree 
of variation. Approximately 2% of participants obtained a quote for the tariff. This 
means that the data is unlikely to be sufficiently robust to test for the presence of 
                                            
69 This is based on 20-24 for the GB population because Census statistics are broken down into 
five year intervals in which 18 and 19 year olds are grouped with 15-17 year olds.  
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heterogeneous treatment effects from tailoring on EV and heat pump owners to 
test hypothesis 4, since the sample size will be very small. The Population-Based 
Survey Experiment which collected appliance data on all survey participants will 
therefore be used to test hypothesis 4. 
Variation in the secondary outcome measures is low; just 1% of participants 
clicked on the ‘Switch to Us’ icon on the webpage and just 0.3% of participants 
switched to the tariff. This low switching rate is in line with what I expected given 
that very few consumers do switch electricity tariff and it also suggests that the 
website was perceived as genuine. Approximately 98% of the sample only viewed 
one page, although approximately 1% viewed as many as 4 pages and a handful 
of participants viewed up to 9 pages.70  
Table 20 Outcome variables in the Flex Trial. 
     
 % SE Range N 
Got a quote (primary outcome) 2 0.02 0-1 6446 
Clicked on ‘Switch to Us’ icon 1 0.01 0-1 6446 
Switched 0.3 0.007 0-1 6446 
 Mean SD  N 




                                            
70 This variable does not represent unique pages viewed but is a measure of the number of pages 
loaded by the participant. 
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2.3.3 Web session characteristics  
In the Flex Trial, data was collected through Google Analytics on what device the 
participant was accessing the website on as well as whether the visitor returned 
to the site more than once and how many times they did this. Since this data was 
collected on all participants and could be expected to explain variation in the 
outcome measures these variables, presented in Table 21, are used as 
covariates in the treatment effects equation.  
As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of participants (93%) visited the 
website on a mobile phone, reflecting a growing trend for browsing the Internet 
on phones (Ofcom, 2015). The majority of visitors only visited the site on one 
occasion, with only 24 users (0.37% of the sample) having visited more than 
once. 
Participants came to the website from 28 referred websites. Although I had 
planned to include this variable as a series of fixed effects in the covariate 
specification of the treatment effect equation, it is excluded from all analyses 
because it requires estimating more additional parameters than there is degrees 
of freedom to do so.  
Table 21 Characteristics of web session in Flex Trial. 
 
 % SE Range N 
Visited website on a mobile 93 0.03 0-1 6446 
Returned to the website  0.37 0.07 0-1 6446 
 
 
2.3.4 Appliance ownership and household data 
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Table 22 describes the self-reported appliance ownership and household 
characteristics of website visitors in the Flex Trial. Although the characteristics 
presented may not necessarily apply to website visitors as a whole, the data 
collected on the sub-sample of participants who completed the survey indicates 
that most participants did not own an EV or heat pump.  Of those who completed 
either of the two surveys, approximately 30% reported owning or driving an EV 
and 8% reported living in households with heat pumps. Thus, whilst this data 
suggests that the advert targeting was relatively effective at driving a larger 
proportion of EV and heat pump owners to the website than their proportion in 
the population – the proportion of people reporting to own an EV is nearly 4 times 
higher than the proportion in the population and 20 times more people reported 
owning a heat pump than the proportion who own heat pumps in the population 
– it seems unlikely that it achieved its intended aim which was to ensure that EV 
owners and heat pump owners formed the vast majority of the sample.  
This does not present a problem for estimating the impact of the interventions on 
the average energy bill payer since none of these variables are included or 
required for estimating the average effect. However, it does change the model’s 
prediction about the direction of the effect of both the predictive price comparison 
and tailored marketing interventions on uptake to the TOU tariff from the 
hypotheses outlined in Section 2.1.9, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
discussion section of this chapter). This is because most participants in the price 
comparison condition would have been presented with a quote demonstrating 
that the TOU tariff would cost rather than save them money whilst most 
participants in the tailored condition would have been told the tariff was suitable 
for electric vehicle owners and heat pump owners and yet not have owned these 
appliances. A classical economic model would thus predict that the price 
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comparison condition will reduce demand for the tariff relative to the control. The 
model outlined in Chapter 3 to explain the impact of tailoring, would also predict 
that the tailored condition would reduce demand for the tariff relative to the 
control.   
Table 22 Self-reported appliance ownership and household characteristics in 
Flex Trial. 
 
 Sample statistics British 
population 
statistics 
Appliance ownership: % SE N % 
EV 31 4.2 124 8 
Heat pump 8 2.5 124 0.3 
EV & heat pump 5 1.9 124 0.03 
Dishwasher 43 11 21 30 
Tumble dryer 48 11 21 60 
Washer dryer 14 7.8 21 23 
Washing machine 71 10 21 90 
Electric shower 47 11 21 - 
Solar panels 14 7.8 21 0.7 
     
Household characteristics:  % SE N % 
Electric heating 38 11 21 10 
Gas central heating 62 11 21 77 
Legacy Economy 7 tariff 36 4.4 121 21 
Smart meter 33 11 21 10 
 Mean SE N Mean 
Number of bedrooms 2.6 0.09 130 2.7 
 
 
When looking at wet goods ownership, we can see that, of those who reported 
whether or not they owned a dishwasher, tumble dryer, washer dryer or washing 
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machine, a higher proportion own a dishwasher in this sample than in the general 
population but a lower proportion report owning a tumble dryer and washing 
machine. The proportion reporting owning a washer-dryer is very similar in this 
sample to the general population. When looking at the household characteristics, 
we can see that the majority of participants (62%) have gas central heating, 
almost in the same proportion to those in the population (77%).  
Although the running of wet goods can be relatively easily shifted into the off-
peak hours on the TOU tariff (by comparison to cooking or lighting), because use 
of these appliances account for a much lower proportion of total household 
energy use than heating or than charging an EV (for households who have one), 
these participants would need to shift more than 60% of their electricity demand 
into the off-peak hours to save money on the tariff relative to the off-peak tariff – 
hence, why the price comparison shows that they would lose rather than save 
money, since it assumes a maximum of 60% super off-peak usage.  
The average reported number of bedrooms is 2.6 which is very similar to the 
British average of 2.7. However, like the data collected on EV and heat pump 
ownership, the data collected on electric heating, presence of a smart meter and 
whether the household is on an Economy 7 tariff also points to the conclusion 
that the average participant in this study is different to the average British energy 
bill payer, as was intended.  
2.4 Results – average treatment effects 
2.4.1 Outcomes by experimental group visually 
As is visible in Figure 19 and Figure 20, and contrary to the initial hypotheses laid 
out in Section 2.1.9, outcomes are consistently higher in the control condition 
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relative to the price comparison condition and tailored condition for each of the 
three binary outcome measures (get a quote, clicks on the Switch to Us icon and 
switching) and the continuous outcome measure (page views). When looking just 
at the primary outcome measure – the proportion who got a quote for the tariff – 
3% of those in the control condition obtained a quote by comparison to just 1.9% 
in the price comparison condition and 1.8% in the tailored condition, meaning that 
get a quote rates were 40% higher in the control condition relative to the price 
comparison condition and 42% higher in the control compared to the tailored 
condition.  
Figure 19 Demand for the TOU tariff across experimental groups  
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The story is similar for the other outcome measures too: 0.8% clicked on the 
Switch to Us icon in the control group compared to 0.6% in the price comparison 
group and 0.7% in the tailored group; 0.5% switched in the control condition 
compared to 0.2% in the price comparison condition and 0.1% in the tailored 
condition and; the average number of page views was 1.1 in the control compared 
to 1.05 in the price comparison and the tailored groups. 
The next section will present results of the regression model testing which of 
these differences are statistically significant.  
2.4.2 Outcomes regression model and results 
The results of estimating equations (1)-(3) set out in Section 2.1.9 are presented 
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the results of the same equations but with the pre-specified covariates.71 The 
results tell the same story as the raw data presented in Figure 19 and Figure 20. 
Looking now at column (1) of Table 23, we can see that the treatment coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant (p=0.010), indicating that the price 
comparison caused get a quote rates to decline by 1.2 percentage points relative 
to the control group in which participants received no information about what they 
would pay on the TOU tariff relative to the average flat rate tariff. Compared to 
the mean get a quote rate in the control group of 3%, this represents a 40% 
decrease in get a quote rates, which is what I had calculated from the raw data 
itself.  
Table 23 Average treatment effect of price comparison and tailoring on get a 
quote rates to the tariff. 
 
 Control vs. price Control vs. tailored Tailored vs. price 
Outcome = get a quote (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 

















































Observations 4303 4303 4291 4291 4298 4298 
R2 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.006 
       
Notes: Traditional p-values reported in brackets. All regressions were estimated 
with robust standard errors.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
                                            
71 The equation with covariates presented in Section 2.1.9 also included fixed effects for the date 
and time the website was visited and the referring website. However, this involved estimating too 
many additional parameters given the available degrees of freedom so these were dropped from 
all analyses.  
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Looking at column (3) of Table 23, the treatment coefficient is also negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that tailoring the marketing of the TOU tariff 
towards EV and heat pump owners caused a 1.3 percentage point reduction in 
get a quote rates compared to the control group who were not told the tariff was 
aimed at EV and heat pump owners, a 43% decrease in get a quote rates relative 
to the baseline get a quote rate in the control group. 
When looking at column (5), the results are also consistent with what was shown 
in the raw data. The treatment coefficient is not statistically significant (p=0.929) 
and has no direction or magnitude of effect, indicating that there is no difference 
in get a quote rates across the price comparison and tailored conditions.  
The results are robust to multiple comparison corrections using the Benjamini 
and Hochberg (1995) method of controlling the false discovery rate and the 
findings hold across all the outcome measures72, regardless of whether the 
equations are estimated using OLS (Table 24) or using logit as a robustness 
check (see appendix 6)73. The impact of the price comparison on switching rates 
in Table 24 is of particular interest.  
Recall that participants in the price comparison condition who, rather than just 
visiting the homepage and leaving the website actually went on to obtain a quote, 
were presented with their estimated annual energy bill under the TOU tariff (as in 
both the control and tailored conditions) but directly compared to what they would 
                                            
72 The adjusted p-values are computed based on all the significance tests used to produce Table 
23 and Table 24. The modified p-value for the 5% confidence level is p<0.0125. See section 1.2.8 
of Annex 4 for a discussion of why the Benjamini and Hochberg (2005) method was chosen over 
alternative methods of correcting for multiple comparisons. 
73 Although the coefficient on clicks on the Switch to Us icon are not statistically significant the 
coefficient is negative and the lack of statistical significance may be due to a lack of power 
because so few participants clicked on the Switch to Us icon. The coefficient on Switching in the 
price comparison is not statistically significant although the coefficient is negative, indicating the 
same direction of effect as seen in the other outcomes.  
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pay on the average flat-rate tariff based on what appliances they reported owning 
in the get a quote questions. Of course, since the majority of people who obtained 
a quote reported not owning these appliances, they would have seen that the 
TOU tariff would increase their energy bill relative to the flat rate tariff. Whilst the 
impact of price comparison information on switching rates is only marginally74 
statistically significant (p=0.080), the effect size is very large considering how few 
people switched in the control group; the model estimates that the price 
comparison reduced switching rates by 0.4 percentage points which represents 
a 133% reduction relative to the baseline switching rate of 0.3%.  
The results are also much unchanged when including covariates, even though 
both covariates are statistically significantly correlated with each of the outcome 
measures. Being a returning visitor decreases the likelihood of obtaining a quote 
by 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points depending on the treatment group to which the 
participant was allocated, which may reflect the fact that returning visitors were 
exposed to the treatment more times thereby increasing the overall negative 
impact of the treatment. Participants who visited the website on their mobile 
phone were statistically significantly less likely to get a quote than participants 
who visited the website on a tablet or laptop or desktop computer. One 
explanation for this is that, although the website was designed to function across 
mobile and non mobile platforms, the aesthetic of the website was higher when 
viewed on a larger screen.  
Overall then, the results tell us that providing website visitors with price 
comparison information and tailoring a TOU tariff towards EV and heat pump 
                                            
74 See Section 1.2.9 of Annex 4 for a discussion of the merits of interpreting statistical significance 
as a continuous measure rather than a binary measure in which p=0.049 is statistically significant 
and p=0.051 is not statistically significant.  
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owners reduced demand for the tariff, which leads me to reject both hypothesis 
1 and hypothesis 2. The results also indicate that tailoring has no advantage or 
disadvantage over the predictive price comparison, leading me to reject 
hypothesis 3. However, I cannot yet reject the hypothesis that tailoring could 
increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst EV and heat pump owners (hypothesis 
4), because the data collected suggested that the average website visitor did not 
own an EV or heat pump and too few indicated whether or not they did own an 
EV or heat pump to test for treatment effect heterogeneity using the Flex Trial 
data. 
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Table 24 Average treatment effect of price comparison and tailoring on secondary outcomes. 
 
Notes: P-values reported in parentheses. All regressions were estimated with robust standard errors. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
^ p-value is greater than the 5 percent significance threshold once correcting for multiple comparison testing using the Benjamini and 







































































































Observations 4303 4303 4303 4291 4291 4291 4298 4298 4298 
R2 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.025 0.019 0.020 0.009 0.008 0.002 
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2.5 Results – robustness check (not pre-specified) 
Too few participants provided data on whether or not they owned an EV or heat 
pump to robustly perform treatment effect heterogeneity analysis along these 
variables. Instead, given that this hypothesis has been tested using the 
Population-Based Survey Experiment, this section focuses on presenting the 
results of a robustness check to test whether the price comparison condition may 
have been perceived as being less aesthetically pleasing to website visitors, 
which in turn may have reduced their propensity to get a quote or switch to the 
tariff. This concern is driven by the fact that the price comparison website 
naturally contained more information than the other two conditions, which may 
have made it less aesthetically appealing. If this is the case then the fact that 
fewer people got a quote for the tariff in the price comparison condition relative 
to the control condition may not be being driven by the price comparison 
information per se but may instead be a feature of the fact that providing price 
comparison information affects the aesthetic of the website.  
To test whether this is likely to be the case, an exploratory analysis is run which 
compares outcomes amongst participants who were assigned to the price 
comparison website and who also visited the website on a mobile phone to all 
other participants, including participants who were also assigned to the price 
comparison condition but who visited the website from a tablet or desktop 
computer. To function on a mobile phone screen, the website had to automatically 
re-scale to fit the smaller size of the screen. The aesthetic of the website was 
therefore superior on a tablet or computer relative to on a mobile phone and this 
is particularly true for the price comparison website which naturally contained 
more text on it than the other two websites in order to provide the comparison 
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information. Therefore, if the price comparison results are being driven by 
aesthetics, it should show up in a negative correlation between being assigned 
to the price comparison condition and visiting the website on a mobile phone, 
since this is likely to be the combination that provides the least aesthetically 
appealing browsing experience.  
The regression equation used to estimate the impact of being in the price 
comparison condition on participants viewing the website on a mobile phone was 
not pre-specified so is presented below: 
[7]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇1𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑇1𝑖 ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
Where: 
 𝑌 is multiple outcome measures (Get a quote, clicks on Switch to Us icon, 
Switched, Page count) 
 𝛼 is a constant 
 𝑇1 is the treatment dummy variable (1=price comparison condition; 0=in 
the control condition, excluding those in the tailored condition) 
 𝑇1𝑖 ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 is the interaction term between being in the price comparison 
condition and visiting the website on a mobile 
 𝛽4 is the coefficient on the interaction term and is the coefficient of interest 
for testing the hypothesis that demand for the tariff is lower amongst 
participants assigned to the price comparison condition and who visited 
the website on a mobile phone  
 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 25. The results show that there 
is a marginally statistically significantly positive, but not negative, relationship 
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between being in the price comparison condition and visiting the site on a mobile 
(N=1,968) compared to being in the price comparison condition and visiting the 
site on a computer (N=187) or being in the control condition and visiting the site 
on a mobile (N=2,002) or computer (N=126). This is true for all the outcome 
variables and a robustness check using logit also finds a set of positive 
coefficients although they are not statistically significant (see appendix 7). 
Although it is possible that the sample size in per group for those visiting on a 
computer is too small to detect any negative impact of being in the price 
comparison condition and visiting the site on mobile, this cannot explain why the 
coefficient on the interaction term is positive rather than negative, particularly 
when the overall average treatment effect is a negative one. Arguably, there is 
therefore no compelling evidence that the price comparison condition reduced 
demand for the TOU tariff because this version of the website was less 
aesthetically appealing than the control group website.  
Table 25 Treatment effect of price comparison on participants who visited the 
website on a mobile phone. 
 
 (1) 




Switch to Us icon 
(4) 
Switched 



























Observations 4303 4303 4303 4303 
R2 0.015 0.025 0.020 0.026 
 
P-values in parentheses. All regression estimated using robust standard 
errors.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
^ p-value is greater than the 5 percent significance threshold once correcting 
for multiple comparison testing using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) 
method. 
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This marks the end of section 2. The next section presents the research design 
and results of study 2(b), the Population-Based Survey Experiment, following the 
same structure as used to present the Flex Trial, study 2(a).  
3 Study 2(b) “the Population-Based Survey Experiment” 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Introduction to the study 2(b) 
The driving factor behind testing the effect of tailoring on demand for a TOU tariff 
is that it is a potentially very promising way of increasing uptake to TOU tariffs 
amongst consumers who are more likely to save money on them whilst detracting 
consumers who are less likely to save. Although the Flex Trial provided a highly 
realistic environment in which to test this, the design presented some challenges. 
Testing the effectiveness of tailoring at recruiting EV and heat pump owners relied 
on the recruitment strategy driving a majority of EV and heat pump owners to the 
website which, based on the sample of data collected from participants, did not 
occur.  
There are three ways of overcoming these potential problems. One method is to 
administer a baseline survey to all eligible participants and randomising those 
who complete the survey to experimental interventions in a field experiment such 
as the Flex Trial. I decided against administering a baseline survey to participants 
of the Flex Trial to avoid Hawthorne Effects.  
A second method is to obtain a full set of baseline data on all participants and 
exposing participants to the interventions in the context of a population-based 
survey experiment (Mutz, 2011) rather than a field experiment. A third method 
which would avoid exposing participants to the fact a trial is taking place would 
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be to sample from a population for whom baseline information already exists, for 
example, through the existence of administrative data; in this context, it would 
involve recruiting amongst people in GB known to have an EV or heat pump.  
Although both these alternative methods are used in this thesis, the advantage 
of using a population-based survey experiment (the second method) over an 
administrative data on EV or heat pump owners (third method) is that it would 
enable me to test both whether tailoring attracts EVs owners, for example, whilst 
also detracting non EV owners, to answer research question 2 since surveys 
make it relatively easy to obtain a full set of baseline data on all participants.  
This chapter therefore describes the design and results of the population-based 
survey experiment. The third method – in which tailoring is tested amongst a 
known population of EV owners – is reserved for the fourth and final study which 
is described in detail in chapter 7.  
3.1.2 Trial design 
This survey experiment was run as part of a larger programme of research on 
consumer demand for TOU tariffs commissioned by the consumer group Citizens 
Advice. The intervention tested in this trial was added to the same survey used 
for this larger research project, which means that interventions other than the 
ones of interest to this study were tested.  
For the purposes of this study, participants were presented with the same three-
tiered static TOU tariff but were randomly assigned to two experimental 
conditions: 
1. Control – the tariff design was presented with no accompanying 
information about the types of consumers for whom it may be most suitable 
   
 
Chapter 6: Method, results and analysis (2)
  276 
2. Tailored – the tariff design was presented with accompanying information 
that said it was particularly well suited to EV owners  
More details on the design of these interventions is provided in Section 3.5. 
Citizens Advice played no role in the design, analysis or interpretation of any of 
the results presented here. For brevity, the wider design of the survey is not 
presented here since it is not relevant to the specific research questions of this 
thesis, however the full questionnaire is presented in Appendix 8. 
3.1.3 Population of interest 
The population of interest is British EV owners and the average British energy bill 
payer who does not own an EV.  
3.1.4 Recruiting amongst the population of interest  
The participants are members of a professional market research companies’ 
online market research panel who identified as living in Britain and being solely 
or jointly responsible for paying their household energy bills.   
The first couple of questions in the survey screened out participants who resided 
outside of Britain and the UK and who were not energy bill payers.  
The market research company recruited participants by sending a link to the 
survey in an email to its existing pool of online market research panellists. The 
research company uses quota sampling to obtain a nationally representative 
sample of the online population of Britain based on age, gender, region and social 
grade. Quota sampling involves over-recruiting amongst certain groups to 
account for differences in average response rates across the four demographic 
categories.  
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3.1.5 Intervention design 
Participants in the control group were presented with the following description of 
the TOU tariff: 
The SuperSaver tariff charges three different rates for electricity: super off-peak, 
off-peak and peak. 
 Super off-peak rate is 5p per unit, and applies 11 pm- 6 am on weekdays 
and all weekend. 
 Off-peak rate is 10p per unit, and applies on 6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on 
weekdays.  
 Peak rate is 20p per unit, and applies 4-8pm on weekdays. 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, which is amongst the best on the 
market. Unit prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch away at any time 
without paying a fee. 
 
By comparison, participants in the tailored group were presented with the 
following description of the TOU tariff: 
The Electric Vehicle tariff charges three different rates for electricity: super off-
peak, off-peak and peak. 
 Super off-peak rate is 5p per unit, and applies 11 pm- 6 am on weekdays 
and all weekend. 
 Off-peak rate is 10p per unit, and applies on 6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on 
weekdays.  
 Peak rate is 20p per unit, and applies 4-8pm on weekdays. 
This tariff is particularly suited to people with electric vehicles, who use 
more electricity than the average household (that mostly just use electricity 
for lighting and kitchen appliances) and could therefore save more money 
by charging their vehicle during the cheap off-peak or super off-peak times. 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, which is amongst the best on the 
market. Unit prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch away at any time 
without paying a fee. 
 
Note that, the tariff has the same structure as the tariff presented to participants 
in the Flex Trial.  
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3.1.6 Outcomes 
The outcome measure is a binary variable indicating whether or not the 
participant said they would be willing to switch to the tariff: 
 Yes I would switch (1) 
 Stick with the tariff I am currently on (0) 
3.1.7 Additional data collection 
Participants were asked to provide a wide range of background information on 
themselves, their household and what appliances they owned (see Appendix 8). 
For now, it is sufficient to say that all participants were asked to indicate whether 
or not they own or lease an EV.  
The question used to identify this was adapted from Nicolson (2017) which also 
asked a nationally representative sample of British energy bill payers whether 
they owned an EV but did not ask participants to indicate whether they leased an 
EV. In this survey, I asked whether participants leased or owned an EV because, 
either way, evidence suggests that people will charge the vehicle from home 
(Knight et al., 2015).  
Immediately after exposure to the tariff, a manipulation check consisting of a 
series of true or false questions about the tariff descriptions was performed to 
determine whether participants perceived the tailoring (see Appendix 9). One was 
used to check how much attention people were paying to the tariff structure by 
asking them to confirm whether the tariff charged the same rate for electricity 
regardless of the time of day. Another asked people to confirm whether the tariff 
was described as being particularly suitable for EV owners. 
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3.1.8 Sample size 
A total sample size of 3,000 participants was chosen to fulfil multiple aims, 
including to test whether tailoring has different effects on EV owners to non-EV 
owners (the aim of this study). The survey was being run as part of a larger 
research project in which participants were being assigned to six experimental 
conditions (more details on this below), and power calculations indicated that a 
sample size of 3,000 (500 per group) would mean that the trial would be able to 
detect an 8 percentage point difference in the average intention to switch to the 
TOU tariff in each of the individual treatment groups from a baseline switching 
rate of 33% with 80 percent power and 95% statistical confidence in a two-tailed 
test. The baseline switching rate was based on the switching rate observed in two 
prior surveys of British energy bill payers (Michael J. Fell et al., 2015; M Nicolson 
et al., 2017). Since tailoring has not been tested on this population before it was 
not possible to predict in advance how large an effect it may have on uptake. 
However, an 8 percentage point difference from a baseline of 33% represents a 
standardised treatment effect of 24% which is in line with the treatment effects 
from message framing observed in the studies discussed in the literature review 
covered in Chapter 3.  
With regards to the aim of this experiment which is to test whether the impact of 
tailoring varies across EV and non-EV owners, it was judged that 3,000 
participants would result in the recruitment of a large enough sample of EV 
owners upon which to conduct the treatment effect heterogeneity analysis. A 
previous survey suggested that approximately 8 percent of British energy bill 
payers owns an EV (M Nicolson et al., 2017), meaning that a sample of 3,000 
participants would deliver approximately 240 EV owners, with an average of 40 
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in the tailored intervention group and 200 split across each of the other five 
groups.  
3.1.9 Randomisation and blinding 
Randomisation was performed in the survey company’s software which uses the 
same randomisation mechanism as MS Excel’s random number generator. 
Participants were blinded to their treatment status since they were not made 
aware that there were any variations in the tariff presentation. Since the 
randomisation was carried out by the survey software, I was also blinded to the 
treatment assignment until the data was delivered.  
The experiment was run as part of a longer survey designed to answer other 
research questions in which participants were randomly assigned to six 
experimental message-framing conditions with a 1:1:1:1:1:1 ratio as follows: 
1. Flat rate tariff no message framing  
2. TOU tariff no message framing  
3. TOU tariff with 6 months’ bill protection 
4. TOU tariff is endorsed by the energy regulator 
5. TOU tariff comes with appliance level consumption feedback 
6. TOU tariff with EV tailoring (TREATMENT) 
For this analysis, participants assigned to the flat rate tariff are excluded from all 
analyses and participants in groups 2-5 that were not given any tailored 
messaging are pooled together to create one large control group to increase 
statistical power by raising the number of EV owners in the sample for the 
treatment effect heterogeneity analysis. Participants in the experiment therefore 
had a 1 in 6 probability of being assigned to the tailored intervention and a 4 in 6 
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Pooling intervention groups from multiple randomised control trials is commonly 
used as a method for undertaking meta-analyses in systematic reviews of clinical 
trials (e.g. see Rothwell et al., 2003) and for increasing statistical power in 
individual randomised control trials. One concern is that pooling participants who 
were exposed to different interventions could increase the variability in the control 
group, and thereby reduce statistical power. However, there is little risk of this 
because intention to switch did not vary significantly across the other treatments, 
aside from in one treatment where the difference was marginally statistically 
significant relative to the no intervention control (these results are presented in 
Appendix 9). 
3.1.10 Analysis plan 
The pre-analysis plan for this study was registered with the Experiments in 
Governance and Politics (EGAP) trial registry (20170403AA) prior to the 
researcher accessing the outcome data. Research question 2 asks whether 
tailoring could be used to increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who 
are more likely to save money on them whilst also detracting customers without 
these appliances from signing up to a TOU tariff who may be less likely to save 
money. In the context of this study, these research questions are associated with 
two hypotheses about impact of tailoring on EV owners and its impact on non-EV 
owners: 
 Hypothesis 1 Willingness to switch will be higher in the tailored group than 
in the control group amongst EV owners. 
 Hypothesis 2 Willingness to switch will be lower in the tailored group than 
in the control group amongst non-EV owners. 
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There are no hypotheses related to the impact of tailoring on average willingness 
to switch so the equations used to test the hypotheses are both interacted 
models.  
Heterogeneous treatment effect equation 
The following statistical equations will be estimated using OLS regression to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively: 
[5]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑉𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑇2𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑉𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
[6]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑜. 𝐸𝑉𝑖  +  𝛽3𝑇2𝑖 ∗ 𝑛𝑜. 𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
[7]  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑘. 𝐸𝑉𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑇2𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑘. 𝐸𝑉𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
Where in all equations: 
 𝑌 is a binary outcome measure (1=intends to switch; 0=does not intend to 
switch) 
 𝛼 is a constant 
 𝑇2 is the treatment dummy variable (1=tailored condition; 0=not tailored) 
 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
In equation [5]: 
 𝐸𝑉𝑖 is  a dummy variable indicating that the participant self-reported as 
owning an EV or not (1=yes; 0=no or don’t know) 
 𝑇2𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑉 is an interaction term between the treatment dummy and the EV 
dummy which indicates whether the participant has an EV and was 
assigned to the tailored condition (1=yes; 0=no) 
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 𝛽1 is the coefficient on 𝑇2 which measures the effect of being in the tailored 
group rather than the control group for the average participant in the 
sample 
 𝛽2 is the coefficient on 𝐸𝑉𝑖  which measures the correlation between self-
reporting to have an EV compared to self-reporting not to have an EV or 
self-reporting to not know and willingness to switch 
 𝛽3 is the coefficient on the interaction term 𝑇2𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑉 which measures the 
effect of being in the tailored group and self-reporting to own an EV rather 
than all other possible combinations and is therefore the coefficient of 
interest for testing hypothesis 1 
 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
For equation [6], the variables have the same meaning as for those in equation 
[5] except that the included covariate captures people reporting that they do not 
own an EV (1) compared to those who say they do or that they do not know (0). 
The interaction term therefore interacts the tailored treatment dummy with not 
owning an EV to test hypothesis 2. 
For equation [7], the variables also have the same meaning as for those in 
equations [5] and [6], except that the included covariate captures people who 
report that they do not know whether they own an EV (1) relative to those who 
report that they do or that they do not (0). The interaction term interacts the 
tailored treatment dummy with not knowing whether the person owns an EV. This 
equation is not associated with any hypothesis but is run for completeness to 
check that there is no statistically significant effect, as would be expected by the 
model.  
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Based on the review of the theory and literature outlined in Chapter 3, I expect 
the coefficient 𝛽3 in equation [5] to be statistically significant and positive but the 
coefficient 𝛽3 in equation [6] to be statistically significant and negative. I expect 
there to be no statistically significant coefficient on 𝛽3 in equation [7]. 
A robustness check is run in which the equations above are estimated using logit 
with marginal effects estimates at the means of the covariates, with these results 
reported in an appendix. 
3.2 Implementation of trial 
The survey was administered in March 2017 and Figure 21 charts the flow of 
participants from initial recruitment through to randomisation and collection of the 
outcome variables. The first question in the survey screened participants on 
whether they were energy bill payers beyond which non energy bill payers were 
excluded from the survey. The survey had a response rate of 28% and attrition 
rate of 19% amongst the population of interest (energy bill payers). This meant 
that the recruitment target of 3,000 was approximately met.  
A randomisation balance check reported in Table 26 shows that the 
characteristics of the control group and intervention group are well balanced 
along all 11 baseline variables at the 95% significance level. The purpose of this 
exercise is to check whether randomisation has delivered groups of participants 
who are statistically indistinguishable from one another across control and 
treatment groups, such that the only difference between the treatment and control 
group is the website version to which they were exposed (the treatment). 
Although one p-value is slightly lower than the 10% confidence threshold 
indicating there are slightly more Welsh people in the control group compared to 
the tailored treatment group, this is no more than would be expected by chance 
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alone75 and there is no evidence to suggest that Welsh people have substantially 
different views on TOU tariffs to other British energy bill payers. 
 
 
                                            
75 When running 11 statistical significance tests it is expected that 1 p-value would be smaller 
than 0.10 (unbalanced at the 90% confidence level).  
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Table 26 Randomisation balance checks on baseline characteristics in the 
Population-Based Survey Experiment. 
 

















Sole energy bill payer  57.1 59.6 0.316 
Female  53.9 50.2 0.148 
Age:    
18-24  17.5 15.9 0.398 
25-34  18.4 19.2 0.686 
35-44  22.1 23.5 0.511 
45-54  19.0 17.1 0.333 
55+  22.9 24.3 0.530 
Region:    
England  86.5 88.4 0.267 
Scotland  8.41 8.37 0.976 
Wales  5.12 3.27 0.085 
Supplied by British Gas  20.0 23.1 0.135 
 
Notes: The p-values in column (3) were obtained from a linear OLS regression 
of each baseline characteristic against a treatment dummy in which the value 
1 is assigned to those in the tailored TOU tariff group and a value of 0 to 
participants assigned to the non tailored TOU tariff group.   
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3.3 Descriptive statistics of sample 
3.3.1 Participant demographic profile 
The socio-demographic characteristics of survey participants in the Population-
Based Survey Experiment are presented in Table 27. The unweighted and 
weighted estimates are very similar, although the unweighted estimates are 
slightly closer to the population estimates on age than the weighted estimates 
(particularly for the youngest age group) but slightly less similar to the population 
estimates for gender. Nevertheless, since the weighted estimates seem to over-
weight young participants much more so than the unweighted estimates over-
represent women, I discuss the characteristics of the sample in terms of the 
unweighted estimates throughout and do not apply sample weights to the 
analyses (for more details on this decision see Annex 3).  
The average participant is aged 35-4476, so about a decade older than the 
average participant in the Flex Trial who was aged 25-34, lives in England and, 
unlike in the Flex Trial, is slightly more likely to be female than male. The average 
participant belongs to social grades A or B77 whereas the average member of the 
adult population belongs to grade C1. However, although the sample 
underrepresents people in social grade C2 and over-represents those in grades 
A and B, it does a good job of representing those in the lowest social grades (D 
and E); 21% of participants in the sample belong to grade D or E compared to 
26% in the general population. This is very similar to the distribution for social 
grade observed in the Tariff Decision Making Study, which also overrepresented 
                                            
76 Age group 35-44 is the modal age category. 
77 Social grades A-B is the modal category.  
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grades A to B, and underrepresented grade C2 whilst covering grades D to E 
well.  
Table 27. Characteristics of energy bill payers in the British population and in the 
survey sample with and without survey weights. 
 
 Population Sample 








Gender:     
Female dummy 51 54 50 2959 
Social grade:78 
 
   
A/B 22 37 37 2959 
C1 31 28 29 2959 
C2 21 14 14 2959 
D/E 26 21 21 2959 
Age in five year 
groups: 
 
   
18-2479 9 17 25 2959 
25-34 18 19 16 2959 
35-44 19 23 19 2959 
45-54 18 18 18 2959 
55+ 37 23 23 2959 
Region: 
 
   
England 86 87 86 2959 
Scotland 9 8 9 2959 
Wales 5 5 5 2959 
 
 
                                            
78 The population values are for the average member of the British population from the Census 
2011 because equivalent values were not available for the average energy bill payer. 
79 This is based on 20-24 for the GB population because Census statistics are broken down into 
five year intervals in which 18 and 19 year olds are grouped with 15-17 year olds.  
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In summary, the participant sample in the Population-Based Survey Experiment 
is roughly nationally representative of the British adult population, despite the fact 
that it slightly over-represents people in the highest social grades relative to those 
in the middle social grades and over-represents people aged 18-24 relative to 
those aged 55 and above. The sampling strategy has been effective at capturing 
people in the lowest social grades and those aged 25-54 as well as evenly 
representing people by region and gender.  
3.3.2 Outcome variables 
Table 28 presents overall intention to switch to the TOU tariff across both the 
treatment and control groups with weighted and unweighted estimates reported. 
Consistent with what we know about inertia in the energy market, most people 
were not willing to switch. Approximately 30% of participants said they were 
willing to switch to the tariff presented to them. The weighted estimates are 
substantively identical to the unweighted estimates, although as expected, the 
unweighted estimates have a smaller standard error. The unweighted in-sample 
estimates will be discussed here since they are substantively identical to the 
weighted estimates. 
Table 28 Outcome variables in the Population-Based Survey Experiment. 
 
 % SE Range N 
Intention to switch (unweighted) 30 0.92 0-1 2960 
Intention to switch (weighted) 31 0.97 0-1 2960 
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3.3.3 Appliance ownership and household data 
Table 29 describes the participants in the Population-Based Survey Experiment 
in terms of the electrical appliances they own at home as well as well as some 
characteristics of their household such as their main method of heating their 
home and whether they are on an Economy 7 tariff. For the most part, the data 
collected in this survey is identical to that collected in the Flex Trial with the 
exception that no data was collected on whether participants have solar panels 
or a smart meter. Instead of collecting data on the number of bedrooms, data was 
collected on the number of household occupants (both serve as a proxy for 
household size and therefore total energy demand).80  
There is a complete set of observations for the EV variable. The survey therefore 
fulfils its main purpose which is to provide an experimental dataset testing the 
impact of tailoring TOU tariffs to EV owners in which it is known which participants 
do and do not own an EV. Although only 5% of the sample in this study owns or 
leases an EV (N = 155) – a much lower proportion than in the Flex Trial – because 
the data indicates who does and does not fit this criteria, the equation presented 
in Section 3.9 can be used to test for the presence of a treatment effect 
heterogeneity, thereby testing hypothesis 4. 
The proportion of participants who own a heat pump is also much lower than in 
the Flex Trial, which was specifically targeting heat pump owners, and is very 
similar to the proportion obtained in another similar nationally representative 
survey (M Nicolson et al., 2017). The proportion who own a tumble dryer and 
dishwasher is remarkably similar to the proportion in the Flex Trial, although 
                                            
80 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the survey was run to answer a large number of research questions 
of which one was the research question posed in this thesis. This explains some of the small 
differences in the type of data collected.  
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different from the estimates obtained from the other nationally representative 
survey.  
As expected for a nationally representative survey, the majority of participants 
have gas central heating (89%) and only a small portion have electric heating 
(10%), much smaller than the proportion who reported having electric heating in 
the Flex Trial (38%) which targeted electric heating users.  
The final column of Table 29 includes the descriptive statistics from another 
nationally representative survey of British energy bill payers run in 2014 (M 
Nicolson et al., 2017). A total of 18% of participants reported being on an 
Economy 7 tariff which is also in line with the estimates from other recent 
nationally representative survey of British energy bill payers (Michael J. Fell et 
al., 2015; M Nicolson et al., 2017). The average number of household occupants 
is 2.6 which is slightly higher than the 2.3 obtained in another nationally 
representative survey but the difference is not so large as to be a cause for 
concern, especially given that household occupancy is not a variable of interest 
in this thesis. 
   
 
Chapter 6: Method, results and analysis (2)  293 
Table 29 Self-reported appliance ownership and household characteristics in Flex Trial. 
 
 Sample Population 
 Unweighted Weighted N  
Appliance ownership: % SE % SE  % 
EV 5 0.4 6 0.5 2959 8 
Heat pump 0.3 0.12 0.3 0.12 2959 0.4 
EV & heat pump 0.03 0.003 0.05 0.005 2959 - 
Dishwasher 46 1 47 0.9 2959 30 
Tumble dryer 49 1 49 1 2959 60 
Washer dryer 23 1 25 1 2959  
Washing machine 86 1 85 1 2959 90 
Electric shower - - - - -  
Solar panels - - - - - 0.7 
       
Household 
characteristics:  
% SE % SE N % 
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Electric heating 10 0.54 10 1 2959 10 
Gas central heating 89 1 79 1 2959 77 
Legacy Economy 7 tariff 18 1 20 1 2959 13-21 
Smart meter - - - -  10 
 Mean SE % SE N % 
Number of bedrooms - - - - - 2.7 
Occupants  2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2959 2.3 
       
Notes: the population estimates are from a nationally representative survey of British adults 
who identified as energy bill payers run in 2015 (M Nicolson et al., 2017). 
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3.4 Results – manipulation checks 
Manipulation checks show that participants generally perceived the manipulation 
as intended; whereas 35%81 of participants in the control group agreed with the 
statement that the tariff was described as being particularly suitable for EV 
owners, 80% of participants allocated to the tailored treatment group agreed, a 
difference which is statistically significant at the 99% statistical confidence level.  
There was no statistically significant difference in the proportion of participants 
who correctly answered the knowledge test question on the tariff structure across 
those in the control and tailored group, indicating that the tailored marketing does 
not detract from the attention people were paying to the tariff structure itself. For 
brevity the results of these checks are presented in Appendix 10. 
3.5 Results – heterogeneous treatment effect 
The results of the analysis used to test hypothesis 4 are presented in Table 30, 
with column (1) presenting the results for EV owners and column (2) the results 
for non EV owners. Consistent with prior research (M Nicolson et al., 2017), the 
results also show that being an EV owner is already associated with a much 
higher baseline willingness to switch to the TOU tariff; the raw data shows that 
baseline willingness to switch amongst EV owners is 75%. The p-value 
associated with the coefficient on the interaction term between being an EV 
owner and being in the tailored group is positive but falls just short of being 
                                            
81 I acknowledge that this is a relatively high proportion. One possible explanation is that these 
participants in the control group thought the tariff structure would be suited to someone with an 
EV and that they were thinking of this when answering the question (even though the control 
group was not told the tariff was suited to EV owners through the tailored marketing). 
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significant at the 10% level (p=0.108). This may reflect the relatively small number 
of EV owners assigned to the tailored group (N=31) however further testing 
amongst a larger sample of EV owners would be required to establish more 
robustly whether, consistent with hypothesis 4, tailored marketing could be used 
to increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst high-consuming electricity users such 
as EV owners. 
Just as importantly, and consistent with hypothesis 4, the tailored marketing is 
selectively effective; the results indicate that tailoring substantially reduces 
average intention to switch to the tariff as observed consistently across the 
outcomes in the Flex Trial. The coefficient on the interaction term between not 
owning an EV and being in the tailored group (N=459) indicates that willingness 
to switch decreases by 19 percentage points, representing a 60% decrease in 
willingness to switch relative to the baseline amongst non EV owners of 33%, a 
result which is significant at the 5% confidence level. Once controlling for this 
interaction effect between tailoring and not owning an EV, the coefficient on the 
tailored dummy representing the average effect of tailoring on intention to switch 
drops from significance (p=0.676), illustrating that the negative average impact of 
tailoring on intention to switch is being driven by the large group of non EV owners 
in the sample. 
Table 30 Does tailored TOU tariffs towards EV owners increase demand amongst 
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Observations (total) 2464 2464 2464 
R2 0.070 0.060 0.015 
    
Notes: p-values in parentheses. All regressions estimated using robust standard 
errors. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
^ p-value is greater than the 5 percent significance threshold once correcting for 
multiple comparison testing using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method. 
 
This latter result is robust to corrections for multiple comparison testing82 and all 
OLS coefficients are substantively identical to the marginal effects estimated 
following a logit analysis. The only key difference is that the coefficient on the 
interaction term between having an EV and being in the tailored group is 
statistically significant at the 10% level, providing some additional reassurance 
that there is a genuine relationship between these two variables which may be 
stronger in a larger sample of EV owners. The logit results are presented in 
Appendix 11. 
4 Discussion 
4.1 Why did the predictive price comparison reduce average 
demand for the TOU tariff in the Flex Trial? 
The price comparison condition substantially reduced demand for the TOU tariff 
relative to the control group. This result is visible in the raw data and is robust to 
                                            
82 The adjusted p-values are computed based on all the analyses run to test for heterogeneous 
treatment effects, namely the results in Table 25 using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) 
method. The modified p-value for the 5 percent significance threshold is p<0.0375. 
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a range of model specifications including the addition of covariates and estimation 
using logit rather than OLS. This is the opposite result to what was expected and 
leads me to reject hypothesis 1. The key question is therefore, why did the 
predictive price comparison condition have a negative causal effect on demand 
for the TOU tariff? I discuss three plausible explanations below but ultimately 
argue that the latter two explanations together provide the most compelling 
rationale for the results. 
4.1.1 The price comparison website was less aesthetically pleasing than the 
control website 
One explanation explored in the analysis is that the additional information 
provided made the predictive price comparison website less aesthetically 
pleasing than the control condition. Due to the relatively small screen size on 
mobile phones the price comparison website looked the least aesthetically 
pleasing on this format so if aesthetics were driving the results then I would 
expect it to show up in the form of a negative interaction effect between being 
assigned to the price comparison website and visiting the website from a mobile. 
However, there is no evidence that this is the case; the results of the 
heterogeneity analysis found that participants in the price comparison condition 
who visited the site on a mobile were slightly more likely to get a quote or switch 
to the tariff and so on, and in the OLS specification this effect was marginally 
statistically significant. This explanation does not, therefore, provide a compelling 
rationale for the results. 
4.2.2 The savings weren’t big enough and the price comparison condition 
highlighted this 
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Another potential explanation for the results is that the £300 financial savings 
promoted on the homepage of the price comparison website were below 
participants’ baseline expectations so correcting these beliefs backfired and 
reduced their drive to get a quote for the tariff. This explanation is consistent with 
a number of models of decision making. For instance, it is consistent with a 
standard economic account of decision making in which consumers are 
imperfectly informed about the actual savings from switching tariff however a 
similar outcome would be even more likely to occur under a modified model which 
either accounts for the possibility that people are overly optimistic when 
estimating the potential savings or, loss-aversion, whereby the costs of switching 
are weighted higher than the benefits (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991, 1992), making it less likely that switching would be judged 
as being net beneficial. Both optimism-bias (Sharot, 2011) and loss-aversion are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the classical economic model of decision making 
and either could explain why a price comparison could reduce uptake, although 
prior evidence already shows that the majority of energy bill payers are loss-
averse (M Nicolson et al., 2017).  
Another modification to the classical model that is sometimes proposed to explain 
how highlighting financial rewards can backfire is crowding-out effects: small 
financial compensation for a task or action (an extrinsic motivation) is worse than 
offering no financial incentive at all because it undermines individuals’ intrinsic 
motivation to undertake the task or action (see Dellavigna et al. [2017] for a recent 
review of this literature). However, crowding out is unlikely to be relevant in this 
context because savings of up to £300 are not negligible and switching tariff is 
arguably not a very intrinsically rewarding task; although TOU tariffs do have 
wider societal benefits these were not emphasised on any of the websites and it 
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is unlikely that many participants would be aware of them without being told 
explicitly.  
Meanwhile, a small group of consumers may have judged that savings of up to 
£300 were sufficiently motivating to get a quote for the tariff. Equally, the results 
presented in Chapter 5 showed that, of the 50% of British energy bill payers who 
were unable to correctly identify the cheapest tariff from a menu of three, 20% 
were willing to admit that they did not when the tariff menu included a TOU tariff. 
Participants like this may therefore have had little prior expectations about the 
potential savings and would also have reason and motivation to make use of the 
get a quote feature that not only performed the calculation on their behalf but, in 
the predictive price comparison condition, also directly compared their estimated 
annual bill on the TOU tariff to what they would pay on an average flat-rate tariff 
based on the appliances they have at home and assumptions about their off-peak 
usage. This therefore leads me to the third complementary explanation for the 
results. 
4.2.3 The majority of participants were unlikely to save money on the tariff – and 
the predictive price comparison made it obvious that they would not 
The get a quote function provided participants with a different quote depending 
on whether they owned an EV and/or a heat pump or neither. Participants who 
reported owning neither were shown that they would be financially worse off by 
£25, reflecting the fact that these consumers would have less flexibility over their 
electricity use. As a result, providing participants with price comparison 
information would have made it clear to website visitors who obtained a quote – 
whom the descriptive statistics indicate were predominantly not owners of EVs or 
heat pumps – that the TOU tariff would not save them money and would in fact 
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increase their energy bills. Indeed, this is the logical corollary to the original 
hypothesis which is that the price comparison would increase demand for the 
tariff on the basis that the recruitment strategy would result in the majority of 
website visitors owning an EV or heat pump. Considered in this light, it is no 
surprise that the largest treatment effect observed across all conditions is the 
negative impact of the predictive price comparison condition on switching rates.  
In summary, I propose that the price comparison reduced the proportion of people 
who obtained a quote because baseline expectations of the savings to be made 
from switching to a TOU tariff and making an effort to reduce peak time 
consumption were higher than the savings advertised on the homepage of the 
price comparison website. The more numerate participants in the price 
comparison group judged that the advertised savings would not exceed the costs 
of switching or the effort required to realise the savings, such as running their 
appliances overnight. Note that, this does not involve making any assumptions 
about how people arrived at their beliefs about the expected savings; their beliefs 
may be rational in the sense of rational expectations or they may be optimistic in 
the sense of optimism bias (Sharot, 2011) or biased if they weight losses higher 
than gains.  
Meanwhile, the price comparison had a negative impact on switching rates 
because, amongst those participants who did get a quote (potentially the less 
numerically confident participants), the quote results in the price comparison 
condition demonstrated that the tariff would be more expensive than a flat-rate 
tariff given that the majority of participants did not own an EV or heat pump and 
the website was hard-coded to display a lower average energy bill on a flat-rate 
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tariff for non-EV and heat pump owners (reflecting the fact that this group has 
less flexible demand).  
By comparison, participants assigned to the control website would have had to 
find the requisite price information for flat-rate tariffs and compute this 
themselves, which as the Tariff Decision Making Study suggested, many would 
not know how to do. The coefficient measuring the impact of the price comparison 
on switching rates is negative and statistically significant at the 90% confidence 
level which is consistent with the possibility that, if more people had obtained a 
quote, this result would surpass conventional thresholds for statistical 
significance (just 21 participants switched across all conditions). Future research 
would be required to establish whether this result is statistically robust. 
In summary, then, although it is ostensibly surprising that the price comparison 
website reduced average demand for the TOU tariff, given that I had 
hypothesised that the price comparison condition would increase demand, the 
finding is good news because, for the reasons discussed throughout this thesis, 
the average visitor to the website would have likely increased their energy bills 
by switching to the TOU tariff.  
4.2 Why did tailoring reduce average demand for the TOU 
tariff in the Flex Trial? 
Tailoring reduced average demand for the tariff amongst participants in the Flex 
Trial relative to the control group that provided no tailored marketing. The 
hypothesis (hypothesis 2) that tailoring would increase average demand for the 
TOU tariff was based on the assumption that the targeted advertising would 
effectively deliver a participant sample comprised mostly of EV and heat pump 
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owners. The descriptive statistics strongly indicate that this is not the case. The 
results are therefore consistent with the model of decision making proposed in 
Chapter 3 and with hypothesis 4 that tailoring TOU tariffs towards particular 
consumer segments will detract consumers who do not belong to these 
segments.  
This explanation is also supported by the results of the Population-Based Survey 
experiment which also found that tailoring reduced the average survey 
participants’ willingness to switch to a very similar TOU tariff; indeed, baseline 
willingness to switch to the tariff amongst non-EV owners was 33% and tailoring 
reduced this by 60%, which means it cut non EV owners’ desire to switch to a 
TOU tariff by more than half. This is a remarkable effect considering that the tariff 
in the control group and in the tailored group are identical, and stands in complete 
opposition to a model of decision making which assumes consumers are fully 
rational and make decisions only on the basis of the costs and benefits of 
alternative options.  
The key question now is, whether or not tailoring can exert a positive influence 
on intention to switch amongst EV owners, which is the second part of hypothesis 
4. To test this, it is necessary to consider the results of the Population-Based 
Survey experiment, reported in Chapter 7.   
4.3 Do tailored tariffs selectively attract EV owners? 
The Population-Based Survey experiment indicates that we can be over 95% 
confident that simply calling a TOU tariff an ‘EV tariff’ instead of an ‘Off-peak tariff’ 
would cut the proportion of non EV owners who would be willing to switch, but 
also less likely to save, by more than half. The results show that we can be just 
under 90% confident that this tailored labelling of TOU tariffs would also increase 
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the willingness of EV owners to adopt a TOU tariff, although since this result is 
not statistically significant at the conventional thresholds, further research is 
required on a larger sample of EV owners to verify whether this result is robust. 
Although these effects cannot be interpreted as causal because EV ownership 
was not randomly assigned, the results from both the Flex Trial and the 
Population-Based Survey Experiment provide early evidence that tailoring the 
marketing of TOU tariffs towards a group like EV owners who are more likely to 
save money on a TOU tariff may increase the likelihood that TOU tariffs will be 
adopted by groups who can save money and not adopted by groups who will not 
save money on them in answer to research question 2.  
Developing such a recruitment strategy was demonstrated to be important 
because the results in Chapter 5 showed that a large portion of British energy bill 
payers will be unable to determine what tariff is right for them, suggesting that bill 
payers need a nudge in the right direction. I therefore conclude that, in 
combination, the Flex Trial and Population-Based Survey Experiment provide 
promising but not statistically robust evidence that this type of tailored marketing 
is likely to be an effective but also selective nudge. The relatively small number 
of participants assigned to the tailored group who also had EVs makes it highly 
desirable to collect more data on the impact of tailored marketing amongst a 
larger sample of EV owners. 
4.4 Why is there no difference in outcomes across the price 
comparison and tailored groups?  
Contrary to hypothesis 3, demand for the TOU tariff was no different across the 
tailored and price comparison conditions. Given that the raw data shows only very 
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minimal differences in outcomes across these groups and the p-values are all 
very large (the p value ranges from 0.611-0.929) it is likely that the null effect is 
a true null rather than that the tailored condition really would have a better or 
worse impact on demand amongst the type of people who participated in the trial 
that the study was merely underpowered to detect.  
The lack of difference between the outcomes in the tailored and price comparison 
groups can therefore be interpreted at face value; showing people they will not 
save money on a TOU tariff is just as off-putting as being told that a tariff is aimed 
at a consumer group to which you do not belong. However, what does this mean 
for the two models of decision making presented in Chapter 3, namely classical 
and behavioural economics? Moreover, does this mean that a predictive price 
comparison could be just as good at increasing uptake amongst consumers who 
could save money on a TOU tariff whilst decreasing uptake amongst those less 
likely to save? I address each of these questions in turn.  
On the one hand this result could be interpreted as meaning that British energy 
bill payers are just as much affected by the type of information they are given 
about a tariff as the way in which information is framed. This is consistent with a 
behavioural economics perspective which assumes that decision making is 
affected both by rational considerations of the costs and benefits of various 
alternative outcomes as well as the decision making context and how cost-benefit 
information is presented to us (Baddeley, 2017). However, the idea that what we 
are told is just as important a how we are told it goes against the results of the 
Population-Based Survey experiment as well as a range of other studies which 
demonstrate that people often make fundamentally different choices when faced 
with the same information framed in different ways (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 
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1979; Hallsworth et al., 2014; Spence and Pidgeon, 2010). When considering the 
results of all three studies reported in this thesis, a more nuanced explanation 
that is consistent with the results of all three studies emerges. I therefore 
postpone the remainder of the discussion of this question for the global 
discussion/conclusion at the end of this thesis.  
4.5 Price comparisons or tailoring – which is the most 
appropriate effective and selective nudge? 
Based on the results of these trials, it would seem that both price comparisons 
and tailoring would deter consumers who are unlikely to save money on a TOU 
tariff from signing up to one. If this is the case, is there any reason to favour one 
over the other?  
There are is one key advantage of tailored marketing over price comparisons. 
Although price comparisons are likely to be effective, they have limited potential 
overall impact because only a very narrow sub-group of consumers make use of 
such tools. According to Ofgem’s annual market surveys – the most 
comprehensive source of data on switching in GB – approximately 14% of 
consumers switch year on year, of which approximately one third switch through 
price comparison websites (Ofgem, 2015). For instance, in the Flex Trial, the 
probability of switching to the TOU tariff having obtained a quote that directly 
compared the estimated energy bill on a TOU tariff to the average flat-rate tariff 
decreased by 133% relative to the baseline in the control group (p>0.10), most 
likely because the majority of visitors to the website did not own a heat pump or 
EV (although I note that, since this result does not meet conventional statistical 
significance thresholds, it represents an interesting but not statistically robust 
finding). Therefore the quote results demonstrated that switching to the TOU tariff 
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would increase their energy bills. However, only a handful of participants got a 
quote.  
By comparison, those assigned to the tailored marketing condition were 
immediately able to see from the homepage that the tariff was best suited to EV 
and heat pump owners without processing very much information at all. Although 
it is possible that a predictive price comparison would increase uptake amongst 
people who would be predicted to save money, the evidence suggests that 
additional interventions will be required to drive people to price comparison 
websites in the first place. Tailored marketing could potentially be used to drive 
people to price comparison websites or it could by-pass them altogether.  
On the other hand, a potential downside of tailored marketing is that suppliers 
could exploit tailoring effects to encourage uptake to tariffs that are not 
necessarily the best tariffs for people. For instance, suppliers could create 
expensive tariffs called ‘EV’ tariffs. Moreover, ownership of an EV is never going 
to be a perfect proxy for being able to save money on a time varying tariff; many 
other consumer groups may benefit from being on a TOU tariff even though they 
do not own an EV and it would not be a good outcome for these groups to be 
deterred. A potentially promising approach could be for utility companies to 
design tariffs based on different types of households and use tailoring to nudge 
householders to the right type of tariff. Another limitation of the tailoring approach 
tested in this experiment is that it will only reach the sub-group of EV owners who 
are already in the market for switching tariff; it will not reach EV owners who have 
never considered switching provider, which could be a much larger group of 
consumers than those who have considered switching. 
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5 Conclusions  
This chapter aimed to present and discuss the results of the Flex Trial, a field 
experiment to measure the average causal effect of price comparison information 
and tailoring on demand for a TOU tariff, as well as the results of the Population-
Based Survey experiment which tested whether tailoring could increase demand 
amongst EV owners whilst decreasing demand amongst non-EV owners.  
The chapter makes three main contributions to this thesis: first, it provides 
empirical evidence to answer the research questions and, in so doing, provides 
evidence for UK policymakers over how to increase adoption of TOU tariffs 
without using mandates or opt-out enrolment; second, it provides additional 
evidence in support of the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 3; finally, it 
generates useful lessons for the design of randomised control trials, some of 
which inform the design of the final field experiment and others which could help 
future researchers undertaking field experiments in the energy domain.  
5.1 Contribution to the research questions  
The results on the impact of tailoring provide evidence in relation to research 
question 2. In short, the results obtained in the Flex Trial and Population-Based 
Survey Experiment show that tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards EV 
owners increases demand for TOU tariffs amongst EV owners, a consumer group 
that is more likely to save money on a TOU tariff, whilst depressing demand 
amongst non-EV owners who are less likely to save money (on average) by 
switching to a TOU tariff. It is therefore an effective and selective nudge.  
The results are therefore good news in the sense that EV owners pose one of the 
greatest threats to the security of the future electricity network (along with new 
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forms of electric heating) so encouraging them to adopt TOU tariffs is very 
important. On the other hand, it is likely that EV owners will need to be specifically 
prompted to consider switching tariff. The results in this study suggest that such 
prompts should be tailored to them as EV owners. The next study tests this 
hypothesis explicitly.  
5.2 Further empirical support for the theoretical model of tariff 
decision making 
Of those who got a quote for the tariff, the majority did not own an EV or heat 
pump. Many did not even own wet goods which can be run at off-peak times. Of 
the 21 who switched, 75% did not own an EV or heat pump. This leads me to 
question the extent to which the consumers who did get a quote and who did 
switch to the tariff would have saved money from such a switch as opposed to 
actually increasing their energy bills.  
One possible explanation for these results is that these consumers expected to 
substantially increase their flexible electricity demand in the near future, for 
example by investing in an EV or an electric heating system with a smart 
thermostat that permits them to programme their heating schedule in line with the 
time periods on the tariff. However, an alternative explanation that is supported 
by the results presented in Chapter 5 is that these people are simply making a 
mistake; they were unable to identify that the tariff would not save them money 
so switched.  
In total, the results provide suggestive evidence that some consumers will sign 
up to a TOU tariff who will not save money on one as proposed by the model 
outlined in Chapter 3. If this is true then the results are more supportive of a 
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behavioural economic model in which decision making is affected by bounded 
rationality than the standard account in which, in the absence of market failures, 
all decisions are optimal and just reflect variation in preferences.  
5.3 Lessons for research design and next steps for Chapter 7 
There are three key limitations to the research presented here that could either 
be improved in future research through changes to research design or simply 
through more research testing additional questions.  
First, whilst the Flex Trial and Population-Based Survey experiment suggests that 
tailoring is effective at selectively recruiting EV owners, the data collected is 
unable to say why tailoring had this effect. Two mutually exclusive explanations 
for why the tailored marketing could impact decisions were proposed in Chapter 
3 and could be tested in future research. The first is that the increased personal 
relevance of the information for EV owners increased the likelihood of information 
processing and later behavioural action and vice versa for non-EV owners 
(Kreuter, 2000).  
The second explanation is that visitors to the tailored website were able to engage 
in some form of heuristic decision making, judging the probability that they would 
save money on the tariff based on some very easily retrievable information (the 
label) rather than the more complex information provided on the tariff structure 
and pricing. Although Tversky and Kahneman (1974) emphasise the way in which 
decision heuristics lead to poor decision making and errors, there are many 
examples showing the way in which heuristics can sometimes lead to better 
decisions given our scarce mental and physical resources (Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer, 2010; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 
2011). Testing these causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of this thesis but, 
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given the large effect sizes observed from tailoring, would be a fruitful avenue for 
future research to help determine whether a similar approach could work in other 
settings.  
Second, as already alluded to above, the approach tested for boosting uptake to 
TOU tariffs amongst consumer groups who can save money will only capture 
people who are already shopping around for tariffs, which the majority of people 
do not do.  
Third, the research design of the Flex Trial was not conducive to the collection of 
baseline data and the trial had to be complemented by additional data collected 
through the Population-Based Survey experiment in order to test for treatment 
effect heterogeneity. Many field experiments collect baseline data on participants 
through surveys administered prior to randomisation however, as argued in 
Chapter 4, this can lower the external validity of trials by highlighting to 
participants that their behaviour is under observation and by confining 
participation to people who are willing to opt-in to participate by completing the 
survey and signing consent forms and so on.  
The limitation of relying on the survey data is that it only measures treatment 
effect heterogeneity on stated intention to switch to the tariff and it is well known 
that behavioural intentions are not perfect predictors of future action. Further, the 
interaction terms which capture the relationship between being an EV owner and 
being in the tailored condition cannot be interpreted causally and even then the 
reference category in such interaction terms do not provide the ideal 
counterfactual. For instance, when interpreting the interaction term between 
owning an EV and being assigned to the tailored group, the reference group is 
not just EV owners who were not assigned to the tailored group but a combination 
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of non-EV owners in the tailored group, non-EV owners in the control group and 
EV owners in the control group. 
This leads me onto the motivation for the OLEV trial which was designed to 
address these limitations. The next chapter presents the results of the final study 
in this thesis, the OLEV trial.
   
 















The OLEV trial – timely, tailored email 
prompts are an effective and selective nudge 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the method and results of the OLEV trial. This field 
experiment tests whether EV purchase represents a window of opportunity to 
prompt EV owners to adopt TOU tariffs that could be exploited through tailored 
email prompts.  
In partnership with the UK Government Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV) 
and the Energy Saving Trust (EST) an email was delivered to approximately 
7,000 private EV owners prompting them to switch electricity tariff and providing 
them with a link to a webpage hosted on the EST website containing information 
to help them identify whether a TOU tariff would be right for their household. The 
outcome measures are open rates to the email and click-through rates to the 
information webpage, both of which are likely to be correlated with switching 
(Morwitz et al., 2007; Kormos and Gifford, 2014).  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 will present a detailed overview of 
the method following the CONSORT statement’s reporting checklist for 
randomised control trials (Schulz et al., 2010; Boutron et al., 2010). Section 3 will 
present the CONSORT diagram of the flow of participants from initial recruitment 
through to randomisation and the results of a balance check across experimental 
groups followed by Section 4 which provides descriptive statistics of the 
participants in my sample. Section 5 will present the average treatment effects of 
the tailored email on engagement with the email prompt whilst Section 6 will 
present the results of a regression analysis used to test whether EV owners are 
more receptive to the prompt shortly after purchasing their EV (the habit 
discontinuity effect). Section 7 discusses the results in relation to whether 
tailored, timely email prompts have the potential to increase switching rates to 
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TOU tariffs, which is the ultimate outcome of interest. Section 8 summarises the 
key findings of this trial.  
2 Method 
This study was designed to complement the first field experiment in two ways in 
terms of its contribution to answering research question 2, namely whether 
tailored marketing can increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who 
are most likely to save money on one.  
The first is that since OLEV has the contact email address and date of purchase 
of every private purchased EV in the UK, OLEV has the ability to prompt every 
privately owned EV owner in the UK to switch electricity tariff. This means the 
email prompts can be delivered to EV owners regardless of their prior probability 
of switching tariff or willingness to shop around for new tariffs, thereby 
overcoming the self-selection problems inherent on just relying on price 
comparison websites or implementing interventions on energy supplier websites, 
as in the Flex Trial. 
The second is that it will involve recruiting amongst a known sample of EV owners 
to increase the amount of baseline data held on participants whilst avoiding 
alerting participants to the fact a trial is taking place, as would be the case if I 
randomised participants to interventions amongst the sub-group who completed 
a baseline survey. Since all participants are known to be EV owners, the causal 
impact of tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards EV owners is equivalent 
to the average treatment effect of tailoring on the outcomes of interest. The 
advantage of estimating the impact of tailoring on EV owners using an average 
treatment effect as opposed to a heterogeneous treatment effect is that average 
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treatment effects have a causal interpretation whereas sub-group analyses and 
interaction terms do not. 
2.1 Population of interest 
The population of interest for this trial is people in the UK who drive a plug-in EV 
for personal use and are therefore exposed to the costs of charging their vehicle 
at home. This excludes people who drive EVs for business purposes (business 
fleets) and therefore whose businesses are likely to cover charging expenses. 
However, new vehicles purchased by businesses make up just 1.2% of all new 
vehicle sales (SMMT, 2017b) and private road users account for 80% of all traffic 
on the road in the UK (Department for Transport, 2016), making EVs driven for 
personal use, whether leased from a company or privately owned, the single 
biggest target market for TOU tariffs.  
Although the previous studies in this thesis confined the population of interest to 
British energy bill payers83, this trial does not explicitly identify which EV owners 
identify as energy bill payers and does not exclude EV owners in Northern 
Ireland. This is for two reasons. Firstly, it will not be possible to exclude EV 
owners who do not identify as energy bill payers because data is not available on 
this variable. However, this does not threaten the success of the study because 
it is unlikely that many people purchasing EVs will not be financially responsible 
for their household energy bills.  
Second, the usual motivation behind excluding Northern Irish energy bill payers 
from consumer trials on electricity tariffs does not apply to this study. The single 
                                            
83 Research on energy tariffs commonly limits participant samples to people who are “at least 
jointly responsible for their household bills” (Ipsos Mori and Consumer Focus, 2012a, i) by 
excluding participants who indicate that they are not responsible for paying household energy 
bills. 
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market for electricity covering GB is separate from the energy market in Northern 
Ireland, which means that British energy suppliers do not have a licence to 
operate in Northern Ireland. The Flex Trial tariff was designed in partnership with 
a British energy supplier, and therefore it would not have been possible for Irish 
consumers to adopt this tariff, hence the study was confined to British bill payers. 
It was for these reasons that the first study was also confined to British energy 
bill payers. However, OLEV’s EV grant is a UK wide policy and Northern Irish EV 
owners will also have access to TOU tariffs from Irish energy suppliers. It would 
therefore not have been considered fair or necessary to exclude Northern Irish 
EV grant recipients from the study considering that they could also potentially 
save money from switching to a new electricity tariff, including TOU tariffs. 
Although TOU tariffs will eventually become mandatory in Northern Ireland, the 
energy regulator intends to encourage voluntary adoption of TOU tariffs in the 
interim period to minimise any potential consumer backlash (Commission for 
Energy Regulation, 2015). 
2.2 Trial design 
This is a two-armed randomised control trial that was designed to test the impact 
of prompting private purchase EV owners to switch electricity tariff via email using 
the generic appeal from Government tariff switching campaigns “Switch energy 
tariff to save money” relative to an email tailored to the target audience of EV 
owners “Switch energy tariff to cut the costs of charging your electric vehicle”.  
Participants were randomly assigned with a 1:1 allocation ratio to receive one of 
two factually identical emails that framed the benefits of switching in one of two 
ways: 
 Control: Switch to save over £300 on your energy bill 
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 Tailored: Switch to cut the costs of charging your electric vehicle by over 
£300 
Both emails encouraged recipients to visit the Energy Saving Trust website 
containing tips on how to either cut the cost of their household energy bills 
(generic control email) or cut the cost of home charging (tailored email). The tips 
also included advice on how to work out whether the Economy 7 tariff, the UK’s 
only TOU tariff at the time the trial was conducted, would be right for them. This 
information is important given that Chapter 5 illustrated that many consumers 
have difficulty in working this out independently.  
The webpage was especially created for the trial, designed by me in collaboration 
with the UK Government OLEV and the Energy Saving Trust.  
The study does not include a no-email control group because it would not have 
been possible to monitor the potential behavioural outcomes in such a group and 
because, as demonstrated through the review of the literature in Chapter 3, it is 
by now relatively well established that any prompt is more effective than no 
prompt (Haynes et al., 2013; Sanders and Smith, 2016), whereas the evidence 
on how best to frame the prompt for maximum effect is less clear.  
The email was sent from a UK Government OLEV email account, because 
government emails tend to receive higher open rates84 and because a key aim of 
the trial was to test whether such emails could be sent to grant recipients from 
government as business as usual. Email was chosen because it is low cost and, 
                                            
84 The source for this is the online email software management tool Mail Chimp, which publishes 
its email marketing benchmarks based on millions of emails sent every month from 12 million 
users. https://mailchimp.com/resources/research/email-marketing-benchmarks/. 
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unlike letters, provides easy tracking of behavioural outcomes using email 
campaign tools (see Chapter 3).  
Emails are preferable to text messages because more information can be 
included in them and are preferable to letters because it is easier to monitor 
recipient engagement with emails than letters. 
2.3 Recruiting amongst the population of interest 
As noted above, the population of interest is people in the UK who drive an EV 
for personal use. Trial participants are all recipients of the private purchase UK 
Government Plug-In Car Grant (PICG) and for which a valid personal email 
address was held for the driver. The PICG subsidises the upfront cost of 
purchasing an EV by up to £5,000.  
This means the trial includes all people who purchase an EV either outright or 
using a finance scheme (EV owners), but excludes people who drive a vehicle 
for personal use by leasing an EV from a company because OLEV only holds the 
email address for the leasing company that purchased the EV not the driver that 
goes on to drive it (EV leasers). EV leasers are part of the population of interest 
since they are likely to be exposed to the costs of charging their EV at home. 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable way of contacting the drivers of leased EVs. 
Despite this limitation, OLEV EV grant recipients represents an excellent 
sampling frame for four reasons. 
First, based on unpublished data from OLEV, approximately 60% of private 
purchase EVs are bought for leasing, so EV owners encompass 40% of the 
population of interest, a sizeable sub-group of the EV population. Moreover, 
private purchase EV owners are an important sub-group of the EV population that 
will represent an increasing share of all vehicles on the road because private road 
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users account for 80% of all motor vehicle traffic in the UK (Department for 
Transport, 2016) and the sale of internal combustion engine vehicles will be 
banned in the UK from 2040 (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
and Department for Transport, 2017). 
Second, since the PICG is automatically applied at the point of purchase and 
approximately 98% of all EVs sold in the UK for private use are PICG eligible 
models (Next Green Car, 2017), the effectiveness of sending generic versus 
tailored email prompts can be tested on a very large sample of EV owners 
regardless of their prior interest in switching tariff and the extent to which they are 
willing to identify as EV owners. Recruiting a sample of EV owners through 
adverts aimed at EV owners then the study could overestimate the effect of 
tailoring on EV owners because it would only recruit participants who are willing 
to identify as EV owners or who automatically self-identify as an EV owner, which 
ex-ante may be correlated with tailoring. Equally, due to the relatively low 
population prevalence of EV owners, sending out generic adverts with a baseline 
survey aimed at identifying EV owners is unlikely to deliver a very large sample 
of EV owners. Indeed, early studies on EV owners have had very low samples 
despite intensive recruitment efforts, for instance in the region of 40 to 100 EV 
owners (Phillips et al., 2013; My Electric Avenue, 2015). This sampling frame is 
known to consist solely of EV owners to provide a very good test of the 
effectiveness of tailoring.  
Third, grant recipients are required to complete a short questionnaire at the point 
of sale which includes their contact names and email addresses as well as a 
number of other demographic characteristics, making it relatively easy to contact 
them directly and prompt them to switch tariff by email, including to tariffs 
designed to incentivise off-peak charging. This information also includes the date 
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of sale, which is necessary for testing whether EV owners are more receptive to 
prompts delivered the more recently they purchased their vehicle, to test the 
habit-discontinuity hypothesis. 
Fourth, since this data is routinely collected as part of the administration of the 
PICG, if the trial is successful – participants open the emails and access the 
information – these email prompts could be rolled out by OLEV as business as 
usual. The trial could therefore have a positive impact on EV owners beyond the 
life of the trial itself.  
An overview of this field experiment is provided in Figure 22.  
Figure 22 Overview of the OLEV trial design. 
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agreement was in place by July 2017. The emails were sent to participants on a 
single day in August 2017. 
Since the project would involve me handling personal data, the project was sent 
to the UCL Data Protection Officer who approved the project (Data protection 
number ‘Z6364106/2016/05/59 social research’. This trial does not alert 
participants to the fact that they are taking part in a trial. It was concluded that 
this does not pose an ethical concern as: 
 The precedent has been set by other trials run with UK Government 
departments in which website or email content is altered  
 Participants will not receive different information in any of the intervention 
arms, it will only be framed differently.  
 It was concluded that the content of the email was unlikely to cause any 
distress to participants. 
Based on this, the project received approval from the Head of Research Ethics 
at UCL’s Bartlett School of Environment, Energy and Resources (BSEER).  
2.4 Intervention design 
2.4.1 Generic vs tailored email design 
The generic email was designed to mirror the type of messaging provided by 
most tariff switching campaigns in the UK reviewed in Chapter 3, which target the 
average energy bill payer and encourage them to switch tariff to save an average 
of £300. 
As in the Flex Trial, the tailored manipulation was designed in line with the 
definition in the health literature, namely that tailoring “is a process of creating 
individualised communication” (Kreuter et al., 2002, p.272). Tailoring is theorised 
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to enhance information processing through several channels, all of which were 
exploited in the design of the tailored email: (1) the content was matched to the 
EV owner’s needs, by drawing attention to the fact that their energy bill would 
increase once charging their vehicle from home and pointing out that switching 
tariff could mitigate this; (2) the method was framed in a way that was relevant to 
the recipient by presenting the savings from switching tariff as a £300 saving to 
be made on home charging an EV rather than a £300 reduction in their energy 
bill.  
The approach to framing also intends to exploit another finding from the 
behavioural science literature on mental accounting, that people do not make 
financial choices in relation to their overall wealth, as assumed by classical 
economics, but in relation to different mental accounts held for different intended 
purposes, for instance rent, holidays and energy (Thaler, 1980, 1990, 1999). It is 
possible that EV owners could have a separate mental account for their energy 
bills as they do for covering the cost of running their EV. If so, and if the EV mental 
account is more salient than their energy bill mental account, this provides an 
additional reason why the tailored email would be more effective than the generic 
email.   
Designing behavioural interventions based on multiple findings from the 
behavioural science literature is a relatively common approach in nudge studies 
both because behavioural interventions can often yield relatively small treatment 
effects (and combining multiple insights could potentially enhance the impact) 
and because it is often not possible to say on theoretical or empirical grounds 
what influences will be more important (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Volpp et al., 
2008). Indeed, since there have been no prior framing studies on EV owners, it 
is not possible to say a priori whether mental accounting or increased salience 
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will be more important and, moreover, the approach to mental accounting fits the 
definition of tailored communication used in the health literature, which has 
undertaken a large amount of research on tailored communications.  
Nevertheless, since there is an element of subjectivity in how tailoring could be 
interpreted, the emails were constructed according to a pre-defined matrix of 
tailored versus non tailored sentences; in other words, for every sentence of 
content in the generic email there is an equivalent in the tailored email that is 
factually identical but ‘framed’ towards EV owners. These are presented in Table 
31, however the full text of the emails as sent to participants is reproduced in 
Appendix 12. Both emails contained text in a one column format with links to the 
webpage of tips hosted on the Energy Saving Trust website, a well-respected 
British organisation providing consumers with accessible advice on energy 
related matters. This webpage is still in use and can be visited at the following 
address http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/travel/electric-vehicles/electricity-
tariffs-electric-vehicles. 
Table 31 Example of the messages provided in each experimental group 
(italicised text is absent in the generic email but present in the tailored email). 
 
 Generic email Tailored email 
Email subject line Switch your energy tariff to 
save £300. 
Cut the cost of charging your 
electric car by £300. 
Email preview 
text (appears 
in inbox)  
Dear [First Name], Your current 
energy tariff may no longer be 
appropriate. Find out how to 
choose the right tariff to save 
£300.  
Dear [First Name], Now that 
you own an electric car, your 
current energy tariff may no 
longer be appropriate. Find 
out how to choose the right 
tariff for your EV to save 
£300. 
   
 
Chapter 7: Method, results and analysis (3) 325 
Email body 
copy – line 1 
You could save over £300 by 
switching your energy tariff. 
You could save over £300 
by switching your energy 
tariff, equivalent to 11,000 
free electric miles. 
 
Email body 
copy – line 2 
We recommend that you consider 
switching your electricity tariff. 
Now that you’ve bought an 
electric car, we recommend 
that you consider switching 
your electricity tariff. That’s 
because, if you’re charging 
your car at home, your 
electricity bill will go up. 
Email body 
copy – line 3 
Click here for five top tips on how 
to choose the right energy tariff. 
Click here for five top tips on 
how to choose the right 
energy tariff for your electric 
car. 
Email body 
copy – final 
line 
Wondering whether Economy 7, 
which gives you a cheaper rate 
overnight, could help lower your 
energy bills? Visit our online guide 
today to find out how much money 
you could save on Economy 7 
based on how you use energy at 
home. 
Wondering whether Economy 
7, which gives you a cheaper 
rate overnight, might help you 
charge your car for less? Visit 
our online guide today to find 
out how much money you 
could save on Economy 7 
based on how much you 




At the time of the trial, there were no smart meter enabled TOU tariffs. The email 
therefore mentioned the savings from switching to flat rate tariffs85 as well as to 
the Economy 7 tariff, the only existing domestic TOU tariff in GB. However, emails 
                                            
85 The reason for mentioning the savings to be made from switching to the cheapest flat-rate tariff 
is that, given so few consumers switch tariff, the largest average savings can still be made by 
switching to the cheapest available flat-rate tariff with further potential savings to be made from 
switching to an Economy 7 tariff, as is made clear to EV owners in the tips pages. 
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are a generic mechanism by which EV owners could be prompted to switch to 
any future smart meter enabled TOU tariff.  
2.4.2 The webpage on the Energy Saving Trust website 
The page on the Energy Saving Trust website created for this trial contained five 
tips on ‘how to reduce the running costs of your EV’: 
 Save over £300 by switching to the cheapest fixed rate electricity tariff 
 Find out if you can switch to an off-peak tariff to benefit from cheap 
overnight electricity 
 Look out for new types of ‘smart’ off-peak tariffs which could save you even 
more money 
 Discounted electricity tariffs for EV drivers 
 Check if you can get a smart meter 
 Figure 23 The webpage (left) and an example of the downloadable tips (right). 
 
2.5 Outcomes 
It is assumed that the tailoring, which affects the content of the email, will play 
the greatest role in encouraging EV owners to engage with the content and 
respond to the call to action in the email to consider switching tariff. However, it 
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is assumed that the timing of the email – specifically, how recently the email is 
sent since the individual purchased their EV – will play the greatest role in 
encouraging EV owners to open the email in the first place since the habit 
discontinuity hypothesis should take effect just from reading the word ‘electric 
vehicle’ and seeing the name of the recipient (OLEV), without having to engage 
in detail with the content of the message itself. 
Therefore, the primary outcome measure used for assessing the average 
treatment effect of the way in which the email was framed is the proportion of 
people who click through to the Energy Saving Trust website from the email 
(binary 1 for YES or 0 for NO).  
The open rate to the email (binary 1 for YES or 0 for NO) is the primary outcome 
of interest for measuring the impact of the timing of sending tariff switching 
prompts on receptiveness to the prompt.  
However, the impact of tailoring will also be measured on open rates and 
unsubscribe rates to the email (binary 1 for YES or 0 for NO).  
2.6 Additional data collection 
Data was also collected on the number of downloads of the PDF leaflets on the 
Energy Saving Trust website. The Energy Saving Trust reported this data to me 
at the end of the trial period (details on this in section 6.7 below). This data cannot 
be linked to the interventions so is not used as an outcome measure, but is of 
general interest for understanding whether email recipients who clicked through 
to the website did indeed go on to access the information provided.  
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In addition to the names, email addresses and the date of purchase, the OLEV 
dataset also contains the following information on PICG recipients which is 
collected via a survey administered in the dealership at the point of purchase: 
 Gender (male, female) 
 Age (17-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, >61, prefer not to say) 
 Employment status (employed, not working) 
 Number of vehicles in household (0, 1, 2, 3 >3) 
 Vehicle type purchased (van or car) 
 Whether the EV will be used as the main household vehicle (yes, no, don’t 
know) 
 Self-reported expected annual mileage (<1600; 1,600-8,000; 8,000-
16,000; 16,000-32,000; 32,000-48,000; >48,000; Don’t know, Varies too 
much to say)  
 Self-reported top three expected uses for the EV (Visiting family or friends, 
Commuting to work, Holiday trips, Shopping, Personal business, Business 
trips, Taking children to school, Commercial use)  
 Self-reported expected charging location (Home, Work, Motorway service 
station, Other public infrastructure, Public car parks, On-street other, On-
street residential) 
 Vehicle make and model (Categorical variable with multiple categories) 
 Purchase cost of the vehicle (Continuous variable) 
The survey was designed by OLEV when the grant was launched so is not 
included in this thesis. 
2.7 Sample size 
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The email contact data was downloaded from the OLEV system in June 2016 in 
preparation for the trial. Once inclusion criteria were applied (private purchase 
recipients with valid personal email addresses), there were 8,081 unique email 
addresses.  
Since this trial has two primary outcomes of interest, power calculations were run 
separately for open rates and click-through rates, conditional on the estimated 
open rate. In both cases the alpha was set at 0.05 and power at 0.80 the 
convention for trials in the social sciences (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). 
2.7.1 Open rate power calculations 
Power calculations run in advance on Stata v.13 indicated that, with a sample 
size of 8,000 participants (4,000 per arm), the trial would be powered to detect 
between a 0.02649-0.02802 percentage point difference in email open rates 
between the control and treatment email from various baseline email open rates 
(0.22-0.2626). The minimum open rate of 22% was set because this is the 
average open rate for email marketing although the average for Government 
emails is 26% so this was set as the maximum likely open rate.86 The 
assumptions used in these calculations and its impact on the minimal effect size 
that the trial will be powered to detect are summarised in Table 32. 






P1 – control 
email open 
rate 












8,000 0.02649 0.22 0.2465 0.02649 12% 
8,000 0.02802 0.2626 0.2906 0.02802 11% 
 
                                            
86 The source for this is the online email software management tool Mail Chimp, which publishes 
its email marketing benchmarks based on millions of emails sent every month from 12 million 
users. https://mailchimp.com/resources/research/email-marketing-benchmarks/. Overall 
average, regardless of sector, was computed by the authors as Mail Chimp only provides 
averages by industry sector. 
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2.7.2 Click-through rate power calculations 
Power calculations run in advance on Stata v.13 indicated that the trial would be 
powered to detect between a 0.02363-0.02933 percentage point difference in 
click-through rates between the control and treatment arms from various baseline 
click through rates (0.0271-0.0362) after accounting for various email open rates 
(0.22-0.2626) – in other words, after accounting for the fact that not all recipients 
would open the email. The smallest assumed click-through rate of 2.7% was set 
since this is the average click-through rate for email marketing, however the 
average for Government emails is slightly higher at 3.6%, so this was estimated 
to be the maximum likely click-through rate.87 The assumptions used in these 
calculations and its effect on the smallest effect size the trial would be powered 
to detect are summarised in Table 33. 




on open rate 
P1 – control 
click 
through rate 














1760 0.0271   0.05332 0.02622 97% 
1760 0.0362 0.06553 0.02933 81% 
Open 
rate: 26% 
2100 0.0271    0.05073 0.02363 87% 
2100 0.0362   0.06269 0.02649 73% 
 
 
2.7.3 The approach taken to the power calculations 
It is considered best practice to select a sample size on the basis of the smallest 
effect size between a control and treatment group that would make the treatment 
                                            
87 Based on the email marketing benchmarks published by Mail Chimp. 
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more cost-effective than the control88 (e.g. see Glennerster and Takavarasha, 
2013), and this was the method used to arrive at the MDE for the Flex Trial (see 
Chapter 6). However, the marginal cost of sending an email to a grant recipient 
is virtually zero so cost-effectiveness is a poor barometer for determining a 
worthwhile difference in open or click-through rates. It was therefore decided that 
the trial would be run if the existing size of the EV population was large enough 
to be able to identify a treatment effect size that is in line with the smaller effect 
sizes observed in the literature on framing effects in letter, text and email 
communication (reviewed in Chapter 3) and if these treatment effect sizes would 
deliver a valuable increase in the number of EV owners exposed to prompts about 
switching to a TOU tariff once an increasing share of new vehicle sales are 
electric.  
The power calculations noted above demonstrated that a sample size of 8,000 
would be sufficient to detect a treatment effect of at least 11% for open rates and 
at least 73% for click-through rates which is in line with the smaller treatment 
effects observed in the literature and was judged by the OLEV to be of 
substantive importance to them. For example, in 2016, approximately 2.6 million 
new vehicles were registered in the UK each year. By 2030, the target is for 60% 
(1.6 million at the current rate of sales) of these new vehicle sales to come from 
EVs and 100% by 2050 (Committee on Climate Change, 2013). An 11% increase 
in open rates from a baseline of 26% would mean reaching an additional 464,000 
– 416,000 = 50,000 new EV owners by 2030 and additional 754,000 – 676,000 = 
78,000 new private EV owners by 2050 with a prompt to switch to a TOU tariff at 
                                            
88 For example, in clinical trials, the minimum detectable treatment effect between an existing 
treatment for a disease and a new experimental treatment might be the difference in patient 
outcomes that would make the new drug more cost-effective relative to the existing drug.  
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minimal cost. This is the number of additional prompts accessed by EV owners 
per year and this rough calculation ignores growth in population and growth in 
new vehicle sales.  
Given that the majority of people are unlikely to open the email, the increase in 
click-through rates resulting from the tailoring email would need to be larger to 
have a substantive impact on the number of recipients accessing information 
about tariff switching; an increase in click-through rates of at least 70% from a 
baseline of 3.6% would mean an additional (754,000 x 0.06) – (754,000 x 0.036) 
= 18,000 new private EV owners accessing specific information about what TOU 
tariff to switch to as well as how to switch. That is twice as many private EV 
owners as currently exist in the UK at present.  
2.7.4 Stopping rules for measuring outcomes 
I pre-committed in advance to stop recording outcomes when there was a 5 day 
period throughout which there were fewer than three new unique opens/clicks. 
This is because, once sent, the email would be stored in recipients’ inboxes 
(unless deleted) so people could open the email and click-through to the link at 
any time. This stopping rule was pre-specified in the Pre-Analysis Plan.  
2.8 Randomisation and blinding 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the generic or tailored email 
message by the email campaign management tool Email Center, from which the 
emails were sent. Email Center uses simple randomisation.89 A 1:1 allocation 
                                            
89 It randomly sorts the list of intended email recipients and then assigns the top half to the control 
and bottom half to treatment as is recommended in Glennerster and Takavarasha (2013).  
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ratio was employed to achieve equal numbers of participants across both groups 
on average. The unit of randomisation was the unique email address.  
Since the intervention is delivered in an email to private email addresses, 
participants will be unaware of any variations in the treatment and since the 
allocation was performed by Email Center, treatment assignment was also 
concealed from me although I sent the emails.  
2.9 Analysis plan 
The trial and Pre-Analysis Plan was registered with the EGAP trial registry 
(20160726AA). Below, I outline the analysis method used to test for the average 
treatment effect and the habit discontinuity effect. 
2.9.1 Average treatment effect equation 
The second research question asks whether tailored message framing could be 
used to increase switching rates to TOU tariffs amongst EV owners. In the context 
of this experiment, this research question is associated with the following 
hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1 Click-through rates to an email prompting EV owners to 
switch electricity tariff will be higher when the email messaging is tailored 
towards EV owners than when the email messaging is applicable to the 
average energy bill payer 
This hypothesis will be tested using the following equation estimated using OLS 
regression:  
[1]  𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇1𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 
Where: 
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 𝛾𝑖 is the outcome measure, a binary variable taking the value of one (1) if 
the participant clicks through to the EST website and (0) otherwise after 
the email is sent 
 𝛼 is the constant 
  𝑇1𝑖   is a binary variable that equals one (1) if a participant was sent the 
tailored email, so that the control (generic email) is the omitted reference 
category 
 𝛽1  
is the coefficients on 𝑇1𝑖  , which measures the effect of being sent the 
tailored email rather than the generic email so is the primary coefficient of 
interest for testing hypothesis 1 
 𝑢𝑖 is the error term. 
The equation above was also run with the secondary outcome measures 
identified (open rates, unsubscribe rates) and the following set of baseline 
covariates to increase the precision of treatment effect estimates by reducing 
unexplained variation in the outcomes (Gerber and Green, 2012):90 
 Postcode district, implemented as fixed effects 
 Time in months since purchase (continuous)91 
 Price of vehicle 
 Time email opened (continuous) 
                                            
90 Three additional control variables specified in the Pre-Analysis Plan but which were not 
ultimately included are (controls for whether or not the electric vehicle had been delivered to the 
owner (dummy) as well as the email client and the device the email was opened on, as it was 
expected that this could affect the way the email displayed and therefore click-through rates. 
However, there was less than 95% variation in the delivered dummy so in line with the Pre-
Analysis Plan, this was excluded from all analyses. Although Email Center provides a breakdown 
of what email client and device recipients used to open the email, this data is provided on 
aggregate and not linked to each individual recipient as the marketing team had originally said. 
These variables were therefore not included.  
91 This variable was created using the date of purchase.  
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 A dummy variable to control for change to the maximum grant value 
awarded (March 2016) 
2.9.2 Testing the habit discontinuity effect – the regression equation 
The habit discontinuity hypothesis states that the receptiveness to the prompt is 
affected by when the prompt is delivered in relation to when the EV owner 
purchased their vehicle, however it is not known whether the effect is linear. In 
the context of vehicle users, it was found that people with strong environmental 
attitudes have lower self-reported car use, but only after recently moving home 
(<12 months ago) but also that  this effect decays as the time since moving home 
increases (Thomas et al., 2016). In the case of people who have recently moved 
home, the effect has been found to last for up to three months (Verplanken and 
Roy, 2016). It was therefore theorised in Chapter 3 that in the same way that this 
prior research suggests “moving into a new home [is] a potential ‘window of 
opportunity’” (Thomas et al., 2016, p.1) to influence people’s use of their vehicles, 
purchasing one’s first EV may also present a window of opportunity to introduce 
EV owners to a new positive habit of enrolling on a TOU tariff and charging their 
vehicles at off-peak times.  
However, unlike with moving home, it is not so obvious when EV owners would 
be most receptive to tariff switching prompts. For example, we could imagine that 
people who have recently purchased an EV will be particularly receptive to 
information that relates to their household electricity use, especially any 
information that specifically addresses them as EV owners. If so, we expect 
engagement rates with an email prompt to decrease linearly as time since 
purchasing the vehicle increases (a negative correlation).  
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Alternatively, engagement may decrease as time since purchasing increases but 
only up until some time point beyond which people are accustomed to owning 
their EV (a negative correlation with an extreme positive skew) if there is cut-off 
point for this window of opportunity e.g. as people become accustomed both to 
their EV and to the increased amount of their monthly electricity bill. On the other 
hand, we might hypothesise that, having just spent thousands of pounds on a 
new vehicle, the prospect of saving £300 on their electricity bills will seem 
relatively unsubstantial – until they receive their first electricity bill after having 
received delivery of their new EV. Two thirds of energy bill payers pay for their 
electricity on a monthly basis (Ofgem, 2015) so it may not be until they receive 
their first few energy bills after buying an EV that they start to take notice of their 
increased electricity use and therefore feel interested in reducing it. 
To avoid the risk of cherry-picking particular values that support the habit 
discontinuity hypothesis, I pre-specified the way in which the analysis would be 
undertaken to test for both a linear and non-linear effect of time on email open 
rates. Firstly, there are therefore two pre-specified hypotheses92: 
 Hypothesis 2 Demand for email information about electricity tariffs will 
decrease as time in months since the EV was purchased increases (the 
habit discontinuity hypothesis) 
 Hypothesis 3 Demand for email information about electricity tariffs will 
initially decrease as time in months since the EV was purchased increases 
                                            
92 The Pre-Analysis Plan specified that I would also test for differences based on weeks since 
purchase however such an analysis became less valuable given that there was a delay in time 
between the data being extracted from the Government’s database system and the start of the 
trial (a three month delay).  
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and then trail off (the habit discontinuity hypothesis with a window of 
opportunity) 
These hypotheses will be tested using the following equation estimated using 
OLS regression:  
[2]  𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 +  𝜒𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 
Where, in addition to the model set out in Equation [1] 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 is a variable that 
aims to test for the presence of a correlation between the time since the recipient 
purchased their EV and demand for information about switching electricity tariff 
as proxied by click-through rates and open rates.  
Secondly, the way in which the variable 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 will be coded was also pre-
specified: 
 To test hypothesis 2, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 will be coded as a continuous variable which 
measures the time in months since the recipient purchased their vehicle 
and where 𝛽2 is the coefficient on 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 which tests the hypothesis that 
email open rates decline as time in months since purchasing the EV 
increases (a classic habit discontinuity) 
 To test hypothesis 3, as a categorical variable in which the sample was 
split into equal quartiles according to the time in months since the vehicle 
was purchased and where 𝛽2 is the coefficient on 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 which tests the 
hypothesis that email open rates decline as time in months since 
purchasing the EV increases but then stagnates (habit discontinuity with a 
window of opportunity) 
The reason the time variable is coded based on quartiles is that it makes it 
possible to pre-specify the type of non-linear relationship that may be expected 
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without having access to the dataset; quartiles were chosen following a recent 
study on the habit discontinuity hypothesis (Thomas et al., 2016).  
3 Implementation of trial 
In August 2016 an email was sent to 8,003 private EV owners in the UK prompting 
them to switch electricity tariff. Figure 24 describes the flow of participants from 
the receipt of email address data, to randomisation, delivery of emails and 
collection of outcomes. The final sample for analysis consisted of 7,038 
participants because some participants were excluded due to having invalid or 
company email addresses or because, after randomisation, some emails failed 
to send (however this was not statistically significantly different across the two 
email conditions).  
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Figure 24 Participant flow diagram. 
 Data on 8,081 unique private purchase recipients of UK 
Government electric vehicle grant obtained 
8,003 eligible recipients of the electric vehicle grant with 
valid email addresses 
78 excluded: 
36 Had false email 
37 Email was for 
an organisation  
5 Email server 
error 
8,003 Randomised 
4,001 Randomised to 
generic email  
(group 1) 
4,002 Randomised to 
tailored email  
(group 2) 
3,536 Delivered 3,567 Delivered 




(failed to deliver) 
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4 Descriptive statistics of sample 
4.1 Participant characteristics and baseline randomisation 
checks 
Table 34 presents the characteristics of the participants in the entire sample and 
for the treatment and control group separately as measured by OLEV through a 
survey administered to grant recipients at the point of purchase in the dealership. 
Balance checks on baseline characteristics indicate that the randomisation was 
successful. The final column presents the p-values associated with a statistical 
significance test for whether there are any significant differences in the 
characteristics of the participants in the control group and those in the tailored 
group for each of the baseline variables. Out of 50 significance tests, only one 
variable is statistically significantly different between the control and treatment 
group at the 5 percent level and a further three variables are statistically 
significantly different across the treatment and control group at the 10 percent 
significance level, which is fewer than would be expected by chance alone.  
There are some statistically significant differences between the characteristics of 
participants who successfully received the email compared to those for whom the 
email was undelivered. However, assuming that the characteristics of individuals 
who do not report valid email addresses to OLEV is the same for future grant 
recipients as for the grant recipients in this trial, these differences will not 
substantively alter the policy implications of any results. 
It is often asserted that EV owners will do the majority of their charging from 
home, due to its convenience (e.g. see Knight et al., 2015), and the data 
overwhelmingly supports this conclusion; 90% of EV owners in the UK who 
purchased their vehicle outright intend to charge their vehicle at home whereas 
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just 25% say they intend to charge at work and less than half (45%) indicate that 
they would use locations that are likely to be equipped with public charge points 
(e.g. public car parks, motorway service stations).93 This has important 
implications for the importance of TOU tariffs since, if EV owners do most of their 
charging from home rather than public service stations, this means that a large 
portion of their charging could potentially be influenced by their household 
electricity tariff.  
Another feature of the dataset worth noting is that there is also a large range in 
terms of when EV owners purchased their vehicle. At the time of the trial, some 
participants had purchased their EV as recently as three months prior to receiving 
the email whereas others had owned their vehicle for over five years. This is 
important since hypotheses 2 and 3 are that receptiveness to the email will vary 
depending on how recently the recipient purchased their vehicle.  
Finally, it is also worth considering the profile of the average private purchase EV 
owner, because it could affect their likelihood of responding to the tailored email 
and also because the profile of the average EV owner may change as EVs 
become more mainstream in a way which could affect the generalisability of the 
findings to future EV owners. According to the data, the average private purchase 
EV owner in the UK is male and, if we assume that non-response for age is 
equally distributed across all age brackets, aged 40 and above. The majority 
already have two vehicles at home when they purchase their EV compared to a 
population average of one vehicle per household. This is not surprising given that 
the purchase price of EVs is significantly higher than traditional combustion 
                                            
93 In the survey, which was designed by OLEV, recipients are able to select multiple responses 
when answering this question, which is why the percentages do not sum to 100. The sample size 
for some of these questions is smaller than the full sample size of 8,003 because new questions 
were introduced into the survey part way through the grant scheme.  
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engine vehicles, even after considering the grant, so are presumably purchased 
by people who are wealthier than average.  
Given that the results of chapter 5 suggested that bounded rationality was more 
likely to affect energy bill payers in lower social grades than bill payers in higher 
social grades, the current profile of EV owners provides a particularly stringent 
test of the tailoring intervention which, according to a classical economic model, 
will have no effect on the outcomes since the incentive to switch (the potential 
£300 plus saving) is the same in both groups. 
Table 34 Descriptive statistics of sample and randomisation balance checks on 
baseline characteristics 
 
 Summary statistics (%) P value  
(2)=(3) 
 






















Owner demographics     
Gender:     
Female 22 22 21 0.930 
Male 76 77 76 0.604 
Not reported 2 2 2 0.082 
     
Age:     
17-30 2 2 2 0.442 
31-40 8 9 8 0.622 
41-50 21 21 21 0.963 
51-60 27 26 28 0.121 
> 61 26 26 25 0.372 
Prefer not to say 16 16 16 0.851 
Not reported 10 10 9 0.042* 
     
Employment status:     
Employed 31 31 31 0.641 
Not working 9 10 9 0.095 
Not reported (dummy) 60 59 60 0.155 
     
Number of vehicles in household:     
0 0 0 0 - 
1 21 21 20 0.258 
2 46 46 46 0.567 
3 17 16 17 0.168 
>3 8 8 8 0.868 
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Not reported 8 8 8 0.285 
     
Self-reported usage of vehicle     
EV will be the main 
household vehicle: 
    
Yes 91 90 91 0.315 
No 6 7 6 0.168 
Don’t know 3 3 3 0.891 
     
Expected average annual 
mileage: † 
    
<1,000 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.592 
1,000-4,999 10 10 10 0.737 
5,000-9,999 52 51 53 0.222 
10,000-19,999 32 33 32 0.562 
20,000-29,999 3 3 3 0.494 
>30,000 1 1 0.4 0.189 
Don’t know 1 1 1 0.665 
Varies too much to say 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.643 
     
Expected charging location: ‡     
Home 92 92 92 0.562 
Work 25 24 26 0.092 
On-street residential 5 5 6 0.266 
On-street other 5 4 5 0.509 
Public car parks 15 15 16 0.341 
Other public infrastructure 15 15 15 0.925 
Motorway service station 15 14 15 0.395 
     
Expected purpose for travel:‡     
Commuting/getting to work 63 62 64 0.308 
Business trips 19 20 18 0.200 
Visiting family or friends 67 66 66 0.761 
Holiday trips 43 43 44 0.528 
Shopping 42 42 42 0.829 
Personal business 23 23 23 0.882 
Education/taking children to school 7 7 8 0.562 
Commercial use 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.610 
     
Vehicle characteristics     
Car 99 99 99 0.257 
Van 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.257 







Characteristics of claim      







Time since vehicle 
purchased in months 
(mean) 
21 (13) 21 (13) 21 (13) 0.584 
 
Notes: The p-values in column 5 were obtained by regressing the treatment dummy against each 
baseline characteristic using logit regression for binary variables and OLS linear regression for 
continuous variables. Covariates found to be significant at the 95% level are marked with an 
asterix. Covariates which are marginally significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold. The 
symbol † means the total sample size for each cell in this category is 3233 rather than 8003 
because this question was not added to the customer survey until May/June 2015 although the 
first survey was run in December 2010. The symbol ‡ means the total sample size for each cell 
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in this category is 3220 because this question was not added to the customer survey until 
May/June 2015 although the first survey was run in December 2010.  
 
Table 35 Comparing the characteristics of participants with valid and invalid email 
addresses 
 Group P value  
(1)=(2) 
 
















Owner demographics    
Gender:    
Female 0.22 0.21 0.818 
Male 0.76 0.73 0.011* 
Not reported 0.02 0.05 0.000* 
    
Age:    
17-30 0.02 0.02 0.771 
31-40 0.08 0.08 0.429 
41-50 0.21 0.21 0.929 
51-60 0.27 0.27 0.782 
> 61 0.26 0.25 0.626 
Prefer not to say 0.16 0.18 0.088 
Not reported 0.09 0.17 0.000* 
    
Employment status:    
Employed 0.32 0.23 0.000* 
Not working 0.09 0.08 0.342 
Not reported (dummy) 0.59 0.69 0.000* 
    
Number of vehicles in household:    
0 0 0 - 
1 0.21 0.22 0.238 
2 0.46 0.45 0.253 
3 0.17 0.15 0.235 
>3 0.08 0.09 0.989 
Not reported 0.08 0.10 0.058 
    
Self-reported usage of vehicle    
EV will be the main household 
vehicle: 
   
Yes 0.90 0.88 0.002* 
No 0.06 0.08 0.028* 
Don’t know 0.03 0.04 0.056 
    
Expected average annual 
mileage:  
   
<1,000 0.01 0.01 0.328 
1,000-4,999 0.10 0.11 0.917 
   
 
Chapter 7: Method, results and analysis (3) 345 
5,000-9,999 0.52 0.49 0.280 
10,000-19,999 0.32 0.32 0.963 
20,000-29,999 0.03 0.02 0.397 
>30,000 0.01 0.01 0.733 
Don’t know 0.01 0.04 0.000* 
Varies too much to say 0.004 0.01 0.496 
    
Expected charging location:     
Home 0.92 0.91 0.578 
Work 0.25 0.26 0.592 
On-street residential 0.05 0.07 0.094 
On-street other 0.05 0.06 0.315 
Public car parks 0.15 0.18 0.060 
Other public infrastructure 0.15 0.13 0.235 
Motorway service station 0.15 0.14 0.806 
    
Expected purpose for travel:    
Commuting/getting to work    
Business trips 0.63 0.62 0.545 
Visiting family or friends 0.19 0.15 0.027* 
Holiday trips 0.66 0.65 0.832 
Shopping 0.43 0.41 0.370 
Personal business 0.42 0.45 0.175 
Education/taking children to school 0.23 0.23 0.957 
Commercial use 0.078 0.07 0.725 
    
Vehicle characteristics    
Car 0.99 0.99 0.673 
Van 0.002 0.002 0.673 
Basic price (mean £) 38,695 34,969 0.000* 
Characteristics of claim     
Time since vehicle 
purchased in months 
(mean) 
21 23 0.000* 
Notes: The p-values in column 4 were obtained by regressing a dummy variable indicating 
whether an individual received the email (1) or whether they did not receive the email (0) against 
each baseline characteristic using logit regression for binary variables and OLS linear regression 
for continuous variables. Covariates found to be significant at the 95% level are marked with an 
asterix. Covariates which are marginally significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.  
4.2 Outcome variables 
Figure 25 presents a diagram of the two outcome measures in this trial, open 
rates and click-through rates, compared to the average open and click through 
rates to emails sent by Government bodies and the average for any type of email 
marketing (see footnote 86 for source). As can be seen, email open rates and 
click through rates are both much higher in this trial than on average. 
Figure 25 Outcome variables in the OLEV trial compared to average email 
campaign outcomes 
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Note: Bars represent the average email open and click-through rate in the study 
(pink) compared to the average open and click-through rate for government 
emails (dark grey) and the average for email marketing as a whole (light grey). 
 
5 Results – average treatment effects 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that the tailored email would increase open rates and 
click-through rates relative to the generic email. This hypothesis is first explored 
by looking at the outcomes graphically followed by a presentation of the results 
of the regression model outlined in Section 2.9.1 to test whether any differences 
are statistically significant.  
5.1 Outcomes by experimental group visually  
Figure 26 is a bar chart of email open and click-through rates across the control 
and tailored group. It shows that both outcome measures are higher in the tailored 
group which framed the benefits of switching in terms of a potential £300 
reduction in charging their EV from home compared to the control group which 
framed this benefit as a £300 reduction in household energy bills. Open rates are 
15% higher and click-through rates are 90% higher in the tailored condition. 
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Note: Bars represent the average email open and click-through rate for the 
generic email and the tailored email with standard error bars.  
 
5.2 Outcomes regression model and results 
Table 36 reports the results of the pre-specific regression analysis testing 
whether the differences in open and click-through rates observed in Figure 26 are 
statistically significant. Looking at the first two columns, the results show that the 
difference in email open and click-through rates is statistically significant at the 
99.9 percent level, which is consistent with hypothesis 1 that a tailored email 
would be more effective than a generic email.  
The model estimates that the open rate was 6 percentage points higher and the 
click-through rate 10 percentage points higher in the tailored group than the 
generic group, which is consistent with the percentage difference in the raw data. 
Moreover, although recipients could unsubscribe from future emails by clicking a 
link at the bottom of the email, very few did so (n=59) with significantly fewer 
unsubscribing in the tailored email relative to the generic email condition 
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which the equation is estimated using logit with marginal effects reported that are 
also almost identical to the OLS coefficients reported here (see Appendix 13). 
























Observations 7038 7038 7038 
R2 0.004 0.018 0.0009 
 
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors with p-values in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
^ p-value is greater than the 5 percent significance threshold once correcting for multiple comparison testing using the 
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method. 
 
6 Results – habit discontinuity effect 
Some participants had purchased their EV as recently as three months prior to 
receiving the email whereas others had owned their vehicle for over five years. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that open rates would decline in a linear fashion based 
on how recently the recipient had purchased their EV, which is the basis of the 
habit discontinuity effect (Verplanken and Wood, 2006; Verplanken et al., 2008; 
Verplanken and Roy, 2016).  
Hypothesis 3 proposed that open rates would decline after a particular point in 
time and then stagnate, in line with the habit discontinuity hypothesis with a 
discrete window of opportunity. As noted above, it was decided in advance that 
this hypothesis would be tested by splitting the sample into quartiles based on 
the time since purchase to avoid cherry picking particular values that support the 
concept of a window of opportunity. Nevertheless, before presenting the results 
of these tests, the next section will provide a graphical overview of the data to 
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help gauge whether the pre-specified models are likely to be a good fit for the 
data.  
6.1 Outcomes by experimental group visually 
Figure 27 presents a line graph plotting the average email open rate by the time 
in months since the email recipient had purchased their EV and it reveals a 
marked non-linearity in the relationship between open rates and time since 
purchase, with outlying values removed.94 Email open rates decline from over 
70% to 40% between those who had purchased their EV three months ago (the 
most recent group of EV owners in the dataset) and those who had purchased 
their EV four months ago or more.  
Figure 27 Average email open rate by time in months since EV purchased  
 
                                            
94 Vehicles purchased more than 50 months ago were excluded because the sample size in each 
of the intervening months is too small (average sample size = 12) to obtain a statistically 
significant estimate of the open rate. This reflects the fact that uptake of the EV grant was 
relatively slow to begin with, as can been seen in Supplementary Fig. 2 reported in the 
supplementary information that accompanies the journal paper (Moira Nicolson et al., 2017). The 
same graph is reported with outliers included in Supplementary Fig. 3 of the journal paper (Moira 
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Notes: Error bars represent standard errors on the mean. Outliers removed (See 
footnote 94). 
6.2 Outcomes regression model and results 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 37. Consistent with 
the habit discontinuity hypothesis, the model estimates that email open rates 
decrease very slightly, by just 0.1 percentage points per month since the recipient 
purchased their EV (b=-0.001, p=0.026). To account for the rightwards skew in 
EV sales, a further robustness check was run using the log transformation of time 
since purchase in months, which also revealed a mild statistically significant 
correlation indicating that open rates decline the longer ago the recipient received 
their EV (b=-0.026, p=0.005). When the sample was split into quartiles based on 
the time in months since purchase and regressed this against open rates, there 
is also a statistically significant negative coefficient (b=-0.012, p=0.028), in 
support of the habit discontinuity effect.  
To test whether the sharp decrease in open rates between the third and fourth 
month since purchase is statistically significant – i.e. whether this represents the 
length of the ‘window of opportunity’ for encouraging EV owners to switch tariff – 
an additional model that was not pre-specified was run in which the independent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether the recipient received their EV three 
months since the email was sent (1) or more than three months since it was sent 
(0). The model estimates that receiving a prompt within three months of owning 
an EV (n=30) is correlated with a 32% increase in email open rates (b=0.320, 
p=0.000). A further robustness check is run including a battery of control variables 
collected at the time of purchase: vehicle price, vehicle type, gender, age, 
employment status, number of vehicles in the household, whether the EV will be 
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the main vehicle and expected annual mileage; the point estimate is almost 
unchanged, with the model estimating that receiving a prompt within three months 
of purchasing an EV is associated with a 28% increase in the likelihood of 
opening the email (b=0.275, p=0.002).  
As outlined in Nicolson et al. (2017), since the decline in open rates is so marked, 
there is little risk that I am selecting an arbitrary point in the data to conduct this 
analysis. Indeed, all of the analyses methods used, including those pre-specified 
in the analysis plan, are supportive of the habit discontinuity effect, including the 
p-value on the dummy variable indicating an EV owner received their vehicle 
within three months, even after controlling for multiple comparisons testing using 
the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) procedure and in further robustness checks 
in which the equation is estimated using logit with marginal effects reported at the 
mean of the independent variables (Appendix 14). 
 
 














































Quartiles of time 













Quartile 1    0.111 
(0.103) 
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Quartile 2    0.044 
(0.519) 
  
Quartile 3    -0.089 
(0.196) 
  
Quartile 4    Omitted   
       
Purchased 
vehicle three 

























Observations 7038 7038 7038 7038 7038 2891 
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.019 
  
Notes: The sample size in Model 5 is smaller because there are missing observations for the covariates, however a further 
robustness check which includes only controls for missing variables provides similar results (see Appendix 15). All models 
are estimated using robust standard errors with p-values in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
^ p-value is greater than the 5 percent significance threshold once correcting for multiple comparison testing using the 
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method. 
 
7 Discussion 
This chapter sought to test the hypothesis that EV owners are more likely to 
respond to tariff switching messages that frame the savings as a reduction in the 
cost of charging their vehicle than to the typical message used in national tariff 
switching campaigns which frame the savings as a reduction in household energy 
bills, even though the savings are financially equivalent. It also tested the 
hypothesis that EV purchase may constitute a significant life change that is 
subject to a window of opportunity during which EV owners could be prompted to 
adopt a TOU tariff, rather than to follow the approach used by most tariff switching 
campaigns which are timed to coincide with the start of the heating season and 
therefore the seasonal peak in energy bills. These hypotheses were tested in the 
context of a field experiment run with OLEV in which approximately 7,000 emails 
were sent to recipients of the Government’s EV grant.  
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The results show that reframing the £300 savings on household energy bills that 
can be made from switching electricity tariff as a £300 saving on charging an EV 
caused a 15% increase in email open rates and a 90% increase in the proportion 
of people who clicked-through to an information webpage that provided tips to 
help them determine whether a TOU tariff was right for them. The results also 
show that the timing of the message is also crucial; an overwhelming 70% of 
recipients who had purchased their vehicle within the past three months opened 
the email whereas this number dropped to 40% amongst those who had owned 
their vehicle for over three months.  
The crucial questions now are: how effective would such prompts be at increasing 
actual switching rates to TOU tariffs amongst private EV owners in the UK and 
beyond; and why did the tailored message work better than the generic message 
when the two emails were factually identical? The possible answers to these 
questions are discussed below.  
7.1 The relationship between open rates, click-through rates 
and switching 
Although the study was unable, for practical reasons, to track whether EV owners 
went on to switch tariff as a result of the prompts, theory (Ajzen, 1991) and 
empirical evidence (Kormos and Gifford, 2014) suggest that the intermediate 
outcomes measured (open rates, click-through rates, downloads) will be 
correlated with switching. By 2050, the target is for 100% of new vehicle sales to 
come from EVs, a target which is increasingly realistic given that the UK 
Government has just announced that the sale of internal combustion engine 
vehicles will be banned in the UK from 2040 (Department for Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs and Department for Transport, 2017). This would mean an EV 
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market size of approximately 2.6 million vehicles at the current rate of sales or 25 
million under the National Grid’s (2017, p.41) high adoption ‘Two Degrees’ 
scenario.  
If these email prompts were sent in the first three months of purchase when open 
rates are approximately 70%, then even if just 5% of those who open a tariff 
switching email go on to switch tariff, that could translate into an additional 90,000 
EV owners switching tariff by 2050 at the current rate of sales or nearly 1 million 
extra switchers at high adoption levels, at almost zero cost (Moira Nicolson et al., 
2017). Given that recipients who open the email are likely to be more engaged 
with tariff switching messages than the average recipient, a higher switching rate 
may be achievable and, if it reaches 50%, this would translate into an extra 9 
million EV owners switching tariff under a high EV adoption scenario, which would 
represent 40% of all plug-in EVs in 2050 (National Grid, 2017, p.41).  
Although this email promoted both flat-rate and TOU tariffs, future emails could 
exclusively promote TOU tariffs. Considering that the National Grid estimated that 
at least 85% of EV owners would need to participate in off-peak charging to avoid 
the worst possible increase in peak electricity demand from EV uptake (National 
Grid, 2017, pp.43–44), a 40% uptake of TOU tariffs by EV owners as a result of 
a single email would be very substantive contribution indeed. However, unlike 
default enrolment (the most common ‘nudge’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)), 
prompts do not succeed by encouraging choice without awareness (Smith et al., 
2013b) and therefore increase the likelihood of active rather than passive 
participation in DSR, whereby people defaulted onto time of use tariffs do not 
substantially alter their energy consumption patterns (Cappers et al., 2016; S. A. 
Fenrick et al., 2014).  
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7.2 Wider applications – the international EV market and 
electric heating 
Since the study was run on the full population of private EV owners in the UK, 
approximately 10% of all UK EV owners, it is reliable to conclude that the 
treatment effects observed here would transfer if OLEV rolled this email 
messaging out to grant recipients as business as usual, as they intend to. Private 
purchase EV owners are those who purchased their EV outright or through hire 
purchase, and excludes vehicles purchased by leasing companies or for 
commercial use (e.g. for company fleets). Other methods would be required to 
reach people who lease their EV, since this group is also likely to be charging 
their vehicles from home and thus presenting a risk to the electricity network. 
Although this study was run on recipients of the UK Government’s EV grant, a 
number of countries (e.g. India, China, South Korea, Sweden, Germany, 
Netherlands, Portugal) run similar EV subsidy schemes for which contact data is 
also likely to be collected to enable the sending of timely, tailored email prompts, 
if further research shows they are effective in these countries too. Moreover, the 
same approach could also be tested in the context of other new low carbon 
technologies such as the installation of new electric heating systems, which are 
also expected to place a great strain on the future electricity network (Frontier 
Economics, 2011) but which are also subject to similar government incentive 
schemes. A key contribution of this study is to demonstrate how additional value 
can be obtained from this administrative data. 
7.3 Why did tailoring work so well? 
Although this study does not provide evidence on why the tailored message 
worked best, the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 identifies three potentially 
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mutually overlapping mechanisms that are most likely to explain the effectiveness 
of tailoring. The first is inattention to insalient costs, or myopia as proposed in 
Gabaix and Laibson’s (2006) model. According to this model, ‘add on’ costs are 
less salient than purchase costs and consumers do not rationally gather 
information about ‘shrouded’ costs. As argued elsewhere (Allcott, 2011), fuel 
costs (e.g. the cost of charging an EV) are analogous to ‘add on’ costs in that, 
unlike the purchase price, they are not explicitly presented upfront. The tailored 
email specifically pointed out that their household electricity bills would increase 
having bought an EV, making it particularly important for EV owners to be on the 
right electricity tariff. Many new EV owners may not have otherwise perceived 
themselves as having higher than average electricity consumption and, unlike the 
generic email, the tailored email ‘unshrouds’ (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) the 
insalient costs of owning an EV, thereby encouraging EV owners to act to lower 
these costs.  
A second potential mechanism is found in Thaler's (1980, 1990, 1999) concept 
of mental accounting which describes the way in which people have been found 
to evaluate their finances. Standard economic theory implies that re-framing the 
savings to be made from switching tariff as a saving on home-charging an EV 
rather than on total household energy bills should make no difference to the 
appeal of switching energy tariff since the financial values are identical and all 
income is fungible; a saving of £300 has the same value in terms of what it can 
subsequently be spent on regardless of how that money was saved or earnt. 
However, experimental evidence suggests that, when evaluating their finances, 
rather than making financial decisions based on its effect on their total wealth or 
consumption, people engage in what is called narrow framing (Barberis and 
Huang, 2001; Dupas and Robinson, 2015) whereby they create separate mental 
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accounts (e.g. an account for spending on rent, an account for spending on food 
and possibly an account for the running costs of their EV) and make financial 
decisions in relation to its isolated effect on each relevant account. The finding 
that EV owners were more motivated by the message that framed the savings as 
a reduction in home charging costs than a reduction in home energy bills may 
suggest that they may be engaging in a form of mental accounting whereby 
household energy bills and the running costs of their EV are accounted for 
separately in their minds but that the ‘EV account’ is more salient to them. The 
concept of mental accounting has been used to explain why people may be more 
likely to spend government transfers on their children when the transfer is labelled 
Child Benefit (Kooreman, 2000; Blow et al., 2010) or on fuel when the transfer is 
labelled a Winter Fuel Payment (Beatty et al., 2014). 
A third related mechanism proposed in the literature on tailored health 
communication (Rimer and Kreuter, 2006) is that tailoring increases the 
perceived relevance and salience of information, thereby increasing motivation 
to process and act on it, in this study, by visiting information about how to reduce 
the costs of charging an EV.  
These explanations are not mutually exclusive but a future study could attempt 
to isolate the impact of ‘unshrouding’ (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) from the impact 
of appealing to a more salient mental account by running an email trial in which 
participants are either told that switching electricity tariff is a good way of 
mitigating the increase in electricity bills owing to buying an EV (unshrouding) 
and another in which the savings from switching electricity tariff are framed in 
terms of the reduction in home charging costs rather than household energy bills.  
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8 Conclusions  
This chapter sought to test whether recipients of the UK Government EV grant 
could be prompted to consider switching tariff by sending them an email reminder 
shortly after purchasing their EV, when they are already likely to be thinking about 
the costs of running their new vehicle.  
This chapter makes two contributions to answering the second research 
question, which is whether tailored marketing messages could be used to 
increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers most likely to save money on 
one. The first is that yes, tailoring tariff switching campaigns towards EV owners 
is likely to be a much more effective way of boosting switching rates to TOU tariffs 
amongst EV owners than relying on generic broadcast campaigns like the DECC 
Power to Switch campaign, which also risk increasing uptake amongst groups 
who would be financially better off by staying on a flat-rate tariff.  
Most tariff switching campaigns emphasise the energy bill savings from switching 
tariff, however, this study shows that EV owners are much more receptive to 
prompts which frame the savings as a reduction in home-charging costs, even 
though the monetary value of the savings presented (over £300) were identical. 
This effect may be reflective of the tendency people have to evaluate their 
finances within separate mental accounts, whereby the costs of charging an EV 
are accounted for independently to the costs associated with household energy 
bills but which, for EV owners, the EV account is more mentally salient. 
Alternatively, it could be that the tailored email unshrouded the hidden costs 
associated with running an EV. Regardless of the mechanism at work, the study 
shows that, rather than relying on EV owners to adopt TOU tariffs of their own 
accord, mass unsolicited emails represent a simple but low cost mechanism of 
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actively prompting EV owners to adopt TOU tariffs or potentially other smart 
charging programmes regardless of their prior interest in switching tariff or 
likelihood of visiting price comparison websites. 
The second contribution to the second research question is that governments 
need to act soon, in the early days of the transition towards EVs. Consistent with 
the habit discontinuity hypothesis (Verplanken and Wood, 2006; Verplanken and 
Roy, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016) (that people are more susceptible to information 
delivered in the context of life changes), email open rates decline from over 70% 
to 40% for recipients who have owned their EV for over three months, equivalent 
to missing out on reaching an extra one million people once EVs reach 60% 
market penetration. In doing so this study demonstrates that the habit 
discontinuity effect applies beyond life changing events such as moving house 
(Verplanken et al., 2008; Verplanken and Roy, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016). 
The practical implications of these findings are important because repetitive 
behaviours, such as EV charging, could become habitual and evidence to date 
shows that EV owners have got into the routine of charging their vehicles when 
they get home from work (Zarnikau et al., 2015; My Electric Avenue, 2015; 
Capova et al., 2015), when electricity demand is at its peak and, in many 
countries, the least efficient and therefore most polluting power plants are brought 
into operation to meet peaks in demand (Ma et al., 2012). By intervening in the 
early stages of EV ownership, such email prompts could deter EV owners from 
getting into the habit of charging at peak times.  
Moreover, sending prompts encouraging the adoption of TOU tariffs to EV owners 
specifically will help to minimise the risk that other consumer groups who are not 
suitable for TOU tariffs will also adopt them. A key argument of this thesis is that, 
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whilst the Government’s target to have 30% of domestic consumers on a time of 
use tariff by 2030 is unlikely to be met without some intervention by Government 
or third parties to help boost switching rates, a recruitment approach is needed 
which encourages uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who will save 
money that does not also increase uptake amongst consumers who are likely to 
be made worse off from switching to a TOU tariff. Since charging an EV uses 
substantially more electricity than most household electrical appliances and the 
vehicle can be set to charge overnight on a timer, EV owners can stand to save 
more money a lot more easily than the average British household. Tailored email 
prompts are therefore an ‘effective and selective’ nudge.  
This concludes Chapter 7 and therefore also the presentation of the empirical 
results of this thesis. Chapter 8 will discuss the results of all three results chapters 
in the context of the wider literature on behavioural science and the overall aim 
of this study, which is how to increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers 
who stand to save money on one but not amongst consumers who could be made 
worse off. This will be followed a conclusion that summarises the key findings of 
this thesis as well as its potential policy implications and avenues for future 
research. 
   
 
















Global discussion:  
The pros and cons of opt-out enrolment and 
tailored marketing for recruiting domestic 
consumers onto TOU tariffs 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of each of the four empirical studies presented 
to show how they achieve the two overarching aims of this thesis. The first aim 
was to synthesise, for the first time, the various measures of uptake to TOU tariffs 
in GB and internationally to provide a robust estimate of consumer adoption of 
TOU tariffs in GB. This aim was motivated on the basis that policymakers and 
electricity network operators need an accurate picture of how many domestic 
consumers will participate in DSR to verify the assumptions in the UK smart meter 
cost benefit analysis (BEIS, 2016b) and to understand the likely contribution of 
domestic DSR to overall DSR in GB. However, since TOU tariffs are not widely 
commercially available in GB, it is necessary to look beyond GB for market-based 
measures of demand that can be synthesised with the available survey evidence 
from GB.  
The second aim was to provide evidence on how the adoption of TOU tariffs 
amongst British consumers could be increased without making them mandatory, 
as in Ireland (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2015), or the default tariff as 
proposed by some US researchers (Faruqui et al., 2014; S. A. Fenrick et al., 
2014; Cappers et al., 2016). The motivation behind this aim is that voluntary 
uptake to TOU tariffs could be lower than the 30% required by the UK 
Government to realise its business case for smart meters (BEIS, 2016b) and 
lower than optimal to realise the system benefits of DSR envisioned by 
Government. However, there is a lack of evidence as to how to increase uptake 
whilst also protecting consumer welfare. As argued throughout this thesis, 
evidence suggests that not all consumers will save money on a TOU tariff (see 
the energy bill impacts documented in Chapter 2) but both mandated and default 
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enrolment will enrol consumers regardless of their likelihood of saving money 
(Chapter 3).   
This research was conducted in several stages to achieve these two aims. I 
discuss each of them in turn.  
2 Aim 1: synthesise the evidence on UK consumer 
demand for TOUs 
To achieve the first aim, this thesis presented the results of a systematised review 
and meta-analysis of enrolment rates to TOU tariffs combining the results of 66 
measures of uptake to TOU tariffs across 27 studies conducted in six OECD 
countries. The two strongest determinants of uptake were the method by which 
uptake had been measured, notably willingness to switch from surveys or 
adoption rates of a commercially available tariffs, and whether recruitment to the 
tariff was opt-in or opt-out. The model in Chapter 2 estimated that these two 
variables explained 85% of the variation in the measures of uptake to TOU tariffs.  
It was therefore recommended that demand for TOU tariffs is expressed as a 
range, accounting for the standard deviation around the mean, for opt-in and opt-
out methods separately but with strong consideration given to the possibility that 
survey measures of demand may be highly optimistic. Under opt-in recruitment, 
it was found that the lowest lower 95% confidence limit for uptake to commercially 
available tariffs was 1%; the highest upper 95% confidence limit was based on 
mean willingness to switch obtained from surveys and was 43%. Under opt-out 
recruitment, the lower 95% confidence limit was 57% and the upper 95% 
confidence limit was 100%.  
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The difference in average uptake to TOU tariffs across survey studies and 
commercially available tariffs cannot be causally attributed to the method of 
measurement for reasons discussed in Chapter 2. However, wider evidence 
suggests that there is a strong risk that uptake is more likely to fall at the lower 
rather than higher end of the range presented above unless action is taken to 
engage consumers with TOU tariffs.  
Surveys measure willingness to switch to a TOU tariff however it is well known 
that behavioural intentions are a relatively poor predictor of future behavioural 
action (Sheppard et al., 1988; Sheeran, 2002; Van Hooft et al., 2005; Whitehead 
and Blomquist, 2006). Consumer inertia is a major feature of the energy market 
with the majority of consumers around the world having never left their home 
supplier since the privatisation of the retail electricity markets over two decades 
ago (Defeuilley, 2009). Therefore, an adoption rate of 43% is unlikely to be 
achieved in reality unless substantial efforts are made to close the intention-
action gap.  
Although prior to this research it was hard to say whether the inconsistency in 
uptake obtained in surveys compared to commercially available products was 
due to cross-country differences in demand (see Chapter 2), the Flex Trial had a 
switching rate of 0.3%, which is 100 times lower than stated intention to switch 
elicited in surveys of British energy bill payers. Although Flex is an unknown 
supplier and uptake to a TOU tariff offered by a large supplier could be higher, it 
would need to be substantially higher to approach anywhere near the volume 
suggested by the surveys.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that opt-in uptake could exceed 43% if new 
recruitment approaches are tested since, after all, the interval of 1%-43% is 
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based on the existing literature which has only tested a limited number of ways 
of increasing opt-in uptake, namely small upfront cash payments and bill 
protection.  
I therefore conclude that, if consumers are left to opt-in to TOU tariff rates, uptake 
could be as low as 1% (or closer to 0.3% if only offered by unknown suppliers) 
unless effort is made to close the intention-action gap, in which case enrolment 
rates could be as high as 43% or potentially higher. If consumers are 
automatically enrolled onto a TOU tariff unless they opt-out, enrolment should 
exceed 57% and approach 100%.  
Although the opt-in estimate covers a wide range of possible uptake measures, 
it carries three main implications for the UK Government in terms of meeting the 
enrolment target required for the smart meter cost-benefit analysis (BEIS, 
2016a). First, the estimate indicates that uptake to TOU tariffs could either be 
substantially lower or moderately higher than the UK Government’s target to have 
30% of domestic consumers enrolled onto a TOU tariff by 2030 if recruitment is 
opt-in. I therefore strongly suggest that research is conducted to increase the 
precision of these estimates. Second, it implies that the Government target could 
be achieved without using opt-out enrolment; the next crucial step is to undertake 
research into how to encourage consumers to adopt TOU tariffs to avoid the risk 
of enrolment rates being closer to the lower bound confidence limit of 1%. Third, 
this research needs to obtain measures of uptake based on behavioural actions 
taken by real consumers in the market rather than based on stated intentions to 
switch obtained in surveys (specific suggestions for how this research could be 
carried out are reserved for Chapter 9).   
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This takes me to the discussion of the second research aim, which was to identify 
a method for closing the potential gap between behavioural intentions and 
behavioural action amongst consumers who are more likely to save money on a 
TOU tariff.  
3 Aim 2: identify a method of increasing uptake to TOUs 
without using defaults or mandates 
Energy consumers rarely switch their energy tariff despite the large annual 
savings on offer (Defeuilley, 2009; CMA, 2016b). In their seminal paper 
Libertarian Paternalism Thaler and Sunstein (2003) proposed that the same 
shortcomings that lead consumers to make poor decisions could be used to 
guide, rather than force, them into making better ones. This approach was 
popularised through their later book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth and Happiness (2008). However, as pointed out in a recent review article 
(Benartzi et al., 2017), in some situations, such as preventing violent crime, 
conventional policy tools such as laws will nearly always be more effective than 
nudges; the comparative advantage of nudge is highest in situations in which 
consumers are making “biased, rushed or otherwise imperfect decisions, in which 
imperfection is judged by reference to the welfare of those same individuals” 
(Benartzi et al., 2017, p.11). Therefore, before regulators intervene to influence 
consumer decision making, it is first necessary to determine whether energy 
consumers really are likely to be making poor choices and, depending on the 
nature of the poor decision making, what type of nudge is likely to be the most 
welfare enhancing. 
Moreover, although nudge has been used to increase average uptake of 
beneficial products or services such as workplace pensions (Wells, 2014), 
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national organ donor registers (E. Johnson and Goldstein, 2003) and exercise 
programmes (Royer et al., 2015), there are many occasions when increasing 
average uptake could pose significant harms on some consumers because the 
best course of action varies across people (Carroll et al., 2009; Keller et al., 2011; 
Sunstein, 2013b). In the case of TOU tariffs, a nudge that increases average 
uptake could harm those consumers who are unable to shift a large enough 
amount of their electricity use away from peak times to be better off rather than 
worse off on a TOU tariff. As shown in Chapter 2, although trials find that most 
people are made financially better off on a TOU tariff, 20%-40% have also been 
made financially worse off, in one trial by nearly £200 a year (Sidebotham, 
2014a), presumably because they are unwilling or possible unable to adjust their 
consumption patterns significantly enough to avoid bill increases.95 A nudge 
which selectively increases uptake amongst those consumers most likely to save 
money may be more desirable and political acceptable than opt-out enrolment 
because it could minimise the possible negative distributional impacts from the 
launch of TOU tariff rates. 
Therefore, to achieve the second aim, this programme of research set out to 
answer two research questions: (1) Is consumer decision making over electricity 
tariffs affected by bounded rationality to justify intervening using nudge? and; (2) 
If consumers are not very good at making these decisions, would tailoring the 
marketing of TOU tariffs towards consumers groups who are more likely to save 
money on one increase uptake amongst these groups whilst reducing enrolment 
amongst consumers who could be made financially worse off from switching? I 
                                            
95 Based on the design of the price comparison intervention in Chapter 6, it can be hard to save 
money on a TOU tariff unless a high proportion of household electricity use is consumed on the 
super off-peak rates – 60% in the case of the TOU tariff tested in the Flex Trial. 
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now discuss the results presented in this thesis in relation to both of these 
research questions. 
3.1 Research question 1: is consumer decision making over 
electricity tariffs substantially affected by bounded rationality?  
3.1.1 Are most energy consumers fully rational? 
Identifying whether energy consumers are making economically sub-optimal 
decisions over their electricity tariff is difficult because, as discussed in Chapter 
3, many of the costs and benefits of switching tariff are unobserved (Wilson and 
Price, 2010). This makes it hard to rule out the possibility that people do not switch 
tariff more frequently because they care more about customer service or other 
features of a tariff or supplier than just the price. As noted throughout this thesis, 
classical economics does not imply that the cheapest tariff is the optimal tariff, so 
if people are not switching tariff despite the savings on offer, this is perfectly 
consistent with a model of a rational decision maker who is prioritising non-price 
attributes. It is also consistent with the rational model of decision making in which 
consumers would like to switch to the cheapest tariff, but does not because they 
do not have easy access to accurate energy consumption information to get a 
reliable quote on a price comparison website.  
Moreover, like most models, the purpose of the classical economic model is not 
to perfectly predict every individuals’ choice but to provide a general analytical 
framework that predicts the average persons’ choice and therefore aggregate 
market phenomena (Friedman, 1953). The important question is therefore not 
whether some energy bill payers do not behave in line with the model of full 
rationality but whether a significant portion of energy bill payers fail to meet the 
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standard of full rationality so that classical economics is unlikely to be a useful 
way of modelling decision making (Box, 1976). 
Instead of testing whether consumers are currently making optimal choices 
regarding their tariff, this thesis first set out to test whether consumers are able, 
in principle, to identify the optimal energy tariff from a menu of options when given 
all the information required, a key assumption of EUT, the dominant model used 
to explain how consumers making decisions under uncertainty (Barberis, 2013). 
To test this I presented 811 British energy bill payers with two vignettes in which 
they were asked to identify the cheapest of three tariffs, one vignette in which all 
three tariffs were flat-rate tariffs and another in which one of the tariffs was a TOU 
tariff (Chapter 5). This exercise does not assume that the cheapest tariff is the 
optimal tariff; it tests people’s abilities to undertake costs-benefit analysis since if 
consumers cannot undertake a cost-benefit analysis based on one variable, in 
this case price, then it is unlikely that they will be able to undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis in which they also need to make trade-offs between multiple factors such 
as price, customer service, green energy, online account management and so 
on, particularly given that people would have to assign a fictional financial value 
to these individual items to undertake the analysis. 
I found that approximately half of the participants surveyed failed to identify the 
cheapest tariff even though they were given all the information required, including 
total household electricity use and its distribution across the day, the type of 
information available through a smart meter. Although there was no statistically 
significant difference in the decision making quality of consumers in the lowest 
compared to the highest three social grades in British society when the tariff menu 
only included flat-rate tariffs, consumers in the lowest three social grades (C2-E) 
performed significantly worse when the menu included a TOU tariff. 
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Although there are limitations to the method – chiefly that consumers facing this 
choice in real life may expend more effort to identify the cheapest tariff than 
survey participants facing no financial consequences from the choice – the results 
are still informative because effort provision is unlikely to explain why all 
consumers failed to identify the cheapest tariff considering that prior research 
(Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2012) confirms what this survey 
also implies which is that many British consumers have poor numeracy skills. 
Moreover, survey participants faced a much easier task than would the average 
energy bill payer; if half of all survey participants choosing between just three 
energy tariffs when only asked to consider price, then consumers faced with 
choosing between several hundred tariffs whilst potentially trying to consider 
many other non-price factors are unlikely to perform substantially better solely 
because their choice has financial consequences. Given that so many energy bill 
payers failed to identify the cheapest tariff and arguably most people will have 
been taught the maths required at primary school, the findings are more 
consistent with a model of bounded rationality than full rationality. Future research 
could definitively disentangle the two models by testing whether performance is 
similarly poor even after people have been given additional training in how to 
undertake the calculation. 
Whilst chapter 5 discussed a number of implications of these results, the two 
most important implications are that: (1) Government cost-benefit analyses which 
rely on the collective decisions of British energy bill payers, such as the one for 
the smart meter roll-out (BEIS, 2016b), should account for the fact that 
approximately half of energy bill payers struggle to optimise; (2) if many British 
energy bill payers are unable to discriminate between tariffs when provided with 
all the information required to do so, then neither opt-in nor opt-out enrolment are 
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likely to be viable recruitment strategies for TOU tariffs. The second implication 
will now be discussed in more detail below. 
3.1.2 Sub-optimal switching 
The policy debate on consumer switching focuses on how to “engage the 
disengaged” (Ofgem, 2016d; CMA, 2016a), taking for granted that the small 
percentage of consumers who switch tariff each year constitute the sub-group of 
rational, optimal decision makers. The results of this study, as well as the wider 
evidence on adult numeracy skills (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 
2012), suggest that this assumption should be questioned.  
That consumers could actively switch to more expensive energy tariffs is 
consistent with the results of the only other known study of consumer decision 
making over energy tariffs which estimated that 17-32% of British consumers who 
reported leaving their incumbent supplier after the privatisation of the energy 
markets in the 1990s moved to a more expensive supplier, despite indicating that 
they switched to reduce their bill (Wilson and Price, 2010).  
This is an interesting result because it suggests that, rather than solely worrying 
about adverse selection to TOUs (Baladi et al., 1998; Hartway et al., 1999; 
Charles River Associates, 2005; Herter, 2007; Ericson, 2011; Qiu et al., 2017), 
whereby TOU tariffs selectively attract consumers who already have favourable 
consumption profiles, we should also be concerned that opt-in enrolment could 
result in adoption of TOU tariffs by consumers who will not save money on them 
due to consumers’ inabilities to determine whether they are suitable for the tariffs 
and low use of price comparison websites. Although previous research has 
suggested that TOU tariffs could create negative distributional impacts if 
vulnerable or low income groups are less likely to adopt TOU tariffs (Spence et 
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al., 2015), to my knowledge this is one of the first projects to find evidence that 
these groups could be disadvantaged precisely because they may sign up to a 
TOU tariff that may end up costing them money. 
This thesis explored two potential ways of helping guide consumers onto TOU 
tariffs who would save money on one. The first method was to use price 
comparisons to help people make informed choices for themselves, a solution 
implied by the classical economic framework. The Flex Trial provided evidence 
that a price comparison could indeed lower uptake to TOU tariffs amongst 
consumers who are less likely to save money on one. However, much more 
research is required into how to develop accurate and transparent price 
comparisons for TOU tariffs.  
This is because, to be effective, price comparisons for TOU tariffs would need to 
be built on some assumptions about the households’ ability to shift their electricity 
use into off-peak times; if price comparisons were simply based on historical 
consumption patterns, then a price comparison would simply show that the 
majority of people would be significantly financially worse off, given that most 
people do have peaky load profiles. However, given that people do not have the 
energy literacy skills to identify the cheapest out of three energy tariffs, it is also 
possible that they would struggle to determine the extent to which any in-built 
load shifting assumptions are realistic for them. Future research could test 
whether consumers would be able to accurately predict how willing or able they 
would be to run their washing machine or charge their EV overnight, for example, 
using a series of questions added to the additional survey given to people who 
use price comparison websites.  
   
 
Chapter 8: Global discussion 373 
The second method was to use tailored marketing. The potential advantage of 
tailored marketing is that it could influence the decisions of people regardless of 
whether they use price comparison websites. Ofgem’s (2015) most recent annual 
survey finds that approximately one third of people report having used a price 
comparison website to help them switch tariff, which still leaves at least two thirds 
who are potentially making this decision without much additional help. 
3.1.3 ‘Green’ defaults could sometimes be bad defaults 
There is a large literature on the use of ‘green’ defaults, whereby people are 
automatically given the most environmentally friendly product or service unless 
they explicitly opt-out (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Sunstein and Reisch, 
2013; Broman Toft et al., 2014; S. A. Fenrick et al., 2014; Faruqui et al., 2014; 
Ebeling and Lotz, 2015). However, the literature and empirical results presents in 
this thesis highlight some potential limitations of opt-out enrolment that warrant 
serious consideration before it is adopted as a recruitment strategy for TOU 
tariffs.  
In particular, with so many British consumers unable to identify whether a TOU 
tariff is right for them even in a relatively simple scenario where they are choosing 
between just three tariffs which they are being paid to take the time to consider, 
then how can we expect consumers in the real world who are facing other 
demands on their time to opt-out of being enrolled onto a TOU tariff if one is 
unsuitable for them? The result is particularly worrying given that: (1) Consumers 
in the lowest three social grades in society performed significantly worse in the 
Tariff Decision Making study when a TOU tariff was included in the menu of tariffs 
relative to those in the top three social grades and; (2) Bad defaults are just as 
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sticky as good defaults (see Chapter 5)96 so consumers who are inappropriately 
defaulted onto a TOU tariff may not dis-enroll once or if they notice the impact on 
their energy bill. 
Although opt-out enrolment could result in a greater overall reduction in peak 
electricity consumption and lowering of future energy system costs and carbon 
emissions97, these efficiency savings will only be transferred to the consumers 
who are on TOU tariffs and able to adjust their consumption patterns; those who 
do not adopt a TOU tariff or adopt one but cannot adjust their consumption 
patterns, could pay significantly more for their electricity than they do currently. 
In previous GB trials of TOU tariffs, whilst the majority of consumers were 
financially better off on a TOU tariff, a sizeable minority of approximately 20%-
40% were made financially worse off on a TOU tariff (Chapter 2).  
The key concern is that these ‘losers’ from TOU tariffs may be disproportionately 
represented by consumer groups who are in most need of reducing their energy 
bills. This is for two reasons. First, the results in Chapter 5 suggest that 
consumers in the lowest social grades, some of whom are likely to be at higher 
risk of living in fuel poverty, are more likely to struggle to identify whether a TOU 
tariff will increase or decrease their energy bill.98 Whilst annual savings of 
                                            
96 US consumers defaulted onto a TOU reduced their peak electricity use by 50% less than those 
who actively enrolled and in one case did not reduce their peak consumption at all, but retention 
rates were identical across both groups (US Department of Energy, 2016). Retention rates were 
in excess of 70%-90% (US Department of Energy, 2016). 
97 This follows from the fact that, although average peak load shifting is lower amongst opt-in 
than opt-out customers, the total amount of electricity shifted into off-peak hours under an opt-out 
policy is greater because default enrolment results in much higher enrolment rates (S. A. Fenrick 
et al., 2014; Cappers et al., 2016).  
98 A household is defined as being in fuel poverty if they are on a low income whilst also living in 
a dwelling that is expensive to heat, due to its thermal performance (Hills, 2012). It seems likely 
that energy bill payers in the lowest social grades are likely to be living across both the social and 
private rental sector, the latter of which has the highest proportion of homes that fail to meet the 
‘decent housing’ standard and also a relatively high proportion of housing benefit recipients (25%) 
(DCLG, 2012, p.50), a benefit which is mostly given to people on a low income.  
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switching to the cheapest flat rate tariff of £300 – or losses of £120 from being on 
a TOU tariff (Chapter 2) – may not seem much to some people, it could make a 
big difference to the welfare of those in the lowest income groups in society. 
Energy bills are the second highest item of expenditure after housing and, for 
those in the bottom income decile, energy bills represent 9% of total household 
expenditure compared to 3% for those in the highest income decile (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017). Second, there is no guarantee that the benefits of a 
smarter energy system – which would be higher under opt-out enrolment – would 
be shared out equally across all consumers or whether it will accrue 
disproportionately to groups who own high consuming flexible electrical 
appliances that offer the greatest potential for financial savings. The only 
comprehensive GB study to assess the distributional implications of cost-
reflecting electricity pricing used a model to estimate whether TOU tariffs would 
particularly disadvantage vulnerable groups (Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates, 2017), however there is not sufficient empirical data to inform the 
model assumptions. Even then, the authors conclude that any potential energy 
bill increases are not a problem because “Currently customers must make an 
explicit choice to be put on a TOU tariff. They would not be likely to make that 
choice if they expected a higher bill. So they are unlikely to suffer this loss as long 
as it remains an explicit choice.” (5). Even with the Renewable Heat Incentive 
and the OLEV EV car grant, these high consuming technologies are not – at least 
not currently – technologies accessible to all consumers, regardless of ability to 
pay. 
Another option is personalised defaults. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, to 
avoid adverse selection, a personalised default will have to be based on a lot 
more than just historical electricity consumption alone. Moreover, if defaults are 
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effective because people do not notice what option was pre-selected for them 
(inattention), consumers will not know they have been enrolled on a seemingly 
suitable TOU tariff and thus make the assumed changes to their electricity 
consumption patterns.  
This discussion suggests that opt-out enrolment to TOU tariffs, whether 
personalised or not, is unlikely to be compatible with the Government’s other 
responsibilities to protect consumers from harm. It may also be possible to design 
TOU tariffs that reduce prices at off-peak times but do not increase the price at 
peak time, to which consumers could be automatically enrolled without any 
adverse consequences. However, whether these tariffs would reduce peak time 
electricity demand rather than just increase off-peak consumption is unknown.  
Alternatively, automated DSR services such as DLC could eliminate any impact 
on the consumers’ energy bill from such ‘choice without awareness’ (Smith et al., 
2013a). For instance, if an EV owner was automatically defaulted onto a 
controlled charging scheme, in which a third party remotely adjusted the current 
going to their smart home charging point, the owner would accrue financial 
savings whilst helping ease the strain on the electricity network without ever 
having to know that such a service was taking place. As long as temperature 
variations on DLC of heating services are minimised, they may have no effect on 
householders’ thermal comfort and thus go entirely unnoticed, especially given 
that worldwide trends in smart thermostat sales99 suggest that suppliers may not 
even need to install a smart thermostat in consumers’ homes to undertake DLC. 
If all electrical appliances were manufactured to permit DLC, companies could 
theoretically extract DSR services from consumers by virtue of the appliances 
                                            
99 In the US, smart thermostats have already reached 70% market penetration and global sales 
increased by over 120% in 2015 alone (IoT Analytics, 2016). 
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and technologies that consumers have already adopted or will adopt, since then 
consent could in theory be obtained at the point of purchase through additions to 
standard product terms and conditions. This is a relatively common commercial 
practice known as ‘bundling’ (Bakos et al., 2014), and Ofgem has indeed recently 
relaxed its rules on bundling (Ofgem, 2016b). An opt-out recruitment policy to 
automated DSR schemes could therefore potentially be highly effective at 
increasing adoption and energy system flexibility, particularly given that evidence 
suggests that only a tiny minority of people read terms and conditions.100  
On the other hand, automatically enrolling electricity consumers onto DLC or 
vehicle-to-grid services, potentially without their knowledge, raises strong ethical 
concerns. It could also backfire. For example, covertly enrolling EV owners on 
controlled charging schemes risks leaving EV owners with their vehicles half 
charged when they need them so could results in many exiting such schemes 
(Moira Nicolson et al., 2017). It may not even be permitted under the Smart 
Energy Code. The Smart Energy Code is the document outlining the rights and 
obligations of organisations involved in the end-to-end management of smart 
metering in GB and which comes into force under the Data and Communications 
Company Licence. In it, it provides a definition for what it calls ‘User 
Unambiguous Consent’: 
…means the explicit and informed consent of an Energy 
Consumer given to a User to undertake a specified action, 
and that consent shall not be treated as having been given 
explicitly unless the Energy Consumer has:  
(a) of his or he own volition, communicated to the User a 
request for it to undertake that action or;  
(b) in response to a specific request by the User for him or 
her to indicate consent to it undertaking that action, taken a 
                                            
100 One of the most comprehensive studies of online purchases finds that less than 0.02% even 
access standard terms and conditions (Bakos et al., 2014), a prerequisite for full informed 
consent.  
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positive step amounting to a clear communication of that 
consent (SECAS, 2017, p.92). 
Whilst the Smart Energy Code does not currently specify what types of actions 
will require Unambiguous Consent, it is clear that, if Unambiguous Consent was 
required for DSR services, opt-out enrolment would not be a permissible 
recruitment method for any DSR services. This is because opt-out enrolment fails 
to satisfy clause (a) and, would only satisfy clause (b), if the consumer undertakes 
some positive action to indicate that they consent, which therefore still requires 
some active choosing on the part of the customer.  
Therefore, at least for the moment, personalised defaults are not a viable option 
for recruiting customers onto TOU tariffs. If the Government decides that 
companies must obtained informed consent from consumers before enrolling 
them onto TOU tariffs or DSR services, then opt-out enrolment will not be a 
permissible recruitment strategy at any point in the future either. Consumers 
would then need to be left to make an active choice whether to adopt TOU tariffs, 
vehicle-to-grid or DLC services. Since opt-in enrolment usually comes at the cost 
of much lower enrolment rates – but given that not all consumers will save money 
on a TOU tariff – the UK Government needs evidence for opt-in strategies that 
are both effective and selective by increasing the likelihood of “getting people into 
the right box” (Johnson, 2016). In this context, this means finding a recruitment 
method that increases enrolment to TOU tariffs amongst consumers who can 
save money and contribute towards reducing peak demand or exploiting 
renewable energy supplies whilst detracting enrolment amongst consumers for 
whom TOU tariffs are likely to increase their energy bills relative to flat-rate tariffs. 
However, as noted in Chapter 3, there is a scarcity of evidence on effective and 
selective nudges, leading me to research question 2, discussed below. 
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3.2 Research question 2: can tailored marketing increase 
uptake to TOUs amongst consumers who are most likely to 
benefit? 
3.2.1 Yes – tailoring shows promise with EV owners 
Overall the results show that it may indeed be possible to use tailored marketing 
to increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst consumers most likely to save money. 
The results of the randomised control trials presented in chapter 6 found that TOU 
tariffs tailored towards EV owners substantially reduced demand amongst non-
EV owners who are less likely to save money on a TOU tariff. The results in 
chapter 6 also produced evidence that naming a TOU tariff “electric vehicle tariff” 
could increase the willingness of EV owners to adopt a TOU tariff, however there 
were relatively few EV owners in the sample and, potentially because of this, the 
result was not even statistically significant at the 10 percent level, making it 
strongly desirable to look to other evidence to substantiate its statistical 
robustness. The results of chapter 7 showed that tailored marketing in an email 
could increase demand for TOU tariffs amongst EV owners relative to generically 
worded emails at the 95% confidence level. EVs are expected to place one of the 
greatest burdens on the future electricity network and, compared to the average 
energy bill payer, have greater potential to save money on a TOU tariff by 
charging their vehicles at home at off-peak times (Frontier Economics & 
Sustainability First, 2015). 
The first field experiment (N = 6000) run on a website for a fictional energy 
supplier called “Flex” showed that tailoring communication about TOU tariffs 
towards EV owners reduces demand for a TOU tariff amongst the average 
consumer shopping around for electricity tariffs online, who are less likely to be 
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able to save money from switching to it. The tailored marketing treatment was 
implemented on the Flex website by calling the tariffs ‘Electric Vehicle’ and ‘Heat 
Pump’ tariffs relative to the control group websites where they had the generic 
name of ‘Off-Peak Saver 3-Rate tariff’ and with any other information about the 
tariffs framed in terms of their relevance to electric vehicle and heat pump owners.  
In the Population-Based Survey Experiment, the tailored marketing treatment 
was implemented in a very similar manner to the Flex Trial (the tariff was called 
an ‘Electric Vehicle’ tariff in the tailored condition but the ‘Super Saver’ tariff in 
the control condition) but was administered to a broadly nationally representative 
sample of British people who identified as energy bill payers in the context of a 
hypothetical survey experiment in which the outcome measure was intention to 
switch to the tariff. This study showed that the EV tailored messaging decreases 
willingness to switch amongst non EV owners and provides some early but not 
statistically robust evidence that the tailored labelling increases demand amongst 
EV owners.  
The final field experiment showed that a tariff switching prompt sent by email to 
nearly every private EV owner in the UK (N=8,000) was much more likely to be 
opened and acted on when the email messaging was tailored towards EV owners 
compared to when the messaging was broadly applicable to all energy bill payers. 
In this OLEV experiment, tailoring was implemented slightly differently from the 
other two trials. Instead of describing TOU tariffs as electric vehicle tariffs, the 
tailored email framed the potential £300 saving from switching electricity tariff in 
terms of a reduction in the costs of charging their electric vehicle from home rather 
than as a reduction in their household energy bills. 
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The relative consistency in the findings across these studies is reassuring as it 
suggests that the effectiveness of tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards 
EV owners is unlikely to be isolated to particular settings, specific ways of wording 
the tailored messaging or to the experimental subjects of this thesis rather than 
the wider population of energy bill payers in GB. As noted in Athey and Imbens 
(2016), most concerns about external validity relate to treatment effect 
heterogeneity, with replication of treatment effects across multiple settings, 
intervention delivery and participants providing greater evidence that the 
treatment effect will generalise beyond the specific study in which the effect was 
measured and therefore to the real-world context which initially motivated the 
study. 
Further research is required to test whether tailored marketing could be effective 
on other high electricity consuming groups, such as households with electric 
heating who are also likely to run their heating during existing peak times unless 
incentivised to do otherwise (Frontier Economics, 2012; National Grid, 2017). In 
particular, research is required which tests the impact of tailored marketing on 
actual switching rates to commercially available TOU tariffs and also DLC of 
home heating services and home EV charging as well as vehicle-to-grid services. 
This study tested the impact of tailored marketing on behavioural pre-cursors to 
switching such as obtaining a quote for a TOU tariff on a fictional energy 
supplier’s website and clicking-though to information about TOU tariffs from an 
email prompt. These outcome measures are likely to be more closely related to 
switching than surveys which measure stated intention to switch to a TOU tariff 
(Arrow et al., 1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Whitehead and Blomquist, 
2006), which forms the bulk of the evidence on consumer demand for TOU tariffs 
(Chapter 2). However, since the ultimate outcome of interest is still switching 
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rates, it is necessary to establish precisely what proportion of EV owners or other 
high electricity users would switch to a TOU tariff or controlled charging scheme 
in response to a tailored marketing message relative to a generic message. 
Although the tailored marketing effect may not differ across types of DSR, it is 
still useful to conduct the research to verify this assumption. 
In addition, policymakers need to identify the level of domestic consumer uptake 
of TOU tariffs required to realise its flexibility strategy. Although the flexibility 
strategy says that DSR could save consumers a total of £40 billion off their energy 
bills from now until 2050 (Ofgem & BEIS, 2017), it does not specify what level of 
adoption this figure is based on or what level of adoption is required to meet 
system demands, after accounting for non-domestic DSR as well as other 
strategies for balancing electricity supply and demand such as storage and 
interconnectors which also form part of the Government’s energy security 
strategy (DECC, 2012a). Although the smart meter cost-benefit rests on 30% 
uptake to static TOU tariffs by 2030 (BEIS, 2016b), this is not necessarily the 
same as the level of uptake required to meet system benefits. 
Once this evidence is obtained, policymakers can make a fully informed decision 
over how recruitment to TOU tariffs or the other automated DSR services should 
be conducted. 
3.2.2 Should tailored marketing be used to recruit customers onto TOU tariffs? 
The final question for debate is therefore whether tailored marketing should be 
employed as a strategy to recruit customers to TOU tariffs. There are two main 
considerations involved in making this decision. The first is whether tailoring the 
marketing of TOU tariffs towards particular consumer groups could itself harm 
consumers. The second is whether tailored marketing would be more effective 
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than some other alternatives at realising the optimal level of domestic consumer 
uptake to TOU tariffs. I address each in turn. 
One potential criticism of tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards high 
electricity users such as EV owners is that, given that EV owners tend to be 
wealthier than the average consumer (Knight et al., 2015), tailored marketing 
could have regressive impacts by increasing the likelihood that the benefits of 
TOU tariffs will disproportionately accrue to the wealthiest members of society. 
Another possibility is that tailoring could be used for harm as well as good if 
suppliers exploit tailoring effects to attract consumers to more expensive tariffs. 
For instance, a two-tiered TOU tariff that operated with a smart meter that one of 
the Six Large Energy Suppliers marketed as an ‘electric vehicle tariff’ had a much 
higher peak time rate and off-peak rate than the most competitive Economy 7 
tariff, a legacy TOU tariff. However tailored marketing is unlikely to 
disproportionately benefit the rich once EVs infiltrate the second-hand market. 
Moreover, regulation could be introduced to prevent unscrupulous suppliers from 
creating ‘Electric Vehicle’ tariffs that are more expensive than identical TOU tariffs 
that are not marketed under such labels. 
Therefore the main consideration over whether tailoring should be adopted as a 
key strategy by the UK Government to boost uptake to TOU tariffs is how tailoring 
is likely to perform relative to a range of alternative approaches which also do not 
involve making a TOU tariff mandatory or the default tariff. One such alternative 
would be to create tailored tariff structures which are particularly favourable for 
EV owners or those with electric heating or to offer one-off financial incentives to 
such consumers to sign up to TOU tariffs. Another alternative discussed in 
Chapter 2 would be to offer small upfront cash payments for switching to a TOU 
tariff, an incentive which could even be targeted at EV owners or households with 
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electric heating. Whilst both these approaches could help to selectively attract EV 
owners or other consumer groups, tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs to EV 
owners, as tested in this thesis, would be lower cost so could generate a higher 
impact per pound spent, which is important given that the marginal cost savings 
to suppliers from having a domestic consumer participating in DSR are reportedly 
modest.101 However, until a cost-effectiveness analysis is undertaken for all three 
approaches, based on actual switching rates, it is hard to say conclusively which 
approach would deliver the most additional sign-ups to a DSR programme for 
each £1 spent.  
Although opt-out enrolment is also likely to be a very low-cost but effective 
recruitment strategy, it is not clear to what extent enrolment rates and changes 
to electricity consumption patterns would vary under an opt-out compared to an 
opt-in system with TOU tariff marketing tailored at high consuming electricity 
users. For instance, it could be imagined that tailored email prompts could boost 
uptake to TOU tariffs significantly in future, and that it could therefore have a high 
potential impact on reducing peak electricity demand. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
if half of all EV owners prompted to switch tariff via email do go on to switch to a 
TOU tariff, this would translate into an extra 9 million EV owners switching tariff 
under a high EV adoption scenario, which would represent 40% of all plug-in EVs 
in 2050 (National Grid, 2017, p.41). Considering that the National Grid estimated 
that at least 85% of EV owners would need to participate in off-peak charging to 
avoid the worst possible increase in peak electricity demand from high EV uptake 
                                            
101 The author attended a number of conferences between 2013-2017 at which representatives 
from energy supply companies reported that the per customer savings from having a half-hourly 
settled domestic customer enrolled on a TOU tariff were too small to make the tariff commercially 
viable.  
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(National Grid, 2017, pp.43–44), a 40% uptake of TOU tariffs by EV owners as a 
result of a single email would be very substantive contribution indeed.  
The first field experiment also found that price comparisons, in which people get 
a quote for a tariff based on what appliances they own and the price comparison 
website does the maths for people, could also effectively deter consumers who 
are unlikely to save from switching tariff. It is possible that price comparisons 
could also increase uptake to TOU tariffs amongst those who could save; 
unfortunately it was not possible to robustly test this in the Flex Trial because 
there were many more non EV and heat pump owners.  
If future research identifies methods of providing transparent and accurate price 
comparisons for TOU tariffs then combining price comparisons with tailored tariff 
marketing to create tailored price comparisons could be an even better approach. 
This is because, a key potential limitation of tailoring tariff marketing to consumers 
based on a single household characteristic such as whether the household owns 
an EV is that such characteristics will never be perfect proxies for being able to 
save money or delivering demand-response relief to the electricity network. More 
research is certainly required to investigate what characteristics provide good 
proxies or indicators for being a flexible electricity consumer who could save 
money on a TOU tariff. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop 
indicators for what could be called ‘flexibility capital’ (Powells and Bulkeley, 2013), 
the next chapter points to this as a fruitful area for future research. 
3.2.3 Message framing debates  
The findings help to add nuance to the debate over the success of message 
framing and nudge as a tool for effecting behaviour change. As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the literature on framing effects has recently been criticised in a 
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number of domains from health psychology (Gallagher and Updegraff, 2012; 
Updegraff et al., 2012) to climate change communication (Bernauer and 
McGrath, 2016b) for providing inconsistent results. Some studies show large 
average effects  (e.g. Bolderdijk et al., 2012)  whilst others show very small 
average effects (Spence and Pidgeon, 2010; Spence et al., 2014; Schwartz et 
al., 2015) or no effect at all (e.g. Toll et al., 2007; Nicolson et al., 2017). Given 
publication bias, it is possible that a large unpublished body of null results framing 
studies exist.  
Indeed a wider criticism of nudge is that researchers are not always able to 
predict when it will work, for whom and why (Harford, 2014; Collins, 2015; 
Dellavigna et al., 2017). What the studies in this thesis collectively show is that 
tailored framing – or at least tailored marketing of TOU tariffs – is a particularly 
effective type of framing but that diagnosis of the population for whom it is 
effective is crucial (Wydick, 2016).  
The effectiveness of tailoring is demonstrated by the large effect sizes observed 
across all three studies. In the Flex Trial tailoring reduced the proportion of 
website visitors who obtained a quote for the tariff by 40%. In the OLEV trial, 
tailoring increase average open rates and click-through rates to the email 
prompting them to switch tariff by 15% and 90% respectively. In the Population-
Based Survey experiment, statistically significantly reduced demand amongst 
non-EV owners by 60% and increased demand amongst non EV owners by 20%, 
although this latter result was not statistically significant so is interesting but not 
robust.  
The importance of diagnosis is demonstrated by the fact the direction of the 
effects varied depending on the study’s participant population. When looking only 
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at the results from the Flex Trial and the OLEV trial the framing effects appear 
inconsistent: in the Flex Trial the average causal effect from tailoring is negative 
whilst in the OLEV trial the average effect is positive. It was only by running the 
Population-Based Survey experiment, which provided higher quality baseline 
data than could be obtained in the highly naturalistic field experiment, that I was 
able to understand why the average effect in the Flex Trial was negative rather 
than positive.  
Although the type of tailored framing employed in this study makes it relatively 
easy to form predictions about which groups will respond to treatment, the results 
still have implications for other contexts in which framing has been employed but 
to varying success. For instance, Bernauer and McGrath (2016) argue that simply 
framing climate change mitigation strategies in terms of either helping the planet 
for the long term good of future generations versus protecting economic growth 
or our health is unlikely to be effective given that these frames will likely have 
conflicting effects on different people which could negate any positive average 
impact from a universal re-framing of climate change. Instead, Bernauer and 
McGrath (2016) suggest that future research should test whether it may be 
possible to change peoples’ attitudes and actions to combat climate change by 
matching climate change communication strategies with peoples’ political 
affiliation. This trial matches a frame to consumer groups based on appliance 
ownership and demonstrates that it is highly effective.  
4 Weighing up the limitations   
There are five key limitations to the research conducted in this thesis, which are 
now discussed in turn.  
4.1 Using economics as a benchmark  
   
 
Chapter 8: Global discussion 388 
The thesis examined uptake to TOU tariffs using a classical economic framework 
as the benchmark against which interventions informed by behavioural science 
were tested. The reasons for using economics as a benchmark were outlined in 
detail in Chapter 3 however this does not mean that there are not potentially 
strong limitations to this approach.  
The first key limitation is that a range of evidence from other social sciences 
suggests that economics is an oversimplified, but also potentially widely 
inaccurate, model of individual behaviour (Chapter 3). The second is that the 
standard model of economics sees no other role for Government or the energy 
regulator than correcting economic inefficiencies (Stiglitz, 2000). Economics 
therefore has nothing to say about the distributional impacts of the recruitment 
methods used for TOU tariffs even though policymakers are expected to ensure 
that the benefits of a smarter energy system are shared out across all taxpayers.  
This thesis tried to address these limitations in a number of ways. First, by using 
behavioural economics it was able to account for a wider range of potential 
drivers of decision making towards TOU tariffs, including psychological drivers 
such as the way tariffs are framed to consumers. By testing whether energy bill 
payers were able, in principle, to make optimal choices over their energy tariff, 
the thesis did not take for granted the assumption made by classical economics 
which is that consumers are approximately fully rational decision makers. 
However, nor did it take for granted that, since empirical evidence shows that 
many consumers are foregoing large financial savings by not switching tariff 
(CMA, 2016b) and struggle to make rational choices over their finances (Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2006a, 2008; van Rooij et al., 2011), they must also be failing to 
make rational choices over their energy tariff because the former does not 
guarantee the latter.  
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Second, the thesis took the stance that the distributional impacts of TOU tariffs – 
and how consumers are recruited – is of prime importance. This is markedly 
different from most analyses of uptake to TOU tariffs which, as pointed out in 
Verbong et al. (2013) are mostly performed by classically-oriented economists 
who “can semantically be divided between a group who claims that users should 
reap the benefits of participation and a group who claim that users who refuse to 
adapt should be punished with higher costs” (122).  
Nevertheless, using economics as a benchmark still has its downsides in respect 
of considering the distributional impacts of TOU tariff recruitment methods. 
Economics defines efficiency in terms of Pareto optimality, namely that changes 
to existing resource distributions are only optimal if they can make someone 
better off without making anyone else worse (Stiglitz, 2000). Classical economics 
is therefore inherently biased towards the status quo and some may argue that 
the status quo in the electricity market is itself inequitable because people who 
consume more electricity at peak times are being subsidised by off-peak users. 
From this perspective, opt-out enrolment onto tariffs which more closely reflect 
the true cost of electricity generation is more equitable, if adopting a ‘user pays’ 
definition of equity.  
Nevertheless, the status-quo is an important benchmark because evidence 
suggests that this is likely to be what people refer to when considering whether 
TOU has made them better off (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991, 1992). As noted in Verbong et al. (2013), a more flexible 
electricity system may indeed save consumers money relative to a future world 
in which average electricity prices are higher but in which there are no TOU tariffs. 
However, people are unlikely to compare their bills on a TOU tariff to a 
counterfactual world in which electricity prices are higher but there are no TOU 
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tariffs; rather, they are likely to compare whether they are better off on a TOU 
tariff relative to what they are paying now because the counterfactual is 
unobserved. Moreover, the evidence suggests that TOU tariffs could substantially 
increase the electricity bills of a sizeable minority of consumers relative to what 
they pay now (Star et al., 2010; Carmichael et al., 2014; Sidebotham, 2014a; 
Long Island Power Authority, 2015). These perceptions matter because 
policymakers are selling DSR to people on the basis that it will save them money 
and, as argued in Verbong et al, “An overly positive approach could be very 
harmful to public acceptance when smart grids have been introduced and prices 
do still rise” (Verbong et al., 2013, p.122).  
Finally, whilst it may be inequitable that high peak time users are currently being 
subsidised by those with flatter electricity profiles, by getting EV owners and heat 
pump owners who will have higher than average peak time use to sign up to TOU, 
tailored marketing could reverse this trend by getting the highest users to 
subsidise the lowest users.  
4.2 The limitations of changing individual behaviour  
A second limitation is that by only focusing on individual theories of decision 
making that emphasise consumer choice, this thesis may underestimate the 
extent to which choices are constrained by important institutional and cultural 
factors. For instance, energy sociologists have argued that encouraging 
individuals to make more sustainable consumption choices may not be the most 
effective way of tackling climate change because public and private organisations 
structure and restrict the choices available for people to develop more sustainable 
ways of living and working (Spaargaren and Vliet, 2000; Uzzel, 2009; Shove, 
2010). In a review article, Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) point out that our 
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society and technology has co-developed over many years in ways that has 
embedded us into a high energy consuming future. Since these developments 
are strongly path dependent, they are not legitimate targets of interventions since 
they cannot be easily changed.  
A good example of the path dependency of energy consumption, given by Wilson 
and Dowlatabadi (2007), is the installation of central air conditioning in the United 
States which increased from being present in 12% of homes in 1962 to 64% of 
homes in 1992, which in turn affected the way homes were designed since air 
conditioning meant that other means of passive cooling such as verandas, eaves 
and thermal mass were no longer required to keep people comfortable. However, 
another example is that encouraging people to replace their internal combustion 
engine vehicles with EVs is helpful but not as impactful as if people had never 
become accustomed to travelling by car and if cities had not therefore been built 
across such extensive areas of land that it becomes infeasible to walk or cycle 
between home and work.  
According to this line of argument, interventions targeting individual behaviours 
will only have a limited effect and substantial changes to energy use can only be 
achieved “not through behaviour change by individuals but through government-
led interventions, the targeted delivery of public services or upstream solutions” 
(Darnton, 2004, p.9). For instance, implementing interventions to boost EV 
uptake may only have a limited effect on the uptake of EVs until the public 
infrastructure is available to permit drivers to charge their vehicles on the move if 
necessary. These major infrastructure investment decisions are the domain of 
government departments, not individual consumers.   
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Nevertheless, whilst behavioural interventionists could learn from the ambition of 
the sociological perspective, if these regimes are strongly path-dependent (based 
on their historical development), then all intervention designers, regardless of 
their theoretical background, will be able to exert the most impact by 
implementing interventions at “critical moments when sociotechnical regimes are 
openly changing and can be most easily influenced” (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 
2007, p.188). Intervening at a point of change, in collaboration with a government 
department that has the potential to exert much greater change, is precisely what 
the study described in Chapter 7 did and showed could be effective.  
Moving from combustion engine vehicles to a system of EVs represents a major 
disruption to the existing socio-technical regime and therefore to the existing 
choice architecture, the term coined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) to describe 
the set of organisational rules and conventions which structure and influence 
consumer choices. The transition towards EVs is creating a host of new systems 
and services including new infrastructure (e.g. public charging points, home 
charging points), institutions (e.g. OLEV, Go Ultra Low, EV public charge point 
car clubs) and therefore new choices and potentially new behaviours. Whilst 
Darnton (2004) may be right in saying that sustainability goals are highly unlikely 
to be met without such government programmes, the lesson from behavioural 
science and nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), is that the way in which these 
programmes are designed and structured could have an important influence on 
take up of these programmes (Hillier et al., 2016, p.2), and, in the case of this 
study, on the other choices people make when they purchase their EV.  
This study demonstrates that OLEV, as the institution responsible for 
administering the EV grant, could take advantage of the window of opportunity 
created when people adopt their first EV to prompt an entire and growing sub-
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group of the population to participate in DSR before they get into the habit of 
charging their vehicle at peak times which would put an increasing strain on the 
electricity network and reduce the environmental benefits of EVs. Given the 
success and low cost of the intervention, OLEV intends to send this email to new 
grant recipients as business as usual with the future intention for this email to 
contain links to specific TOU tariffs that are suitable in structure for home 
charging. If such prompts become part of the normal fabric of designing 
government programmes, they can help to create a lower carbon ‘choice 
architecture’ that means the choices people make, whether conscious or not, are 
more likely to lead to low energy consuming lifestyles, a goal emphasised strongly 
in Shove (2010). Indeed, a recent review article concluded that, despite the 
marked differences in the theoretical and epistemological underpinning of 
behavioural theories and social practice theories, these “tensions…fall into less 
sharp relief when designing interventions and making policy recommendations” 
(Kurz et al., 2015, pp.124–125). 
At the same time, it is also acknowledged that nudge will not have as large an 
impact on behaviour as a carbon tax or major cultural shifts in the expectations 
people have over the size of the homes they live in (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 
2007) or the way they travel to and from work or holiday destinations. However, 
the topic of this thesis is DSR and most of the policy changes required for 
enabling DSR outlined in Chapter 2, including electricity settlement reform and 
the smart meter roll-out, are already underway. Therefore, a key missing link in 
realising domestic participation in DSR is changing individual consumer 
behaviour and this thesis shows that nudge is a valuable tool for influencing 
peoples’ choices over their energy tariff, beyond just using nudges such as opt-
out enrolment.  
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4.3 Recruitment strategies 
A third limitation is that the participant recruitment methods employed in this 
thesis are likely to have excluded some of the most vulnerable members of 
society. As noted in Chapter 5 and 6, online surveys tend to recruit a higher 
proportion of younger people who are more likely to have Internet access. 
Naturally, both the online field experiments would only cover people with Internet 
access. Although nearly 90% of British people have Internet access (Office of 
National Statistics, 2015), for 10% of the population to be without access 
encompasses 6.5 million people whose views are excluded from the research 
conducted. The key risk is that it cannot be known whether the treatments tested 
would work on these groups and that by excluding their views, their interests 
would not be accounted for in the conclusions and recommendations of this 
thesis.  
With regards to the latter concern – of failing to consider the interests of 
vulnerable consumers – it is my view that the case made in this thesis against 
opt-out enrolment for TOU tariffs (a case that I have not seen taken anywhere 
else) does consider and align with the interests of vulnerable consumers. 
Vulnerable groups may be even less likely to pay attention to default settings 
because other aspects of their lives mean that they may have less time and 
mental bandwidth to meticulously analyse the details of all correspondence from 
their energy supplier. Future research would be required to test whether tailoring 
the marketing of TOU tariffs towards EV and heat pump owners would also 
detract vulnerable consumers who may also be less likely to save money on a 
TOU tariff.  
4.4 Generalising to future consumers  
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The fourth potential limitation is that the energy market is evolving rapidly and will 
continue to evolve whereas the data collected in this thesis started in 2016 and 
concluded in 2017. This raises potential issues regarding the applicability of the 
results to future energy consumers. For example, the study sampled early 
adopters of EVs and it is possible that early adopters of EVs will not respond in 
the same way to tailored marketing messages as would future adopters when 
EVs become mass market. It also raises issues over the generalisability of the 
results to future scenarios in which, for example, TOU tariffs are not the key 
mechanism by which domestic consumers will be incentivised to engage in DSR.  
Regarding the first point, it seems unlikely that tailored marketing would be less 
effective on later adopters because early adopters of EVs may be more rational 
than later adopters; study 5 suggested that bounded rationality was higher 
amongst consumers in low socio-economic grades and study 7 showed that EV 
owners are likely to much wealthier than the average bill payer.  Regarding the 
second point, as noted elsewhere, the results of this study are generally 
applicable to any type of DSR not just TOU tariffs. Assuming that consumers will 
always need to provide their consent for DSR, it will be necessary to consider 
whether consent will be assumed unless people opt-out or whether it will have to 
be actively given. For the same reason that it may be unethical to automatically 
enrol people onto TOU tariffs if they do not have the energy literacy skills to work 
out whether they would be better off opting out and because they may not notice 
that they have been defaulted onto a TOU tariff, it may also be unethical to 
automatically charge and discharge someone’s electric vehicle as part of a 
vehicle-to-grid service without the EV owners’ knowledge.  
Equally, automatically enrolling a consumer onto a DLC programme and remotely 
turning up or down their thermostat in line with real-time availability of electricity 
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supply may also be considered highly unethical unless it is done with the persons’ 
knowledge. Unfortunately, opt-out enrolment is not a good method for obtaining 
peoples’ informed consent because defaults are effective, not only because of 
status-quo bias, but because people do not pay attention to what option was pre-
selected as the default (Keller et al., 2011). Further, this debate does not only 
apply to DSR: the Smart Energy Code has a general definition of what it calls 
User Unambiguous Consent, which if it was applied to DSR or any other customer 
service, would mean opt-out enrolment would be forbidden. The results of this 
thesis – which demonstrate the effectiveness of tailored marketing – could be 
relevant in a range of future consumer scenarios.  
4.5 Commercial availability of TOU tariffs 
As noted in Chapter 4, TOU tariffs of the type required to meet the challenges of 
the future electricity grid are not widely commercially available in most European 
countries including in GB. Only two smart-meter enabled TOU tariffs emerged in 
the GB market just shortly after data collection for this thesis was either 
completed or already significantly underway. Although the Flex Trial simulated in 
a very realistic environmental what it might be like for a consumer to visit an 
energy supplier’s website to switch to a TOU tariff, participants were not actually 
enrolled onto the tariff. Even those who switched without knowing the study was 
part of a trial, in reality may have left the tariff in a cooling off period. Retention 
rates to TOU tariffs or other DSR services are also an important consideration 
when evaluating recruitment methods. This is an inescapable limitation of the 
thesis which I tried to overcome by measuring as many behavioural outcome 
variables as possible in the present circumstances. Other possible ways of 
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conducting research in the absence of a large market for domestic DSR are 
discussed in Section 4 of Chapter 9 which discusses future research.   
4.6 Summary of limitations 
Although there can be strong limitations to exclusively using economic theoretical 
frameworks, this thesis tried to overcome the two most important ones by 
accounting for psychological influences on decision-making and accounting for 
the distributional implications of recruitment methods used for TOU tariffs. 
Although the behavioural sciences may assign greater agency to human 
decisions than would a sociological model, evidence suggests that there are 
strong merits in trying to change individual behaviour at a time when the 
institutional frameworks in which individual choices are embedded are also 
changing (Verplanken et al., 2008; Verplanken and Roy, 2016; Thomas et al., 
2016).  
At the same time, this thesis acknowledges that nudging people into making more 
environmentally friendly choices will in no way be sufficient on its own to address 
climate change. Both government and industry have a major role to play in setting 
and meeting carbon emission targets, raising fossil fuel prices to reflect their 
environmental cost as well as creating the opportunities for people to make 
environmentally friendly choices. Although there are many more psychological 
influences to decision making than were employed in this thesis – framing is the 
main one adopted – it would be beyond the scope of the thesis to test others. 
Although the thesis focused on TOU tariffs, the debate over opt-in vs opt-out 
enrolment is generally applicable to almost any other energy service, such as 
vehicle-to-grid or DLC.  Ideally, future research would measure the impact of a 
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range of different recruitment strategies on switching rates to a range of DSR 
services onto which consumers could be enrolled in reality. 
5     Conclusions 
This chapter set out to discuss the results of each of the empirical studies 
presented in this thesis to answer the research questions, whilst also considering 
the limitations of each study and the wider literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 
3.  
The conclusions of the thesis as a whole are summarised in the next chapter 
along with their implications for the regulation of the GB electricity market and the 
UK Government’s cost-benefit analysis for the National Smart Meter 
Implementation Programme. The next chapter also includes specific 
recommendations for future areas of research. 
   
 
















Conclusion and future research:  
Minimise opt-outs and market TOU tariffs at 
high consuming electricity users 
   
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 400 
1 Introduction  
This thesis had two aims: (1) to provide the first robust estimate of likely British 
consumer adoption of TOU electricity tariffs and; (2) to generate evidence on how 
adoption rates could be increased without making TOU tariffs mandatory or 
automatically enrolling people unless they opt-out.  
These aims were motivated on the basis that an accurate understanding of likely 
consumer adoption rates of TOU tariffs is important for the success of the UK’s 
energy security and decarbonisation strategies (DECC, 2012a; BEIS, 2016c; 
Ofgem & BEIS, 2017) and the UK Smart Meter Implementation Programme which 
is premised upon 30% of domestic consumers adopting a static TOU tariff by 
2030 (BEIS, 2016b).  
Moreover, given that consumers rarely switch tariff or supplier (Defeuilley, 2009; 
CMA, 2016b), there was a legitimate cause for concern that uptake to TOU tariffs 
would be lower than optimal if methods for increasing enrolment rates were not 
identified which, unlike mandates or opt-out enrolment, would respect the fact 
that TOU tariffs will not be right for all consumers.  
This chapter summarises the key findings in relation to the aims of the thesis and 
outlines the original contribution of this thesis to the literature on DSR and nudge. 
This is followed by a brief outline of how the results have or could be used to 
inform policies around DSR in GB and avenues for future research. 
2 Summary of key findings and main argument of thesis 
To achieve aim 1, this thesis provided evidence that if consumers are left to opt-
in to TOU tariffs, uptake could be as low as 1% unless effort is made to close the 
intention-action gap, in which case enrolment could be around 43% or above; if 
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consumers are enrolled onto a TOU tariff by default, unless they opt-out, 
enrolment could exceed 57% and approach 100%.  
To achieve aim 2, the thesis provides evidence that tailored marketing could be 
an effective, but also potentially preferable, alternative recruitment method for 
TOU tariffs than opt-out enrolment. The evidence for this is now summarised 
below. 
There are obvious advantages to using opt-out enrolment. Although people who 
actively sign up to TOU tariffs reduce their peak electricity use by significantly 
more than consumers who are enrolled by default (Chapter 3), the evidence 
suggests that opt-out enrolment would result in higher overall reductions in peak 
electricity demand than if recruitment was opt-in because of the much higher 
enrolment rates on an opt-out system (S. A. Fenrick et al., 2014; Cappers et al., 
2016). This greater reduction in peak demand would lower electricity system 
costs overall, savings which will accrue to those who are on TOU tariffs and can 
adjust their consumption patterns.  
However, the evidence reviewed in Chapter 3 of this thesis and also the new 
evidence presented in Chapter 5 suggests that these efficiency gains will come 
at a price. In the case of TOU tariffs, opt-out enrolment, whether personalised or 
not, presents a real risk that millions of consumers could be signed up to tariffs 
that substantially increase rather than decrease their energy bills, particularly 
vulnerable consumers.102 This is based on the findings from study 1 which 
showed that approximately half of all British energy bill payers are unable to 
                                            
102 Half of the domestic electricity customer base of 28 million customers (Ofgem, 2016d) is 13.5 
million people. If the survey overestimated the proportion who would correctly identify whether a 
TOU tariff would be right for them by 50%, this is still 6.7 million customers. If all of these people 
were enrolled onto a TOU tariff by default, and assuming that at least 40% would be financially 
worse off as was the case in the CLNR TOU tariff trial (Sidebotham, 2014a), this would mean 
harming 2.6 million bill payers. 
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identify the cheapest tariff even when given all the information required to do so 
and that this ability declines when the menu of tariff options includes a TOU tariff, 
particularly for consumers in the lowest three social grades (C2-D) who are more 
likely to be in fuel poverty because they are more likely to have below average 
incomes and may also face high energy costs if they are living in poorly insulated 
homes (Hills, 2012).  
Further, since even bad defaults are ‘sticky’ (Keller et al., 2011) – retention rates 
amongst consumers automatically enrolled onto TOU tariffs exceed 70% 
regardless of whether the household shifts their electricity use away from the 
expensive peak times (US Department of Energy, 2016) – there is no guarantee 
that consumers would dis-enroll from an unsuitable tariff once it had started to 
negatively impact their energy bills.  
Defaulting consumers onto TOU tariffs on the basis of their electricity 
consumption history (personalised defaults) will not necessarily prevent this 
problem either; for a TOU tariff to change consumption patterns – the aim of any 
DSR programme – people would first need to know that they have been put on a 
TOU tariff. However, one of the key reasons opt-out enrolment is thought to work 
is precisely because people do not realise what option was pre-selected for them 
(Keller et al., 2011), which is why opt-outs often end up with people enrolled onto 
receiving unwanted marketing communication (Carroll et al., 2009). 
Automation could avoid the negative financial implications of being unknowingly 
enrolled onto a TOU tariff. However, if the Government decides that companies 
must obtain informed consent from people before enrolling them on TOU tariffs, 
vehicle-to-grid or DLC of home heating services – what the Smart Energy Code 
refers to as User Unambiguous Consent (Smart Energy Code Company, 2017) 
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– then opt-out enrolment will not be an option for automated services either 
because opt-out enrolment does meet the criteria for User Unambiguous 
Informed consent laid out in the Smart Energy Code (2017). 
However, without opt-out enrolment, we are left with opt-in, a strategy which 
would result in substantially lower enrolment rates. Further, the same bounded 
rationality that means consumers would not know whether to opt-out of being 
automatically enrolled onto a TOU tariff would also affect consumers opting in. 
The first study effectively forced consumers into making an active choice between 
three tariffs and 50% still did not identify the cheapest tariff, implying that opt-in 
enrolment will not prevent consumers from adopting inappropriate tariffs either.  
This thesis therefore tested the effectiveness of tailored marketing, a strategy 
which aims to overcome the disadvantages of both opt-in and opt-out enrolment 
by being both ‘effective’ and ‘selective’ (Johnson, 2016). That tailored marketing 
can be effective and selective is demonstrated by the results from two field 
experiments and one survey experiment which show that, compared to marketing 
appeals which address the average energy bill payer, tailoring the marketing of 
TOU tariffs towards high peak-time electricity users, could reduce uptake 
amongst lower consuming groups who are more likely to face increases in their 
energy bills from switching to a TOU tariff. One of the field experiments, the OLEV 
trial, also produced evidence from a large sample of EV owners that tailored 
marketing messages presented in emails could increase demand amongst EV 
owners, who are higher than average peak time electricity users. The survey 
experiment provided similar, but not statistically robust evidence of this effect too. 
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In this thesis, the high consuming group is EV owners, who use approximately 
double the amount of electricity as households without EVs103 (National Grid, 
2017) and who mostly charge their vehicles during the existing peak times 
(Capova et al., 2015; Zarnikau et al., 2015), when the marginal carbon intensity 
of electricity is at its highest (Ma et al., 2012).  
That tailored marketing can be effective on EV owners was shown by the results 
in Chapters 6 and 7: tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs to EV owners using 
appeals such as “Switch to this EV tariff” or “Switch to cut the costs of charging 
your EV”, increased demand for these tariffs amongst EV owners relative to 
generic marketing appeals such as “Switch to save money on your energy bills” 
and “Switch to the Off-Peak Saver tariff”; however, tailored marketing was also 
selective because these tailored marketing messages also decreased demand 
amongst other consumers who are likely to have lower electricity use and who 
are also more likely to face higher electricity bills on a TOU tariff because, unlike 
EV owners, they do not have a single large electricity load that they can shift into 
the off-peak times.  
The effect sizes are large (up to 90% relative to the baseline) and consistent in 
direction and magnitude across one survey experiment and two field 
experiments, including one performed on nearly every privately owned EV driver 
in the UK (Chapter 7). The latter experiment, for example, demonstrated that 
unsolicited mass emails could effectively engage an additional one million people 
with TOU tariffs once EVs reach 60% market penetration if the message is 
tailored to EV owners and sent within the first three months of vehicle purchase.  
                                            
103 See Appendix 3.2. 
   
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 405 
Further research is required to test whether tailored marketing could be effective 
on other high electricity consuming groups, such as households with electric 
heating who are also likely to run their heating during existing peak times unless 
incentivised to do otherwise (Frontier Economics, 2012; National Grid, 2017). In 
particular, further research is required to test the impact of tailored marketing on 
actual switching rates to a range of commercially available DSR services relative 
to opt-out enrolment. At present, opt-out enrolment may indeed perform better 
however once more EVs and heat pumps enter the market, tailored marketing 
towards these groups may be able to rival opt-out enrolment for recruitment 
numbers. Once this evidence is obtained, policymakers can make a fully informed 
decision over how recruitment to TOU tariffs or the other automated DSR services 
should be conducted.  
Nevertheless, by starting this discussion and providing evidence of the promising 
role that tailored marketing could play, it is hoped that this thesis will provide 
nuance to the debate on opt-in versus opt-out enrolment in the context of 
consumer participation in the smart grid. Without this discussion and evidence, a 
policymaker may dismiss calls for TOU tariff enrolment to be opt-in on the basis 
of their knowledge of the effectiveness of opt-out enrolment in the contexts of 
pensions or on the basis that there is no viable alternative. However, TOUs are 
not like pensions because not everyone will benefit from TOUs and the study 
shows that tailored marketing is a very promising alternative that respects the fact 
there is no one-size fits all energy tariff. 
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3 Original contribution of this thesis 
The introduction to this thesis set out four original contributions that this research 
intended to make. The following sections review to what extent the research 
succeeded in doing so.  
3.1 Substantive contribution to the literature on consumer 
participation in DSR 
The first was a substantive contribution to knowledge over how many British 
consumers could be expected to adopt TOU tariffs and how to increase uptake if 
it was lower than optimal. This thesis made this contribution by synthesising the 
available empirical evidence on uptake to TOU tariffs to find that uptake could be 
as low as 1% but that tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards consumer 
groups such as EV owners could help to increase uptake so that it is closer to the 
43% who say they would be willing to adopt a TOU tariff in surveys (of which prior 
research shows EV owners are likely to form a disproportionate number [Nicolson 
et al., 2017]).  
In doing so, this thesis takes forward both the academic and policy literature on 
domestic DSR in two key ways. First, it progresses the debate on how to increase 
uptake to TOU tariffs away from an exclusive focus on the average energy bill 
payer to how to increase uptake amongst particular consumer groups. Whilst this 
thesis started out by highlighting that a key challenge for the success of domestic 
DSR is how to encourage an additional 30% of domestic consumers to adopt the 
kinds of tariffs and programmes that expose consumers to DSR signals, the 
thesis has demonstrated that an even greater challenge is how to make sure that 
the right 30% of consumers sign up.  
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Prior to this research there was no discussion or empirical research testing ways 
of achieving targeted uptake of TOU tariffs. The only concern that had been 
expressed was that TOU tariffs would be adopted by people who already have 
low peak time energy consumption (Baladi et al., 1998; Hartway et al., 1999; 
Charles River Associates, 2005; Herter, 2007; Ericson, 2011; Qiu et al., 2017), 
so-called ‘free-riders’ who would “provide little to no load relief during load-control 
events, but still benefit as much as do those providing significant load reductions” 
(Herter, 2007, p.2122). This thesis provided evidence to suggest that a different 
type of adverse selection problem is possible, whereby TOU tariffs attract 
customers who do have peaky electricity demand profiles but who, for a variety 
of reasons, may be unable to change this but also unable to process the 
information required to determine whether switching to a TOU tariff would 
increase or decrease their energy bill. These consumers will provide no benefits 
to the electricity network and will just face higher energy bills.  
The Government needs to decide whether the increase in overall TOU tariff 
adoption rates from using opt-out rather than opt-in enrolment (S. A. Fenrick et 
al., 2014; Cappers et al., 2016) is more important than protecting the sizeable 
minority of energy bill payers who are unwilling or unable to alter their electricity 
consumption patterns from being enrolled onto TOU tariffs. If the Government 
decides that the benefits to society as a whole from having a more flexible energy 
system cannot justify significantly increasing the energy bills of ~40% of British 
consumers, then opt-out enrolment for TOU tariffs would need to be ruled out.  
A second way in which this thesis takes forward the literature on consumer 
participation in DSR is that it highlights an important distinction between 
consumer adoption and consent. Unlike the former, consent is usually 
characterised in the health domain as being voluntary, informed and given by a 
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person with the capacity to understand the information given to them to make an 
informed choice.104 The Smart Energy Code has a similar definition called “User 
Unambiguous Consent” which is defined as a request by the consumer to a third 
party (the ‘User’) to undertake a particular action or when the consumer takes a 
positive action agreeing showing that they agree to a third party’s request to 
undertake an action on their behalf (SECAS, 2017, p.92). The Government now 
needs to decide whether it will require energy suppliers and other DSR 
companies to obtain User Unambiguous Consent from customers before 
enrolling them onto DSR services. If it does, then opt-out enrolment, whether 
personalised or not, will not be a viable recruitment option.  
As pointed out in the last chapter, the distinction between consumer adoption and 
consent will become increasingly pertinent in a world where electrical appliances 
are increasingly being made both Internet connected and ‘DSR-ready’105, i.e. 
where an appliance could be remotely controlled by a third party, such as a third 
party turning up or down the set-point on a smart thermostat for a heat pump (a 
type of DSR called DLC). In my experience many new technology companies, 
including those intending to enter the domestic DSR market in Britain, express 
the view that consumers only care about saving money and do not need to know 
how so-called ‘smart’ savings are achieved. Given that Ofgem has recently 
decided to remove prohibitions on tariff bundling (Ofgem, 2016e) and there is 
nothing in the European Commission’s Smart Energy Code (SECAS, 2017) to 
                                            
104 See, for example, the NHS’ definition of consent http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/consent-to-
treatment/pages/introduction.aspx#definition.  
105 The European Commission has worked with industry to create a set of standards to ensure 
the interoperability and DSR readiness of smart appliance and home energy management 
systems including ETSI/OneM2M and the SAREF (Smart Appliances REFerence Ontology) 
ontology for smart appliances.  
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prevent non-energy suppliers from undertaking such practices, regulators may 
need to consider this as an area for future regulation.  
3.2 Theoretical contribution 
The second contribution that this thesis makes is to the theory of bounded 
rationality. Herbert Simon proposed that humans are not fully rational, in the 
sense of processing all available information before making a decision, but are 
rather boundedly rational; people selectively search through information, 
terminating their search with “the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses 
of action” (Simon, 1985, p.295). The finding that only 50% of energy bill payers 
were able to identify the cost-minimising tariff when given all the information 
required may be of no surprise to psychologists. However, “empirical validation 
and precision are particularly critical for policy-relevant behavioural research” 
(Nature Energy, 2017, p.1) because it is only if a large proportion of consumers 
fail to select the cost-minimising tariff that energy companies will be able to 
charge what they want (Varian, 1980). The first study provides empirical evidence 
to support the intuition that many, not just a small minority of, consumers would 
struggle to work out whether or not they should opt-out of being enrolled onto a 
TOU tariff if their supplier wrote to them to say this was going to happen and gave 
them information to help them make an informed choice. This also rules out the 
common “as if” argument used to defend the rationality paradigm (Friedman, 
1953) and suggests that bounded rationality should be incorporated into 
economic cost-benefit analyses used by Government that rest of the decisions 
made by domestic energy bill payers, such as the smart meter cost benefit 
analysis.  
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Although a prior study suggested that consumers may struggle to identify the 
cost-minimising tariff (Wilson and Price, 2010), it was not able to rule out the 
possibility that unobserved non-price factors or imperfect information could have 
been influencing people’s decisions; the study in this thesis eliminated the 
influence of those possible confounding factors by asking people to identify the 
cheapest tariff and providing all the information required.  
3.3 Contribution to the small evidence base on effective and 
selective nudges 
The third contribution is to take forward the literature on nudge by contributing to 
the small literature on what Johnson (2016) called “selective and effective” 
nudges. As noted in Chapter 3, there are many contexts in which there is a need 
to influence consumer decisions without manipulating default options. In some 
cases, choice architects may lack the information required to identify a suitable 
default, such as in the case of credit cards, mortgages, health insurance schemes 
(Johnson, 2016) and the decision over at what age to retire (Knoll et al., 2015). 
In other cases, success relies on maintaining on-going engagement in a particular 
behaviour such as enrolment in a course of antibiotics or a weight loss 
programme (Keller et al., 2011). There are also some decisions for which the 
public or policymakers feel that automatic enrolment would unethical even in 
cases where it has been shown to save lives; many countries have rejected calls 
to make registration to their national organ donor register an opt-out rather than 
opt-in choice (A Spital, 1995; Spital, 1996) despite the evidence that opt-out 
enrolment results in much higher registrations and organ donations (E. Johnson 
and Goldstein, 2003).  
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However, much of the literature on nudge has tested ways of influencing the 
average individuals’ behaviour, for example using opt-out enrolment or social 
norms messaging to encourage people to save energy or enrol in a pension. 
However, in the case of TOU tariffs as in the case of mortgages, credit cards and 
many other consumer goods, the best option will vary across people and in these 
cases a more targeted approach is required (Keller et al., 2011). Although 
commitment devices aimed at encouraging weight loss (Volpp et al., 2008; John 
et al., 2011) or smoking cessation (Giné et al., 2010) are targeted, the targeting 
is achieved by deliberately implementing these interventions on exclusively 
obese or smoking populations. However, in many cases, it will not be possible to 
selectively expose nudges to particular sub-groups, for example, because there 
is no mailing list or existing institutions (such as weight loss groups) by which only 
the right individuals can be nudged. In these cases the nudge will need to be 
administered to an entire population and, to avoid it nudging the wrong people, 
the nudge will need to be designed to be selectively effective, in the way that 
tailored EV messaging is in the case of TOU tariffs. The Flex Study combined 
with the Population-Based Survey experiment (Chapter 6) showed how an 
energy supplier could market their tariffs as ‘EV tariffs’ on their website, with the 
knowledge that doing so would increase uptake amongst EV owners without also 
attracting non EV owners who may be less appropriate for a TOU tariff.  
3.4 Methodological contribution  
The fourth contribution is that thesis shows how innovative research methods can 
be used to measure consumer behaviour rather than just relying on stated 
preferences obtained from surveys, even in cases where the behaviour in 
question is difficult to measure because it requires access to industry (e.g. energy 
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suppliers) or because there is an absence of data (e.g. in the case of TOU tariffs 
which do not exist commercially in the UK). To my knowledge, this is one of the 
first times that  intermediate outcome measures such as click-throughs, opens of 
emails and other so-called “digital footprints” (Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014; 
Kosinski et al., 2016) have been used to measure demand for future energy 
products for which an understanding of consumer appetite is vital.  
This thesis also demonstrates how government data can be used to overcome 
many of the barriers involved in sampling amongst populations of interest to 
energy researchers, in this case EV owners. Past research on EV owners has 
struggled to recruit as many as 100 EV owners (My Electric Avenue, 2015) 
because EVs are still in the minority. This thesis was able to reach over 7,000 
private EV owners – 10% of all EV owners in the UK – by partnering with the UK 
Government OLEV, the department responsible for administering the UK’s EV 
grant scheme. This is important for ensuring that interventions tested in academic 
research or piloted in industry trials are likely to generalise if and when the 
intervention is introduced on a national scale. For example, My Electric Avenue 
found that the majority of its trial participants were “comfortable or very 
comfortable with [a controlled charging technology] being able to curtail their 
charging”(My Electric Avenue, 2015, p.10). However, this information cannot be 
generalised to the wider population of EV owners since we cannot expect that 
people who volunteer to try out new technologies in experimental trials – and who 
complete feedback surveys – will have the same views as the average EV owner. 
As Government’s increasingly administer services electronically, such databases 
will make it easier for researchers to access traditionally hard-to-reach audiences, 
including, for instance, heat pump owners through the UK Government’s 
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Renewable Heat Incentive. Another advantage of conducting research in this way 
is that it enables researchers to increase the policy relevance of the results:  
…in the absence of this behavioural evidence, policy 
decisions could be subject to the whims of a policymaker's 
assumptions about how they think they would behave in 
similar circumstances or how they have behaved in the 
past. A policymaker could dismiss a proposal for such an e-
mail scheme because they would never open such e-mails, 
or endorse the proposal because they routinely open 
promotional e-mails. Critically, the results of research like 
that of Nicolson and colleagues are important regardless: 
either the data are surprising and violate assumptions, or 
they provide empirical confirmation that intuitions are valid 
(Nature Energy, 2017, p.1). 
 
The results have already been used to advise policymakers and other industry 
stakeholders on how to engage consumers with TOU tariffs (see Annex 1). The 
results of all four studies reported in this thesis could potentially inform future 
research by OLEV and Ofgem to test the impact of interventions on actual 
switching rates through a new domestic licence condition (SLC 32A) that requires 
energy suppliers to participate in tariff switching trials. These existing and future 
contributions to policy are described in full in Annex 1.  
4 Future research 
The thesis also identifies many research gaps which could provide useful 
avenues for future research. These are summarised in Table 38 but described in 
full in Annex 2.  
Table 38 Avenues for future research (see Annex 2 for details). 
 
What research? Why and how? 
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Increase the precision of 
estimates of uptake to TOU 
tariffs and identify what is 
optimal level of uptake to DSR 
services amongst domestic 
users 
 Why: To inform the BEIS smart meter cost 
benefit analysis (2016a) and Ofgem’s 
Flexibility strategy (2017b). 
 How: Ofgem’s programme of trials or a 
Virtual Energy Company106 funded by the 
EPSRC-funded Smart Meter Research 
Portal107 (SMRP) (grant number: 
EP/P032761/1). 
Test whether tailored marketing 
could increase switching rates 
to TOU tariffs and other DSR 
services amongst electric 
heating owners 
 Why: The electrification of heat is a major 
driver for domestic DSR (Ofgem & BEIS, 
2017). 
 How: Running a similar trial to the OLEV trial 
using the Government’s database on 
Renewable Heat Incentive Recipients. 
Test why tailored marketing is 
effective: mental accounting 
(Thaler, 1980, 1985, 1999), de-
shrouding (Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006) or 
personalisation leads to 
increased information 
processing (Rimer and Kreuter, 
2006)  
 Why: to help inform the design of tailored 
marketing strategies and develop 
behavioural economic theory. 
 How: a trial in which each item is 
manipulated individually (see Annex 2), 
although information processing is likely best 
studies at the neural level, as in 
neuroscientific studies on loss-aversion 
(Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013). 
                                            
106 This idea is being developed by Michael Fell at the UCL Energy Institute. For more information 
see section 1 of Annex 2. 
107 For more information on SMRP see 
http://gow.epsrc.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/P032761/1 and 
http://cee.ac.uk/smart-meter-research-portal-smrp/.  
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Test methods of identifying 
consumers with ‘flexibility’ 
capital  
 Why? A person’s ability to be flexible over 
the timing of their electricity use is unlikely to 
be driven by a single factor such as being an 
EV owner but rather could be determined by 
a number of overlapping variables such as 
appliance ownership, working patterns, 
dwelling characteristics and so on. If 
identified as being causally related to 
flexibility in empirical research, such markers 
could be used to create a ‘flexibility capital’ 
index for each individual household in the 
population, which suppliers and third parties 
could use to match energy bill payers to 
suitable DSR services, to increase the 
‘winners’ and reduce the ‘losers’ from DSR. 
 How: Machine learning techniques on smart 
electricity meter data via the SMRP. 
Test the impact of non-punitive 
TOU tariff structures such as 
critical peak rebates (where 
people get paid for being 
demand-responsive rather than 
charged more for failing to be 
demand-responsive) 
 Why? To minimise the negative distributional 
impacts of TOU tariffs (as above) but identify 
whether payments are less effective at 
generating demand-responsiveness than 
penalties, as would be expected given that 
energy bill payers are loss-averse (M 
Nicolson et al., 2017). 
 How? Ofgem’s trials or a Virtual Energy 
Company. 
Test whether disaggregated 
energy billing for EV owners 
 Why? In putting together the advice for EV 
owners in the OLEV trial I identified that EV 
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can maximise the consumer 
savings of TOU tariffs 
owners’ abilities to save money on TOU 
tariffs is likely to be strongly affected by their 
ability to shift their non-EV demand away 
from peak times. Creating TOU tariffs which 
only charge EV owners on a time-of-use 
basis for their charging demand, but allowing 
the rest of their household use to be charged 
at a flat-rate, could increase the proportion of 
EV owners for whom TOU tariffs would save 
money and thus be the optimal tariff.  
 How? Ofgem’s trials or a Virtual Energy 
Company. 
Test the consumer 
acceptability of EV controlled 
charging schemes with/out 
vehicle-to-grid services 
 Why? To identify whether voluntary uptake 
will be sufficient to avoid mandating 
controlled charging, as recommended by the 
Smart EV Options Group (Cross et al., 
2016). 
 How? Ofgem’s trials or a Virtual Energy 
Company. 
Develop an accurate method 
for comparing TOU tariffs 
 Why? This thesis suggested that price 
comparisons could potentially improve 
consumer decisions, when used; if TOU 
tariffs are not on price comparison websites, 
people will be less likely to adopt them. 
There are many ways in which TOU tariffs 
could be compared to other TOU tariffs and 
flat-rate tariffs e.g., based on historical use 
(but this risks only enrolling consumers onto 
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TOUs who already have favourable 
consumption profiles, defeating the purpose 
of DSR which is to change patterns of use) 
or by predicting the consumers’ potential to 
change consumption patterns e.g. using 
machine learning, for which there is no 
precedent and testing is required to test the 
accuracy of such predictions which, without 
automation, will be dependent on human 
behaviour change.   
 How? Ofgem’s trials or a Virtual Energy 
Company. 
Test tailored marketing in other 
consumer goods markets for 
which opt-out enrolment is 
inappropriate due to 
heterogeneity 
 Why? Switching rates are low across 
mortgages, credit cards, mobile phone 
contracts etc. (Costa et al., 2016); however, 
in all these cases, opt-outs are not suitable 
because there is no one-size fits all best 
credit card, mortgage type (fixed vs. 
variable), mobile phone contract etc. 
 How? Trials in partnership with the relevant 
commercial organisations.  
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
The Irish energy regulator has made TOU tariffs mandatory to ensure that 
enrolment rates are high enough to realise its business case for smart meters 
(Commission for Energy Regulation, 2015). In the US, researchers are 
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advocating for a policy of opt-out enrolment (Faruqui et al., 2014; S. A. Fenrick et 
al., 2014; Cappers et al., 2016).  
In contrast, the UK Government has yet to propose any alternative to the status 
quo which is to wait for consumers to switch between tariffs of their own accord 
on the basis that these tariffs will attract all consumers who can save money from 
switching to one (DECC, 2014; BEIS, 2016b). However, prior to this study, there 
was no robust estimate of the number of consumers who would voluntarily adopt 
a TOU tariff once they do become commercially available; an earlier draft of the 
Government’s cost-benefit analysis states that it is based on international 
evidence of uptake to such tariffs but no studies or measures of uptake were cited 
(DECC, 2014). In addition, no methods had been identified for how to 
successfully increase uptake if recruitment rates were lower than required, apart 
from automatically enrolling consumers onto a TOU tariff unless they explicitly 
opted-out, an approach which poses a number of ethical concerns. 
This thesis therefore aimed to provide the first robust estimate of likely British 
consumer adoption of TOU tariffs as well as evidence on how adoption rates 
could be increased without making TOU tariffs mandatory or automatically 
enrolling people unless they opt-out. Three main conclusions were drawn from 
the results:  
1. The UK Government’s target to have 30% of domestic consumers enrolled 
onto a TOU tariff by 2030 in addition to those who are already enrolled on 
legacy TOU tariffs such as Economy 7 (BEIS, 2016b) is optimistic in the 
absence of a recruitment strategy to motivate consumers to switch tariff in 
higher numbers as currently switch tariff. Estimates obtained from 
consumers in national surveys measuring willingness to switch to a TOU 
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tariff should not be used to predict uptake given that, across 27 existing 
studies, survey measures of uptake is more than twice as high (2.2 times 
higher) as uptake to internationally available TOU tariffs. 
2. Opt-out enrolment and simple opt-in enrolment may not be viable 
recruitment strategies for TOU tariffs or DSR services, depending on 
whether it is considered ethically permissible to enrol customers onto 
automated DSR services potentially without their knowledge.   
3. Tailoring the marketing of TOU tariffs towards high electricity users could 
help nudge consumers towards actively signing up to tariffs, whilst also 
helping to reduce peak electricity demand. Johnson (2016) calls this an 
‘effective’ and ‘selective’ nudge. Specifically, the results of this thesis show 
that:  
 Labelling a TOU tariff an ‘EV tariff’ could increase uptake to TOU 
tariffs amongst EV owners without simultaneously attracting other 
consumers who may be less likely to save money on a TOU tariff. 
EV owners consume about double the amount of electricity as an 
average household and usually charge their vehicles at existing 
peak times. 
 Although some EV owners may never visit energy supplier’s 
websites or pay attention to such marketing, another study showed 
that this self-selection problem could be overcome by actively 
prompting EV owners to switch to a TOU tariff via email, especially 
if this email is sent within the first three months of purchase and is 
tailored to EV owners in particular (“switch to save £300 on charging 
your EV”) rather than the average energy bill payer (“switch to save 
£300 on your energy bills”). In my estimation, this low cost and easy 
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to implement intervention could encourage an additional 1 million 
people to switch to a TOU tariff once EVs reach 60% market 
penetration.  
 Although tailored marketing is unlikely to yield enrolment rates as 
high as those under an opt-out scheme which can deliver 
recruitment rates of almost 100% (Chapter 2), future research run 
in partnership with energy suppliers through Ofgem’s new domestic 
licence condition (SLC 32A) could help determine whether tailored 
marketing could yield domestic consumer enrolment rates in line 
with what Government requires to realise the business case for 
smart meters (BEIS, 2016b) and its flexibility strategy (Ofgem & 
BEIS, 2017).  
The results of this thesis have implications for all types of consumer participation 
in the smart grid, whether that is signing up to TOU tariffs, selling surplus solar to 
the grid, having the set-point on their thermostat adjusted in line with the real-
time price of electricity (DLC of heating) or giving electricity back to the grid via 
the battery in their EV (vehicle-to-grid). In each case, if it is agreed that 
consumers must give their consent to provide these services, a decision will need 
to be made about whether consumers will consent by default, unless they opt-
out, or whether it will be opt-in – and to what extent it matters that consent is 
informed.
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1 Questionnaire used in the Tariff Decision Making Study 
We are now going to describe two scenarios involving people who are trying to choose 
a new electricity tariff.  
There are two main types of electricity tariff in the UK:  
 
• Flat-rate tariffs, where you pay one price for each unit of electricity you use (e.g. you might pay 14p per unit of 
electricity no matter when you use it) and a yearly standing charge (a fee for having electricity delivered to your 
home) 
 
• Off-peak tariffs, where you might pay two or more different prices for electricity according to the time of day 
you're using it, a bit like peak and off-peak train tickets (e.g. you might pay 20p in the day and 10p at night)  
 
Click next to read the scenarios. 
Q1 ASK ALL, SCENARIO 1 
Selin lives with her partner. Their current tariff has come to an end and they’re trying to 
choose a new one.  
Take a look at the three tariffs they’ve got to choose from and then decide which tariff 
you think would be cheapest for them considering that they use 2,000 units of electricity 





Flat-rate tariff 2 
(3) 
Flat-rate tariff 3 
Unit rate 15p/unit 14p/unit 13p/unit 
Standing charge £68/year £60/year £95/year 
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Discount for switching to 
paperless billing 
£30/year None None 
 
Please select the tariff that you think would be cheapest for Selin and her partner. You 
may want to use a calculator to help you. 
1. Flat-rate tariff 1 
2. Flat-rate tariff 2 
3. Flat-rate tariff 3 
 
Q3 ASK ALL, SCENARIO 2 
Stephanie lives with her partner. Her current tariff has come to an end and she’s trying 
to choose a new one.  
Take a look at the three tariffs she’s got to choose from and then decide which tariff you 
think would be cheapest for her considering that her family uses 3,100 units of 
electricity a year at the following times of the day: 
 50% between 4pm-8pm  
 40% between 7am-4pm  
 10% overnight (between 8pm-7am) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 









10p/unit 14p/unit 13p/unit 
Off-peak:  Day 7am-4pm  14p/unit 14p/unit 13p/unit 
Peak:  Evening 4pm-8pm  30p/unit 14p/unit 13p/unit 
Standing charge £70/year £60/year £95/year 
 
Please select the tariff that you think would be cheapest for Stephanie and her family. 
Use a calculator to help you. 
1. Off-Peak tariff 1 
2. Flat-rate tariff 2 
3. Flat-rate tariff 3 
 
2 Keywords for Google advert targeting in the Flex Trial  
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Keyword Population target108 
Electricity supplier (1)-(3) 
Electric tariff (1)-(3) 
Compare electricity suppliers (1)-(3) 
Energy tariff comparison (1)-(3) 
Cheap overnight electricity (1)-(3) 
Cheap energy tariff (1)-(3) 
Energy tariff (1)-(3) 
Energy supplier (1)-(3) 
Economy 7 alternatives (1)-(3) 
When is electricity cheaper to use (1)-(3) 
Economy 7 tariff (1)-(3) 
Economy 7 meter (1)-(3) 
Economy 7 times (1)-(3) 
Economy 7 heaters (2) 
Controls for heat pumps (2) 
Heat pump smart thermostat (2) 
Heat pump controls (2) 
Heat pump (2) 
EV charging stations (1) 
Electric vehicle charging cable (1) 
Electric vehicle tariff (1) 
Electric car tariff (1) 
EV charging cable (1) 
Electric car charging point (1) 
Electric car charging station (1) 
Electric car charging (1) 
Electric car charging point (1) 
EV charging tariff (1) 




                                            
108 (1)=EV owners; (2)=heat pump owners; (3)=all energy bill payers. 
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3 Assumptions used to estimate electricity demand of a 
heat pump and EV  
3.1 Heat pump 
# Assumption and the data source Value 
1 Average UK domestic heat demand: DECC (2012, p.4) 450 
TWh/year 
2 Number of UK households: Office for National Statistics 
(2016) 
27 million 
3 Air Source Heat Pump Seasonal Performance Factor109: 
Summerfield et al. (2016, p.65) 
2.56 
Equation used to compute electricity demand of heat pump using assumptions 
(1), (2) and (3): 








                                            
109 A heat pump delivers more heat than it uses in electricity and is therefore more than 100% 
efficient (DECC, 2012b). To account for the relative efficiency of a heat pump, the average heat 
demand in the UK can be adjusted using the Seasonal Performance Factor, which is a measure 
of how efficiently a heat pump is operating (Ofgem, 2016a) taken from the most recent UK heat 
pump field trials for air source heat pumps at the system boundary level 2 (Summerfield et al., 
2016). Air source heat pumps were chosen because, based on installation data obtained by the 
author from the Microgeneration Certification Scheme, approximately 80% of heat pumps 
installed in the UK are air source, a figure which is corroborated by data from the European Heat 
Pump Association cited in (Hannon, 2015) citing (Nowak et al., 2014) . The system boundary level 
2 includes “the heat pump unit and the equipment to make the source energy available for the 
heat pump” (Zottl et al., 2012, p.5) but excludes the back-up heater and all auxiliary drives. 
110 Based on the assumed values, this should be 6,500kWh but a calculation error was made and 
so 6,300kWh was used to create the quote. However, this will make only a very minimal difference 
to the energy bill under the tariff and will have no impact on the energy bill difference between a 
flat-rate and the TOU tariff.  
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3.2 EV 
# Assumption and the data source Value 
1 Battery capacity of Nissan Leaf (most popular EV model in 
2015): 
Manufacturer’s website in 2015 
30kWh 
2 Battery range of Nissan Leaf:  
Manufacturer’s website in 2015 
100 miles 
3 Average annual mileage driven in UK in 2014: 
Department for Transport (2015) 
7,900 miles 
4 Proportion of charging done from home: 
Based on rapid evidence assessment which indicated that 
the majority of charging is done at home Knight et al. 
(2015)111 
60% 
Equation used to compute electricity demand of EV using assumptions (1), (2), 
(3) and (4): 






 * 0.60 
Electricity demand estimate used in quote: 
4,200 kWh 
 
                                            
111 The figure of 60% was chosen because it represents one possible interpretation of the term 
‘majority’. Ideally, the quote would have varied depending on different possible home charging 
behaviours but this would have added substantial extra development work for the website without 
being necessary for answering the overall research question. However, even if vehicle owners 
use their home charge point for more than 60% of their charging needs, the impact on electricity 
demand would, at the time of writing, be relatively small because of the increase in EV efficiency, 
represented by the range/capacity term in the equation in the table above.  
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4 Electricity prices used to provide quotes in the Flex 
Trial 






TOU tariff in UK 
CLNR trial112 
(p/kWh) 
Low 14 11.3 8 
Medium 14 14.9 11 
High 14 30.6 23 
Standing charge 69 Zero 91 
Tariff comparison 
rate113 
14.02 15.39 11.3 
 
5 Survey questions embedded in the Flex website 
Please fill in a few more details below and then click Confirm and Switch. 
[1] How many bedrooms does your property have?  
Drop down menu: 1 bedroom, 2 bedrooms, 3 bedrooms, 4+ bedrooms 
[2] Do you have any of the following in your house? Select any that you have in 
your home. 
                                            
112 Source Figure 25 from (Frontier Economics, 2012). Prices read from graph by eye so actual 
amounts may not be exact. 
113 The tariff comparison rate was developed by Ofgem and it provides a single figure accounting 
for standing charges, the unit rate and any discounts based on average electricity consumption. 
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Radio buttons: Heat pump, electric vehicle – leased, electric vehicle – owned, 
Washing machine, Tumble dryer, Washer dryer, dishwasher, Electric shower, 
Solar panels with a home battery (for storage) 
[3] What is your main method of heating your home?  
Drop down menu: Gas central heating, Electric night storage, Heat pump, 
Underfloor heating, Other gas, Other electric, Other, Don’t know.  
[4] Do you have a smart meter fitted at this address?114 
Radio buttons: Yes, No, Don’t know 
[5] Do you have an Economy 7 meter?115 
Radio buttons: Yes, No, Don’t know 
[  ] Tick this box if you have read and are happy with the terms and conditions.116 
Confirm and Switch [button] 
  
                                            
114 This question had a ‘?’ icon adjacent to it that explained what a smart meter is as follows: 
““Smart meters can only be installed by an energy supplier. Smart meters send your meter 
readings directly to your energy company.” 
115 This question had a ‘?’ adjacent to it that explained what an Economy 7 tariff is as follows: ““If 
you pay less for the electricity you use overnight or if your meter has two dials on it, marked 
‘low’/’high’ or ‘day’/‘night’ then you have an Economy 7 meter.” 
116 The word ‘terms and conditions’ was hyperlinked to a document containing the standard terms 
and conditions for an energy tariff provided by the energy supplier that designed the TOU tariff 
used in the Flex trial. 
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6 Average treatment effect of price comparison and tailoring on all binary outcomes in 
the Flex Trial (logit robustness check) 
 
 





































































































Observations 4288 4288 4288 4276 4276 4276 4280 4280 4280 
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.097 0.140 0.042 0.102 0.188 0.021 0.060 0.045 
 
Notes: Logit model estimated with robust standard errors in which the coefficients represent marginal effects estimated at the 
mean value of the treatment dummy variables. p-values in parentheses.  
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7 Treatment effect of price comparison on mobile 
visitors in the Flex Trial (logit robustness check) 
    
Outcome= (1) 
Got a quote 
(2) 
























Observations 4303 4303 4303 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.101 0.154 
    
Notes: Logit model estimated with robust standard errors in which the coefficients 
represent marginal effects estimated at the mean value of the treatment dummy 
variables.  
p-values in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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D_region Where do you currently live? The map below may 
help you.  
 
D4_region I live in... 
 North East  South East 
 North West  South West 
 Yorkshire & 
Humberside 
 Wales 
 East Midlands  Scotland 
 West Midlands  Northern 
Ireland 






Q1 Are you financially responsible or jointly financially 
responsible for paying the gas and/or electricity bills 
in your household? 
Please select one response only. 
 Yes, solely responsible 




Q2 Which of the following companies supplies your 
electricity? 
Please select one response only. 
 British Gas 
 Bulb 
 Co-operative Energy 
 Ebico 
 E.ON 
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 Ecotricity 
 EDF Energy 
 First Utility 
 Flow Energy 
 Good Energy 
 Green Energy UK 
 Green Star Energy 
 LoCO2 Energy 
 M&S Energy 
 npower 
 Ovo Energy 
 Places for People Energy 
 Sainsbury’s Energy 
 Scottish Hydro 
 Scottish Power 
 Spark Energy 
 SSE 
 Utilita 
 Utility Warehouse 
 Other (please specify)  
 Don't know 
 
Info The next two pages will show you details of a number 
of electricity tariffs. Some of these tariffs charge a 
different price for electricity depending on the time 
that you use it. 
 
Tariffs like these might become more common when 
more people have smart meters, because these meters 
can record electricity use every half hour and show 
you your usage in real time on an in-home display. 
 
At the moment, the average electricity tariff in Great 
Britain charges about 14p per unit of electricity.  
 
Please read the descriptions imagining the tariffs are 
on offer to you now, and answer the questions.  
Random_BlockCopy1 This is the block respondents will be allocated to. 





   
 





Include: Random_BlockCopy1 IS 
BLOCK_1Copy1 
Q5a Imagine this new electricity tariff was available 
to you today...  
 
 
The SuperSaver tariff charges three different rates for 
electricity: super off-peak, off-peak and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 11pm-
6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 6am-
4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 




There is a standing charge of 22p per day, which is 
amongst the best on the market. Unit prices are fixed 
for a year, but you can switch away at any time without 




Based on the information you have read, please 
indicate whether you would like to switch to the 
above tariff, or stick with the tariff you are 
currently on. Please select the option reflecting 
your true preference even if you don’t think you 
would be able to switch in reality (such as if you 
are on a fixed term contract).  
 
 
Please select one response only. 
 Switch to the tariff shown above 
 Stick with the tariff I am currently on 
 
Q6a Compared to your current tariff, what level of 
annual savings would be enough to persuade 
you to switch to this tariff? Please type a 
number (using digits) in the box. 
 
 
The SuperSaver tariff charges three different rates for 
electricity: super off-peak, off-peak and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 11pm-
6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 6am-
4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
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There is a standing charge of 22p per day, which is 
amongst the best on the market. Unit prices are fixed 
for a year, but you can switch away at any time without 
paying a fee.  
 
I would have to save...per year 




Include: Random_BlockCopy1 IS 
BLOCK_2Copy1 
Q5aCopy1 Imagine this new electricity tariff was 
available to you today...  
 
 
The SuperSaver tariff charges a single rate of 
12p per unit for electricity, which is amongst 
the lowest on the market. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 




Based on the information you have read, 
please indicate whether you would like to 
switch to the above tariff, or stick with the 
tariff you are currently on. Please select 
the option reflecting your true preference 
even if you don’t think you would be able 
to switch in reality (such as if you are on 
a fixed term contract).  
 
 
Please select one response only. 
 Switch to the tariff shown above 
 Stick with the tariff I am currently on 
 
Q6aCopy1 Compared to your current tariff, what 
level of annual savings would be enough 
to persuade you to switch to this tariff? 




The SuperSaver tariff charges a single rate of 
12p per unit for electricity, which is amongst 
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the lowest on the market. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 
away at any time without paying a fee.  
 
 
I would have to save...per year 




Include: Random_BlockCopy1 IS 
BLOCK_3Copy1 
Q5aCopy2 Imagine this new electricity tariff was 
available to you today...  
 
 
The SuperSaver tariff charges three different 
rates for electricity: super off-peak, off-peak 
and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
This tariff comes with a six month bill 
protection guarantee. We will automatically 
refund you if you spend more on this tariff than 
your old one - so you can't lose out. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 




Based on the information you have read, 
please indicate whether you would like to 
switch to the above tariff, or stick with the 
tariff you are currently on. Please select 
the option reflecting your true preference 
even if you don’t think you would be able 
to switch in reality (such as if you are on 
a fixed term contract).  
 
 
Please select one response only. 
 Switch to the tariff shown above 
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 Stick with the tariff I am currently on 
 
Q6aCopy2 Compared to your current tariff, what 
level of annual savings would be enough 
to persuade you to switch to this tariff? 




The SuperSaver tariff charges three different 
rates for electricity: super off-peak, off-peak 
and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
This tariff comes with a six month bill 
protection guarantee. We will automatically 
refund you if you spend more on this tariff than 
your old one - so you can't lose out. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 
away at any time without paying a fee.  
 
 
I would have to save...per year 




Include: Random_BlockCopy1 IS 
BLOCK_4Copy1 
Q5aCopy3 Imagine this new electricity tariff was 
available to you today...  
 
 
The Electric Vehicle tariff charges three 
different rates for electricity: super off-peak, 
off-peak and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
This tariff is particularly suited to people with 
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electric vehicles, who use more electricity than 
the average household (that mostly just use 
electricity for lighting and kitchen appliances) 
and could therefore save more money by 
charging their vehicle during the cheap off-
peak or super off-peak times. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 




Based on the information you have read, 
please indicate whether you would like to 
switch to the above tariff, or stick with the 
tariff you are currently on. Please select 
the option reflecting your true preference 
even if you don’t think you would be able 
to switch in reality (such as if you are on 
a fixed term contract).  
 
 
Please select one response only. 
 Switch to the tariff shown above 
 Stick with the tariff I am currently on 
 
Q6aCopy3 Compared to your current tariff, what 
level of annual savings would be enough 
to persuade you to switch to this tariff? 




The Electric Vehicle tariff charges three 
different rates for electricity: super off-peak, 
off-peak and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
This tariff is particularly suited to people with 
electric vehicles, who use more electricity than 
the average household (that mostly just use 
electricity for lighting and kitchen appliances) 
and could therefore save more money by 
charging their vehicle during the cheap off-
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peak or super off-peak times. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 
away at any time without paying a fee.  
 
 
I would have to save...per year 




Include: Random_BlockCopy1 IS 
BLOCK_5Copy1 
Q5aCopy4 Imagine this new electricity tariff was 
available to you today...  
 
 
The SuperSaver tariff charges three different 
rates for electricity: super off-peak, off-peak 
and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
This is a GoodGrid Approved tariff as certified 
by the GB energy regulator. Approved trials 
have shown that most people who sign up save 
money, and that it helps the electricity grid to 
run more efficiently. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 
away at any time without paying a fee.  
 
 
Based on the information you have read, 
please indicate whether you would like to 
switch to the above tariff, or stick with the 
tariff you are currently on. Please select 
the option reflecting your true preference 
even if you don’t think you would be able 
to switch in reality (such as if you are on 
a fixed term contract).  
 
 
Please select one response only. 
 Switch to the tariff shown above 
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 Stick with the tariff I am currently on 
 
Q6aCopy4 Compared to your current tariff, what 
level of annual savings would be enough 
to persuade you to switch to this tariff? 




The SuperSaver tariff charges three different 
rates for electricity: super off-peak, off-peak 
and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
This is a GoodGrid Approved tariff as certified 
by the GB energy regulator. Approved trials 
have shown that most people who sign up save 
money, and that it helps the electricity grid to 
run more efficiently. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 
away at any time without paying a fee. 
 
 
I would have to save...per year 




Include: Random_BlockCopy1 IS 
BLOCK_6Copy1 
Q5aCopy5 Imagine this new electricity tariff was 
available to you today...  
 
 
The SuperSaver tariff charges three different 
rates for electricity: super off-peak, off-peak 
and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
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When you sign up to this tariff you will also get 
access to a service showing your household 
electricity use broken down by appliance (e.g. 
washing machine, oven, etc.). This will show 
you exactly how much electricity your washing 
machine (for example) is using in a day or week, 
and what times you have used it. This makes it 
easier to decide what to use when to save 
money. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 




Based on the information you have read, 
please indicate whether you would like to 
switch to the above tariff, or stick with the 
tariff you are currently on. Please select 
the option reflecting your true preference 
even if you don’t think you would be able 
to switch in reality (such as if you are on 
a fixed term contract).  
 
 
Please select one response only. 
 Switch to the tariff shown above 
 Stick with the tariff I am currently on 
 
Q6aCopy5 Compared to your current tariff, what 
level of annual savings would be enough 
to persuade you to switch to this tariff? 




The SuperSaver tariff charges three different 
rates for electricity: super off-peak, off-peak 
and peak.  
 
• Super off-peak rate is 6p per unit, and applies 
11pm-6am on weekdays and all weekend.  
 
• Off-peak rate is 12p per unit, and applies on 
6am-4pm and 8pm-11pm on weekdays.  
 
• Peak rate is 24p per unit, and applies 4-8pm 
on weekdays.  
 
When you sign up to this tariff you will also get 
access to a service showing your household 
electricity use broken down by appliance (e.g. 
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washing machine, oven, etc.). This will show 
you exactly how much electricity your washing 
machine (for example) is using in a day or week, 
and what times you have used it. This makes it 
easier to decide what to use when to save 
money. 
 
There is a standing charge of 22p per day, 
which is amongst the best on the market. Unit 
prices are fixed for a year, but you can switch 
away at any time without paying a fee.  
 
 
I would have to save...per year 
Please enter a numeric response in £ only.  
 
 
Manipulation check We'd now like you to consider the following 
statements and indicate whether they are true or false 
based on the information you've received about the 
tariff that you just saw. 
1. The tariff you just saw charged one price for your 
electricity regardless of what time of day you’re using 
it 
2. The tariff came with a six month bill protection 
guarantee, meaning you would be automatically 
refunded if you spend more on this tariff than your old 
one. 
3. The tariff was described as particularly suitable for 
people with electric vehicles. 
4. The tariff was GoodGrid Approved by the GB energy 
regulator. 
5. Signing up to the tariff would give you access to a 
service showing your household electricity use broken 
down by appliance. 
 
Please drag each item to a category or click on the 
category header. You can change your choice by 
dragging the statement into the other box. 
 [INTERVENING ADDITIONAL 
INTERVENTIONS ADMINISTERED – THESE 
WERE REMOVED BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT 
RELEVANT TO THIS THESIS] 
Q11 The following questions are about your present 
electricity tariff and supplier.  
 
In which of the following ways do you pay for the 
electricity you use?  
Please select one response only. 
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 Monthly direct debit 
 Quarterly direct debit 
 Cheque, cash, card or bank transfer on receipt of 
your bill 
 Prepayment meter 
 Other  
 Don't know 
 
Q12 Are you currently on a ‘time of use’ tariff such as 
Economy 7 or Economy 10 (i.e. you pay less for 
electricity at certain times of the night or day)? 
Please select one response only. 
 Yes - Economy 7 
 Yes - Economy 10 
 Yes - other time of use tariff 
 No 
 Don't know 
 
 [INTERVENING ADDITIONAL 
INTERVENTIONS ADMINISTERED – THESE 
WERE REMOVED BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT 
RELEVANT TO THIS THESIS] 
Q17 We would now like to ask you some questions about 
your household. Before you start, a household is:  
 
• one person living alone; or  
• a group of people (not necessarily related) living at 
the same address who share cooking facilities and 
share a living room or sitting room or dining area  
 
Counting yourself, how many people, including 
children, usually live in your household?  










Q18 And how many of the people living in your household 
are aged 15 and under? 
Please select one response only. 
 0 
   
 










Q19 At which of the following times is at least one 
household member over the age of 18 usually at 
home?  
Please select all that apply. 
 Mornings in the week (roughly 7am-9am) 
 Day time in the week (roughly 9am-5pm) 
 Evening in the week (roughly 5pm-11pm) 
 Overnight in the week (roughly 11pm-7am) 
 Weekends (any time) 
 
Q20 Is the house or flat in which you live…? 
Please select one response only. 
 Owned outright 
 Owned with a mortgage or loan 
 Rented from the council 
 Rented from a housing association 
 Rented from someone else (e.g. a private landlord) 
 Rent free 
 Don’t know 
 
Q21 What is your main method of heating your home? 
Please select one response only. 
 Gas central heating 
 Other gas heating (e.g. single point gas fire) 
 Electric night storage heaters (a heater that mainly 
heats up overnight and releases heat during the day) 
 Other electric heating (e.g. single point electric fires, 
convection heaters or electric boiler) 
 Solid fuel central heating (e.g. coal, wood) 
 Oil central heating 
 Other solid fuel heating (e.g. coal, wood) 
 Calor gas, propane or LPG 
 District heating 
 Heat pump (ground or air source) 
 Other (please specify) 
 Don't know 
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Q22 Do you have any of the following appliances in your 
home?  
























Washing machine     
Tumble dryer     
Washer-dryer     
Dishwasher     
 
Q23 Do you have a ‘smart thermostat’? A smart 
thermostat allows you to change your heating settings 
using a smartphone app or from a computer.  
Please select one response only. 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 
Q24 Does your household lease or own an electric vehicle 
or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle? An electric vehicle 
runs only on electricity which is stored in a battery in 
the vehicle and is plugged into the mains electricity for 
charging. A plug-in hybrid electric vehicle combines 
a petrol or diesel engine with an electric motor - it can 
be plugged into the mains electricity for charging.  
Please select one response only. 
 Yes - own an electric vehicle 
 Yes - lease an electric vehicle 
 Yes - own a plug-in hybrid vehicle 
 Yes - lease a plug-in hybrid vehicle 
 No 
 Don't know 
 
D4 Please select the option that you think best describes 
the area you live in. 
Please select one response only. 
 Urban area - cities or towns 
 Suburban area – residential areas on the outskirts of 
cities and towns 
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 Rural area - villages or hamlets 
 
D_socialgrade D5_socialgrade We would now like you to think 
about the main income earner in 
your household, that is the person 
with the highest income. This may 
be you or it might be someone else.  
 
Which of the following groups does 
the main income earner in your 
household belong to?  
 
[If the main income earner is retired 
with an occupational pension, please 
enter their former occupation. Please 
only enter ‘retired’ if the main income 
earner is only receiving the state 
pension. If the main income earner 
has been unemployed for a period of 
less than 6 months, please answer 
based on their previous occupation.]  
 Higher managerial/ professional/ 
administrative (e.g. established 
doctor, solicitor, board director 
in large organisation (200+ 
employees), top level civil 
servant/ public service 
employee, head teacher etc.) 
 Intermediate managerial/ 
professional/ administrative (e.g. 
newly qualified (under 3 years) 
doctor, solicitor, board director 
of small organisation, middle 
manager in large organization, 
principal officer in civil service/ 
local government etc.) 
 Supervisory or clerical/ junior 
managerial/ professional/ 
administrator (e.g. office worker, 
student doctor, foreman with 25+ 
employees, sales person, student 
teacher etc.) 
 Skilled manual worker (e.g. 
skilled bricklayer, carpenter, 
plumber, painter, bus/ 
ambulance driver, HGV driver, 
unqualified teaching assistant, 
pub/ bar worker etc.) 
 Semi-skilled or unskilled manual 
worker (e.g. manual jobs that 
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require no special training or 
qualifications, apprentices to be 
skilled trades, caretaker, cleaner, 
nursery school assistant, park 
keeper, non-HGV driver, shop 
assistant etc.) 
 Student 
 Retired and living on state 
pension only 
 Unemployed for over 6 months 
or not working due to long term 
sickness 
 
D7_employment Which of these applies to you?  
 Working full time (30 or more 
hours per week) 
 Working part time (8 - 29 hours 
per week) 
 Working part time (Less than 8 
hours a week) 
 Full time student 
 Retired 
 Unemployed 
 Other not working 
 
 
D6 What is your annual pre-tax household income?  
 
By ‘household income’ we mean the total income 
received from all sources, including wages earnt by 
you, your partner and/or any other earner in the 
household, bonuses, pension income, benefits or rents 
and before tax deductions.  
 
Your data will be kept confidential and not passed on 
to any third parties.  
Please select one response only. 
 Up to £10,000 a year 
 £10,001 to £20,000 a year 
 £20,001 to £30,000 a year 
 £30,001 to £40,000 a year 
 £40,001 to £50,000 a year 
 £50,001 to £60,000 a year 
 £60,001 to £70,000 a year 
 £70,001 to £80,000 a year 
 £80,001 to £100,000 a year 
 £100,001 to £120,000 a year 
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 Over £120,001 a year 
 Prefer not to say 
 
D8 Do you consider yourself to have a disability or 
chronic illness? 
Please select one response only. 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 




9 Average treatment effect of individual control group 
interventions on willingness to switch to the TOU tariff 
in the Population-Based Survey Experiment (robustness 
check) 
   
Outcome=intends to switch to TOU 





















Observations 2464 2464 
R2 0.016 0.014 
   
Notes: Column 1 reports the results of an OLS model. Column 2 reports the 
results of a logit model in which the coefficients represent marginal effects 
estimated at the mean value of the treatment dummy variables. All models 
estimated using robust standard errors. 
p-values in parentheses. 
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10 Manipulation checks: did participants pay attention 




















Correctly answered the question on 
tariff structure 
75 72 0.132 
Agreed the tariff was described as 
being suitable for EV owners 
35 80 0.000 
 
Notes: The p-values reported in column 3 were obtained from an OLS regression 
of whether the individual correctly answered the question on tariff structure 
against the treatment dummy variable indicating whether the participant was in 
the tailored group (1) or the control group (0) and another regression in which a 
dummy variable indicating whether the individual agreed that the tariff was 
described as being suitable for EV owners was regressed against the tailored 
treatment dummy. For the tariff structure question, participants were asked to 
indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement “The tariff 
you just saw charged one price for your electricity regardless of what time of day 
you’re using it” and for the tailored treatment question, whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statement “The tariff was described as particularly 
suitable for people with electric vehicles”. 
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11 Treatment effect of tailoring on EV and non EV 
owners in the Population-Based Survey Experiment 
(logit robustness check) 
    
Outcome=intends to 







Don’t know EV 










































Observations 2464 2464 2464 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.048 0.013 
    
Notes: Logit model estimated with robust standard errors in which the 
coefficients represent marginal effects estimated at the mean value of the 
treatment dummy variables.  
p-values in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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12 Emails sent to EV owners in OLEV trial 
12.1 Generic email 
Email subject line: Switch your energy tariff to save £300. 
Email preview text (the preview text people see in their inbox): Dear [First Name], 
Your current energy tariff may no longer be appropriate. Find out how to choose 
the right tariff to save £300.  
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Body text:  
 
12.2 Tailored email 
Email subject line: Cut the cost of charging your electric car by £300. 
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Email preview text (the preview text people see in their inbox): Dear [First Name], 
Now that you own an electric car, your current energy tariff may no longer be 
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13 The impact of tailored emails on open rates and click-
through rates in OLEV trial (logit robustness check) 
 

















Observations 7038 7038 7038 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.009 - 
    
Notes: All models estimated using logit with reported coefficients representing 
marginal effects estimated at the means with robust standard errors.  
p-values in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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14 Explaining email open rates by time since EV 
purchased in OLEV trial (logit robustness check) 
Notes: All models estimated using logit with reported coefficients representing 
marginal effects estimated at the means with robust standard errors. The sample 
size in Model 5 is smaller because there are missing observations for the 
covariates, however a further robustness check which includes only controls for 
missing variables provides similar results. All regressions were estimated with 
robust standard errors.  
p-values in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
      

























































































    X 
Observations 7038 7038 7038 7038 2891 
Pseudo R2  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.014 
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15 Explaining email open rates by time since EV 
purchased with controls for missing data (robustness 
check) 
   






















Missing data on whether EV will be main 















Observations 7038 7038 
R2 0.007 0.005 
   
Notes: Model 1 reports the results of an OLS regression in which the 
independent variable is a dummy variable which takes on the value one if the 
recipient received their EV three months ago and zero if the recipient received 
their EV four months or more ago, with the addition of dummy variables 
controlling for whether the recipient did not report the status of the variables 
included in column 5 of Table 37 in Chapter 7. Model 2 reports the results of the 
same variable specification as model 1 but estimated using logit with reported 
coefficients representing marginal effects estimated at means. All models 
estimated using robust standard errors.  
p-values in parentheses 
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1 The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) 
1.1 UK Smart Meter Implementation Programme Cost Benefit Analysis  
BEIS could consider commissioning research to increase the precision of 
estimates of uptake to TOU tariffs, considering that the results of this study 
suggest that uptake could either be moderately higher or substantially lower than 
required for realising the business case for smart meters (BEIS, 2016b). This 
research would ideally measure uptake to TOU tariffs to which consumers can 
switch to rather than using surveys. For more details see Annex 2, section 1. 
1.2 Power to Switch campaign 
BEIS runs an annual ‘Power to Switch’ campaign that aims to prompt consumers 
to switch tariff. When encouraging EV owners to switch tariff, it will be more 
effective to target EV owners as a distinct group than to rely on generic mass 
switching campaigns, which target the 'average energy bill payer'.  
Once the market for EVs is more advanced, the BEIS ‘Power to Switch’ campaign 
could include posters that are specifically tailored to EV owners to encourage 
them to switch to TOU tariffs. Based on the results of this trial, these messages 
should emphasise the cost savings for home charging their vehicle rather than 
the potential reduction in their household energy bill.  
1.3 Gaining consent for vehicle-to-grid services 
BEIS has recently invested £20 million to develop vehicles capable of returning 
electricity to the national grid, which could also help to balance electricity supply 
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and demand in the future.117 The same challenges described in this thesis for 
how to encourage adoption of TOU tariffs are also likely to apply to obtaining 
consent from EV owners to provide vehicle-to-grid services.  
Whilst vehicle-to-grid is a different proposition to the TOU tariffs presented to 
participants in this thesis, the results suggest that future research could usefully 
test whether tailored marketing could be used to obtain consent from EV owners 
to deliver such services.  
2 Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 
The implications of this research for the British energy regulator Ofgem were 
communicated to Ofgem in response to its recent public consultation “Helping 
consumers make informed choices – proposed changes to rules around tariff 
comparability and marketing” and is available online.118 The response was co-
authored by myself and a colleague at the UCL Energy Institute but the sections 
based on this thesis were written by me and are summarised below. 
2.1 Future regulation of tariff marketing 
The results suggest that tariffs which are called ‘EV tariffs’ are likely to be more 
popular amongst EV owners than generically named TOU tariffs such as ‘off-peak 
saver’ tariff. To ensure the best outcomes for consumers, a number of changes 
to existing regulation may be required.  
                                            
117 Department for Transport “Innovative vehicle to grid technology to receive £20 million”, 8 July 
2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/innovative-vehicle-to-grid-technology-to-receive-20-
million 
118 Nicolson, M. and Fell, M. “Response to Ofgem consultation on ‘Helping consumers make 
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The first is that the Universal Supply Obligation which “requires suppliers to offer 
terms to all domestic customers that make a valid request” to protect customers 
against suppliers cherry-picking desirable customers may prevent suppliers from 
offering EV tariffs (or other group-specific tariffs). The reasons for this are outlined 
by Sara Bell, the CEO of the startup energy supplier Tempus Energy in its letter 
to Ofgem: 
[The Universal Supply Obligation is] currently causing 
Tempus and other innovative suppliers significant problems 
in bringing their innovations to market…We consider the EU 
obligation of universal supply to mean that every customer 
is entitled to an electricity supply, not that innovative 
suppliers offering niche deals (for example for customers 
with electric vehicles or demand flexible customers) need 
to offer these deals to all customers. Being overly restrictive 
risks causing confusion for customers as suppliers are 
forced to offer supply to customers who are not suitable for 
the product… (Bell, 2016, pp.3–5). 
Second, labelling tariffs ‘EV tariff’ will only lead to better consumer decision 
making, if the so-called ‘EV’ tariffs really are the cheapest option for an EV owner 
compared to any other tariff. It is acknowledged that suppliers could take 
advantage of labelling effects to drive customers to more expensive tariffs and 
regulation may be required to prevent this. 
Third, to make it easier for EV owners or other high electricity consuming groups 
to compare tariffs – including flat-rate and TOU tariffs – price comparison 
websites should be encouraged to enable EV owners to identify themselves as 
‘EV owners’, to improve the accuracy of price comparison results and cheapest 
tariff messages. Currently, price comparison websites allow users to input their 
electricity consumption manually or to use an estimate (based on the median 
household electricity usage). However, the median (3,300 kWh) is likely to be 
very inaccurate for EV owners, the majority of whom are likely to be charging at 
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home (see Chapter 7) and therefore with much higher electricity usage 
(depending on the efficiency of the vehicle and occupants’ use patterns).  
Fourth, the decision on whether to introduce a “requirement that any calculation 
by a supplier of the estimated annual cost figure119 should be internally consistent 
(ie calculated in the same way by any given supplier for all tariffs and for all 
customers over time)?” (Ofgem, 2016b, p.7), should be informed by future 
empirical research testing methods of generating accurate price comparisons for 
TOU tariffs (see Section 8 of Annex 2). 
2.2 Ofgem programme of trials 
Given the lack of evidence on how to increase uptake to TOU tariffs without using 
opt-out enrolment, it is recommended that Ofgem use its recently introduced 
licence condition (SLC 32A) which requires suppliers to participate in customer 
switching trials, to test methods of increasing switching rates to TOU tariffs and 
not just the best available flat-rate tariffs, as was the focus of the CMA’s (2016a) 
inquiry into the energy market. Trialling methods of increasing uptake to TOU 
tariffs is in alignment with all four of Ofgem’s major themes: promoting value for 
money, promoting security of supply, promoting sustainability and delivering 
government programmes.  
Where commercial TOU offerings are not available for testing, it would be worth 
exploring the option of running trials in collaboration with Ofgem’s Innovation Link, 
which has recently established a ‘regulatory sandbox’ that would permit energy 
                                            
119 The estimated annual cost figure is the figure provided by suppliers and price comparison 
websites to consumers which presents them with the estimated annual energy bill under one or 
more tariffs. 
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suppliers and other organisations to test new offerings amongst consumers prior 
to full launch (Ofgem, 2017c).  
Another option may be for such research to be conducted through the Virtual 
Energy Company, a testbed for research teams and companies to run trials of 
innovations in a constrained but realistic setting. The Virtual Energy Company will 
be funded by EPSRC through the Smart Meter Research Portal (SMRP) project 
(grant number: EP/P032761/1) and aims to either simulate or carry out the day-
to-day operations of supplying participating customers with energy, including 
billing, customer support, etc. in order to achieve its objectives. 
The thesis also provides some specific implications for what prompts are most 
likely to be effective. These are summarised below: 
 Switching prompts may be more effective when tailored to specific 
consumer groups rather than aimed at the ‘average energy bill payer’, as 
current campaigns usually are. Ofgem could experiment with using 
prompts which are segmented by specific consumer groups.  
 Although the CMA (2016a) recommends trialling tariff switching prompts 
delivered to consumers via their supplier, the OLEV trial suggests that 
switching prompts can be highly effective when sent from organisations 
other than energy suppliers, such as the Office for Low Emission Vehicles. 
Indeed, energy suppliers may not be the best organisations to deliver 
these prompts given that research finds that the vast majority (81%) of 
consumers do not pay attention to any other information in their bills except 
the amount they owe, suggesting that they may ignore prompts that are 
included on bills from their supplier (Consumer Focus, 2011).  Potential 
organisations include councils, housing associations, schools and 
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people’s employers. Ideally, a trial would compare the effectiveness of 
each of these types of messengers.  
 Whilst the start of the heating season or the termination of a consumer’s 
existing tariff may seem like an ideal time to prompt people to switch, the 
OLEV trial suggests that Ofgem could usefully trial the effectiveness of 
sending tariff switching prompts at different moments in the year or at 
different moments in a consumer’s life. Using timely prompts to encourage 
consumers to switch tariff was also proposed by The Behavioural Insights 
Team in its consumer report for Citizens Advice (Costa et al., 2016). One 
potential option would be for Ofgem to partner with estate agents to 
provide new home buyers or new renters with information about switching 
tariff when they receive the keys to their new property.  
3 The Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV) 
The results also have implications for OLEV, the partner organisation for the 
OLEV trial the results of which were reported in Chapter 7 of this thesis. These 
were communicated to OLEV in a report120 and in further meetings with OLEV 
and BEIS at which the results were presented to a range of stakeholders involved 
in the administration of the EV plug-in grant scheme. The main points are 
summarised below: 
 OLEV should continue to work with the Energy Saving Trust to maintain 
the website page of tips for EV owners and continue to send email prompts 
to EV owners about switching tariff. Once suppliers start offering TOU 
                                            
120 Nicolson, M., Huebner, G., Shipworth, D., Elam, S. “Do you want a time of use tariff with that? 
Prompting EV owners to switch tariff just after purchasing their vehicle.” A report prepared by UCL 
for the UK Government Office for Low Emission Vehicles, November 2016. 
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tariffs, these emails could include links to specific tariff offerings to which 
EV owners could switch directly from the email.   
 OLEV could run further email trials testing different ways of engaging EV 
owners with TOU tariffs, including emails which aim to measure the extent 
to which EV owners would be willing to sign up to controlled charging 
schemes such as the one being piloted in Electric Nation (Section 7 of 
Annex 2) 
 If leasing continues to form a large proportion of total EV sales, then the 
Government could try other methods of prompting lease-holders to sign 
up to DSR programmes, for instance, by prompting EV owners to switch 
to TOU tariffs when they are carrying out mandatory or routine tasks 
related to having an EV, such as renewing their vehicle tax or applying for 
the London congestion charge exemption on the Transport for London 
website.  
 OLEV could seek to identify whether there is a gap between the level of 
EV uptake required to make EV charging tariffs commercially viable and 
the level of uptake beyond which reinforcement of the local electricity 
network will be required and then how to bridge this gap (e.g. via 
regulation). According to My Electric Avenue (2015), 30% of the nation’s 
low voltage feeders would require reinforcement once 40%-70% of people 
have an EV. However, this is a wide range and lower levels of EV uptake 
may still have an impact on the network without providing a business case 
for suppliers to offer ‘smart’ charging tariffs. 
4 Energy suppliers 
Tariffs which are called ‘EV tariffs’ are likely to be more popular amongst EV 
owners than generically named TOU tariffs such as ‘off-peak saver’ tariff, even if 
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the rate and structure is identical. Suppliers should be mindful that such tariff 
names could lead some EV owners to sign up to tariffs that are not suitable for 
them, if they only pay attention to the name but little else (e.g. the tariff structure). 
5 Distribution network operators  
Distribution network operators (DNOs) are responsible for managing Britain’s 
electricity distribution network. The implications of this thesis for DNOs were 
communicated to the Smart EV Project through my response to the Smart EV 
Project consultation on 16 December 2016121, a project aiming to provide 
stakeholder supported recommendations to the Energy Networks Association to 
inform a standardised approach by which DNOs would operate controlled EV 
charging.  
The Smart EV Project requested feedback on its proposals for “the level of choice 
that [EV] customers should have and the rewards that they should receive when 
managed charging occurs” (Cross et al., 2016, p.2): (1) a “high incentive” 
scenario whereby anyone purchasing an EV is forced to be subject to a controlled 
charging scheme, with drivers compensated through subsidies on their electricity 
bill; (2) a “high regulation” scenario, identical to the latter but without 
compensating drivers and; (3) a “market led” scenario where EV owners can 
voluntarily adopt managed charging, with the level of customer reward dependent 
on the amount of demand-response provided by the driver (Cross et al., 2016).  
                                            
121 Individual responses were not published but the summary of all responses is provided in EA 
Technology’s “Consultation on Managed Electric Vehicle Charging: Summary of Responses 
Issue 1.0 Helping Electricity Networks Facilitate Electric Vehicle Uptake Delivered by EA 
Technology on Behalf of a Consortium of Key Government, Industry, Utility and Consumer 
Stakeholders”, 3 March 2017. https://www.eatechnology.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Smart-EV-Managed-EV-Charging-Consultation-Summary-Report-
Issue-1.0.pdf.  
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Although controlled charging is a different DSR service from the TOU tariffs 
presented to participants in this thesis, the strategies which are effective for 
engaging consumers with TOU tariffs are unlikely to be substantially different to 
those which are effective for engaging them with controlled charging. Both 
offerings will be new to most British EV owners and, given the inertia in the energy 
market, the first and greatest challenge is how to engage EV owners with any 
type of DSR programme as opposed to how to influence them to select between 
different types of programmes. 
The results of this thesis suggest that there are alternatives to both mandated or 
purely opt-in enrolment to controlled charging which are not considered by the 
Smart EV Project. In particular, the OLEV trial suggests that EV owners could be 
prompted to sign up to controlled charging schemes by emailing them within three 
months of purchasing their EV. The advantage of a voluntary approach over the 
methods proposed by the Smart EV Project (Cross et al., 2016) are that such 
strong limitations on consumer choice could generate negative unintended 
consequences, including limiting the uptake of EVs, if consumers feel it is the 
only way to avoid mandatory charging. Moreover, as Cross et al. (2016) notes, 
there is a lack of evidence on the likely level of voluntarily consumer uptake to 
controlled charging schemes and mandates are only a first best solution if the 
market-based mechanism is insufficient to prevent electricity infrastructure 
upgrade work. 
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1 Increase the precision of estimates of uptake to TOU tariffs 
The wide range of uptake estimates described above means it is hard for the UK 
government to plan on certain levels of TOU penetration. For example, an 
enrolment rate of 1% (the lower bound estimate from the meta-analysis) could 
have a substantial impact on the UK Government’s smart meter cost benefit 
analysis, which relies on uptake of 30% by 2030 (BEIS, 2016b).  
How can uptake estimates be made more precise? The review in Chapter 2 
highlighted a gap between the results obtained from surveys and those obtained 
from studies in which people were able to switch to a TOU. Given the lack of 
evidence of uptake based on actual switching rates, it is strongly recommended 
that countries obtain a measure of uptake based on recruitment rates to 
commercially available next-generation TOUs.  
There are three mechanisms by which this research could be conducted 
depending on the commercial availability of TOU products: (1) Ofgem’s 
programme of consumer trials; (2) the regulatory sandbox that is part of Ofgem’s 
Innovation Link; (3) the Virtual Energy Company122, funded through Smart Meter 
Research Portal, a five year project funded by EPSRC to provide smart energy 
data to the research community (grant number: EP/P032761/1).   
The Virtual Energy Company intends to be a testbed for research teams and 
companies to run trials of innovations in a constrained but realistic setting. It aims 
to either simulate or carry out the day-to-day operations of supplying participating 
customers with energy, including billing, customer support, etc. in order to 
achieve its objectives. 
                                            
122 This idea is being developed by Michael Fell at the UCL Energy Institute. 
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2 Test whether tailored marketing effects generalise to electric 
heating owners in a trial on recipients of the Government’s 
Renewable Heat Incentive  
Tests of the efficacy of tailored marketing could also be carried out on how high 
power users such as those with electric heating, for instance, by partnering with 
BEIS who administer the Renewable Heat Incentive, a subsidy scheme for 
renewable heating technologies including heat pumps. The administrative 
database associated with these subsidies will contain the names and contact 
details of all heat pump owners in the country. This could be used to run a similar 
trial to the one presented in Chapter 7, in which email prompts were delivered to 
recipients of the UK Government’s EV grant.  
3 Test why whether tailored marketing is effective 
The studies presented in this thesis were not designed to test why tailoring 
worked. The tailoring intervention as implemented in the OLEV trial may be 
exploiting mental accounting (Thaler, 1980, 1985, 1999) and de-shrouding 
(Gabaix and Laibson, 2006) whilst in the Flex Trial it is may be due to de-
shrouding or the theory that personalisation leads to greater likelihood of 
information processing (Rimer and Kreuter, 2006).  
A future study could disentangle the effect in the OLEV trial by testing the impact 
of a tailored message emphasising the way in which home charging increases 
one’s electricity bills (de-shrouding) relative to another message which frames 
the savings to be made on household energy bills from switching to a TOU tariff 
as savings to be made on the cost of charging the EV (to exploit mental 
accounting). Disentangling these mechanisms from increased information 
processing is likely to be best achieved through investigation at the neural level 
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as in neuroscientific studies on loss-aversion (Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 
2013). Alternatively, time taken to act on the information could be used as a proxy 
for speed of processing. Understanding why tailoring is effective could also help 
us to narrow down the other likely applications of tailoring.  
4 Test methods of identifying consumers with ‘flexibility capital’ 
…flexibility will not be sold or bought in a one-time 
transaction, but must be re-purchased and re-performed 
again and again in response to each instance of over 
voltage, under voltage, generation – supply imbalance and 
so on…[and therefore] rather than a commodity [a good that 
can be exchanged for financial reward], demand flexibility 
might be usefully thought of as a form of socio-technical 
capital held by end users of energy (Powells and Bulkeley, 
2013, p.1). 
Although heat pump and EV owners may have higher flexible electricity 
consumption than the average energy consumer, flexibility may be determined 
by a number of overlapping characteristics such as the presence of particular 
electrical appliances, automation technologies, work schedules and so on. It 
could be imagined that each of these characteristics can make an individual more 
or less able to shift their consumption away from peak times or in line with the 
price on a real-time TOU tariff as well as make an individual have more or less 
flexible electricity use available for automated DSR. It could be imagined that 
each of these characteristics could be scored for every individual, to provide an 
overall index of an individual’s total ‘flexibility capital’, to adapt a term coined by 
Powells and Bulkeley (2013).  
By identifying the characteristics that drive a persons’ flexibility through empirical 
investigation, such a flexibility capital index could be created. This may therefore 
enable energy suppliers or other third parties to match consumers to DSR tariffs 
and services on the basis of their flexibility capital index, targeting them using 
tailored marketing. This research should not stop at identifying clusters of users 
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who have the potential to use electricity flexibly123; to be most useful, it needs to 
identify easily observable characteristics that are proxies for having flexibility 
capital for targeted marketing purposes.  
5 Test the impact of non-punitive TOU tariff structures 
An alternative way of minimising the risk that consumers could be made 
financially worse off from switching to a TOU tariff is to create tariffs which aim to 
stimulate demand-response in ways that present consumers with the option to 
reduce their energy bills if they do participate but which will never increase them 
if they fail to participate.   
Such ‘non-punitive’ tariffs could take two main forms. One design would reduce 
the price of electricity at off-peak times without also increasing it at peak times. 
Another option would be to pay consumers a fixed fee for reducing their electricity 
at peaks, known as a critical peak rebate. Critical peak rebates can also be paired 
with direct load control, where a third party automatically reduces consumption at 
peak times, a practice which has been found to increase the demand-
responsiveness of customers (Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 2012). 
The key aim is to identify whether such tariffs are more or less attractive to 
consumers than punitive tariffs and, most importantly, whether non punitive tariffs 
are less effective at reducing peak energy demand than punitive tariffs. This may 
happen if, rather than delaying electricity consumption until the cheaper hours, 
consumers simply increase their overall electricity demand by increasing their off-
peak electricity use.  
                                            
123 An EPSRC funded project at the University of Reading – Red Peak – has “identifying clusters 
of users who might provide flexibility for peak shifting intervention” as one of its aims.  
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Critical peak rebates have never been tested in the UK – aside from one trial in 
London which is ongoing124 – but evidence from the US suggests that critical 
peak rebates are effective although less effective than the punitive alternatives 
(Hledik et al., 2017). However, if uptake to critical peak rebates is substantially 
higher, this lower level of demand-responsiveness may be compensated by the 
higher levels of customer enrolment. Only empirical research can determine 
whether or not this is likely to be the case. 
6 Test whether disaggregated energy billing for EV owners can 
maximise the consumer savings from TOU tariffs 
Although not an original aim of the thesis, a side-product of generating the tariff 
advice for EV owners on the Energy Saving Trust website for the OLEV trial is 
that, unless EV owners can use some of their other household appliances at off-
peak times in addition to charging their vehicles at off-peak times, not all EV 
owners will be financially better off on a two-rate TOU tariff.  
In theory, the proportion of EV owners who could save money from switching to 
a TOU tariff could be substantially increased if the electricity used to charge an 
EV was billed independently from the electricity an EV owner used for their other 
household electrical appliances. In this way, an EV owner could have a TOU rate 
applied to the electricity used to charge their vehicle but still remain on a flat-rate 
for the remainder of their household electricity demand. Since it is a household's 
high consuming electricity loads that will place the greatest strain on the electricity 
network it arguably makes more sense to distinguish between the high 
consuming flexible loads like EV charging from low consuming and less flexible 
                                            
124 Energywise is a project led by UK Power Networks in collaboration with UCL and local 
charities to assess the impact of critical peak rebates on the electricity consumption patterns of 
British Gas customers of a housing development in Tower Hamlets, London. 
http://innovation.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/innovation/en/Projects/tier-2-projects/Energywise/.   
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loads like cooking than to charge all electricity in the same way depending on 
time of day. 
A number of energy suppliers in the US already offer this service to EV owners 
using sub-metering125 but such an approach could be implemented at lower cost 
using smart meters, which are capable of metering up to two different sources of 
electricity at a time. Alternatively, it may be possible to implement a 
disaggregated billing service using non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) whereby 
“computational techniques are used to estimate the power demand of individual 
appliances from a single meter which measures the combined demand of multiple 
appliances” (Kelly, 2016, p.1). In 2016 it was reported that over 30 companies 
are offering disaggregation services to consumers (Kelly, 2016), implying that 
disaggregation technology is indeed working and making it a potential option for 
delivering disaggregated billing for EV owners. Indeed, Kelly (2016) notes that 
this type of appliance-targeted DSR is one potential use case for NILM.  
However, since there is insufficient empirical research to suggest how much other 
electricity an EV owner can shift into the off-peak times, research is required to 
test whether disaggregated energy billing for EV owners could reduce overall 
DSR from EV owners by removing any incentive to adjust the timing of electricity 
use apart from the electricity used to charge their EV. This research could also 
usefully test whether disaggregated billing could increase overall switching rates 
to TOU tariffs amongst EV owners, for example, if it increased the perception 
amongst EV owners that such a method would be more likely to save them money 
than if their whole household electricity use was charged on TOU scheme. If 
                                            
125 For examples, see Portland Gas and Electric that offer a two-rate TOU tariff for EV owners 
which records the electricity used to charge the vehicle separately using a second meter: 
https://www.pge.com/en_US/residential/rate-plans/rate-plan-options/electric-vehicle-base-
plan/electric-vehicle-base-plan.page.  
   
 
Annex 2: Future research 522 
disaggregated billing was substantially more popular, then any decrease in 
demand-response could be compensated for or exceeded by the increased 
enrolment numbers. 
7 Test the consumer acceptability of EV controlled charging 
schemes with/out vehicle-to-grid services  
The key potential advantage of automated/controlled charging126 over TOU tariffs 
is that it will allow suppliers or DNOs to respond to immediate events on the 
network and to help avoid herding effects that could create new peaks. Despite 
its advantages, there is still a lack of knowledge over the extent to which the 
average EV owner would consent to having their charging remotely controlled 
and how to obtain this consent, from a sufficiently large number of EV owners, to 
increase participation in controlled charging.  
For example, although My Electric Avenue found that the majority of its trial 
participants were “comfortable or very comfortable with Esprit being able to curtail 
their charging”(My Electric Avenue, 2015, p.10), this information cannot be 
generalised to the wider population of current and future EV owners. This is 
because the finding is based on surveys conducted with fewer than 100 people 
who had already agreed to participate in a 12 month research trial involving 
controlled charging of their EVs and were willing to complete the survey.  
Since no research has been conducted which aims to establish what proportion 
of EV owners would voluntarily sign up to controlled charging, it is not known 
whether adoption rates would be higher, lower or equal to what is required to 
defer or avoid reinforcement of the electricity network. If voluntary uptake is likely 
                                            
126 Controlled charging is the process by which a third party remotely controls the current 
delivered to an EV when plugged in. 
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to be equal to what is required, then mandated charging is not required; however, 
if uptake is likely to be lower, then research is required for how to increase 
adoption without using mandates, given that mandates could be unpopular and 
less effective overall.  
Research is therefore required to meet three objectives: 
 Obtain a measure of likely voluntary adoption of controlled charging 
schemes amongst EV owners. There are two main ways this could be 
tested: (1) introduce a question into the EV PICG survey which asks 
people how willing they would be for a third party to control their charging 
(question wording would need to be developed carefully) and how likely 
they would be to choose controlled charging over some of the alternatives 
such as ‘smart’ static TOU tariffs; (2) put this question to a nationally 
representative sample of EV owners in an online market research panel, 
which also requires EV owners to select what option they would choose if 
they could sign up to controlled charging, a ‘smart’ TOU tariff or a number 
of other options that are likely to be available to them – most market 
research companies run weekly panels and results can be obtained 
relatively quickly and at relatively low cost.  
 Test methods of obtaining active consent from EV owners to participate in 
controlled charging. To be effective, this method must be able to reach a 
sufficiently large proportion of EV owners in the UK, for example by 
encouraging tariff switching through an email from OLEV delivered to EV 
grant recipients or in the dealership when EV owners purchase their EV 
as part of their completion of the survey they complete when accepting the 
grant. 
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 Test the extent to which EV owners will override automated charging. Even 
if EV owners sign up initially to controlled charging schemes, it still seems 
likely that EV owners would be permitted to override the automated control 
should they need to. More research would be required to establish whether 
EV owners would override automated control and, if so, how often and with 
what impact for the distribution network.  
8 Develop an accurate method for comparing TOU tariffs 
Price comparison websites are now a key part of the landscape for switching 
tariffs, with about a third of tariff switches occurring through price comparison 
websites (Ofgem, 2015). However, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, estimating 
a customers’ annual bill on a TOU tariff is not straightforward because TOU tariffs 
are expected to generate, but do not guarantee, alterations in household 
electricity consumption patterns.  
There is therefore a need for research into how to create accurate energy bill 
projections on TOU tariffs that are understood by energy consumers. One 
potential method for allowing consumers to compare TOU tariffs is to provide 
consumers with a projection based on three possible scenarios – a scenario in 
which their total energy consumption and energy consumption patterns stay the 
same; a scenario in which they shift their electricity use away from the peak times 
moderately and; a scenario in which they shift their electricity use substantially 
away from peak times. This projection could be given as a vignette in which 
consumers are asked to identify with some fictional energy bill payer (are you 
more like John, Jack or Amy?) or explicitly based on their own potential usage 
(decide whether you will continue as you are, change a little or change a lot?). 
This should be tested in empirical trials to monitor its impact on the quality of the 
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individuals’ decision (i.e. whether they sign up to a tariff that saves them money 
in reality) as well as on their likelihood of switching to a TOU tariff (i.e. whether 
they switch from a flat-rate tariff to a TOU tariff).  
This research is required to ensure that price comparisons involving TOU tariffs 
provide consumers with as realistic an approximation as is possible about their 
likely energy costs. Further, if Ofgem follows the CMA suggestion to “require 
suppliers to have regard in the design of their tariffs to the ease with which 
customers can compare ‘value for money’ with other tariffs they offer” (CMA, 
2016d, p.23), this could have the unintended consequence of dis-incentivizing 
suppliers from offering more complex tariffs like TOU tariffs which are naturally 
much harder to compare (or will at least require more development effort to 
provide an easy method of comparison) than flat-rate tariffs. The comparability of 
TOU tariffs is therefore potentially very important for the success of DSR in the 
domestic sector in the UK. 
9 Test tailored marketing in other consumer good markets for 
which opt-out enrolment is unethical  
As noted in Chapter 3, there are many contexts in which there is a need to 
influence consumer decisions without manipulating default options, either 
because the choice architects lack the information required to identify a suitable 
default (e.g. in the case of credit cards, mortgages or health insurance schemes) 
or in cases which require on-going engagement rather than just a one-time 
decision such as enrolment in a course of antibiotics or a weight loss programme 
(Keller et al., 2011). In these cases it is necessary to prompt consumers to make 
an active choice. There are also some decisions for which the public or 
policymakers feel that automatic enrolment would unethical even in cases where 
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it has been shown to save lives; many countries have rejected calls to make 
registration to their national organ donor register an opt-out rather than opt-in 
choice (A Spital, 1995; Spital, 1996) despite the evidence that opt-out enrolment 
results in much higher registrations and organ donations (E. Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003). This suggests the value of research testing whether tailoring 
interventions at particular consumer groups could be effective at improving 
decision making in these contexts too. 
As pointed out by Ofgem and the CMA (2016), the energy context is relatively 
unique in the sense that there is no trigger point for making a decision; if you want 
to buy a home or get credit you have to choose a mortgage or credit card. 
However, energy tariffs share many similarities with these other consumer 
groups: like energy tariffs, mortgages and credit cards are relatively homogenous 
by comparison to other consumer goods such as supermarket food or of what 
gym to become a member. Choosing an energy tariff is similar to a health 
insurance programme in the sense that, at least if health insurance is not 
mandatory, there is no trigger point in the way that there is when an individual 
runs out of milk or bread (or at least not until it may be too late). 
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1 Survey weights – when they will be used, and when they will 
not 
1.1 Using weights to correct for selection error 
The Tariff Decision Making Experiment recruited amongst a nationally 
representative sample of the urban population of Britain whilst the Population-
Based Survey Experiment used quota sampling to recruit a nationally 
representative sample of the British population. Nevertheless, as a result of 
unequal probabilities of selection due to sampling design in the Population-Based 
Survey Experiment as well as participant non-response across both surveys, the 
final samples may not be representative of the urban or whole British population 
respectively. In addition, since the target population for these two studies is British 
energy bill payers, a variable against which participants were screened during the 
survey, there is no guarantee that the sample is perfectly representative of British 
energy bill payers.  
Survey weights can be used to account for unequal probabilities of selection due 
to the survey sampling design; unequal response rates across groups in the 
sample and; differences between the characteristics of people in the sample and 
the population of interest, for example in this thesis between the participants who 
are sampled in the Tariff Decision Making Study and the Population-Based 
Survey Experiment and the average energy bill payer in Britain (so called post-
stratification sampling weights (Debell and Krosnick, 2009)). If the survey uses a 
quota sampling design, as was used in the Population-Based Survey Experiment 
although not in the Tariff Decision Making Study, then weighting to account for 
unequal probabilities of selection and non-response will usually achieve the third 
aim of making the sample more like the population. However, whether or not 
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sample weights should be used in the analysis of survey data depends on 
whether the data is being used to provide descriptive statistics for a given 
population or to estimate causal effects (Solon et al., 2013: 22-23): 
In our detailed discussion…we have noted instances in 
which weighting is not as good an idea as empirical 
researchers sometimes think. Our overarching 
recommendation therefore is to take seriously the question 
in our title: What are we weighting for? Be clear about the 
reason that you are considering weighted estimation, think 
carefully about whether the reason really applies. 
1.2 Weights are used for descriptive statistics 
Following the recommendation in Solon et al. (2013), this thesis will present 
descriptive statistics in both unweighted and weighted forms. Characteristics will 
be discussed in terms of in-sample estimates rather than weighted estimates if 
the two are substantively similar. Deciding what constitutes a notable 
demographic discrepancy is a matter of judgement however according to Debell 
and Krosnick (2009) “demographic discrepancies exceeding 5 percentage points 
are “notable””, “discrepancies [of] less than 2 percentage points are not” and 
those “in the 2 to 5 point range may be notable if the characteristic is of special 
interest for the study or is strongly associated with key outcome variables” (Debell 
and Krosnick, 2009). I will therefore interpret in-sample estimates in both the 
Tariff Decision Making Study and the Population-Based Survey Experiment if 
they are similar but discuss any significant discrepancies and their possible 
impact on the interpretation of the results. 
1.3 Weights are not used in causal analysis 
Weights will not be used to estimate the causal effect of tailoring on intention to 
switch to the time-varying tariff in the Population-Based Survey Experiment. This 
is for two reasons. First, any sampling error introduced through non-response will 
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be the same on average across treatment and control groups and therefore does 
not pose a threat to the estimate of causal effects. As noted in Wooldridge (2009) 
who discusses the use of weights in non-experimental analyses, weighting has 
no impact on the consistency of standard error estimates and can reduce 
precision when sampling is exogenous.  
Second, weighting the observations to help make the participants in the sample 
more like the target population, namely the average British energy bill payer, 
requires a reference dataset that disaggregates the characteristics of British 
energy bill payers by demographic variables that can be used to construct 
weights. However, such a reference dataset does not exist and Census data is 
not sufficiently granular to be used for creating bespoke weights. Moreover, even 
if better data were available, since weights can only eliminate sources of sample 
selection error that are correlated with the variables from which the weights are 
constructed (Imai et al., 2008), weighting on its own cannot guarantee that the 
sample population is the same as the population of interest.  
A more transparent option which this thesis adopts is to present the descriptive 
statistics of the sample compared to the characteristics of the average British 
member of the population. The thesis draws on a dataset obtained by the author 
from a survey run with a professional market research company with a nationally 
representative sample of British adults who identified as energy bill payers. When 
the necessary comparison data is not available in this latter dataset, the thesis 
draws on Census data. This means that the results can be interpreted in this light 
whilst acknowledging the fact that there may be differences between the average 
energy bill payer and the average member of the public.
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1 Internal and external validity  
1.2 Threats to internal validity 
According to Shadish et al. (2002), a study which is interested in answering a 
causal research question has internal validity “if the observed covariance 
between a treatment and an outcome” (Athey and Imbens, 2016, p.5) represents 
a causal effect. This thesis will discusses the results of the studies using a RCT 
design in terms of this definition of internal validity. 
Section 3.1 of Chapter 4 highlighted the three key assumptions that must be met 
for the difference in average outcomes across control and treatment groups in a 
RCT to represent a causal effect: (1) random assignment; (2) excludability and; 
(3) non-interference, also known as the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA). The key threats to the internal validity of RCTs are therefore: violations 
or interference in the randomisation mechanism (Gerber and Green, 2012) and 
anything which could lead to violations of the excludability and non-interference 
assumptions as discussed in both Gerber and Green (2012) and Glennerster and 
Takavarasha (2013), including partial compliance and evaluation-driven effects 
(Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013).  
Spillovers and attrition can also affect the internal validity of a randomised trial by 
lowering statistical power and by introducing bias if it is correlated with participant 
factors that are also correlated with response to the treatment (Glennerster and 
Takavarasha, 2013). These threats are relevant to RCTs conducted in survey 
contexts (and therefore the population-based survey experiment) as well as those 
conducted in the field. Details of how each of the studies in this thesis were 
designed to mitigate these threats are described in the following sections.  
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1.2.1 Violations or interference in the randomisation mechanism 
This assumption will be satisfied as long as all subjects are allocated to treatment 
and control groups by the same procedure. To avoid violations of this assumption, 
randomisation in all the randomised control trials was performed by a machine. 
This means there was no researcher discretion in the mechanism.  
To ensure that the assignment mechanism was truly random – for example, that 
subjects were randomly sorted and then treatment randomly assigned to half of 
the subjects rather than by some haphazard mechanism – I made sure that I 
understood what mechanism was being used by the email tool for the OLEV trial, 
by the developer who designed the website for the Flex Trial and by the survey 
company who implemented the randomisation in the survey software (the exact 
mechanisms are reported in the relevant sections above). In all cases, 
randomisation balance checks will be conducted and results presented in each 
of the results chapters to provide evidence that randomisation was performed 
successfully. For the Flex Trial, for which there is no baseline data, the results of 
balance tests on the group sizes across treatment and control conditions will be 
presented.  
1.2.2 Excludability 
The excludability assumption is that observed outcomes “respond solely to the 
receipt of treatment, not to the random assignment of the treatment or any indirect 
by-products of random assignment” (Gerber and Green, 2012, p.45). The 
assumption would be violated if different procedures are used to measure 
outcomes across treatment and control groups or if other actors intervene in 
either just the treatment or control group because the experiment is taking place. 
Plausible scenarios for the latter example are when the random assignment of an 
intervention, for example bed nets to reduce malaria transmission in developing 
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countries, triggered local organisations to increase their provision of bed nets in 
control regions by highlighting the potential importance of bed nets. In other 
cases, such behaviour could introduce bias, for example if the people 
implementing the trial deliberately deviate from the protocol by extending the 
treatment to people based on perceived need (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 
2013), for example, school teachers who were responsible for administering free 
milk to some students and not others in a large but non-cluster randomised 
control trial in the 1970s UK (Baker et al., 1980) may have deviated from the 
protocol by giving free milk to the students they felt were in greater nutritional 
need, which would result in the trial underestimating the impact of free school 
milk. The latter scenarios are examples of what is called one-sided non-
compliance (Gerber and Green, 2012), whereby the control group is treated when 
it should not be, and the second also involves interference in the randomisation 
mechanism.  
The excludability assumption is highly unlikely to be violated for the trials 
presented in this thesis for three reasons. First, across all trials, the same 
methods are used to measure outcomes in treatment and control groups.  
Second, because random assignment is being performed by a machine and both 
I and any partners (such as OLEV) are blinded to the assignment until outcome 
measures are observed, it would be impossible for us to know who was in which 
group in order to intentionally treat the control group differently from the treatment 
group. It is potentially plausible that, by engaging OLEV in a trial of this type and 
suggested that tailored messages would be more effective, I may affect how 
OLEV deals with its grant recipients. However, prior to the trial and throughout 
the trial, OLEV had never before contacted its grant recipients. There is therefore 
minimal risk that they would have sent them tailored correspondence in the time 
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prior or during the trial. OLEV also reviewed the trial protocol and was aware that 
nothing should be sent to participants prior or during the trial to avoid influencing 
results.  
Third, emails prompting electric vehicle owners to switch tariff are arguably less 
emotive than free milk for hungry children or bed nets for people in regions with 
high malaria incidence; the common motivations behind external bodies 
interfering with treatment assignment are therefore less likely to play a role here. 
The nature of the interventions tested in this thesis also makes interference 
between groups less likely too, as the next section will outline. 
1.2.3 Non-interference (the stable unit treatment value assumption) 
This assumption states that potential outcomes in the control group reflect only 
the treatment status of the individual in the control group and not the treatment 
status of individuals in the treatment group, or vice versa. According to Gerber 
and Green (2012), this assumption would be threatened as a result of three main 
occurrences: (1) partial compliance whereby participants in the treatment group 
come into contact with participants in the control group and pass on the benefits 
or dis-benefits of the intervention, for example if the families of children being 
treated with deworming medicine move to a region assigned to the control group; 
(2) subjects are aware of the treatment that they and other subjects receive, 
leading the treatment group to “work harder” than they would normally 
(Hawthorne effect), the control group to compete with the treatment group (John 
Henry effect) or the control group to resent not having the treatment and thus 
work less hard than they would normally (Resentment/demoralisation effects); (3) 
resources that are used to treat participants in the treatment group diminish 
resources that would otherwise be available to participants in the control group.  
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The risk of any of these scenarios occurring is minimal to non-existent in the case 
of the studies in this thesis because of the nature of the intervention and the way 
in which the studies have been designed. Consider the first issue – interference 
due to contact between participants in the control and treatment groups. In all 
trials, the pool of participants will be so geographically dispersed that the 
likelihood of participants coming into physical contact with one another and 
discussing a website they visited, a survey they completed or an email they 
received about energy tariffs is minimal. A more plausible scenario is that, if the 
prospect of electric vehicle or heat pump tariffs is popular amongst electric vehicle 
and/or heat pump owners that participants of the Flex Trial127 or OLEV trial128 
could post about it online. However, even in the unlikely event that someone was 
interested in energy tariffs enough to post something online about it, it is unlikely 
that such a post would receive sufficient attention (e.g. go viral) to have a 
substantial impact on participants. If such a post did go viral, I would find out 
about it and could consider its impact on the results.  
Participants in the Flex Trial and OLEV trial are not made aware that they are 
being observed for research purposes at all, which eliminates the threat of 
Hawthorne or John Henry effects. Although participants in the population-based 
survey experiment are aware that they are participating in research, they are not 
made aware that the tariff descriptions vary randomly and, since participants can 
only complete the survey once, there is no plausible mechanism by which 
panellists could discuss what they saw with one another and then go back and 
change their response. 
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The prospect of an intervention resulting in the loss of resources to others who 
form the control group may be feasible in the context of some trials. For example, 
where an intervention, such as bed nets, is already being administered in some 
form and providing more bed nets to the treatment group could reduce the ability 
of a partner organisation to provide the baseline level of bed nets it was already 
providing (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). However, the interventions 
delivered in this trial are very low cost – they involve amending the wording of 
text on a website, an email and in a survey describing tariffs – and were not being 
administered in any form prior to these studies. For instance, OLEV was not 
sending any email correspondence to its grant recipients prior to the trial.  
1.2.4 Partial compliance as a result of compliers and defiers 
Partial compliance can also have effects on the internal validity of trials beyond 
just violating the excludability and non-interference assumptions. Broadly 
speaking, partial compliance occurs when participants do not receive the 
treatment that was assigned to them (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). This 
happens when some of the participants in the control group end up being treated 
and/or when some of the participants assigned to the treatment group do not get 
treated at all or do not get treated fully.129 Although this can happen as a result of 
the deviations from the trial protocol, it can also happen purely as a result of 
participants undertaking their normal everyday behaviour. For example, in a 
clinical trial designed to assess the impact of mammograms on breast cancer 
mortality rates (Freedman et al., 2004), whilst many participants in the treatment 
group may indeed go get a mammogram and most in the control group will not 
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(compliers), some participants assigned to the treatment group will  not attend 
whilst some in the control group may go and get a mammogram (defiers).  
In the presence of compliers and/or defiers, the ability to estimate the impact of 
the treatment on the outcome of interest is threatened because doing so requires 
the treatment group to be significantly more likely to receive the treatment than 
participants assigned to the control group. In the case of the Population-Based 
Survey Experiment, the existence of compliers and defiers is unlikely because, 
conditional on completing the survey, participants will be treated and the analysis 
is only performed on those who complete the survey. In the case of the OLEV 
trial, all participants with a valid email address will receive the treatment and 
treatment effects are only estimated amongst the group who receive the email, 
and this should be the same across both treatment and control groups (this will 
be tested). Although some participants will not open the email and therefore be 
exposed to the treatment in the body copy of the email (as opposed to just the 
copy in the subject line), all analyses are performed as intent-to-treat to avoid 
introducing bias.  
In the case of the Flex Trial, there is a small probability that individual people 
could be treated with more than one treatment if they visit the website from 
multiple browsers, given that the study randomises at the cookie level, which 
identifies a combination of a user account, browser and device not a person. This 
is how all online field experiments (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2011; Edelman and 
Duncan S. Gilchrist, 2012; Blake et al., 2017) and commercial organisations run 
randomised control trials online. However, whilst this remains a possibility, the 
probability that any such incidents will have a substantive effect on results is low. 
First, given that the supplier is not well known, it is assumed that the 
overwhelming majority of participants will not visit the website more than once, 
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meaning that the outcome recorded for most people will be based on a single 
visit. This data will be collected so it will be possible to identify what proportion of 
participants are new rather than returning users.  
Second, interference amongst the minority of participants who may return to the 
site on multiple occasions is unlikely because the cookie is registered on devices 
and on the users’ browser profile making it unlikely that a unique person would 
‘mistakenly’ be treated as two separate individuals in the experiment. This is 
because, the first time that a unique user account/browser clicks on an advert, a 
cookie is dropped to mark the treatment to which the individual is assigned so 
that if they ever visit the website again from that browser or from that device, the 
original treatment assignment is honoured to prevent interference across groups. 
This means that a unique individual who visits the website on Internet Explorer 
from their laptop and then visits the website from their mobile phone but using 
the same browser will still be presented with the website variation to which they 
were originally assigned. The only time there would be a violation of this rule 
would be if an individual visited the site from a different browser and a different 
device. Researchers who use online data that rely on unique identification of 
individual people generally consider that the Internet does, in practice, identify 
unique individuals with good accuracy (Rutz and Bucklin, 2008; Lambrecht and 
Tucker, 2011). 
1.2.5 Attrition  
By reducing the total sample size or lowering variation in outcome measures, 
attrition can reduce statistical power and therefore the ability to detect whether 
any difference in average outcomes across treatment and control groups 
occurred by chance or due to the treatment itself, which is the aim of an 
experiment. In general, attrition is less likely to be a problem in the studies in this 
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thesis because, compared to other trials where an intervention is delivered and 
outcomes measured months or sometimes year later, there is very little time 
between intervention exposure and outcome data collection. Nevertheless, the 
risk of attrition is not zero and attrition can be more problematic if it differs across 
treatment and control groups since this could bias treatment effect estimates 
(Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013).  
To minimise the risk that attrition would adversely affect my ability to measure 
treatment effects, the following steps and/or design choices were made: 
 For both surveys, the market research company and advertising agency 
oversampled participants based on an expected non-response rate; 
 For the Flex Trial, the primary outcome measure was the proportion who 
get a quote for the tariff, an outcome which is collected on the homepage 
and which participants can complete by entering just their postcode on the 
basis that making it easy for participants to provide this outcome measure 
increases the likelihood that they will. The ‘get a quote’ textbox was placed 
at several locations throughout the website to maximise the likelihood that 
participants would complete it before leaving the website. However, whilst 
the success of these efforts were important for generating sufficient 
variation in the outcome measures for statistical power, they are not 
required to minimise missing data since the outcome of interest is whether 
or not people do provide a quote or do switch to the tariff. To minimise the 
proportion of people leaving the website before indicating whether they 
own an electric vehicle or a heat pump, the survey that participants were 
presented with if they entered their postcode consisted of just three 
questions, to minimise fatigue and therefore attrition.  
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 For the OLEV trial, power calculations for detecting differences in click-
through rates to the email accounted for the fact that a large proportion of 
recipients were unlikely to open the email  
1.2.6 Spillovers 
Spillovers are positive or negative externalities arising from implementing the 
intervention of interest (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). Glennerster and 
Takavarasha (2013) give the example of a vaccination programme which could 
lower disease incidence in the community as a whole, an informational 
programme in which non-participants also learn of the benefits of using bed nets, 
marketwide effects whereby firms fire older workers because the intervention 
gives them incentives to hire young workers and behavioural effects whereby 
individuals in the control group imitate the behaviour of those in the treatment 
group.  
If spillovers occur but are not measured, then I could underestimate the impact 
of the interventions tested (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). If spillovers 
affect participants in my control groups, then the control group would no longer 
represent a good counterfactual of what would happen in the absence of the 
intervention (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). 
Since the studies in this thesis are conducted online and over a relatively short 
period of time, spillover effects are unlikely. The likelihood of control-group 
participants imitating the behaviour of participants in the treatment group in any 
studies is very low given that participants are most likely to be undertaking the 
study in privacy of their own home.  
The interventions in the Flex Trial and the Population-Based Survey Experiment 
also do not lend themselves to positive or negative externalities; unlike an 
   
 
Annex 4: Ethics, internal and external validity 542 
immunisation program, it is hard to see how tailored messaging on a website or 
as part of an intervention delivered in a survey experiment could convey 
meaningful effects beyond the group of participants exposed in the study. 
Although it is possible that non-participants of the email trial could find out about 
the webpage on the Energy Saving Trust website if trial participants post about it 
online, since the outcome measures of interest are open rates and click-through 
rates from the email, there is almost no chance that such spillovers could affect 
the outcomes in the control group and therefore undermine the quality of the 
control group as a valid counterfactual.  
If non-participants of the trial access the webpage and download the PDF 
information, my trial will not be able to directly attribute this effect to the emails 
since there is no identifier that can link email recipients to the downloads; 
however, since the Energy Saving Trust is providing data on the number of 
downloads of the PDFs, I will be able to capture the total downloads of the 
information on the website.  
The probability that the trials could increase switching rates and therefore 
competition in the retail electricity market in Great Britain is very low because, 
although the trials are relatively large compared to many trials in the social 
sciences, the sample size is not large enough in the context of 25 million 
household electricity consumers to have an impact on the market as a whole.  
The most likely positive spillovers that would not be captured by the studies in 
this thesis is the impact of the tailored prompt on actual tariff switching rates in 
the OLEV trial. This is unavoidable given that I cannot link my data to energy 
supplier customer data; the only way of doing so would have been to have 
entered a data sharing agreement with every energy supplier in Great Britain and 
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this was not deemed feasible given the timescales of the project or worthwhile 
given that I did not know how effective, if at all, the email prompts would be. 
However, when presenting the results I will attempt to estimate the potential size 
of these potential positive spillover effects based on assumptions about the 
proportion of recipients who would switch, and how this would affect the total 
number of switchers in the treatment and control condition in the event that the 
tailored email results in higher open and click-through rates. 
1.2.7 Measurement error 
Aside from the OLEV trial, all of the studies in this thesis use self-reported data 
collected through surveys. A survey instrument is valid if it measures what it 
intends to measure however self-reported data can introduce error and steps 
should be taken to minimise this. For instance, the Population-Based Experiment 
relies on people accurately reporting whether they own an electric vehicle since 
this variable will be used to test for treatment effect heterogeneity in the impact 
of tailoring. The wording of the question used to identify electric vehicle ownership 
was piloted in cognitive based interviews for a prior survey that I conducted on a 
different nationally representative sample of electric vehicle owners (M Nicolson 
et al., 2017) to check that people correctly understood the question. The question 
briefly explains what an electric vehicle is as it is not assumed that it will be 
common knowledge: “An electric vehicle runs only on electricity which is stored 
in a battery in the vehicle and is plugged into the mains electricity for charging. A 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicle combines a petrol or diesel engine with an electric 
motor - it can be plugged into the mains electricity for charging”. Although some 
people may inaccurately report their electric vehicle ownership status, 
randomisation ensures that the same number of people will give an inaccurate 
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report in both the treatment and control groups so measurement error is not 
expected to affect the validity of the treatment effect estimate.  
The same goes for measuring intention to switch to the tariff in the Population 
Based Survey Experiment, which requires people to say whether they would or 
would not switch to the tariff presented. Although some people may be undecided 
and so select a response at random, the measurement error will be the same on 
average across the groups.   
Measurement of electric vehicle and heat pump ownership is also self-reported 
in the Flex Trial however since it is not required for assessing the treatment effect 
this is not a major threat to the internal validity of the trial. 
Although the OLEV trial uses behavioural outcome data, self-reported data will 
be included as covariates in the regression equation to test for the habit 
discontinuity effect including details such as expected annual mileage and 
whether the owner intends to use the electric vehicle as their main vehicle. These 
questions are answered by the person making the purchase in the dealership on 
the day they purchase their vehicle with the assistance of the dealer. OLEV 
explained that they are conducting periodic checks to ensure that the details are 
being completed by the purchaser rather than the dealer and these checks have 
not revealed any problems with data collection. Some data may be missing but 
this will be handled by controlling for missingness, for example, if gender or age 
is missing, a dummy variable will be included for gender or age being missing. 
Behavioural outcome data is used in both the Flex Trial and the OLEV trial and 
although it is less problematic than self-reported data care has also been taken 
to avoid errors introduced by myself as the researcher. For instance, in the Flex 
Trial, the behavioural outcome measures (get a quote rates, clicks on the Switch 
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to Us icon, page views, switching) are collected by Google Analytics tracking 
installed on the website by the professional website developer. The only potential 
source of measurement error that could be introduced in the behavioural data is 
through inaccurate coding during dataset cleaning, for example, if I were to 
mistakenly identify an action as ‘get a quote’ when it was some other action taken 
by the user on the website as a result of mistranslating the web language. To 
minimise this risk, the developer provided me with a code book that associated 
all the labels that they gave in the web language to a description that I understood. 
Using pilot data, we coded up the data and verified that we each produced the 
same results; for instance, that the counts for each of the outcome variables were 
identical for us both.  
As in prior research (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2011; Edelman and Duncan S. 
Gilchrist, 2012; Blake et al., 2017) I do not have data to address measurement 
error introduced in the data collected by the Flex Trial resulting from inaccurate 
identification of unique individuals who visit the website from multiple devices and 
browsers. However, the risk of this is relatively low in principle because it is 
expected that most participants will only visit the website on one occasion.   
The OLEV trial uses behavioural data collected through the email campaign tool 
and administrative data collected at the point of purchase. The data on the date 
of purchase is recorded on the system automatically when a purchase is made 
so is unlikely to be subject to error; it is this data that will be used to test the habit 
discontinuity effect.  
1.2.8 Multiple hypothesis corrections 
Since each of the studies will involve testing multiple hypotheses, this increases 
the risk of erroneously accepting a hypothesis that is actually false unless 
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measures are taken to correct for this. Following the recommendations of Fink et 
al. (2012) and Almeida et al. (2012), the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) 
correction will be employed to minimise the false discovery rate (FDR). The FDR 
“correction allows for an appropriate level of caution in interpreting the results of 
testing many hypotheses, without becoming so conservative that we can no 
longer draw important conclusions about heterogeneity in responses to 
treatment” (Fink et al, 2012: 18). 
The correction will be applied to groups of hypotheses tested. For instance, it will 
be applied to correct all p-values used to test the average treatment effect of 
tailoring in the Flex Trial across each of the four outcome measures. A separate 
correction will then be applied to correct for multiple hypothesis testing owing to 
running treatment effect heterogeneity analyses.  
I do not apply the correction across all the hypotheses tested in this thesis or on 
a chapter-by-chapter basis because the purpose of multiple hypothesis 
corrections is not to penalise each additional p-value computed by a researcher 
in their lifetime (Perneger, 1998) but to control the error rate for the specific 
judgement that is being made by the researcher in their research (Cyrus, 2017).  
1.2.9 Arbitrary statistical significance thresholds 
Another consideration when assessing the internal validity of a trial is its 
dependence on conventional standards for statistical significance for assessing 
whether there is evidence against the null hypothesis. Although it is conventional 
to treat p-values which fall below the threshold of p=0.05 as statistically significant 
and those which exceed p=0.05 as not statistically significant, the p-value is a 
continuous variable which, if interpreted as such, can provide a more informative 
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or nuanced account of the likelihood that any given result casts doubt on the null 
hypothesis (Halsey et al., 2015; Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016).  
This is because, “In the same way that a small P value does not guarantee that 
there is a real effect, a P value just above 0.05 does not mean no effect” 
(Hackshaw and Kirkwood, 2011, p.1), particularly if the independent variable of 
interest has a small effect on the dependent variable of interest or the outcome 
measure has a low baseline prevalence in the population. For instance, since 
very few people switch tariff, field experiments which test methods of increasing 
switching rates are likely to have very low variation in many outcome variables of 
interest.  
Although researchers should ensure they recruit enough subjects to run a 
sufficiently  powered study – given the pre-study odds of the hypothesis being 
true at a certain statistical significance level (Ioannidis, 2005) –  Glennerster and 
Takavarasha (2013) argue that researchers should also be cautious about 
ignoring promising results of early studies which may find evidence of a possible 
relationship which could be tested again in future research. This is a sensible 
approach given that the results of one isolated study can never, on its own, 
provide sufficient evidence to reject a given null hypothesis (Ioannidis, 2005). 
Following the recommendations of the statement on p-values published by The 
American Statistician, I will interpret my results using the p-value and other 
contextual factors including the study design, the way the interventions were 
implemented, the quality of the outcome data collection and the external evidence 
for the phenomenon under study (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016, p.9).  
Following the approach adopted in the American Economic Review, as well as a 
number of other top economics journals, results tables will highlight results which 
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are statistically significant at the 10% confidence level using a + sign. The 
convention of only highlighting results which are significant at the 99.9%, 99% or 
95% confidence level is influenced by medical research where the risk of a false 
positive could be life-threatening. For the purposes of this thesis, being able to 
have 90% confidence, or even 80% confidence, that one type of marketing 
intervention would increase uptake to a TOU tariff may provide sufficient grounds 
for marketing the tariff in that way rather than the alternative against which the 
intervention was being evaluated, particularly if the results are consistent across 
each of the studies in the thesis and the effect sizes are large. In any case, the 
reader can draw their own judgement on these effects.  
Note also that adopting this approach to evaluating statistical significance can 
work both in favour or against the researchers’ pre-existing assumptions about 
whether an intervention will be effective or not. For instance, although it is 
hypothesised that tailored marketing will increase uptake amongst EV and heat 
pump owners it also hypothesised that uptake will either be lower or no different 
amongst participants who do not belong to this group.   
2 Evaluating external validity   
Another type of validity considered by Shadish et al. (2002) is external validity, 
which they define as “the extent to which a causal relationship holds over 
variation in persons, settings, treatments, and outcomes” (p.83). This is echoed 
in Gerber and Green (2012) who put forward a four-part typology for evaluating 
the ‘fieldiness’ of field experiments but which is arguably applicable more broadly, 
including to population-based survey experiments and non-experimental surveys, 
both of which are employed as methods in this thesis.  
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According to Gerber and Green's (2012) typology, external validity should be 
assessed on the basis of the extent to which: (1) the context in which the study 
is conducted is the same as or similar to the real-world context in which the 
behaviour of interest would be observed; (2) the interventions tested in the study 
are similar to or the same as the intervention as it would be implemented in real 
life; (3) the participants recruited into the study are the same as or like the 
population who are likely to be subject to the intervention and; (4) the outcomes 
measured in the study are the same as or similar to the outcomes that matter in 
real life.  
There are many other typologies used to assess external validity and I am not 
suggesting this is the only one; only that it is a suitable typology for the research 
methods used in this thesis.  
Nevertheless, two relevant aspects that this typology does not capture is that 
knowing that one is in a study can affect peoples’ behaviour (see the discussion 
of evaluation-driven effects in Glennerster and Takavarasha [2013]) and the fact 
that, whilst studies can be designed to generate generalisable results as best as 
possible (in the manner described above), proof of generalisability can never 
come from considering the design or results of a single study or from a number 
of studies from a single research group or team but only from repeated 
experimentation and replication (McDemott, 2011). In this sense, the important 
factor is whether the multiple studies in this thesis produce results that are 
consistent with each other, a factor that will be discussed in the global discussion 
of this thesis (Gerber and Green, 2012).  
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When discussing the results of the studies, I will refer to the criteria laid out by 
Gerber and Green (2012) as well as in relation to evaluation-effects in terms of 
the expectations I have of the studies in terms of their generalisability.  
3 Ethical considerations 
It is not possible to obtain informed consent from participants in natural field 
experiments. Informed consent is one of the first standards laid out in The 
Nuremberg Code of 1947 by which all medical research must abide when 
conducted on human participants. The Code was created to prevent the types of 
immoral experiments conducted on Nazi prisoners of war (‘The Nuremberg Code 
(1947)’, 1996).  
However, as stated by List (2011), whilst voluntary consent remains essential for 
“experiments that can affect the physical health of the participants…the case for 
voluntary consent in [social science] experiments is less clear-cut.” (p.8). Framing 
studies are particularly suitable candidates for natural field experiments since 
manipulating the way in which information is presented poses no physical risk to 
participants so arguably falls outside of the scope of experiments for which 
informed consent is explicitly required. For instance, consider a field experiment 
run by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) which aimed to test the impact of race 
on employment outcomes by sending identical CVs to prospective employers 
with names that signal different races. The employer suffers no physical harm 
from this experiment and perhaps suffers only a minimal harm from having their 
time taken up considering CVs for fictional individuals; on the other hand, 
revealing the true purpose of the experiment may have changed the way the 
employers had responded. As argued by List (2011), with “the benefit 
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of…oversight [from ethical review boards], there are valid arguments for not 
making informed consent an ironclad rule in natural field experiments” (p.8). 
   
 


















Choosing regression estimators – OLS 
versus random effects and logit  
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1 Random effects versus OLS for the meta-analysis 
The meta-analysis reported in Chapter 2 used OLS with Fixed Effects rather than 
a Random Effects model. This was done for three reasons. First, study effects 
are unlikely to be random because studies were not randomly sampled from a 
larger population of studies. On the contrary, the systematised review design 
used means that studies were purposively sampled on the basis that they met 
specific inclusion criteria.  
Second, the key difference between random and fixed effects models is that 
random effects models partition the unexplained variation in the outcome 
measure into two components: between-study variation and also within-study 
variation. In clinical trials, where outcomes are monitored for multiple patients 
over time, there is likely to be considerable within-study variation. However, in 
this study, within-study variation is likely to be minimal because the outcomes 
were not recorded over time; substantively, it is more likely that differences in 
tariff design will account for differences in uptake within studies since the only 
reason there are multiple measures of uptake from the same study is if the same 
study tested different tariff types, and this is included as a fixed effect in the 
model.  
Third, random effects models for meta-regression in clinical trials are motivated 
on the basis that the true treatment effects obtained across multiple studies are 
unlikely to be the same across studies and the random effects model, unlike the 
fixed effects model, accounts for this. However, the meta-regression in this 
research is not being used to aggregate treatment effects obtained from multiple 
independent randomised control trials or even to obtain an estimate of the 
average uptake; rather it is being used to estimate the impact of different features 
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of TOU tariffs, such as the presence or absence of automation or upfront cash 
incentives, on uptake, whilst controlling for observed differences in study design 
such as whether it was a survey experiment or TOU tariff trial. Unlike in clinical 
trials, which treat these moderators are treated as nuisance variables to be 
controlled for using random effects, this study is interested in the size and 
statistical significance of these moderators, which motivates inputting these 
variables as fixed effects. By including a fixed effect for each study, I also control 
for other unobserved differences across studies that may affect the outcome. 
Moreover, I do not assume that estimates of uptake are constant across studies, 
which is why the average uptake is presented as a range based on the two most 
important determinants of uptake identified in the meta-analysis, namely the 
method by which uptake was measured and whether recruitment was opt-in or 
opt-out.  
2 Choice of statistical model – OLS vs logit  
The outcomes variables in this thesis are all binary. Following Angrist and 
Pischke (2008), this thesis will report treatment effects estimated using OLS 
regression rather than logit. This is because, the conventional wisdom in the 
econometrics literature is that “while a nonlinear [probit, logit] model may fit the 
CEF [conditional expectation function] for [binary dependent variables] more 
closely than a linear model” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.103), logit and OLS 
regression generally produce very similar results, both in practice and in Monte 
Carlo simulations in which the data generating process is known (Beck, 2011).130 
Most applied economists therefore use OLS regression on binary dependent 
                                            
130 The exceptions in the simulated models are when there is extreme kurtosis or skewness in 
the dependent variable since then OLS can produce coefficients which are greater than 1, which 
is nonsensical when the dependent variable is binary.  
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variables (Beck, 2011). In addition, it is well accepted that logit should not be 
paired with fixed effects (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Katz, 2001), which are used 
in a number of analyses throughout this thesis.  
Nevertheless, it is also acknowledged that methodological conventions vary 
across disciplines. Some researchers argue that, since the only advantage of 
OLS over logit is that OLS coefficients are easier to interpret than marginal 
effects, logit may be safer than OLS regression because the data generating 
procedure is more likely to resemble a logit than a linear model (Beck, 2011). 
Therefore, robustness checks in which the equations are run using logit with 
marginal effects estimated at the mean value of the independent variables will 
also be run. Since the OLS and logit results are substantively identical, the logit 
results are reported in the appendices for brevity.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
